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    Introduction 
During recent years, lobbying has become an inevitable term in our daily life. The 
term is often used (and abused) for illustration of different situations ranging from daily 
politics, elections, campaigns, advocacy and even corruption! It does not surprise then 
that most people nowadays have a blurry idea of what lobbying actually is. The 
responsibility for such an inaccurate perception falls on the media, who also have blurred 
the perception of the process, but this has not prevented them from using it to describe a 
variety of situations which often do not have much to do with the term. Lobbying is 
simply a dynamic activity, which even further complicates all attempts at understanding 
and reporting about it. 
Is regulation of lobbying a socially relevant topic? 
The misperceptions and misunderstandings of the term lobbying unfortunately 
evolved in a direction where lobbying started being perceived by default as something 
which is negative, bad for society, democracy, the economy, equality, integrity, 
accountability and political image in general. This is why many lobbyists still hardly 
present themselves as lobbyists, especially in non-regulated environments. Being a 
consultant or an intermediary in many cases involves nothing but lobbying, but it also 
sounds less dangerous. 
Public discomfort with the term was especially high whenever a lobby scandal 
would fill pages of the press. Even though these scandals occur rarely, they strongly 
affected the perception of lobbying. The Jack Abramoff scandal (2006) in the United 
States is probably the most infamous example of the abuse of lobbying which ended in 
criminal charges. The epilogue of this scandal was the conviction of Abramoff together 
with several White House officials, one congressman and other lobbyists involved. This 
scandal was probably the most important impetus for the reform of the lobbying 
legislation which took place in 2007, and theory offers even some evidence which 
correlates lobbying regulation cycles with periods of lobbying-related scandals1. 
                                                          
1 D. Lowery and V. Gray, “How Some Rules Just Don’t Matter: The Regulation of Lobbyists,” Public Choice 
(1997), p.145. 
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The EU was not immune to similar cases. The latest example from 2013 is that of 
former Austrian MEP Ernst Stasser. After journalists who were posing as lobbyists 
reported him for soliciting money in exchange for legislative influence, he was 
subsequently convicted for corruption and received a four-year prison sentence.  
The negative public perception of lobbying was also an alarm to politicians to stay 
away from lobbying in the eyes of the public as much as possible2. However, the constant 
demand for information which they create (especially in EU) has resulted in an equally 
constant supply of information from lobbyists, who started to concentrate in all 
politically or financially important cities of the world - Washington, Brussels, and London 
being the most in focus. This market where information is exchanged for influence on 
public decision-making has alarmed many watchdogs (NGOs mostly), who kept 
informing the public of all suspicious influence by lobbyists that endangered best public 
interest.    
All this resulted in higher social interest in lobbying which is, among other reasons 
that require further elaboration, reflected in the regulation of lobbying. At one side, 
institutions were seeking to improve their own integrity and accountability, while 
politicians were trying to increase chances for being re-elected by avoiding being directly 
correlated with lobbyists. On the other hand, citizens and the NGOs wanted more 
transparency in decision-making.  
Hence, the regulation of lobbying became an important social and political topic. 
Speaking from that point of view, regulation of lobbying is supposed to shed more light 
on who is seeking to influence what, why and how. It is supposed to reveal channels of 
influence and the key players involved. It is supposed to keep decision-making in line 
with the public interest as much as possible, rather than serving the private interest.  
                                                          
2 According to a Gallup Poll regarding the public opinion of 22 different professions, lobbying is perceived 
as the least honest and ethical job, right after that  of car salesmen. Congressmen rank a few places higher, 
but still three levels lower than lawyers. Furthermore, according to Pew Research, 81% of Americans 
believe that bribery is a common practice between lobbyists and congressmen. Obviously, the public 
opinion of lobbying is not high, but does the responsibility of such a negative opinion fall solely on the backs 
of the lobbyists and the companies for which they work, or is the problem deeper than that? - “Lobbying & 
Rent Seeking,” n.d., http://www.intellectualtakeout.org/library/business-and-economics/lobbying-rent-
seeking. 
12
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At the same time, the world policymaking and research arena has shown great 
interest in the regulation of lobbying. Their interest appears in number of studies on 
lobbying in general, but also on the regulation of lobbying both locally and globally. 
Despite this, most of these studies discuss the phenomenon from a political or purely 
legal point of view. 
 
Is regulation of lobbying a relevant topic from a law and economics perspective? 
At the very beginning, it would be useful to underline that this research does not 
aim at providing a definite answer on an important question - are there economic 
reasons to regulate lobbying, and if yes, which? Providing any type of a sufficient answer 
to this would require writing a separate book. On the other hand, this question cannot be 
treated as irrelevant for this research, and at least acknowledging some of the basic 
economic reasons for regulation should be made with regards to lobbying. Referring to 
potential economic reasons for regulation of lobbying in this research should be 
considered as an additional contribution to understanding the relevance of the topic, but 
certainly not perceived as an attempt to answer the question. It should be perceived as 
another supporting pillar of the main research question: How can tools for the 
comparative assessment of lobbying regulations be improved? 
In the previous lines, the social interest of lobbying regulation was tackled in regard 
to transparency, integrity, democracy, etc. Similarly, purely legal reasons for regulation of 
lobbying would usually, as shown in the last chapter, be related to the necessity of 
allowing more profound exercising of political rights (the right of assembly, the right of 
petition, etc). Similarly, regulation of lobbying could be regarded as a contribution to the 
enforcement of a package of anti-corruption laws.  
When it comes to economic reasons for regulation, and consequently the reasons 
for regulation of lobbying, things are even more complex and equally more interesting3. 
In explaining the economic nature of lobbying regulation, two major economic 
                                                          
3 For more on economic approaches to regulation and the relevant literature see J. A. den Hertog, “Review of 
Economic Theories of Regulation,” Discussion Paper Series / Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute 10 
(2010): 1–59.  For more on regulations and different types of regulations see R. Van den Bergh and A. 
Pacces, eds., Regulation and Economics, 2nd ed. (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2012). 
13
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approaches to regulation could be useful as a starting point. While one approach suggests 
that regulations are being made in the best public interest by a regulator who has enough 
relevant information to pursue the public interest (public interest theories of regulation), 
the other one suggests that regulators always lacks sufficient information and that 
regulations arise as a sum of different public and private interests involved in the process 
(private interest theories of regulation). Having this in mind, the economic reasons for 
the regulation of lobbying could be numerous and theoretically funded in both groups of 
theories, but in essence, lobbying is being regulated either for the protection of the public 
interest or for the protection and advancement of a narrower private or public interest.  
The additional connecting of lobbying to some of the most important law and 
economic and public choice concepts will perhaps provide a slightly better insight into 
the relation of the regulation of lobbying and economic theories of regulation in general.  
Broadly speaking, lobbying may be seen as a process where information is 
exchanged for the (possibility of) influence. If one assumes that regulation protects the 
public interest without significant cost (Posner 1974)4, then regulation of lobbying could 
be interpreted as a tool for the protection of the public interest from the assumed 
negative influences of lobbying. In other words, this regulation should fight market 
failures which could arise as a consequence of an unregulated lobbying market. Although 
these market failures are not certain, discussing their possible influences is useful for 
understanding the academic complexity of the problem, and the importance of careful 
lobbying regulation in regulatory practice. 
For instance, linking lobbying with the asymmetry information problem (Akerlof 
1970)5 could provide more insight into the potential dangers of lobbying in general. 
Before getting to that point, it is interesting to note that one can actually see the lobbying 
process as a tool for information asymmetry reduction, since lobbying increases the 
information flow from the private to the public sector and vice versa. However, it should 
not be forgotten that this assumption is predicated upon many preconditions and factors. 
                                                          
4 R. Posner, “Theories of Economic Regulation,” The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 5 
(1974): 335–358.  
5 G. Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 84, no. 3 (August 1970).  
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One of the most important ones is the equal degree of access to the decision makers. If the 
degree is unequal, things become more complex. 
In cases where different players have different degrees of access to information 
(primarily in terms of supply), it is difficult to estimate whether lobbying contributes to 
increasing or decreasing information asymmetry as the information flow is disrupted. 
Hence, a lobbying regulation designed to be capable of creating equal conditions for 
all who wish to supply and receive information could be an answer to this problem. In 
other words, if a law on lobbying would successfully create conditions where all 
interested lobbying players could communicate their interest in the same way (having the 
same degree of access to decision makers), then regulation of lobbying would be a step 
forward in the reduction of information asymmetry which arises from unregulated 
lobbying activities.     
Thus, the regulation should ideally allow lobbying to contribute to the reduction of 
information asymmetry and to the improvement of allocation efficiency. Of course, all this 
is true only under the assumption that regulators have all the necessary information 
while enforcement is expected to be perfect, and this assumption is not easy to defend 
(Sappington and Stiglitz 1987)6.  
        Another puzzling question to be asked in relation to the same concept is 
whether having more players in the lobbying market is better or worse for the 
information flow, and is there perhaps any relation between the number of lobbying 
players and the adverse selection problem?  
        Lobbyists have far better knowledge on the quality of the information they 
supply in the lobbying market than the regulators who demand it, and who moreover face 
costs whenever attempting to determine the quality of supplied information (Coase)7. As 
regulators are not able to distinguish high-quality information from the lemons, they 
might not be interested in paying an adequate price (grant the adequate access, Bouwen 
2002)8 for high-quality information, which might cause suppliers of high-quality 
                                                          
6 D.E.M. Sappington and J.E. Stiglitz, “Privatization, Information and Incentives,” Journal of Policy Analysis 
and Management 582 (1987): 567–582. 
7 R. H. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” The Journal of Law and Economics 3 (1960). 
8 P. Bouwen, “Corporate Lobbying in the European Union: The Logic of Access,” Journal of European Public 
Policy 9, no. 3 (January 2002): 365–390. 
15
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information to leave the market. This could result in a lower average quality of 
information at the side of the supply.  
Will this lead the ones with the best information outside of the lobbying market, as 
there is no regulator willing to sufficiently reward the high-quality supplier? How real is 
this fear and is the regulation of lobbying a tool to deal with it?  
Perhaps an unregulated lobbying market is also capable of dealing with these 
challenges. A way of thinking of this is to make a parallel between the process of lobbying 
and the process of signalling9. Those who lobby intensively might be aware of the high 
quality of their information, and by being able to send a strong message, they indicate the 
quality of their information and their competitive market strength (Nelson 1974)10. Since 
sending an informative signal comes at a certain cost, those who are signalling stronger 
might be creating the conditions where they could be recognized as providers of high 
quality information11 and where they become sufficiently rewarded by an appropriate 
degree of access.          
 A similar standpoint has been developed within political sciences under the 
concept of elite pluralism (Broschied and Coen 2007)12 where high-quality information 
supply (in the competitive market) is being rewarded with more access to decision-
making.  
 These ideas deserve much more elaboration in any case, but even discussing the 
potential problems contributes to higher understanding of the complexity and the nature 
of lobbying and its regulation.  
Following the same path, yet another interesting correlation could be established. 
The connection of lobbying and rent-seeking is interesting, as the latter explains the 
dissipation of resources which are spent on lobbying instead of on the improvements of 
                                                          
9 S. Lohmann, “A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action,” American Political 
Science Review 87 (1993). 
10 P. Nelson, “Advertising as Information,” Journal of Political Economy (1974): 729–754. 
11 R.L. Calvert, “The Value of Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model of Political Advice,” The Journal of 
Politics, 1985. 
12 A. Broscheid and D. Coen, “Lobbying Activity and Fora Creation in the EU.,” Journal of European Public 
Policy 14, no. 3 (2007). 
16
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production (Tullock 1967; Buchanan et al. 1983)13. In other words, the problem is that 
market players could be incentivised to excessively spend their resources on "purchasing" 
favourable laws, instead of improving their products, developing cost-cutting 
technologies, investing in R&D, etc. This problem does not only reflect the losses in 
efficiency (Heckleman and Wilson 2013)14, but it also indicates the problem at the side of 
the regulator15, which might get captured by different interest groups and make laws 
which advance special, rather than the general public interest (Stigler 1971; Peltzman 
1976; Tirole 1986)16. In the case of an unregulated lobbying market, an additional threat 
in this sense would be a wide open revolving door opportunity, which could additionally 
and dangerously shift the decision-making process towards the private, instead of the 
public interest17.   
The supply and demand for regulation seen this way raises some concerns as it 
suggests that groups with strong interests or large membership might represent a danger 
for regulators who have to resist their pressures and make decisions on behalf of the 
                                                          
13 G. Tullock, “The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft,” Western Economic Journal (1967): The 
Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft; J. Buchanan, G. Tullock, and R. Tollison, “Toward a Theory of 
the Rent-Seeking Society,” Public Choice 41, no. 2 (1983): 339–345. 
14 J.C. Heckelman and B. Wilson, “Institutions, Lobbying, and Economic Performance,” Economics & Politics 
25 (2013): 360–386. 
15 Here, it would be useful to make one distinction, as lobbying regulation literature usually does not 
differentiate between regulators and legislators. Both terms are in use and they stand for a body which is in 
charge of regulating lobbying. However, the capture theory on informational lobbying makes this 
distinction. While regulator is meant to be a single-body in charge of regulation (an agency for instance), the 
legislator is a multi-member party in charge of regulation (an assembly for instance). For more see 
M.Bennedsen and S. E. Feldmann, “Lobbying Legislatures,” Journal of Political Economy 110, no. 4 (August 
2002): 919–946. For the sake of clarity, this research will equally treat both terms in the sense that they 
refer to a body which is responsible for the regulation of lobbying. As the research is comparatively 
oriented and in different countries different bodies would be responsible for lobbying regulation, both 
terms are equally valid and this research and its results are assumed to be insensitive to the distinction.   
16 GJ Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2 
(1971): 3–21.; S. Peltzman, “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,” Journal of Law and Economics 
(1976): 211–248.; J. Tirole, “Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion on Organizations,” 
Journal of Law and Economics 2, no. 2 (1986): 181–214. For better understanding of the complexity of the 
problem and capture theory in general see also: C. Woll, “Who Captures Whom? Trade Policy Lobbying in 
the European Union,” in Lobbying in the European Union: Institutions, Actors …, ed. D. Coen and J. Richardson 
(Oxford University Press, 2009), 268–288; D. Helm, “Regulatory Reform, Capture, and the Regulatory 
Burden,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy  22  (2006): 169–185; E. Dal Bó, “Regulatory Capture: A Review,” 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22 (2006): 203–225. 
17 For more on revolving door from the capture perspective see papers (also reviewed by E. Dal Bó, 2006): Y 
Che, “Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance For Agency Collusion,” Rand Journal of Economics (1995): 
378–397; D. Salant, “Behind the Revolving Door: A New View of Public Utility Regulation,” Rand Journal of 
Economics (1995): 362–377.  
17
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public interest18. Should businesses, represented by well-funded interest groups, have 
such a dominant and influential role in the legislative process (Hanson and Yosifon 
2003)19? Although some empirical findings suggest that capturing regulators is not 
necessarily certain in all cases (Young 2012; Falaschetti)20, the fact that lobbyist continue 
to invest more and more funding in lobbying each year suggests that this brings them 
profits21.    
Once when a "wanna-be monopolist" believes he has finally acquired the desired 
monopole position, the race starts over as now he has spent additional resources in 
defending this position against other players, who also spend resources in competing for 
the monopole position. Hence, rent-seeking is not only referring to activities directed at 
obtaining, but also at maintaining favourable wealth transfers, which might be a 
significant burden to economic growth and efficiency. This might be a strong statement, 
and theory allows some flexibility when it comes to rent-seeking and lobbying. In fact, it is 
quite difficult to assess which lobbying impacts were wasteful and which were not (E.C. 
Pasour, Jr 1987)22.     
Yet, it is hard to predict what consequences the regulation of lobbying might have on 
rent-seeking behaviour. As lobbying regulation is generally connected with improvement 
of transparency, another question is whether more transparent lobbying will reveal rent-
seeking tendencies? How would that influence the competition among lobbyists, and is 
that competition beneficial at all from the public point of view (Becker 1983)23? Would, 
                                                          
18 "The demand for regulation would be connected primarily to two features of the group of beneficiaries. 
First, whether the beneficiary group is large and, second, whether the group has large stakes in regulation. 
Excessive group size could hamper successful organization of the beneficiary group... Large stakes could 
mobilize group members and give them an incentive do demand regulation. On the supply side, one would 
have to pay attention to the machinery that produces regulation: the public sector, which responds to 
political pressures." - E. Dal Bó, “Regulatory Capture: A Review.”, p.205. 
19 J. Hanson and D. Yosifon, “The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, 
Power Economics, and Deep Capture,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 152 (2003): 129. 
20 K. Young, “Transnational Regulatory Capture? An Empirical Examination of the Transnational Lobbying of 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision”, Review of International Political Economy 19 (2012): 663-
688; D. Falaschetti, “Can Lobbying Prevent Anticompetitive Outcomes? Evidence on Consumer Monopsony 
in Telecommunications.”, Journal of Competition Law and Economics, (2008). 
21 Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust - Promoting Integrity through Self-Regulation (Volume 2), 2012. p 
29. 
22 E.C. Pasour, “Rent Seeking: Some Conceptual Problems and Implications,” The Review of Austrian 
Economics. (1987): 123–145. 
23 G.S. Becker, “A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,” The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 98 (1983). 
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perhaps, the price of the unrestricted lobbying competition be below or above the price of 
transaction costs required by the state to establish a fair competing environment 
(Goldberg 1979)24, and would such a goal be feasible at all (Stigler and Friedland 1962; 
Posner 1971)25? Would more transparency in lobbying, as some new studies suggest, 
attract more players which would compete more harshly and dissipate more (Denter, 
Morgan and Sisak 2011)26, or perhaps restrictiveness of lobbying regulations do not have 
an impact on that (Lowery & Gray 1997)27? 
Answering these questions would certainly be a great contribution to better 
understanding if lobbying should be regulated, and what that regulation should look like, 
but also an important contribution to the normative law and economic analysis of 
lobbying regulations. If lobbying regulation is supposed to be an effective tool for 
reduction of distortive effects on the market (Svendsen 2011)28, there are at least several 
economic (prevention of anticompetitive outcomes, reduction of asymmetry of 
information, prevention of regulatory capture, adverse selection treatment, reduction of 
efficiency losses29) and social reasons (improvement of accountability and integrity of 
institutions through the improvement of transparency in lobbying) to believe that 
lobbying should be regulated to some extent.  
However, it should be acknowledged that lobbying regulations are anyhow getting 
adopted, improved and removed in real life circumstances. The official motivation behind 
this tendency is usually satisfaction of political and social goals, while economic reasons 
are left completely out of the debate.  
This research, by studying the cost-benefit nature of existing lobbying regulations, 
tends to expand the scope of the discussion and emphasize that satisfying goals of 
                                                          
24 V. P. Goldberg, “Regulation and Administered Contracts,” Bell Journal of Economics 7 (1976): 426–448. 
25 G. Stigler and C. Friedland, “What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity,” Journal of Law and 
Economics 5 (1962): 1–16; RA Posner, “Taxation by Regulation,” The Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management  (1971): 1097–1133. 
26 P. Denter, J. Morgan, and D. Sisak, “"Where Ignorance Is Bliss, ‘Tis Folly to Be Wise": Transparency in 
Contests,’” 2011.  
27 D. Lowery and V. Gray, “How Some Rules Just Don’t Matter: The Regulation of Lobbyists.” 
28 G. T. Svendsen, “Evaluating and Regulating the Impacts of Lobbying in the EU? The Case Study of Green 
Industries,” Environmental Policy & Governance 21 (2011): 131–142. 
29 "Various laws and rules directed to limiting the influence of pressure groups can be explained as 
instruments to limit wasteful expenditure on political pressure (Becker)" - J.A. den Hertog, “Review of 
Economic Theories of Regulation.”, Discussion Paper Series / Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute 10 
(2010): p.27. 
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accountability and transparency comes at a certain cost for the society. It stresses that 
regulation of lobbying should take into greater consideration the economic effects of 
different regulatory approaches, and stimulates more research in this direction, 
especially in a comparative perspective. 
Being inclined rather to the positive than to a normative approach, the research 
focuses on the actual regulations, their structure, and likely effects of specific structural 
approaches in adopting regulations. It offers an additional tool for improvement of 
comparative analysis of these structures by highlighting examples of successful and less 
successful practices, so that policymakers and researchers have more tools for potential 
optimization of both existing and newly introduced lobbying regulations. 
Thus, the central question of this research, having in mind the gaps in the literature 
and practice, is: How can tools for the comparative assessment of lobbying regulations be 
improved?  
 
At the moment, researchers and policymakers have only tools that are good proxies 
for the measurement of the benefits of lobbying regulation, with the CPI Index30 as the 
most advanced tool. In contrast to that, both literature and practice have limited tools to 
study the compliance and enforcement costs of lobbying regulations.  
The Cost Indicator Index (CII), introduced by this research and partially built on the 
CPI Index framework, represents an important innovative addition to the assessment of 
the costs of lobbying regulation. By combining the results from these two indices, the 
research offers a completely new platform for the assessment of cost-benefit features of 
lobbying regulations, and it demonstrates its applicability, especially in comparative 
research. Hence, the introduction of the new tool to the research arena is perhaps the 
most important contribution of this work.   
However, it has to be underlined at the very beginning that the methodology can be 
further improved in the future, and some recommendations in this sense will be given as 
well. The results obtained by the application of the CII should be taken with some reserve 
due to their indicative nature, which is a consequence of material and time constraints, 
                                                          
30 For details on CPI Index see Chapter II, Section III. 
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and difficulties in reaching a higher number of respondents in questionnaires that were 
used.                                     
Another limitation, which will be discussed in Chapter III, is the challenge of 
establishing the CII thresholds, where certain decisions were taken in order to provide an 
as good classification of the CII results as possible. This has influenced the results to 
some extent, but not significantly. More fine-tuning in this segment would be useful in the 
future, but what remains important is that it is demonstrated that the CII methodology 
works in different scenarios, even in its current state of development. Perhaps, one 
should look at it as on a well designed and already functional prototype, which would 
certainly benefit from some fine-tuning in the future.  
The last important issue to be tackled is the definition of lobbying. In other words, 
how much is this research sensitive to different conceptual views on lobbying? As the 
analysis is positive, the research focuses on different lobbying definitions that appear in 
different laws, but the new methodology is robust enough to deal with all definitions of 
lobbying that exist in different lobbying regulations.  
The scope of the definition definitely plays an important role31. In case of the CII 
methodology, the type of definition may  also slightly influence the cost-benefit ratio of 
the entire law. The CII framework also additionally allows a comparative cost-benefit 
assessment of different definitions, based on their scope and structures. For instance, the 
CII looks at whether lobbying in the executive branch is also included in the definition, as 
some laws recognize lobbying only within legislatures. This automatically narrows down 
the target group of the law and lowers overall compliance and enforcement costs. Hence, 
a proper definition is important.   
 What is considered as lobbying in this research is determined by an analysis of 
particular laws, and that definition is afterwards evaluated through the cost-benefit 
framework. General literature on lobbying offers many different definitions, and it is 
sometimes useful to refer to them in order to better understand what the research is 
                                                          
31 L.H. Mayer, “What Is This ‘Lobbying’ That We Are So Worried About?,” Yale Law & Policy Review 26 
(2008): 485. The author also emphasizes that having a single definition of lobbying would be beneficial for 
regulators, but at the same time since lobbying is a dynamic discipline and it has different appearances in 
different circumstances, using different definitions is reasonable and sometimes more effective. 
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about and to understand that there are many conceptual differences between similar 
processes that are misperceived as lobbying activities32.  
The research starts with an overview of academic literature on lobbying regulation, 
identifies the research gap and introduces the research question (Chapter I). This review 
enables the reader to get inside of the lobbying regulation research arena, and it points 
out that economic analysis of the regulation of lobbying is relatively scarce.  
The analysis continues towards an exploration of the main trends in lobbying 
regulation policymaking (Chapter II), which focuses mostly on Europe and the US. The 
purpose of this part was to provide an overview of lobbying regulation activity in 
general, and to explain the main differences in the US and the EU, which are the most 
important lobbying markets. At the same place, it is demonstrated and highlighted that 
estimation and studying of the effects of lobbying regulations is lacking, and that there 
are very few tools for comparative assessments of lobbying regulations. 
After analysing the literature and regulatory tendencies around the world, the next 
part (Chapter III) offers a theoretical framework for the design and the application of 
newborn tools. Here currently available tools are discussed and explained. A detailed 
explanation of the CPI index which is used as the foundation for the CII is equally 
provided. Also, the entire evolution of the creation of the CII is explained, with special 
                                                          
32 There are different views on what should be considered to be lobbying and what not. Rival (2008) uses 
the definition of Farnel (2008) which states that lobbying are all those political actions of firms that are 
meant to influence public decisions including, inter alia, laws, regulations or other things. The definition of the 
Chartered Institute of Public Relations (CIPR) has even wider approach which explains what is lobbying by 
describing the activity of lobbying. For CIPR, lobbying represents The specific efforts to influence public 
decision making either by pressing for change in policy or seeking to prevent such change. It consists of 
representations to any public officeholder on any aspect of policy, or any measure implementing that policy, or 
any matter being considered, or which is likely to be considered by a public body. For this research, these and 
other similar definitions are too narrow as it is difficult to expect that all definitions from actual laws will be 
able to fall under one of them. Generally, what this research sees as lobbying are all type of formal and 
informal legal activities motivated by economic, social, political and other reasons, which are aimed at 
influencing lawmaking and law execution. Last but not the least important, it is useful to mention that 
theory (more than practice) also makes differences between lobbying groups, pressure groups, interest 
groups, activities of advocacy, etc. For more on these differences see S. Serenari, “Lobbying in European 
Union: Access to the Decisional Process” (Peter Pasmany University, Budapest, Hungary, 2005). Serenari 
also emphasizes that there are differences in the nature of the promoted interest. Not every interest has to 
be necessarily corporate driven (NGOs for instance usually use advocacy to promote certain values, and in 
some laws they might stay outside of the regulatory monitoring), and hence, the levels and types of 
influences can vary as well. In this paper, Serenari defines lobbying as coherent and effective activity directed 
by a party (the promoter of a partisan interest) to address the choice of a public institution, which means to 
produce a legal effect, as public bodies always act and react through legal activities. 
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reference to the world of RIA, Central Banks Independence and Regulatory Independence 
literature in regards of indices constructing methodology. At the same place the 
theoretical framework for qualitative analysis of lobbying regulations (The Ninefold 
theory) is also introduced, as well as an additional tool for the isolated assessment of 
individual law's articles (Cost-Benefit Labels).  
The last part of the research (Chapter IV) demonstrates the application of the CII 
and its theoretical framework in a case study of the Western Balkans, with a special focus 
on Serbia. The explanation for such a choice comes from the fact that exactly these 
transition countries have become European leaders in lobbying regulation, although they 
have not had much success in introducing lobbying laws. Another reason for choosing 
this area is that it has not been sufficiently studied so far, mostly due to the language 
barriers, so for many lobbying regulation researchers this chapter can be a useful source 
for expanding their knowledge on lobbying regulation in this area.    
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Chapter I - A Law and Economics view on EU-lobbying regulation literature 
1.1. Introduction  
          This Chapter reviews the most important academic and policy papers on lobbying 
regulation in the EU, both from a comparative and a sui generis perspective, focusing 
mostly on the period from 2000 onwards. It also indicates the most relevant studies 
related to understanding of the EU lobbying context, but it primarily focuses on specific 
lobbying-regulatory issues. Mentioning the most important studies on the EU level and 
the member states’ level, it reveals areas where further research might be necessary for 
improved policymaking in terms of lobbying regulation. Most importantly, this part helps 
the reader to understand the background and relevance of the central research question - 
How can tools for the comparative assessment of lobbying regulations be improved? Some 
views on economic reasons for the regulation of lobbying were tackled in the 
introduction, and it will not be discussed in depth in this part again.  
          The chapter suggests that the debate, in general, suffers from a lack of regulatory 
impact assessment arguments related to the structure of regulatory models that are 
widely suggested. More precisely, a concept of costs related to lobbying regulations is not 
sufficiently developed and the debate mostly remains focused on costs of entry, while it 
ignores the social costs related to higher competition among lobbyists that may arise 
with greater transparency involved.    
          When it comes to a trans-Atlantic comparative approach, this chapter suggests that 
a more precise comparative analysis would be useful to estimate the real effects of the 
New Transparency Register of the EU. On the top of this, development of other additional 
comparative tools could be beneficial for cross-country legal transplantations of the best 
practices. 
 
1.2. Theoretical and policy treatment of lobbying regulation in the last 
decade.  
  Lawyers and political scientists are by default mostly interested in the impact of 
lobbying on democracy, accountability and transparency. Consequently, economists look 
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on its economic impacts over society, or they look to it as to a strategic economic tool for 
the advancement of the economic interest of a company..  
  Hence, the chapter will review the major policy issues and theoretical works that 
were debated over the last decade exclusively in terms of the regulation of lobbying, 
mostly leaving other issues and debates related to lobbying in general outside the scope 
of the research.  
  Additional narrowing of the scope will be the application of a specific timeframe 
for the research. This Chapter will mostly deal with studies and researches from 2000 
onwards, since most lobbying regulations come from this period. The work will start 
firstly with a brief overview of the most important and recent scientific works on 
lobbying in general, as those findings seem to be necessary for understanding the 
framework for the main area of this research – lobbying regulations. 
   
1.2.1. Lobbying research challenges – a theoretical approach to lobbying in the last 
decade. Review of the key-issues that explain the context of EU lobbying 
regulation. 
  As the importance of lobbying started to increase over the last two decades in 
Europe and the rest of the world, except the US where it has been debated for more than 
five decades continuously, the academic community became more involved in providing 
theoretical and empirical studies dealing with different aspects of lobbying.  
  Without any doubt, among the most explored issues was the institutional 
demand33 on information in the EU (Bouwen 2002, 2004, 2010; Lehman 2011; Hayes-
Renshaw 2011; McCown 2011; Saurugger 2011, Weslake 2011;Greenwood 2003; Eising 
2004; Michalowitz 2004; Broscheid & Coen 2006; Mahoney 2004).    
  This group of authors has introduced several fundamental theoretical ideas to 
the EU lobbying debate, mostly founded on information interdependency between the EU 
and the private sector. They provided theoretical and empirical data on those public-
                                                          
33 Probably the only study that directly focuses on this demand in an economic sense is the economic 
analysis of post-Lisbon EU lobbying (H. Hauser, ‘European Union Lobbying Post-Lisbon: An Economic 
Analysis’, Berkeley J. Int’l L., 76 (2011), 680–709). He actually argues that after the Lisbon treaty it may be 
anticipated that the demand and supply of information will shift from their previous positions, mostly 
debated by Bouwen (P. Bouwen, ‘Corporate Lobbying in the European Union: The Logic of Access’, Journal 
of European Public Policy, 9 (2002), 365–390). 
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private and inter-institutional dependencies, explaining how each of the EU institutions 
has a different demand on different types of information34. Starting from the very early 
works of Van Schendelen (1993)35, one of the most cited authors in this domain, Bouwen 
has introduced a theoretical framework for corporate lobbying in the EU36, by linking 
each of the EU institutions with the respective type of information they demand from the 
private sector. Bouwen further argues that the European Commission creates most of the 
demand on “expert-knowledge” as it has very limited institutional capacity to obtain 
relevant knowledge on its own.  
Economically speaking – the Commission faces huge costs for obtaining relevant 
information necessary for efficient policymaking.  Similarly, the EU Parliament creates 
demand on information of “European Encompassing Interest” while the Council relies on 
the “Domestic Encompassing Interest” type of information. This theory was the first 
complete theory which described the interdependencies between the EU institutions and 
the stakeholders37. 
  In 2011 this approach was further extended by several important studies with 
specific analysis of the institutional demand for the Commission (Bouwen 2011); the EU 
Parliament (Lehmann 2011); The EU Council (Hayes-Renshaw 2011); the European Court 
of Justice (McCown 2011); the COREPER (Saurugger 2011) and the European Economic 
and Social Committee (Westlake 2011)38. Additional studies, on the other hand (Broscheid 
and Coen 2006)39, were investigating the incentives for having a “policy fora” in some 
policy areas, while in the other ones it does not exist. In addition, they explored why the 
number of actors significantly differs over the policy sectors.   
                                                          
34 The European Commission is dependent on the Expert Knowledge (P. Bouwen 2002, 2003; F. Pappi and C. 
Henning 1999), the European Parliament on information containing the “European Encompassing Interest” 
and the EU Council on information containing the “Domestic Encompassing Interest”.  
35 M. Van Schendelen, ed., National Public and Private EC Lobbying (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993). 
36 P. Bouwen, supra n.33  
37 Stakeholders is a term widely used in the literature on lobbying in the EU, and in this sense refers to 
different pressure groups, interest groups, lobbyists and all the parties participating in the public affairs 
arena in Brussels. All of them interact in some way with the institutions of the EU and the EU needs them to 
improve its lacking legitimacy. 
38 These papers were published all together in D. Coen and J. Richardson, ed., Lobbying the European Union: 
Institutions, Actors and Issues (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
39A.Broscheid and D.Coen, ‘Lobbying Systems in the European Union: A quantitative Study’, MPIFG Working 
papers 06/3. 
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  Relevant scientific attention was also given to the reasons for “the strategic 
choices made by lobby groups when venue-shopping” (Eising 2004)40. Here, the author 
correlates specific legal changes (the Lisbon Treaty) with the shift of choices41 of 
lobbyists towards the EU Parliament, which became a more attractive venue for 
lobbyists.  
  There were also works which studied the institution-stakeholder relationship in 
an empirical manner (Mahoney 2004)42.  By analysing nearly 700 civil society groups 
active in Brussels, the author explains how the EU institutions influence the activity of 
interest groups by distribution of subsidies, creation of formal arenas for debate and 
other means of influence. 
  The group of above-mentioned theories represents the essential foundation for 
further understanding of the anatomy of EU-lobbying, especially in respect to its 
regulation and improvements of transparency. These theories helped in the 
demystification of core relations between the EU institutions and the private sector that 
seeks to influence them. In that sense, the level of dependency of the institutions (which 
is widely considered to be high) may explain why there are still no solid rules on 
lobbying activities in the EU.  
  The second group of studies is more focused on techniques of influence and the 
main actors in the EU lobbying arena (Gueguen 2007; Coen & Richardson 2009; Coen 2003, 
2004; Burson-Marsteller’s reports from 2005 and 2009; Long & Lorinczi 2011; Thomas and 
Hrebenar 2000; Serenari 2005; Bouwen & McCown 2004; McGrath 2002; Pedler 2002).  
  Along with the exchange and demand theories, a significant number of scholars 
were working on determining the most used lobbying strategies and tools in Europe, how 
private interest is organized, what positive and negative practices are involved in 
lobbying, and ultimately the similarities with the US in this segment.  
                                                          
40R. Eising, “Multilevel Governance and Business Interests in the European Union,” Governance 17, no. 2 
(2004): 211–245. 
41For a more economic point of view on the same issue see: Henry Hauser, ‘European Union Lobbying Post-
Lisbon: An Economic Analysis’, Berkeley J. Int’l L., 76 (2011), 680–709.  
42C. Mahoney, “The Power of Institutions: State and Interest-Group Activity in the European Union,” 
European Union Politics 5, no. 4 (2004). 
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  When it comes to more practical works, a comprehensive EU-lobbying guide-
book (Gueguen 2007)43 was published in 2007 which is probably considered as the best 
practical and most accessible piece of work, but at the same time the least academic one. 
The author’s respectable practical experience and a wide professional network in 
Brussels helped him to bring a new light on the anatomy of most important lobbying 
groups, trade associations, companies, NGOs and syndicates.  
  The author also examines the most common tools and strategies used, and 
supplements them with a number of real-life cases and interviews with the most 
prominent lobbyists and decision-makers. Within this less academic literature, three very 
informative reports prepared by Burson-Marsteller44 (2005; 2007; 2009), with a variety 
of useful statistical data on EU lobbying, could be added. They examine the perception of 
lobbying in the EU, investigate what are the most effective roots of influence, measure 
lobbying effectiveness, compare effectiveness of corporate v. NGO lobbying, etc.  
  Surely, there are studies that more generally and academically explain the 
complex network of actors and tools in use in the EU. “This paper surveys the history of 
European Lobbying and recent empirical studies on current practice. It presents some key 
results on the structure, methods and strategies of professional interest representation in 
Brussels” (Coen 2007)45. 
  The author tracks the historical development of lobbying, explains how the 
channels of influence evolved during the last decade and how firms and institutions 
adapted to those changes. A similar approach, but rather with a strong focus on the 
definition of the key-terms in the EU arena is offered by Serenari (2005)46. 
  A more specific paper on the role and success of environmental NGOs was given 
by Long and Lorinczi (2009)47 who analyse a strategic approach to EU lobbying, as well 
                                                          
43D. Guéguen, European Lobbying (Europolitics, 2007). 
44Burson-Marsteller is one of the leading corporate-PR and marketing firms in Europe.  
45D. Coen, Lobbying in the European Union (Brussels, 2007), 
http://www.eurosfaire.prd.fr/7pc/doc/1211469722_lobbying_eu.pdf. 
46S.Serenari, "Lobbying in European Union: Access to the Decisional Process”, Peter Pasmany University, 
Budapest, Hungary, 2005”. 
47T. Long, L. Lörinczi, “NGOs as Gatekeepers : A Green Vision,” in Lobbying the European Union: Institutions, 
Actors, and Issues, ed. D. Coen and J. Richardson (New York, NY : Nova Science Publishers, 2009), 169–185. 
28
22 
 
as the relation of EU lobbying with concepts of pluralism, elite pluralism (Broschied & 
Coen 2007)48 and the “clientelism”.  
  Being aware of the importance of comparative learning when it comes to 
strategies and tools of influence, some studies were searching for the answers in a 
transatlantic perspective (Thomas and Hrebener 200049; McGrath 200250).   
  When it comes to this perspective, Woll (2006, 2009)51 aptly highlights that 
“despite the wealth of the lobbying literature in both the US and the EU, few studies have 
compared the two directly”52. Similarly, Thomas and Hrebenar (2000) worked on a 
comparison of the EU and the US system by giving explanations on the differences 
between lobbying groups and their strategies, and the importance of different political 
frameworks for those particularities.  
  In another relevant study, McGrath (2002) compared lobbying practices in 
Washington, London and Brussels. The decision to compare those three cities comes 
from the fact that these places are the most relevant lobbying markets in the world. The 
research distinguishes different lobbying systems and standards, depending on their 
respective institutional settings and cultural factors in all three cities.  
  The final group of authors (Pedler et al. 200253; Coen and Richardson et al. 
200954) enriched existing literature revealing important case studies and analysis from 
the EU lobbying arena. In the book edited by Coen and Richardson there are several 
interesting “sectoral studies” of different authors such as the cases of health lobbies 
(Greer)55; tobacco lobbies (Boessen and Maarse)56; and Agro-Industry (Grant and 
                                                          
48 A. Broscheid and D. Coen, “Lobbying Activity and Fora Creation in the EU.” 
49C.S. Thomas and R.J. Hrebenar, “Comparing Lobbying across Liberal Democracies: Problems, Approaches 
and Initial Findings,” Journal of Comparative Politics 2, no. 1 (2009). 
50C. McGrath, ‘Comparative Lobbying Practices: Washington, London, Brussels’, Annual 
Conference of the Political Studies Association. 2002 
 <http://www.ppr.ro/pics/documente/comparative-lobbying-practices.pdf> [accessed 2 July 2013]. 
51C. Woll, ‘Lobbying in the European Union: From Sui Generis to a Comparative Perspective’, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 13 (2006), 456–470; C. Woll, ‘Who Captures Whom? Trade Policy Lobbying in the 
European Union’, in Lobbying in the European Union: Institutions, Actors and Issues, ed. by D. Coen and J. 
Richardson (Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 268–288. 
52The same holds when it comes to a direct qualitative, comparative analysis of regulations in trans-atlantic 
perspective.  
53R. Pedler, ed., European Union Lobbying Changes in the Arena (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
54D. Coen and J. Richardson, supra n.39 
55D. Coen and J. Richardson, supra n.39, pp. 189-211. 
56D. Coen and J. Richardson, supra n.39, pp. 212-232. 
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Stocker)57. Similarly, the book published a decade ago by Pedler (2002) offers fifteen 
lobbying cases – from lobbying on the e-commerce trade (Pointer)58, global warming and 
climate issues (Boyd59; Long, Salter and Singer60), Japanese lobbying in the EU (Kewley)61 
etc. These cases are important for research of lobbying regulations, since they serve as an 
indicator of the actual lobbying market. They map the route of influence and pattern of 
interaction between the public and the private sector, and understanding those is 
essential for the shaping of the regulatory frame for lobbying.  
  As the EU lobbying regulation scene remains as the main focus of this research, it 
should be pointed out that previous paragraphs are dedicated to the most relevant and 
recent authors and literature on EU lobbying in general. All of those theories and 
empirical findings could be widened further, but the goal was only to emphasize the 
relevant authors and theories for the framework of this research, while marking relevant 
literature for all future researchers of lobbying regulation and the EU-lobbying 
environment.  
  However, the papers mentioned here are in fact very crucial for understanding 
the current theoretical and practical debate on lobbying regulation. In fact, it may be very 
hard to understand and contribute to the regulatory debate without referring to the 
mentioned studies and findings.  
 
1.3. Theories and policy positions regarding the regulation of lobbying – a 
comparison and the EU perspective. 
 
1.3.1. The background of the debate 
  The second part of this Chapter is dedicated exclusively to an overview of 
lobbying regulation literature. The question of whether lobbying should be a subject of 
regulatory intervention is not a new one. In most of the countries in the world, practically 
                                                          
57 D. Coen and J. Richardson, supra n.39, pp. 233-255. 
58 R. Pedler, supra 53, pp. 35-56. 
59 R. Pedler, supra 53, pp. 57-86. 
60 R. Pedler, supra 53, pp. 87-103. 
61 R. Pedler, supra 53, pp. 177-201. 
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the whole Africa and Asia62, this activity is completely unregulated and institutional 
interaction with interest representatives still mostly lacks transparency. In that part of 
the world, lobbying is mixed up with corruption, and that is why lobbying generally 
leaves a “bad taste in the mouth” of the general public, but nevertheless influences 
decision-makers.  
  In national economies which grow rapidly, such as India and China, the situation 
is also very similar. India, for instance, has a very high level of corruption63, which means 
that not only citizens but businesses also use corruption64 as an influence mechanism.  
  Regulating lobbying directly in those countries would not have a significant 
impact, as the rule of law is generally weak65 and corruption is still widely used as a non-
risky and quite cheap influence mechanism. In an environment where corruption is 
highly utilized due to a weak rule of law and other institutional problems, regulating 
lobbying would not make much sense since it is avoided anyway. Hence, lobbying 
                                                          
62 Except  Taiwan, which was the first and only country in Asia  to introduce lobbying regulation laws in 
2007. 
63  According to the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (2011), India had a 3.1 index 
of corruption (on the scale where 0 represents a maximum level of corruption and 10 represents a “no 
corruption” scenario).  
64 It is interesting to mention that some authors (P. Denter, J. Morgan and D. Sisak, ‘"Where Ignorance Is 
Bliss, “Tis Folly to Be Wise": Transparency in Contests”’, Working Paper 2011 
<http://ideas.repec.org/p/usg/econwp/201128.html>) claim that bribery is actually more desirable from 
an economic standpoint than lobbying. The reason for this is that bribery, according to them, represents a 
purely redistributive tool, while lobbying creates dissipation of resources and unrecoverable death-weight 
losses for the society. Of course, this is a very narrow perspective, as corruption has a large number of 
negative welfare effects on any society. Some studies have actually given the proof (B. Harstad and J. 
Svensson, ‘Bribes, Lobbying, and Development’, American Political Science Review, 105 (2011), 46–63; B. 
Harstad and J. Svensson, “Bribe to Bend or Lobby for Change,” Unpublished Manuscript no. February (2010), 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&bt 
nG=Search&q=intitle:Bribe+to+Bend+or+Lobby+for+Change+?#0) that lobbying is nothing but a substitute 
to corruption, even though the empirical backup was clearly missing. The claim comes from the pure fact 
that under conditions where the economy is sufficiently developed, it is more rational for the firms to invest 
in lobbying as it is legal in the first place. Also, results achieved by lobbying are less likely to disappear, like 
in instances when corruption gets detected and the officials are replaced. In addition – the company’s 
reputation goes down significantly. In short, the authors conclude that as an economy grows, more and 
more firms will invest in lobbying than in corruption. This assumption has been confirmed to some extent 
in Chapter IV of the research regarding the case of Serbia. However, an interesting empirical study (N.F. 
Campos and F. Giovannoni, “Lobbying , Corruption and Political Influence in Transition Countries,” 
Transition (2006)) showed that even in poorer, less developed countries, lobbying may be a better influence 
tool than corruption.   
65 The rule of law index; http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/.   
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regulation is a special type of regulation and it should be an upgrade to existing, 
preferably well-implemented, sunshine laws.66 
  In contrast, there are attempts in other parts of the world to legally or morally 
deal with lobbying, mostly through laws and codes of conduct, either separately or 
cumulatively. In Europe, most of the member states67 do not have specific laws to deal 
with this issue, and they are generally dealing with it through some general provisions in 
other laws. Those are laws which deal with transparency, corruption prevention or 
conflict of interest, codes that regulate the conduct of public employees, or there are even 
specific lobbying-rules within some of those laws68.  
  In the US, on the other hand, regulation of lobbying has taken several phases69 
and it is still a quite debated issue. Due to a very broad regulatory experience in lobbying, 
most of the available studies are in fact based on the US lobbying setting, which is very 
different than the European one, especially in respect to lobbying incentives and 
mechanisms.  
  The obvious difference is that the legal traditions are different, but this should 
not be an obstacle when it comes to a qualitative analysis where some elements may be 
observed regardless of the differences. Accountability, transparency and costs, for 
instance, are categories independent from those differences and those could be 
                                                          
66 “Sunshine law” is a term used widely in the literature that refers to a law that brings more transparency 
and reduces corruption in general. Those could be laws that impose more integrity on the work of public 
employees, corruption-fighting laws and lobbying laws.  
67 In Europe there are indeed very few member states which have regulated lobbying activities. The 
European Commission and the European Parliament have recently launched the first joint registry (which 
can be interpreted still as a tool of self-regulation) in 2011. The countries that have specific laws on 
lobbying are Lithuania (2000), Poland (2005), Hungary (2006), Montenegro (2011), Macedonia/FYROM 
(2008/2011), Slovenia (2011). Ukraine, Serbia, the UK, Denmark and Croatia have prepared (or are 
working on it as we speak) respective drafts of lobbying laws and are waiting for their adoption in 
legislative procedures. Germany and France have regulated lobbying by setting up a system of registrations 
in parliaments. Besides them, only the US, Australia, Canada, Taiwan and Israel have regulated lobbying 
activity.  
68 For instance Slovenia deals with lobbying in a Law on integrity and prevention of corruption – Zakon o 
Integriteti in Preprečevanju Korupcije, Uradni List 69/2011. Similarly, Israel has amended its law on Knesset 
(Israeli parliament) with a couple of articles on lobbying.  
69  The first formal law that was regulating lobbying was the “Foreign Agents Registration Act - FARA” 
introduced in 1938, then in 1946 the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act was adopted. After several 
decades, The Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) was introduced in 1995, and finally in 2007 The Honest 
Leadership and Open Government Act – HLOGA was enacted. All of those laws are federal laws and they 
regulate lobbying on the federal level. At the same time, most of the states within the US have adopted their 
own lobbying regulation. 
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comparable. Moreover, both the EU and the US federal institutional systems are 
comparable to some extent as they have very similar roles, even though the institutional 
setting remains different.  
  Also, it is worth mentioning that lobbying is more intensive, aggressive and 
complex in the US mostly because controlled financial contributions are allowed from the 
private sector to public officials, and because the US decision-makers are more 
constituency-sensitive than the officials of the EU, especially EU Commissioners who are 
appointed bureaucrats and not elected officials dependent on votes. 
  There are other differences that have been already discussed in the literature; 
such as the relation of the type of legislature (an EU-type parliament v. the US Congress) 
with incentives to lobby (Bennedsen and Feldmann 2002).70 The authors explain why 
lobbying is more intensive in the US than in Europe and the main finding is that a 
majority in the US Congress is much more flexible than a majority in European 
parliaments. This also means that in the US, coalitions vary from policy to policy, and 
there is more room for influencing individual representatives than in Europe, where 
heads of parties make decisions on votes and MPs just vote based on those decisions. 
More flexible coalitions are more suitable for lobbyist as they give more room for 
influence. Majorities are more unpredictable, which leaves more room for influence, and 
thus, it provides lobbyists with greater incentive to address decision-makers.   
  In the last decade, the lobbying regulation debate has emerged from relative 
irrelevance to become an important issue. Besides purely academic debate in the legal, 
political and economic field, a constant policy debate was occurring in the US and 
Brussels between the decision-makers, civil society and “watch dogs” who were urging 
for more transparency. The big alliances such as the Alliance for Lobbing Transparency 
and Ethics Regulation (ALTER-EU)71; Corporate Europe Observatory72; the European 
Union Information Website73 or large international organizations such as the 
                                                          
  70 M. Bennedsen and S. E. Feldmann, ‘Lobbying Legislatures’, Journal of Political Economy, 110 (2002),  
919–946. 
71 www.alter-eu.org 
72 www.corporateeurope.org  
73 www.euractiv.com   
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Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)74 were, and still are, 
very active in this field.  
  Research on lobbying regulation in general could be divided into three main 
approaches. The first one is a classical comparative approach which allows for an 
overview on lobbying regulatory techniques globally. In the second one, the EU is 
compared with another jurisdictions (usually the US), either on supra-national or 
national levels (where regulatory models from few of the EU member states are 
compared with the equivalent ones in the US). The third approach represents research 
exploring EU-lobbying in a sui generis perspective. Both of these approaches will be 
addressed in the following section. 
 
1.4. Comparative studies on lobbying regulation 
 
  In this section, the most important and recent academic and policy papers 
dealing with lobbying regulation in a comparative perspective are going to be explored. 
However, within this approach we can identify two major trends. One group of 
researchers worked on comparative studies between all the countries in the world that 
have imposed any kinds of rules75 related to lobbying (Chari, Hogan and Murphy 2008, 
2009, 2010; Griffith 2008; the OECD special reports from 2007a, 2007b; Flannery 2010; 
Malone 2004). The other group of studies is focused almost exclusively on the 
comparison of “the EU approach – the US approach” (Mihut 2008; Wesselius 2005; Woll 
2006; Thomas 2004). 
  The common thing in both approaches is the dominant presence of the US 
experiences, which should not be surprising due to its position in the world of lobbying 
and lobbying regulation.  
  The second common denominator in these studies is the clear absence of an 
economic reasoning in approach. Similarities and differences are compared from a legal 
or a political point of view, without any regulatory impact analysis. On the other hand, 
                                                          
74 www.oecd.org   
75 Regulation via specific law, regulation throughout more general laws or even self-regulation practices.  
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there are papers that deal only theoretically with this question, but there are no 
examples of both a legal and economic approach united in one paper.  
  Probably the most recognized names in the first group of studies that are 
focused on a global comparison of lobbying regulations are Chari, Hogan and Murphy. 
This group of authors has published (2009)76 a study that compares lobbying regulation 
in Canada, the US, the EU and Germany. The authors offer a useful transparency and 
political science-literature overview with identification of which countries in Europe 
have any type of regulatory rules related to lobbying. They also analyse existing tools for 
measurement of the strength of the lobbying regulation (Opheim’s index, Brinig et al.’s 
rating scale and the CPI Index) and use the CPI77 index for their own research as the most 
advanced available tool for comparative assessment of lobbying regulation.  
  They applied the CPI index on Europe, and compared European scores with the 
scores of the states of the US,  and divided all the systems into the lowly regulated, 
medium regulated and highly regulated systems; simultaneously listing the 
characteristics of each of them. Furthermore, they have placed the EU, Poland and 
Germany into the lowest category – highlighting the fact that there is a necessity for 
improvement in European lobbying regulation practices. In medium-regulated systems, 
they have placed Canada, a few American states, and Lithuania and Hungary from the 
European group of countries that have been analysed.   
  In the same study, the authors have developed a logical framework for 
distribution of countries into any of the three systems, based on regulatory elements they 
have adopted in respective jurisdictions – the Threefold classification. 
  In addition, they tried to correlate country rankings within the CPI index with 
the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index78, but no significant 
correlation has been discovered between the two of those indices. However, this does not 
mean that further research in this segment may not be done in the future. 
                                                          
76 R. Chari, G. Murphy and J. Hogan, ‘Regulating Lobbyists: a Comparative Analysis of the United States, 
Canada, Germany and the European Union’, The Political Quarterly, 78 (2007), 422–438. 
77 The CPI comes from the Center for Public Integrity, who first used this methodology.  
78 J. Hogan, R.S. Chari and G. Murphy, ‘Lobbying Regulation Across Four Continents: Promoting 
Transparency?’, Working paper, 2009 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1450816> [accessed 25 February 2012]. 
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  In another paper that came a year before (2008)79, the same authors investigated 
the reasons for the lack of lobbying regulation in most of the countries by conducting an 
empirical research regarding the attitudes of the key-players towards the regulation of 
lobbying. Starting with political ideas (mostly transparency) underlying lobbying 
regulation, they continued with presentation of the results from their research based on 
concepts of deliberative democracy.  
On the other hand, some of the most relevant conclusions have underlined that 
interviewed parties prefer self-regulation over a state-imposed regulation that, according 
to them, tends to be inefficient. Even though there are some indications to believe that 
may be true (cases of Macedonia, Montenegro, Hungary as well as some concerns 
expressed in the introduction with regards of general effectiveness of regulations) it is 
hard to argue that a more efficient system is one of self-regulation of lobbyists. At the 
same time, the results of the research show that interviewed actors80 support the 
establishment of the lobbyists register and regular reporting procedures, and this 
support was discovered to be very strong regardless of the type of the group (politicians 
or lobbyists themselves). A huge support for penalization of wrongdoers is also a proof 
that this might be an effective enforcement tool, and it is believed among the interviewed 
that it would significantly deter that type of behaviour.   
  The significance of the data collected in above mentioned research is actually 
very high as there are very few recent studies with the similar database. The information 
on preferences of different actors towards lobbying regulations are relevant as they help 
researchers and policymakers in the development of more optimal regulatory 
frameworks, which should take into consideration inputs given both from the lobbyists 
and public administration. 
  The same authors have also published maybe the most important book related 
to lobbying regulation81. The book represents the most important piece of work in this 
                                                          
79 J. Hogan, R.S. Chari and G. Murphy, ‘“Next Door They Have Regulation, But Not Here”: Assessing the 
Opinions of Actors in the Opaque World of Unregulated Lobbying’, Canadian Political Science Review, 2 
(2008), 125–151. 
80 Which include lobbyists, politicians and administrators. 
81R. Chari, G. Murphy, and J. Hogan, Regulating Lobbying: A Global Comparison (Manchester University Press, 
2010). 
 The book also has a webpage: www.regulatelobbying.com   
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field, but at the same time it does not provide many answers on the economic reasons for 
lobbying regulation, while the ones that are offered can be easily argued. This work does 
provide probably the best overview on the global distribution of lobbying regulation and 
it analyses all relevant laws by the CPI82 methodology.  
  However, when it comes to the reasons for lobbying regulation, they stay 
focused mainly on the concept of the deliberative democracy which is a political science 
concept and focuses on the promotion of transparency and accountability in decision-
making. On the other hand, when it comes to reasons for not regulating lobbying, for the 
first time, some economic reasons are taken into account such as entry barriers and, 
generally speaking, the costs. Both arguments will be further discussed in the concluding 
remarks. 
  Yet, there is another important work (McGrath)83 that has identified and listed 
all relevant lobbying legislations within the European Union countries with a focus 
pointed at Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic.  The author remains mostly focused 
on the ten new member states that joined the EU together in 2004, and he explores what 
kind of rules, if any, exist in those countries and observes general lobbying trends in 
them. The study concludes that countries which recently adopted democratic multi-party 
political systems are even faster in adopting lobbying control measures than the old 
member states, even though lobbying activity occurs at a higher level in the old ones. The 
relevance of this paper is exceptionally important as there are almost no studies which 
explore lobbying development (besides the above-mentioned group of authors – Chari, 
Murphy and Hogan 2010) in those countries.  
It may be concluded that in the new member states which still have problems with 
corruption, the regulation of lobbying is an important task for the regulators as they do 
not have a well-developed general legal framework for fighting corruption.  
 The high level of corruption has motivated greater lobbying regulatory activity 
than in the old member states, but there are very few studies dealing with those new 
jurisdictions, and there is a great potential for research on lobbying regulation within 
                                                          
82The CPI methodology refers to the CPI Index which measures the strength of lobbying regulation and 
makes it comparable across the countries.  
83 C. McGrath, ‘The Development and Regulation of Lobbying in the New Member States of the European 
Union’, Journal of Public Affairs, 32 (2008), 15–32. 
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them.  In addition, there is still very limited information on the results of the enforcement 
of the lobbying rules in those countries. However, the final chapter of this research offers 
some fresh data and information in this sense.  
  Some other authors (Flannery 2010)84 offer a comparative, qualitative and 
quantitative study on the EU, the US and Canada. While the quantitative part of the study 
remains based on the widely used CPI index, the qualitative part is related to measures 
“promulgated in legislation”. The main critique that can be attached to this paper is that 
the CPI index over the mentioned countries was already applied earlier by Chari, Murphy 
and Hogan (2009), so there is not much to be learned from another application over the 
same laws. 
  Besides the academic debate on lobbying regulation, the policy debate was also 
present in the past decade. One of the most active roles in this debate was initiated and 
organized by the OECD. The OECD organized a series of round tables and public 
discussions on lobbying regulation, which were summarized in special reports 
afterwards. Besides a sui generis approach, experts from the OECD also looked for 
comparative solutions and analysed if they are necessary and applicable to Europe.  
  After first OECD’s symposium on lobbying (held in Paris in 2007) the report 
Lobbying: Models for Regulation85 was released. This report gives an overview on the 
most important regulatory regimes and outlines the most important principles in 
lobbying regulation that decision-makers should be aware of in designing the regulation. 
It deals in-depth with concrete regulatory mechanisms, and recommends who actually 
needs to be captured with lobbying regulation, questions how much transparency is 
enough, and how much financial disclosure is necessary based on comparative analysis of 
other jurisdictions. It highlights that all regulation should fulfil at least three core 
objectives – capturing the intent of lobbying, disclosure of beneficiaries and institutions 
that are the targets. Besides this, the report deals with comparative compliance and 
sanction mechanisms, while at the same time questions whether a standard or self-
regulation is a better method. However, the answer still remains unknown as both 
                                                          
84 P. Flannery, ‘Lobbying Regulation in the EU: A Comparison with the USA &Canada’, Social and Political 
Review, 2010, 69–78. 
85 A.P. Pross, ‘Lobbying: Models for Regulation’, OECD Symposium on Lobbying: Enhancing Transparency, 
2007 <http://www.oecd.org/governance/ethics/38944782.pdf> [accessed 4 July 2013]. 
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options have many pros and contras, and regulation in each case should be imposed by 
taking into account specific national circumstances.   
  On the other hand, this report is one of the most important policy 
recommendation sources as it deals with concrete mechanisms and regulatory design, 
unlike other papers which explore regulations from a macro perspective, without dealing 
in-depth with specific rules and tools. Another relevant issue that is lacking in this report 
is an issue of the costs of regulation. A link between costs and certain design of regulation 
in an economic sense is still missing, even though it is clear that this relation is important 
for regulators.  
  Moreover, besides the costs of rules’ enforcement, some authors86 concluded 
that fostering transparency in the lobbying market can even further boost the 
competition among lobbyists and increase “unproductive competition” to an undesired 
level, from a social costs point of view. They conclude that more transparency triggers 
more competition, which creates huge losses for society, since lobbying expenditures are 
unproductive. Thus, the question of lobbying costs still remains open for further 
research.  
  In other cases (Besharov 2003)87 it also remains unclear how more disclosure 
(and more competition as a result of it) will affect the rent-seeking behaviour of the 
decision-makers.  
  Another relevant OECD report from 200788, similarly to the report of the 
Institute of Public Administration of Ireland (Malone 2004)89, provides a list of countries 
that have regulated lobbying on a global level. While the OECD provided unofficial 
translations of relevant lobbying codes of Poland, Lithuania and Hungary, Malone 
provided the list of more than twenty countries (including Japan) that have worked on 
the lobbying regulation issue. Still, neither of these papers goes into legal or economic 
analysis, but simply describes the regulatory regimes in selected countries. On the other 
                                                          
86 P. Denter, J. Morgan and D. Sisak, ‘"Where Ignorance Is Bliss, “Tis Folly to Be Wise": Transparency in 
Contests”’, Working Paper 2011. <http://ideas.repec.org/p/usg/econwp/201128.html> 
87 G. Besharov, ‘Seeking Lobbying Rents’, Duke University Economics Working Paper No. 02-34 2003. 
88 LEGISLATION ON LOBBYING IN EUROPE (Expert Group on Conflict of Interest with a Special Session on 
Lobbying: Enhancing Transparency and Accountability 6-8 June 2007, Château de la Muette, Paris, 2007). 
89 M.M. Malone, Regulation of Lobbyists in Developed Countries Current Rules and Practices, Regulation 
(Dublin, Ireland, 2004). 
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hand, these papers remain an important contribution since they provide a great starting 
point for further comparative legal and economic analysis.  
  What can be learned from this group of comparative studies? The results of this 
review have shown that political science dominates in those comparisons, and in some of 
the studies it is perhaps followed with some legal theory. Economic reasons for the 
introduction of lobbying regulation are not mentioned so far, and none of the regulatory 
models was examined from a law and economics perspective. Even though regulation is 
one possible tool for fighting market failures, no study actually asks this question, but 
rather assumes that there is a legal and political problem that has to be solved via 
regulation, without questioning its impact in an economic sense. Market failures do not 
appear to be a reason for lobbying regulation, nor is economic rationale used to backup 
different regulatory models.  
 In previous papers, transparency, accountability and improvement of decision-
making are listed among the most important reasons for the regulation of lobbying. 
While the first two components are unquestionable, the last one remains blurry, and it is 
not adequately explained, especially from an economic standpoint. It still remains 
unknown what the conditions are in which lobbying improves decision-making in a 
society, if it improves it at all. It is still a mystery if lobbying reduces asymmetry of 
information, but at least there are studies which explain how lobbying creates rent-
seeking behaviour on the side of decision-makers’, and when institutions may be 
relatively easily captured. This knowledge, in terms of lobbying regulation, is highly 
beneficial since it suggests what the shortcomings and weaknesses in the lobbying cycle 
are.  This information is, in this sense, useful in the design of better lobbying rules, 
especially in terms of rules for preventing conflict of interest – such as the revolving door 
rule.  
 The importance of the United States of America when it comes to any issue 
related to lobbying comes from the fact that it is the cradle of this activity. Moreover, the 
regulation of lobbying in the US was always an important regulatory issue, and even 
nowadays this country goes through the debate again, with even more restrictive 
lobbying regulation potentially being adopted in near future. Comparison between the US 
and EU was always the first logical comparison due to the similarities in size, economic 
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organization and political system. However, they are not as equal as we may think. 
Euractiv90, in one of its studies on lobbying, explains the differences between the 
systems, highlighting the different style (consensus based in the EU v. aggressive in the 
US), funding differences, transparency issues, representation system and others.  
  Consequently, several studies dealing exclusively with a regulatory comparison 
between the two have emerged. Mihut (2008)91 for instance has addressed those two 
systems, but no clear-cut results have been offered, while highlighting that regulation in 
both systems is based on the need for greater transparency, honesty and accountability. 
Again, no economic arguments or examples of bad regulatory practice are considered, 
even though it is suggested that this may be something to be regulated in Romania.  
 
1.5. The EU studies on lobbying regulation – a sui generis perspective 
  The question of whether and how lobbying should be regulated has been on the 
discussion agenda in Europe for about two decades. The EU so far has not shown serious 
interest in regulating lobbying with a formal law, while at the same time expecting 
lobbyists to comply with voluntary registers, and self-enforced codes of conduct that 
lobbyists were imposing over themselves. Even though there are many that raised voices 
clamouring for more formal regulation and increased transparency, the latest step taken 
by the EU was the introduction of a unique joint register of the European Parliament and 
the European Commission in 2011.  
  At the same time, the situation on national levels in Europe was more dynamic. 
Besides Germany, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Montenegro, Slovenia and Macedonia, 
some other countries are also working on drafting similar laws – the UK, Serbia, Croatia, 
Ukraine and Denmark92. The effects of those laws are yet to be explored, especially in 
smaller countries where the number of registered lobbyists will hardly exceed 100. This 
fact makes it even more reasonable to question if such regulations are necessary, and if 
there are other tools for enhancing transparency related to lobbying.  
                                                          
90 ‘EU and US Approaches to Lobbying’, 2005, http://www.euractiv.com/pa/eu-us-approaches-
lobbying/article-135509  [accessed 6 July 2013]. 
91 L. Mihut, ‘Lobbying in the United States and the European Union: New Developments in Lobbying 
Regulation’, Romanian Journal of European Affairs, 2008 [accessed 6 July 2013]. 
92 Corporate Europe Observatory, “Danish Parliament Takes Steps towards Lobbying Transparency,” 2012, 
http://corporateeurope.org/blog/danish-parliament-takes-steps-towards-lobbying-transparency. 
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  There are several papers dealing exclusively with EU lobbying regulation, with a 
few studies comparing lobbying regulations on national levels in Europe. Moreover, no 
papers have yet examined the inefficient practices such as those in Macedonia and 
Montenegro which suggests that research should also go in this direction in the future.93   
  Besides the focus on EU lobbying that was given by Chari, Hogan and Murphy 
(2011), additional papers that may be relevant are Chari & O’Donovan (2011)94, 
Obradovic (2009)95, Dalia (2011)96, Greenwood & de Castro Asarta (2011)97, Naurin 
(2008)98, ALTER-EU (2010)99 – a collection of articles of various authors from the 
practice and policy area. These studies are mostly focused on the situation in Brussels 
and lobbying activity between the three main institutions – the Commission, the 
Parliament and the Council. From the dates of publication, it may be concluded that most 
of the debate actually took place in the last couple of years and more works can be 
expected on this topic.  
  The main issue debated was the EU’s choice not to have more formal lobbying 
regulation. Since 2011, the EC and the EP have set up the joint register, whereas before 
they maintained separate ones with similar rules. However, those rules were not 
enforceable100 or unavoidable101. In these circumstances, it can be easily debated 
whether it is better to have no rules at all or only more formal rules that can actually be 
                                                          
93 The regulations might be treated as inefficient ones as after their adoption there were practically no 
lobbyists registered. In Macedonia there was one registered lobbyist, while in Montenegro there is not even 
once a year after the adoption. 
94 R. Chari and D. O’Donovan, “Lobbying the European Commission: Open or Secret?,” Socialism and 
Democracy 25, no. 2 (2011): 104–124. 
95 D. Obradovic, ‘Regulating Lobbying in the European Union’, in Lobbying in the European Union: 
Institutions, Actors and Issues, ed. by D. Coen and J. Richardson (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
96 G. Dalia, ‘Il Nuovo Registro Per La Transparenza’, Working paper (Napoli, 2011). 
97J. Greenwod, I. Asarta, “The (European) Transparency Register: A landmark development?”,Regulation, 
2011. 
98 D. Naurin, Deliberation Behind Closed Doors: Transparency and Lobbying in the European Union (ECPR 
Press, 2007). 
99 ALTER-EU, “Bursting the Brussels Bubble,” 2010, www.alter-eu.org/book/bursting-the-brussels-bubble. 
100More precisely, the Commission was never imposing any enforceable rules, but only a voluntary 
registering while expecting that lobbyist comply with a voluntary code of conduct (Register of Interest 
representatives). The Parliament has adopted a more formal method (Parliament’s accredited lobbyist 
scheme) where all interested parties have to register and obtain a one-year pass for entering the 
parliament. This method was only revealing the list of persons holding the badge and the interest they were 
promoting, but no other details were revealed.  
101 This can be well depicted via the results of a survey conducted by the ALTER-EU from March 2010. The 
results showed that 174 well-known lobbying firms were not registered at all in the Commission’s register. 
The results have also shown that about 60% of all the companies were not registered at all.  
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enforced and serve the purpose of transparency. Some very influential organizations 
(mostly the Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation – ALTER-EU) were 
putting a lot of pressure in this direction, but were mostly receiving very broad answers 
back from the Commission while getting criticized by parts of the industry102.  
  A few authors, like Obradovic (2009) and Chari and O’Donovan (2011), were 
detailed in examining the history of lobbying regulation in the EU, focusing on both the 
Commission and the Parliament while referring to the reasons103 for improvements that 
were occurring during the time. More attention was given to the voluntary register 
introduced by the Commission in 2008 and the information that registrants were 
supposed to disclose. Obradovic (2011) assiduously highlights that this register remains 
voluntary and that there are practically no significant incentives for the lobbyists to 
register, while at the same time the very few incentives might conflict with other EU 
regulations which guarantee equal access to information to all interested parties. This 
study also notices that “sanctions” potentially imposed by the Commission would not be 
significantly effective, especially due to the lack of a proper and efficient monitoring 
agency which would oversee enforcement.  
  Similar conclusions were discussed by Chari and O’Donovan (2011) who 
highlighted that not more than one-third of lobbyists were actually registered within the 
Commission’s register. Moreover, they ask a very important question about the new joint 
register, which was discussed at the time between the Commission and the Parliament, 
regarding its actual efficiency and necessity in regard to its voluntary nature.   
                                                          
102 However, it is not true that all of the industry is opposed to some kind of lobbying regulation. An 
important survey (J. Hogan, R.S. Chari and G. Murphy 2010) actually reveals the attitude of the business 
world towards regulation of lobbying. This survey did cover the EU as well as other non-European 
jurisdictions. For instance, 58.3% of interviewed lobbyists agreed that introduction of lobbying regulation 
might improve decision-making, transparency and accountability. In addition, 44.4% of them agreed to the 
proposition that penalizing unprofessional lobbying would be a good deterrent against such behaviour. The 
same research revealed that 45.5% agreed that they should be required to be publicly registered when 
lobbying public officials.  The results suggest that lobbyists do not think some regulation is bad or that it 
would seriously make their job too difficult. Of course, those answers do not actually explain what level and 
type of regulation (if any) would be optimal.  
103 An Open and Structured Dialogue between the Commission and Special Interest Groups, 1992, 
http://ec.europa.eu/civil_society/interest_groups/docs/v_en.pdf; The White Paper on Governance, 
COM(2001) 370, 2011. 
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  As the new joint register104 of the Commission and the Parliament (June 2011105) 
was established based on joint inter-institutional agreement,106it still remains pretty 
unclear how significant improvements are made in comparison to previous solutions107. 
  To date, only a few studies have directly focused on this register (Dalia 2011; 
Greenwood & de Castro Asarta 2011).  The latter ones are stressing that the new register 
represents an improvement in transparency and definition of those who are about to 
register. However, at this moment, it is already clear that the New Transparency Register 
has low credibility in terms of securing transparency, as argued by the ALTER-EU108. 
  A more detailed legal study on the development of the registry, with the different 
regulatory approach backgrounds of both EU institutions that created the New 
Transparency Register, was elaborated by Dalia (2011). He shows how the inter-
institutional agreement evolved and concludes that the EU continues to apply the “soft-
law” as a regulatory model: “L’adozione dell’Accordo per la transparenza sembra 
confermare la tendenza delle instituzioni europee a disciplinare il loro raporto con i 
rappresentanti di interessi attraverso atti di soft law” (Dalia 2011: 21).  This may or may 
not be the best choice, but what is certain is that the previous voluntary solutions have 
not been very efficient. Dalia suggests the need for more information disclosure about the 
previous activities of lobbyists, but this may be hard to achieve due to a lack of formal 
lobbying book-keeping procedures in the past.  
 
 
 
                                                          
104  http://europa.eu/transparency-register/index_en.htm. 
105 The Commission’s press release 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/773&format=HTML&aged=0&language=
EN&guiLanguage=en. 
106 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2011-
0174&language=EN#title2. 
107The ALTER-EU position paper reveals what could be the most important improvements with the new 
register.  Among the issues that are warmly welcomed are a “one-stop shop method”, better registration 
incentives, individual lobbyists named and number of  lobbyists per organization reported, lobbying goals 
disclosure, online availability of data, unique code of conduct, improved complaints and sanctions, and 
annual report on work of the register. More information is available at http://www.alter-
eu.org/sites/default/files/documents/alter-eu_position_on_joint_ep-ec_register.pdf 
108 RESCUE THE REGISTER, How to Make EU Lobby Transparency Credible and Reliable, 2013, 
http://corporateeurope.org/pressreleases/2013/new-report-shows-urgent-need-rescue-eus-ineffective-
lobby-register. 
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1.6. Conclusion  of Chapter I - the future research challenges and needs   
  
  In previous pages it was already noted that there are very few economic 
arguments in the debate on lobbying regulation in Europe, but also in the lobbying 
regulation debate in general. Only two economic arguments have been mentioned in all 
analysed studies – entry barriers109 that may arise from regulation, and broadly speaking 
costs. The two elements are just some of the classical effects of regulatory intervention, 
but it does not mean they always occur with regulation. In the case of lobbying 
regulation, these elements may be debated as well from a regulatory structure point of 
view. Different regulatory approaches (binding laws or self-regulation) differently affect 
the lobbying market, as well as different approaches in binding regulation might have 
very different reflections in terms of compliance and enforcement costs. The same holds 
true for their effects on transparency and accountability. Even in situations where one 
could talk of a complex binding regulation, it is still not certain if this would necessarily 
negatively affect the entry.  
  Even though practice indicates that after imposing stricter lobbying rules, the 
number of registered lobbyists drops, it does not necessarily mean that entry became 
more difficult. For instance, it is challenging to argue if the number of lobbyists dropped 
after the registration and reporting rules were imposed, just from the fact that most of 
the countries did not have any prior database to be used as a reference on the number of 
active lobbyists. Only the US may be used as an example to test this hypothesis, as they 
had several regulatory phases where every time stricter rules were imposed, the 
registration was also obligatory in the previous phase of regulation as well. Comparing 
previous registration levels and the new ones may be used as a reference on the relation 
between the regulation and more transparency and the participation/entry levels.  
                                                          
109 Entry barriers are defined in various ways. For a review of different types of concepts, see R. P. McAfee, 
H. M. Mialon, and M. A. Williams, “What Is a Barrier to Entry?,” American Economic Review, 2004. The 
authors analyse conceptual differences by looking at works of G. Stigler (1968), J.S. Bain (1956), J.M. 
Ferguson (1974) and few others.   
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  For instance, one year after the US Honest Leadership and Open Government Act 
(HLOGA) went into effect in 2007 and imposed more frequent reporting and 
transparency rules that additionally burdened lobbyists, the number of registrations 
decreased. For example, according to available data on the number of registered 
lobbyists within the US Senate, the number of registrants in 2006 was 14,534 and in 
2010 the number of registrations was 12,220. The drop was not insignificant, but it is 
hard to argue that this was just because the burden became higher. It is also likely that 
some of those who went out of the market probably did not find it profitable enough to 
stay for one reason, or they simply switched to other influence tools that do not force 
them to be registered, since registration is related to specific financial thresholds. The 
fact they do not meet the new threshold or they have decided not to report does not 
mean they do not lobby and they are out of the market. Moreover, if we observe reported 
lobbying expenditures in 2006 ($2.62 billion) and in 2010 ($3.51 billion) it becomes even 
more questionable if lobbying became less attractive after the introduction of harsher 
transparency rules. 
  Yet from another perspective, it is hard to argue that the introduction of 
additional transparency rules might significantly affect an activity which is found to be 
quite profitable for companies. Some studies show that the rate of return of investment 
in lobbying might reach a ratio as high as 22,000%, or for each 1 dollar invested in 
lobbying an average return was 220 dollars (Alexander, Scholz & Mazza 2009).110 Thus, it 
may be assumed that slightly harsher transparency rules would not negatively affect the 
value of lobbying significantly as a strategic economic tool that firms use, or significantly 
limit the entry per se.   
   There may be an additional argument which challenges the idea that lobbying 
regulation may reduce the entry. It has to be clarified that the regulation of 
pharmaceuticals, for instance, is not exactly the same as the regulation of lobbying. While 
in the first case entry may be decreased due to new safety and production standards that 
require large investments in equipment and facilities (which again create large expenses 
                                                          
110 R. Alexander, S. Mazza and S. Scholz, ‘Measuring Rates of Return for Lobbying Expenditures: An 
Empirical Case Study of Tax Breaks for Multinational Corporations’, Journal of Law and Politics, 25 (2009). 
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that small firms cannot easily meet), the rules imposed on lobbyists do not impose such 
costly implications for the industry.   
  Analysed studies do deal with regulation costs, but those costs refer only to the 
costs of establishing and maintaining the register of lobbyists. Even though enforcement 
costs are important, they are still just one side of the coin. Looking at costs in such a 
narrow way would suggest that lobbying should be regulated in most cases since 
lobbying regulation itself may not be too costly per se, especially in cases of non-complex 
regulatory models.   
  When it comes to the costs related to the regulation of lobbying, an additional 
issue which is almost completely neglected is the social cost related to competition 
among the lobbyists (Becker, 1983). It is very likely that more transparency could have a 
positive impact on competition among lobbyists. Not only theory (Denter, Morgan and 
Sisak; 2011) but also previously mentioned data expenditures from the US suggest this 
might be the case.  The concern that competition among lobbyists may be seen as an 
unproductive endeavour, which contributes to the creation of additional costs for the 
society, suggests that the level and type of lobbying regulation should be chosen with 
great consideration. 
    In short, the reviewed literature suggests several conclusions: 
 There is generally a lack of economic reasoning in the lobbying regulation 
debate, more precisely – the problems of entry and costs are usually taken too narrowly 
and explained incompletely. There are no predictions related to the compliance effects of 
lobbying regulation for the industry, and enforcement related to the public sector. 
Moreover, a profound efficiency analysis of different regulatory models is completely 
lacking. Regulation is strongly suggested by various studies due to a necessity for 
transparency improvement, but no study offers a comprehensive answer on which 
regulatory structure and approach should be taken in different cases.  
 More profound qualitative, comparative legal, and learning-based studies 
would be welcomed especially in assessing the true quality of the New EU Transparency 
Register. For those more profound comparisons, additional mechanisms should be 
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developed for a comparative assessment of the strengths and weakness of different 
regulatory models. 
 When it comes to EU member states’ level, it would be very useful to analyse 
the regulatory failures of several states in their attempts at implementing lobbying 
regulations. Analysing reasons for those failures may be very useful for other member 
states with a similar environment, and which are considering the introduction of similar 
rules. So far there are no studies explaining this phenomenon. 
 There is still lack of tools for a structured cost-benefit approach of different 
lobbying regulatory structures and particular mechanisms. The only existing tool - the 
CPI Index - provides an indication of the benefits, but there are no tools to provide an 
indication of regulatory cost in terms of compliance and enforcement costs related to 
different regulatory strategies.  
 Regulators seem to lack sufficient tools to optimally structure their lobbying 
regulations, while researchers lack the tools to conduct a more profound and structured 
comparative assessment of lobbying regulations worldwide.  
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Chapter II - Lobbying Regulation in the Policy Arena and Current Tools for 
Comparative Assessment of Lobbying Regulations 
1. Introduction 
   
  Chapter II will start with the introduction of the research question, based on the 
spotted research gaps discussed in the previous chapter. The main purpose of this part of 
the research is to highlight the necessity for the improvement of the tools for 
comparative assessment of lobbying regulations, and to discuss the options and 
foundations for potential improvements.  
  By focusing on actual policy treatments and developments of lobbying laws in 
the US and Europe, it will be possible to see how lobbying laws evolve in practice, and on 
what foundations they get introduced. This insight will additionally support the research 
question and highlight the need for improvement of the tools for comparative assessment 
of lobbying laws in the policymaking arena as well.   
  Further on, the chapter will pay special attention to Regulatory Impact 
Assessment analysis (RIA) and look into general tools which are already available for 
assessment of (lobbying) regulations worldwide. Some of the methodological 
foundations from the RIA world can be very useful for the development of the custom-
made CII method, which is designed in a way to have better comparative applicability. 
These foundations and their usefulness for the CII will be discussed in particular. 
  At the end of this Chapter, the CPI index will be introduced, as well as a few other 
previously created tools for assessment of the benefits of lobbying regulations. The limits 
of these tools will be discussed, which will additionally emphasize the importance of the 
improvement of the assessment technique, and its expansion towards the costs 
assessment as well.  
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2. Setting the objectives and the research questions 
 
  Chapter I of this research identified the major research needs in regard to 
understanding and better structuring lobbying regulations. In particular, the necessity 
for a more cost-sensitive approach when it comes to the design of lobbying regulation 
was highlighted.  At the same time, it was suggested that when it comes to a comparative 
approach, a more comprehensive (both law and economic) comparison would be helpful 
to understand which mechanisms tend to be efficient tools for lobbying regulation, taking 
into consideration transparency indication on one hand and the cost indication on the 
other. In addition, the introduction examined potential economic reasons for lobbying 
regulation in general. This research is more inclined to the idea that regulation of 
lobbying may be comparatively the best approach111 to deal with possible negative 
effects of lobbying112 and protection of the public interest113.  
  Holding that the motivations for the regulation of lobbying are quite the same all 
around the world (transparency, accountability, integrity, responding to the scandals as 
the most prominent ones)114, while expected benefits are equally hard to identify and 
measure, further analysis will focus on the development of a special tool equally 
important for researchers and policymakers.  
                                                          
111 For more on theoretical foundation, see Goldberg, “Regulation and Administered Contracts”; D. Whynes 
and R. Bowles, The Economic Theory of the State, Oxford Universiry Press (Oxford University Press, 1982). 
For more on why regulation of lobbying may be comparatively more desired than self-regulation see 
Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust - Promoting Integrity through Self-Regulation (Volume 2). 
112 G. Tullock 1967; J. Buchanan et al. 1983; J.C. Heckleman and B. Wilson 2013; G. Stigler 1971; P. Denter, J. 
Morgan and D. Sisak 2011. 
113 C. Opheim, “Explaining the Differences in State Lobby Regulation,” Political Research Quarterly 44, no. 2 
(June 01, 1991): 405–421; D. Lowery and V. Gray, “How Some Rules Just Don’t Matter: The Regulation of 
Lobbyists.” 
114 V. Kalnins, Transparency in Lobbying: Comparative Review of Existing and Emerging Regulatory Regimes , 
2011. Or for instance see the part of the lobbying regulation rationale from the report “Submission 
Department of Public Expenditure and Reform Regulatory System for Lobbying in Ireland” (2012): 1–10. : 
Unregulated lobbying creates risks in terms of the lack of openness, transparency and the integrity of the 
political and administrative decision-making. As highlighted in the final report of the Mahon Tribunal such 
lobbying can exacerbate corruption risks. Even small gifts and other benefits of a minor value that arise in the 
context of the lobbying process can engender a sense of obligation or reciprocity. Unregulated lobbying can 
also erode the legitimacy of democratic governance by undermining political equality between citizens or even 
from being seen to have this effect. Responding to scandals by regulating is also mentioned as a reason by D. 
Lowery and V. Gray (1997), Supra, No.1.  
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  Hence, the goal of this research is to create a special methodology for the 
assessment of lobbying regulations in order to: 
1. Improve tools for the comparative assessment of lobbying regulations.  
2. Improve the capacity of regulators and policymakers by offering them a special cost-
benefit tool for the optimization of the structure of lobbying regulations. 
  These objectives could also be reframed in a research question, for an additional 
clarification of the intention of this research.  
1. How can tools for the comparative assessment of lobbying regulations be improved? 
 
  To fulfil these goals/answer the research question - this research will focus on 
the development of the Cost Indicator Index (CII). This tool is not aimed at replacing 
already available qualitative and quantitative Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) 
procedures developed and used in different countries around the world. Instead, it 
should be a tool used for easier comparison of different regulatory models for the 
regulation of lobbying, and it should expand current tools solely based on legal indicators 
to a comparison based both on legal and economic indicators. Similarly, it should be a 
useful tool for countries which have not sufficiently developed their RIA systems, or the 
scope of application of their RIAs is simply too narrow. In those cases, the CII (combined 
with the CPI) should enable them to have a simple RIA tool for their lobbying regulation 
proposals.  
 
3. Reasons for improvement of comparative assessment tools for the 
regulation of lobbying  
  Once again it should be stated that this research does not aim at discussing the 
economic reasons for lobbying regulation or the economic nature of lobbying, even 
though some reference to this was provided in the introduction in order to emphasize the 
importance of the subject. Instead, the aim is to use a law and economics approach to 
improve current tools for the comparative assessment of regulatory solutions for 
lobbying over different jurisdictions. Upgrading the current tools should result in a better 
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understanding of different practices through a more comprehensive comparison of 
different regulatory mechanisms and their alternatives.  
  Lessons learned from comparisons of different regulatory solutions via law and 
economics indicators should serve to improve the design of future regulations of 
lobbying, especially in countries where RIA procedures do not exist or are too narrow in 
their scope. In addition, in jurisdictions where lobbying is announced to be soon 
regulated, regulators may use the tools offered in this research for indication of the costs 
and benefits of their proposals long before they can actually use a full Regulatory Impact 
Assessment analysis (in countries where they use it).   
  In the first chapter of this research, it was clearly shown that comparative 
studies of lobbying regulations were mostly comparing their transparency effects, while 
rarely analysing the design of regulations from an economic point of view. Laws with a 
higher level of transparency (measured with the CPI Index) were considered a priori as 
the better ones, and tools that were strengthening transparency were usually not 
observed together with their economic effects.  
  This research analyses specific regulatory approaches by focusing on concrete 
tools for transparency improvement in lobbying regulations, and it also seeks to 
categorize them based on their cost-indication dimension. An additional motivation for 
such an approach is the common approach of most lawyers, who usually tend to propose 
legal solutions without taking into consideration their economic effects, and especially 
their influence on social costs115. In some cases, such proposals have become quite 
ineffective laws (Macedonia and Montenegro as mentioned earlier), especially in those 
countries where ex-ante RIA tools are insufficiently developed. Hence, the Cost Indicator 
Index (CII) for lobbying regulations is specifically designed to be a simple but significant 
tool exactly for those countries, especially at the very start of the debate.   
  The development of the new tool should, first of all, improve the general 
assessment of lobbying regulations and highlight that the desired high transparency 
                                                          
115See for instance Lobbying Law in the Spotlight: Challenges and Proposed Improvements, 2011 
<http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/administrative_law/lobbying_task
_force_report_010311.authcheckdam.pdf>; ‘Discussion on Adoption of Law on Lobbying in Montenegro’ 
<http://www.skupstina.me/index.php?strana=zakoni&id=1824>; Regulatory Frame for Lobbying in 
Macedonia, Slovenia and Montenegro (in Serbian) (Belgrade, 2011). 
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should always be paired to its cost-indication, before opting for a concrete regulatory 
solution. Moreover, the new scale, which adds the cost-indicator component to 
transparency indicators, will enable comparison of different transparency mechanisms 
by both legal and economic dimension and allow improved learning not only from 
comparisons of different regulations, but also from comparisons of different regulatory 
measures within a single piece of lobbying regulation.  
  The CPI (see Chapter III, section 6 for detailed explanation of the CPI) gives, on 
the one hand, an indication on transparency116 and accountability117 defined as the 
“strength of lobbying regulation” where the more points a regulation has, the stronger it 
is, according to this scale. The newborn scale introduced here uses for its foundation only 
those CPI indicators that can be evaluated in terms of the cost and burden they are 
expected to produce. 
  However, unlike a CPI score where higher means better, a CII score should be as 
low as possible, which indicates low compliance and enforcement costs related to 
lobbying regulations. Consequently, having as high a scores-difference as possible is 
desired – the highest possible transparency provided on the lowest possible cost (the 
result will have the indicative and not monetary nature).  
  The methodology offered in this research is designed to satisfy research and 
policy needs. Its simplicity allows for its wide and quick application, and its design fits 
well with previous methodologies used for the comparative assessment of lobbying 
regulations.  
 
 
 
                                                          
116For a general overview on transparency and its role see J.L. Broz, ‘Political System Transparency and 
Monetary Commitment Regimes’, International Organization, 56 (2002), 861–887; A Héritier, ‘Elements of 
Democratic Legitimation in Europe: An Alternative Perspective’, Journal of European public policy, 1999;      
L. Enriques and G. Hertig, ‘The Governance of Financial Supervisors: Improving Responsiveness to Market 
Developments’, 2010 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=1711230>. 
117For more on the concept of accountability see Collin Scott, ‘Accountability in the Regulatory State’, Journal 
of Law and Society, 27 (2000), 38–60; The Real World of EU Accountability, ed. by M. Bovens, D. Curtin and P.  
’t Hart (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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4. Why is it so important to improve tools for the comparative assessment 
of lobbying regulation? 
There are several important answers to this question, but the three most relevant ones 
are: 
1. The dynamics of lobbying regulation -  An important reason for improving 
the tools for the assessment of lobbying regulation is the dynamics of lobbying regulatory 
activity, especially in Europe. According to current tendencies within European 
countries, we can expect very dynamic regulatory activity of lobbying. On the other hand, 
the debate on reforming lobbying regulations in US is again very active since 2009, after 
the first election of the President Obama. 
2. Methodological complexity and diversity of the Regulatory Impact 
Assessment tools are limiting their application on comparative analysis in an easy 
and informative manner. For precise assessment of a specific regulation, more detailed, 
quantitative and qualitative analysis should be done in each case. In countries where 
impact assessment tools are used, regulatory impact assessment analysis (RIA) are 
mostly different, and they depend on the concrete legislative, political and economic 
traditions of every country. Hence, the methodological differences, as well as the 
complexity and diversity of RIAs are obstacles for comparisons between different 
lobbying regulations, especially in an economic sense.  To be more precise, they are 
obstacles for a simple comparisons based on economic indicators for the costs, and 
likewise comparisons by the transparency indicators of the CPI index.  
3. Limited application of the currently available tool for comparative 
assessment of lobbying regulation – the CPI Index – which does not allow comparison 
on any economic criteria and limits comparisons only to the non-economic criteria 
(transparency and accountability – political criteria) which are defined as the “strength” 
of lobbying regulation. Of course, these are not completely non-economic criteria, as they 
could be observed as non-monetary benefits of a regulation. 
   Still, these limitations prevent researchers and policymakers from learning as 
much as they could from comparisons of different regulatory solutions. Hence, 
improving the tools should improve and expand the scope of learning and provide 
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information on the relation between benefits and costs of lobbying regulation, based on 
indication for both dimensions.  
  In order to better understand these issues and problems, each of them will be 
analysed individually in the following sections of this chapter: Section I will address the 
current dynamics of lobbying regulation, focusing especially on the US and EU as the two 
most important continents when it comes to the regulation of lobbying. Section II will 
address Regulatory Impact Assessment analysis as a tool, and highlight its limits for the 
comparative assessment of lobbying regulation. Section III will explore the structure, 
scope and applicability of the CPI Index, as well as its limits, while highlighting 
possibilities for improvement of this method, which is currently the best and the most 
applicable tool for the comparative assessment of lobbying regulation.  
5. Section I 
5.1. An overview of the recent dynamics and development of lobbying 
regulation 
  This section will address the most recent developments in lobbying regulatory 
activity both in the US and EU. It will first refer to the US, and then to particular European 
countries and the European Union. The purpose is to illustrate the significance and 
expansion of lobbying regulation in both continents and to show that many of the 
existing and future laws, especially in the South East Europe (SEE) have been proposed 
or adopted without any regulatory pre-assessment.      
5.2. The US lobbying regulation system – an overview and current tendencies  
  The US has the longest tradition in lobbying regulation,118 both on the state and 
federal level. US lobbying is considered to be the most dynamic in the contemporary 
world, with the largest number of registered lobbying firms involved, and a continuous 
increase in lobbying expenditures.119 
                                                          
118 For more on US lobbying regulation history see Thomas Susman and William Luneburg, ‘History of 
Lobbying Disclosure Reform Proposals Since 1955’, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO 
FEDERAL LOBBYING LAW AND PRACTICE (American Bar Association, 2009). 
119 The correlation between transparency and lobbying expenditures is an interesting issue which requires 
more research. Some authors (P. Denter, J. Morgan and D. Sisak 2011, “"Where Ignorance Is Bliss, ‘Tis Folly 
to Be Wise": Transparency in Contests.’”) were modelling this relation, and their results suggested that 
increased transparency that comes with regulation attracts more players into the lobby arena. More 
competition makes the race for influence harsher, and this leads to dissipation of resources in a “non-
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Figure 1 - Overview on lobbying spending and lobbying numbers in US 
 
The figures clearly indicate that lobbying has been an important part of US 
political life in the last decade, but nevertheless lobbying has played this role for a much 
longer time in America. The first traces of regulatory activity related to lobbying can be 
found at the beginning of the 20th century. According to Chari, Murphy and Hogan (2010), 
the earliest steps were made individually within states long before the first federal 
regulation, and by 1950, 38 states already had some type of lobbying regulation.    
  Meanwhile, regulatory activity also started to develop on the federal level under 
the Public Utilities Holding Company Act120. This act imposed reporting duties for the 
first time for legal and natural persons wishing to influence the US Congress. Another 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
productive competition”. Even though this sounds as a reasonable assumption, if we look into the data on 
expenditures, we see they were increasing at a relatively stable rate and have not changed significantly after 
the introduction of the new rules. However, in 2007 when the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act 
was adopted, the increase in expenditures relative to 2006 was significantly larger than in other periods. 
Still, this does not have to be a clear indicator, as data are based on reported aggregate expenditures and the 
reporting rules were changed under the new law. However, growth in expenditures can be explained in 
another way. For instance: “...government has grown in size and complexity, more lobbyist have been needed 
to explain how business operates..how legislation would affect various interests"; (R. Chari, J. Hogan, and G. 
Murphy 2010, p.22). 
120 Public Utilities Holding Company Act (PUHCA) (United States Congress, 1935). 
1.44 
1.44 
1.56 
1.64 
1.82 
2.04 
2.18 
2.42 
2.62 
2.85 
3.30 
3.50 
3.54 
3.32 
3.30 
10.408 
12.936 
12.535 
11.838 
12.125 
12.920 
13.167 
14.066 
14.514 
14.840 
14.154 
13.672 
12.931 
12.655 
12.411 
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Number of registered lobbyists Total lobbying spending (in billions of $US)
56
50 
 
similar provision was introduced a year later (1936) in the Merchant Marine Act.121 
These acts were the first to introduce the registration and reporting on the US federal 
level, but they were not the first laws on lobbying in the US, in the real sense of the word.  
  However, laws that were solely dedicated to regulating lobbying activities and 
behaviour arrived soon, and in 1938 there came the first law which was dedicated only to 
the regulation of lobbyists. This law and the laws that followed deserve a closer look 
which will reveal the tendency of lobbying regulation in the US from its beginnings: 
 1938, Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)122 – The actual purpose of this law was 
not to regulate lobbying as we think of it today, but to impose registration duty on 
foreign citizens who were aiming to influence US federal institutions.  The law was 
adopted as a consequence of the fear that Nazis could engage in financing some groups 
that could destabilize the US. It was later revised, but even though it did not focus on 
lobbyists in the sense in which we see them today, it was an important step in the 
development of lobbying regulation in the US and the world. 
 1946, Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act (FRLA)123 – This is the first US federal law 
on lobbying. This law for the first time required the registration of all those who wished 
to influence Congress. There were no rules on financial disclosure or on lobbying 
intentions. Instead, registration was expected to inform policymakers and the general 
public as to who was aiming to influence federal policies. This means that all those whose 
principal aim was influencing the House of Representatives or the Senate were subject to 
registration and quarterly reporting. The problematic issue with this law was that it was 
unclear who exactly was expected to be registered, because it was unclear what was to be 
considered as the “principal purpose”. This is why this law had quite a low compliance 
rate – in the report issued by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 1991124 this 
law was labelled as ineffective.  
                                                          
121 Merchant Marine Act (United States Congress, 1936). 
122 Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) (United States Congress, 1938). 
123 Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act (FRLA) (United States Congress, 1946). 
124 GAO, Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946 Is Ineffective, T-GGD-91-56, Jul 16, 1991. 
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 1995, Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA)125– the law that replaced the FRLA and for the 
first time clearly defined who were considered to be lobbyists and when exactly they had 
to register. The number of registered lobbyist under this law increased due to the clear 
financial thresholds that were clearly set – a lobbyist is a natural person who spends 
more than 20% of his/her working hours on lobbying, and who has received at least 
$5,000 as compensation from a client. In the case of a lobbying firm (instead of a natural 
person) the threshold was $20,000 semi/annually.  
  On the other hand, this law had its own problems. The main issue was related to 
reporting, which was too slow (on six months), and reports were not sent in an electronic 
form so there had not been enough publicly available.126  In addition, public officials were 
not subject to these rules, which opened large room for different types of “benefits” that 
were often offered by lobbyists. Thus, this law also had to be amended in 2007 by a new 
set of rules. 
 2007, Honest Leadership and Open Governments Act (HLOGA)127– was introduced to 
amend the LDA, as a consequence of several corruption scandals (the most famous is the 
Abramoff scandal from 2006) that negatively affected accountability of the US federal 
institutions. Besides lobbyists, regulation was this time affecting public officials as well. 
The most important improvement was the introduction of the “cooling-off” clause, which 
prevents public officials from becoming lobbyist for a period of two years after the 
termination of their public contract.     
This time, reporting was improved by the introduction of electronic filing, and 
submissions were introduced on a quarterly basis,128 which improved overall disclosure. 
In addition, public officials were no longer allowed to receive gifts or compensation for 
travel129. An institutionalized watchdog (Government Accountability Office)130 was 
consequently established with authorization to audit131 submitted reports.  
                                                          
125 Lobbying Disclosure Act (United States Congress, 1995). For more on LDA see E. Peterson, CRS Rerport for 
Congress - Lobbying Reform: Background and Legislative Proposals, 109th Congress, 2006. 
126 ALTER-EU, “Bursting the Brussels Bubble.” supra n.99, p.127.  
127 Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA) (United States Congress, 2007). 
128 Since the reporting cycle was cut down from 6 to 3 months, the new thresholds for the new cycle were 
$2,500 for individuals and $10,000 for the firms. 
129 Title VI of the HLOGA: “Prohibited Use of Private Aircraft,” is related to the restrictions on the use of 
campaign funds for flights on non-commercial aircraft. 
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5.2.1. Lobbying regulation reform tendencies from 2007– the need for even more 
transparency? 
  Even though the HLOGA introduced impressive improvements in terms of 
transparency and conflict of interest prevention, President Obama heavily criticized 
lobbying rules and lobbyists during his election campaign in 2008: “I intend to tell the 
corporate lobbyists that their days of setting the agenda  in Washington are over, that they 
had not funded my campaigns, and from my  first day as president, I will launch the most 
sweeping ethics reform in U.S.  history. We will make government more open, more 
accountable and more responsive to the problems of the American people.” 
  Almost immediately upon taking office, in January 2009 he issued Executive 
Order (EO) 13490132 where he limited the access of lobbyist to the executive branch of 
government, and which was criticized to be almost unconstitutional in terms of 
infringement of the First Amendment of the US Constitution which guarantees the right 
of petition133. By this EO, the executive branch introduced additional rules for lobbying 
which go further beyond the HLOGA-rules. The effect of these new rules was to: (a) 
restrict any kind of gifts to executive officials, (b) prevent former lobbyists from getting 
employment in the executive branch, which may be interpreted as a “reverse cooling-off” 
rule, (c) limit of access of lobbyists to serve in an advisory sense134 in executive branch 
committees and boards.135 
  Despite this approach being generally welcomed by the public and criticized by 
business, the actual results of those intentions are still blurry. As Professor J. Thurber, 
one of the leading US lobbying scholars, noticed “... A consequence of President Obama’s 
attempt to reduce conflicts of interest has seriously limited those with expertise from 
serving as appointees and on government advisory panels. Little seems to have 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
130 www.gao.gov   
131 2 U.S.C. § 1614 
132 Executive Order 13490 - Ethics Commitments by Executive Branch Personnel (Federal Register, Vol. 74, No. 
15). 
133 Lobbying Law in the Spotlight: Challenges and Proposed Improvements. p.5. 
134 The function of participation in those boards was very close to role of the consultation procedure of the 
EU (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/00c5e7159b/Consultation.html).    
135http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-lobbyists-agency-boards-and-
commissions 
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fundamentally changed in lobbying whether it is done transparently or non-transparently. 
The rhetoric has changed, but the way Washington works seems unchanged”136. 
  The direction of the debate has remained on a similar course even afterwards. In 
the most recent debate, voices were raised by several independent research centres and 
foundations137, and also professional associations138. The direction of those approaches 
diverges, but the general tendency is that the HLOGA again needs to be revised and 
additionally improved. Since all those positions cannot be summarized in this section, 
only two prominent ones are going to be referred to,  in order to reflect the state of the 
debate and the direction it is going. Those are the respective positions of the American 
Bar Association and the Sunlight Foundation.  
  The American Bar Associations139 has been particularly publicly active on this 
matter (within the Task Force on Federal Lobbying Laws) and they actively advocated for 
the reform140 of the HLOGA. The ABA argues that lobbying is an important part of the 
democratic and political process in the US, and that it is good for both the lobbying sector 
and the Government to maintain the interaction as transparently141 as possible.  
  Concretely, this organization recommends that rules for registration have to be 
revised and set to be clearer for those who have to comply with them142. The ABA also 
                                                          
136 J. A. Thurber, Changing the Way Washington Works? President Obama’s Battle with Lobbyists (London, 
2010). 
137 The Sunlight Foundation, see http://sunlightfoundation.com/policy/lobbying/ and its project Policy 
Mark-up at http://publicmarkup.org/bill/real-time-online-lobbying-transparency-act/. 
138 Supra n.126. 
139 http://www.americanbar.org/aba.html. 
140“The Task Force believes that the LDA disclosure system is in need of improvement.” Supra n.136. p.15. 
141 http://www.abanow.org/2010/05/lobbying-awareness-of-rules-transparency-important/. 
142 A lobbying firm will be required to register if, on behalf of a particular client: (a) employees of the firm in 
the aggregate make 2 or more lobbying contacts at any time on behalf of the client; and (b) the firm receives 
or expects to receive from that client for matters related to lobbying activities, at least the amount specified 
in 2 U.S.C. §1603(a)(3)(A) (currently $3,000) in the quarterly period during which registration would be 
made.  
A lobbying organization will be required to register if:  
(a) employees of that organization in the aggregate make 2 or more lobbying contacts at any time on its 
behalf; and  (b) the organization expends in connection with lobbying activities at least the amount 
specified in 2 U.S.C. §1603(a)(3)(B) (currently $11,500) in the quarterly period during which registration 
would be made.  For purposes of these criteria, employee, lobbying contact and lobbying activities would be 
defined as under current law (2 U.S.C. §§1602(5), (7) & (8)). 
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urges for more complex reporting by suggesting an extensive list of items to be reported 
by each single registrant143. 
  One of the additional things that the ABA insists on, due to the weak 
enforcement and audit of compliance, is strengthening of the enforcement of the lobbying 
rules. The current situation under the HLOGA is that the Clerk of the House and the 
Secretary of the Senate have to indicate non-compliance to the Department of Justice in 
order to identify wrongdoers. However, the Department of Justice has not been very 
active so far in investigating and punishing wrongdoers. 
  According to this position, the ABA suggests that this role should be entirely 
transferred to a single agency under the executive branch (most under the Department of 
Justice), which will have the necessary tools and power of investigation, monitoring and 
sanctions.   
  As anticipated, the position of the ABA falls prey to the general problem 
discussed in this research – suggestions for improvement of lobbying rules are usually 
cost-non-sensitive in the US. It is important to keep in mind that the ABA’s voice is heard 
often in the US Congress as it represents an important stakeholder for the US 
Government. While lobbying rules in the US were outside of the scope of the Regulatory 
Impact Assessment procedure144 so far, important stakeholders like the ABA have also 
shown a cost-non-sensitive approach in their recommendations.   
                                                          
143 (a) the bills and topics with respect to which lobbying activity was conducted;  
(b) all congressional offices, congressional committees, and federal agencies and offices contacted;  
(c) all individuals employed by the firm or organization who both made any lobbying contact and also 
devoted at least twelve (12) hours during the quarterly reporting period to lobbying activities or lobbying 
support (as hereinafter defined) on behalf of the client;  (d) all other individuals employed by the firm or 
organization who engaged in lobbying activities or lobbying support; and  (e) all other persons and entities 
retained by the registrant firm or organization that engaged in lobbying support along with a statement of-  
(1) the nature of the lobbying support rendered with a short narrative summary of work performed;  (2) 
the amount paid to such other person or entity for lobbying support; and  
(3) the names of individuals employed by that other person or entity who supervised the provision of 
lobbying support or devoted more than a specified number of hours to lobbying support during the 
quarterly reporting period. 
144 Due to the US RIA system which has a narrow scope of application, that has left the HLOGA outside of the 
scope. 
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  Another approach which urges for even more transparency comes from the 
Sunlight Foundation145 which actively lobbies146 for the Lobbyist Disclosure 
Enhancement Act. The aim of this proposal is to establish The Lobbying Disclosure Act 
Enforcement Task Force147 for improvement of enforcement of the lobbying rules, and to 
amend some rules set earlier in the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA, 1995)148 in order to 
improve the frequency and accuracy of registration (instead of 45 days now only 5 days 
to register the contact with the new client), and enlarge the scope also on contacts with 
public officials regarding financial contributions. These changes would require lobbyists 
to disclose the names of the public officials they have met, dates of those meetings and 
the issues discussed. 
  The Sunlight Foundation goes beyond even current proposals and offers 
additional amendments of the currently employed lobbying rules, by opening a public 
debate on the introduction of another bill under name of the “Real Time-Lobbying 
Disclosure Act”149. These rules, if adopted, should further strengthen democracy and 
counteract the “distorting effect that lobbying has on public policy”.   
This proposal deals with various part of lobbying rules, but the most important 
changes it brings are: 
 Registration - within 72 hours of making a lobbying contact, electronically, with an 
extensive list of items to be clarified and reported. 
                                                          
145 The Sunlight Foundation is a non-profit occupied with knowledge-based work on the improvement of 
Government accountability and transparency. Besides other activities, it is engaged in advocating lobbying 
reform in the US. 
146 Sponsored and introduced to the Congress by Rep. M. Quigley [IL-5] (introduced 6/23/2011). 
147“Grants such Task Force primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting each case referred to 
the Attorney General under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995.  Requires such Task Force to: (1) collect 
and disseminate information on the enforcement of such Act; (2) audit at least annually the extent of 
compliance with such Act; and (3) establish, publicize, and operate a toll-free telephone hotline for 
members of the public to report noncompliance with lobbyist disclosure requirements.” 
148(1) require notifications of noncompliance of lobbyist disclosure requirements to the Attorney General 
(instead of  the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia); (2) amend the definition of "lobbyist" under such 
Act to eliminate the exemption from such Act of certain lobbyists who work for a client on a part-time basis; 
(3) require lobbyists to register with the Senate and House of Representatives within 5 days after a 
lobbying contact (currently, 45 days); and (4) expand disclosure requirements relating to contacts with 
executive and legislative branch officials and political contributions. 
149“Real Time Online Lobbying Transparency Act,” Sunlight Foundation, n.d., 
http://publicmarkup.org/bill/real-time-online-lobbying-transparency-act/. 
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 Expansion of the definition of lobbyists – elimination of the 20% rule (from the LDA, 
where a person who were spending less than 20% of their working time on lobbying was 
not expected to register. This subjective criterion was a cover for many lobbyists who 
lobbied without being registered). 
 Reporting – requires each registered lobbyists to report in real-time (at the latest 72 
hours of significant contact) their activity on a complex form. 
 The Congress should make these reports available in an electronic form within 48 hours 
of their receipt. 
 Other provisions requiring political committees to report within 72 hours all 
contributions they received, specifically bundled contributions. 
  This approach, unlike the ABA’s approach, is more radical as it looks on lobbying 
as a negative externality to democratic life and accountable decision-making. However, 
since lobbying is inevitable, the strongest possible rules should be applied, according to 
the Sunlight Foundation. 
  
5.2.2. An interpretation of US lobbying regulation in regard to this research 
  The brief chronological analysis of the development of lobbying regulation in the 
US allows several important conclusions to emerge: 
 Lobbying regulation was continuously developed in direction of higher transparency. 
Every newly adopted federal law kept expanding the scope of lobbying definition, kept 
decreasing time in which registration and reporting has to be completed, and kept 
improving public access to relevant documents.  
 An active regulatory dynamic probably positively affected compliance costs. However, 
there is no clear information on this aspect of regulatory impacts. The debate on 
lobbying reform is dominated by legal and political arguments, while cost (compliance 
or enforcement costs) of proposed improvements were not taken into consideration 
nor in public debates nor under the US Congress’ capacity (due to the limited scope of 
the US RIA procedure). 
 The current state of public debate, especially by the current US administration, civil 
society and part of the lobbying sector indicates a new need for more transparency 
63
57 
 
and revision of the current rules in this direction. However, it seems that proposals for 
improvements neglect general economic and market implications, as well as the 
compliance and enforcement effects of proposed improvements.  
  When it comes to a comparative perspective, lobbying regulation in the US has 
been only subject to comparative analysis of their strength measured by the CPI Index150. 
In this perspective, US legislation is often considered as the most advanced one which 
goes along with high CPI scores of lobbying regulations of US federal states. However, 
this glorification of US lobbying regulation might be misleading since high CPI scores are 
observed isolated from any costs or inefficiencies. Before understanding even basic 
relations between certain types of regulations or single rules with their economic effects, 
recommending any type of regulatory model might be very difficult. In other words, it 
has to be understood better which tools are efficient ones and what is more beneficial 
than costly, even in general terms. 
 
5.3. The European lobbying regulation system – an overview and recent 
regulatory tendencies 
  The situation in Europe is no less dynamic regarding the regulation of lobbying, 
especially in the last decade.  Literature which deals with European lobbying and the 
regulation of lobbying has already been analysed in detail in the Chapter I. Here, in order 
to avoid repetition of other authors’ work on the development of lobbying regulation in 
Europe, this section will provide a brief list of countries with lobbying legislation, and 
focus more on the general features of regulatory style, technique and recent tendencies. 
Due to a complete lack of research, this section will for the first time be introducing 
experiences and regulatory tendencies from the countries of the Western Balkans (WB). 
Putting focus on tendencies in this area is relevant and necessary, as lobbying regulation 
activity in this area is almost completely out of the international research arena151.       
                                                          
150 “Lobbying Regulation Across Four Continents: Promoting Transparency?”, R. Chari, J. Hogan, and G. 
Murphy (2009).  
151 For instance, the most advanced book on this topic by R. Chari, J. Hogan, and G. Murphy (2010) or 
another important report of the same team (R. Chari, J. Hogan, and G. Murphy, REPORT ON THE LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR THE REGULATION OF LOBBYING IN THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE MEMBER STATES  
(Strasbourg, 2011) p.23) does not mention the Macedonian Law on Lobbying which was officially in power 
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The reason for this is not the irrelevance of the topic or the geographical area, but a 
problem of availability of information for researchers in English. At the end, an overview 
of the current EU lobbying rules will be given. 
  Most of European countries still have not regulated lobbying at all152, either 
because they do not officially recognize lobbying as a profession or because they believe 
that regular laws on the prevention of conflict of interest or corruption-fighting are 
sufficient to counteract negative externalities on democracy caused by lobbying. Still, 
those countries that decided to undertake some action regarding lobbying regulation 
have opted for regular laws rather than soft-law153 mechanisms, such as code of 
conducts, ethic codes or similar rules that are mostly expected to be self-enforced.154  
  The latest Law on lobbying in Europe was adopted at the end of 2011 in 
Montenegro.155 Besides Lithuania, Poland156 and Macedonia157 have specific laws on 
lobbying, while Slovenia158, France159 and Germany160 have lobbying rules that are part 
of other laws or administrative rules - which cannot be considered as lobbying laws in a 
precise sense.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
from 2008 and has been revised recently. Meanwhile, in 2011 Montenegro got the Law on Lobbying while 
Serbia and Croatia are very close to this point. 
152 J. Hogan, R.S. Chari and G. Murphy (2010). 
153There is an interesting article on the motivation to use soft-law in an international environment: TL 
Meyer, ‘Soft Law as Delegation’, Fordham International Law Journal, 32 (2009), 1–55. 
154 Self-regulation in lobbying is the most important alternative to mandatory regulation, and it represents 
some type of compromise between unregulated and regulated lobbying. However, it has to be highlighted 
that the majority of current EU lobbyists are in any case bound with at least some type of codes of conduct 
but still the pressures for regulation of their behaviour have been rising over time. This is probably because 
the monitoring and enforcement of compliance to those codes was not strong enough. Hence, if the internal 
enforcement of the compliance would be better, these mechanisms would be more efficient and probably be 
a better substitute to regulations. Hence, the current state of development of self-regulatory mechanisms 
may not provide sufficient response and it seems that regulation is still more effective in terms of securing 
the sufficient transparency in lobbying. For more information on self-regulation (and positions of lobbyists 
towards it) in lobbying, see PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE, 
Lobbyists, Government and Public Trust: Promoting Integrity by Self-Regulation, Components, 2009; Lobbyists, 
Governments and Public Trust - Promoting Integrity through Self-Regulation (Volume 2, 2012). 
155http://www.hdl.com.hr/preuzimanje/newsdata/Sluzbeni%20list%20%20Zakon%20o%20lobiranju.pd. 
156LEGISLATION ON LOBBYING IN EUROPE., Supra n.56. 
157 Zakonot Za Dopolnuvanje Na Zakonot Za Lobiranje (Macedonian) (National Assembly of Republic of 
Macedonia, 2011). 
158 Zakon O Integriteti in Preprečevanju Korupcije (Slovenian).  
159 “REGISTER OF INTEREST REPRESENTATIVES -Représentants D’intérêts À l’Assemblée Nationale,” n.d., 
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/representants-interets/index.asp. 
160 Supra n.151, p.14. 
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  The UK161 and Denmark162 are currently working on their proposals and we can 
expect them soon to have specific lobbying regulations. Other SEE countries such as 
Croatia163 and Serbia164 are also very close to the adoption of laws on lobbying. 
  Even though they were just introduced, it is interesting to mention that 
Slovenian lobbying rules already had some enforcement issues (reporting duties of 
public officials), while Macedonian law had to be revised in 2011 because only one 
lobbyist was registered under the initial rules. Moreover, in 2011 Hungary abandoned its 
lobbying law that was in place since 2006165. All these enforcement problems and 
regulatory diversities are evidence that countries were usually creating lobbying rules 
with very little understanding of the nature of lobbying activity, little comparative 
learning, and even without a simple ex-ante estimation of the effects of introduced rules, 
especially their compliance effects166. 
  The reason for this might be that in smaller countries, the lobbying industry is 
insufficiently large, and the need for having lobbying seems to be overestimated. Another 
problem is that lobbying rules are badly structured due to a lack of specific expertise and 
general RIA application, which causes regulatory failures and resources dissipation both 
in terms of compliance and enforcement. Similarly, a need for having binding rules on the 
EU level tends to be underestimated. To some extent, these tendencies are paradoxes: the 
EU level which attracts most of the lobbyists is entirely under-regulated, while national 
approaches in countries where lobbying is regulated could be labelled as over-regulated, 
especially in the Western Balkans.   
                                                          
161 “Alliance for Lobbying Transparency,” n.d., http://www.lobbyingtransparency.org/about-alt. 
162 “CORPORATE EUROPE OBSERVATORY - Danish Parliament Takes Steps towards Lobbying 
Transparency,” n.d., http://corporateeurope.org/blog/danish-parliament-takes-steps-towards-lobbying-
transparency. 
163 “CROATIAN SOCIETY OF LOBBYISTS,” n.d., www.hdl.com.hr ; “SERBIAN ASSOCIATION OF LOBBYISTS,” 
n.d., http://drustvolobistasrbije.org/. 
164 B. Kascelan and D. Krsmanovic, Ekonomsko i Politicko Lobiranje (Serbian) (Belgrade: Zavod za udzbenike, 
2012). 
165 Supra n.113, p.23. 
166As it is the case with the latest Law on Lobbying – from Montenegro. All official documents that were 
preceding the adoption of the law are publicly available through the website of the Parliament of 
Montenegro. Among three different analyses done by different committees within the parliament, none 
tackles the issue of costs. See ‘Discussion on Adoption of Law on Lobbying in Montenegro’ - 
http://www.skupstina.me/index.php?strana=zakoni&id=1824. 
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  Like on the US federal level, most of the lobbying in Europe actually takes place 
within European Union institutions in Brussels, following the increasing political and 
economic role of the EU institutions. Specific political, legal and economic roles of those 
institutions attract most of the European lobbyists167 both from member states and non-
member states of the EU.  
  Due to the high demand on access168 that lobbyist create over the EU 
institutions, and due to specific problems of democratic deficit and accountability169 of 
the EU (especially the European Commission)170, the EU has been dealing with lobbyists 
by its own original set of rules.  
  However, unlike the US where lobbying is strongly regulated by binding laws, in 
the EU rules were never set to be classically binding nor was there any significant 
mechanism for punishment of those who did not comply with the rules which were found 
to be ineffective even from their beginnings171. 
  The European Commission and the EU Parliament are mostly frequented by 
lobbyists and they had their own separate rules to deal with them, but since 2011 they 
                                                          
167 Estimates differ based on methodology and the scope of the term "lobbying", but some authors have 
estimated that around 16,000 lobbyists work in Brussels. According to some authors, there are probably 
many more people indirectly involved in helping those who are visible, which means that this number 
might in fact be much higher  (Guéguen, European Lobbying. Supra n.11).  
168 For more on theory of access goods see Supra n.1, Bouwen, 365–390, (2002); P. Bouwen, ‘A Theoretical 
and Empirical Study of Corporate Lobbying in the European Parliament’, European integration online papers 
(EIoP), 7 (2003) <http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=37092 
35> [accessed 2 July 2013]. 
169 M. Bovens, D. Curtin, and P. 't Hart (eds), The Real World of EU Accountability., Chapters 4 (the 
Commission), 5 (EU Agencies) and 6 (the EU Council). 
170This is something that is also highlighted by the members of the European Parliament. Recent 
accusations on the lack of legitimacy came from the EU representative Nigel Farage at the session held in 
European Parliament, Strasbourg, 16 November 2011. ‘’And who exactly is responsible, who is in charge out 
of all you lot? The answer is none of you because none of you have been elected; none of you have any 
democratic legitimacy for the roles you currently hold within this crisis’’. But besides political statements, also 
see  S. Smismans, “Representation through Interest Committees: The Case of the Tripartite Advisory 
Committee for Safety, Hygiene and Health Protection at Work.”, in Les Modes de Représentation Dans l’Union 
Européenne, ed. S. Sauragger and B. Irondelle, 2003; D. Beetham and C. Lord, “Legitimizing the EU: Is There a 
“Post-parliamentary Basis for Its Legitimation,” Journal of Common Market Studies 39, no. 3 (2002): 443–
462; P. Bouwen, “Business Interest Representation and Legitimate European Governance,” in Civil Society 
And Legitimate European Governance, ed. S. Smismans (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006), 277–296; C. 
Crombez, “The Democratic Deficit in the European Union - Much a do About Nothing?,” European Union 
Politics 4, no. 1 (2003): 101–120. 
171 ALTER-EU Assessment of European Parliament – Commission Agreement on a Common “Transparency 
Register,” 2011, http://www.alter-eu.org/sites/default/files/documents/alter-eu_position_on_joint_ 
ep-ec_register.pdf.  
67
61 
 
jointly introduced the New Transparency Register, which unified the rules that lobbyists 
should follow both for the Commission and for the Parliament. However, for a long time 
the rules on lobbyists set by the Parliament and the Commission were different and 
unconsolidated. From that point of view, the New Transparency Register represents an 
important improvement172 regardless of all the problems related to its efficiency173. 
  For instance, the EU parliament had its own Register set up in 1996 where 
interested parties were subject to registration and compliance to a code of conduct. The 
efficacy of these rules has also been heavily criticized174. The main feature of this 
criticism was that the definition of lobbyist was imprecise, the registration which opened 
a door for a yearly pass did not have significant effect175, and the code of conduct could 
not guarantee that lobbyists would act sufficiently ethically176, especially due to weak 
and insufficient enforcement. 
  A similar but even less formal approach was afterwards adopted by the 
Commission. The Commission has defined its position of openness and participation with 
regards to outside-stakeholders in several important strategic documents such as the 
White Paper (2001)177, the Green Paper (2006) which opened the door for establishment 
of the “consultation procedure”178. 
  Due to high demand on access and its strategic approach, in 2008 the 
Commission launched the Voluntary register of the Commission.  The word “voluntary” 
has to be highlighted, as unlike in the Parliament where access was directly correlated 
with possession of a badge, lobbying within the Commission could be exercised 
regardless of any registration. Those who registered were also expected to follow the 
                                                          
  172 J. Greenwood and J. Dreger, “The Transparency Register: A European Vanguard of Strong Lobby 
Regulation?" (published Online) (2013), http://www.palgravejournals.com/iga/journal/v2/n2/ 
full/iga20133a.html#bib17.  
173 RESCUE THE REGISTER, How to Make EU Lobby Transparency Credible and Reliable. Supra n. 45. 
174 R. Chari, J. Hogan and G. Murphy (2010; 2011), Bouwen (2003). 
175Those who very simply register would carry a badge with their name and organization stated, and have 
full access within the Parliament building. Anyone could practically lobby for anything, as registration was 
just a formal act. This also meant that all lobbying outside the buildings of the Parliament was completely 
invisible. The registration procedure itself required only reporting of the name of the lobbyist, their 
affiliation to an organization, general interest of influence and duration of influencing. 
176 R. Chari, J. Hogan and G. Murphy (2011). p.9. 
177 The White Paper on Governance, COM(2001) 370, 2001. 
178 The Green Paper - European Transparency Initiative, COM(2006) 194, 2006. 
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Code of conduct, but since there was no oversight institution179 nor were the penalties 
efficiently set180 – bona fides was the only mechanism to rely on. 
  A year later it was already clear that the voluntary registration was not a very 
effective approach. According to the special report of the ALTER-EU181 the compliance 
rate was quite unsatisfying – “...By 25 May 2009, only 1488 organisations had registered. 
Only 593 of them have offices in Brussels. This means that only 22.8% of Brussels-based 
lobby entities have registered so far, based on the European Parliament’s estimate of 2,600 
lobby groups with offices in Brussels in 2000”. Even the Commission intended to consider a 
change of the register from voluntary to a compulsory (after a trial period of one year), 
but this did not happen, despite the fact that the results of voluntary approach were 
unsatisfactory. 
  Separate rules on lobbying at the Commission and the Parliament were in place 
until June of 2011, when the EU Commission and the EU Parliament launched182 the new 
joint Transparency Register based on the special inter-institutional agreement183, and it 
is operated by the Joint Transparency Register Secretariat under the General Secretariat 
of the Commission. The main improvements brought by this action could be summarized 
in following way184: 
- One-stop shop—Information on lobbying in one place; no parallel lobbying transparency 
systems for the Parliament and the Commission. 
- Better incentive for registration—Lobbyists working with a firm or organisation that is not 
registered in the joint register will no longer be able to get a long-term ‘lobbyist’ access 
badge to the European Parliament. 
                                                          
179 The Commission’s Lobby Register One Year On: Success or Failure?, 2009. 
180 “The Commission will impose a penalty only if it can establish that one or more of the seven rules in the 
code of conduct have been broken. The possible penalties are: (a) temporary suspension from the register 
and withdrawal of any associated advantages for a set period or until the body companied against corrects 
the situation; (b) exclusion from the register in the event of severe and persistent failure to comply with the 
code” – The Commissions Code of Conduct for Register of Interest Representatives (the old register).  
181 Supra n.178. 
182 “Press Release: ‘Commission and European Parliament Launch Joint Transparency Register to Shed Light 
on All Those Seeking to Influence European Policy’ IP/11/773,” n.d. 
183 Agreement Between the European Parliament and the European Commission on the Establishment of a 
Transparency Register for Organisations and Self-employed Individuals Engaged in EU Policy-Making and 
Policy Implementation, n.d. 
184 The summary of relevant improvements is taken from the ALTER-EU Assessment of European Parliament 
– Commission Agreement on a Common “Transparency Register.” (2011). 
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- Individual lobbyists named—Names of individual lobbyists will be displayed in the register, 
but the proposal only covers lobbyists with access badges to the Parliament.  
-  Number of lobbyists per firm or organisation is to be reported 
- Main legislative proposals lobbied on—The proposal only requires a general list. Especially 
for consultancies (including law firms), a list of the main legislative proposals being lobbied 
on for each client is crucial. 
- Open data—Data to be “made available in electronic, machine-readable format”. 
- One code of conduct for all lobbyists—All registered lobbyists have to comply with a 
common code of conduct.  
- Regular data checks. 
- Improved complaints and sanctions mechanism. 
- Complaints procedure has been clarified—Maximum penalty is removal from the register, 
blacklisting and withdrawal of Parliament access badges. 
- Annual reporting on operation of the register with input from stakeholders. 
- Review—There will be a review of the register at the latest two years after its launch. 
 
For the first time all registrants are consolidated in one, easy searchable database and the 
rate of registration since the establishment has been positive185.  
  The latest figures from the same year indicate 5,834 registered parties, which 
reflects the continuous but moderate growth in registering186. For instance, in June 2011, 
just before the New Transparency Register was launched, the number of registrants 
within the old Commissions’ Register of Interest representatives was just above 4,000 
while the Parliament in March 2011 had about 4,500 registrants. The new joint database 
should provide more accurate estimates on the total number of lobbyist operating at the 
EU level and provide easier public access to transparency-relevant data. 
  However, despite all the improvements it is difficult to judge the New 
Transparency Register as a significantly better tool, in comparison with the earlier EU 
approach187. First of all, it has to be clear that introduction of the New Transparency 
                                                          
185  Statistic report from the New Transparency Register, January 12, 2012. 
186 ‘Statistics for the Transparency Register - on 10.07.2013 there were 5,834 Registrants in the Register’. 
187  Supra n.183. 
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Register does not represent a transition from soft-law to a binding law. The EU has 
remained on the assumption that soft-law mechanisms could be further improved, and 
that stronger enforcement is not necessary for improvement of transparency, which is 
clear from its official position188 from the time that the Register of Interest 
Representatives was in place.    
  However, this approach can be easily criticized from an economic standpoint, as 
it is widely acknowledged that different regulatory models, especially soft-laws and 
regular laws, create different incentives for the behaviour of regulated parties. Lindstedt 
and Naurin (2010)189 have been investigating the effects of increased transparency on the 
reduction of corruption levels. Their findings indicate that “…transparency requirements 
that are implemented by the agent itself are less effective compared to non-agent controlled 
transparency institutions, such as free press”. Before arriving to this conclusion they had 
divided transparency into transparency controlled by the agent itself and transparency 
which is not under the agent’s immediate control, as the two affect corruption in different 
ways. The conclusion that might be extracted from their results, which is particularly 
interesting for this research, is that transparency measures which are implemented by 
the agent-itself are less efficient than measures enforced by a third party.  
  These findings could be easily replicated with the EU and the New Transparency 
Register, but still, the EU has remained in a position of trust190 with self-enforcement of 
the transparency, in spite of the concerns that came from civil society and academia. 
 
5.3.1. An interpretation of the EU lobbying regulation in regard to this research  
  From the overview of the EU and European national practices, we can also 
derive several important conclusions in regard to the goals of this research: 
 Lobbying regulation activity in European countries is in expansion, but research and 
public debate still lack a sufficient level of expertise on the experiences of other 
                                                          
188 “European Commission Press Release MEMO/08/428” (European Commission, n.d.). 
189 C. Lindstedt and D. Naurin, ‘Transparency Is Not Enough: Making Transparency Effective in Reducing   
Corruption’, International Political Science Review, 31 (2010), 301–322. 
190 “European Commission Press Release MEMO/08/428.” - "The Commission is ready to trust the profession. 
The register offers lobbyists legitimacy and recognition as a profession. With self-declaration, the registrant 
takes responsibility for supplying correct information, and the Commission believes this trust should first be 
tested, before considering the possibility of more binding regulation." 
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countries. At the EU level, the voluntary system shows strong weaknesses in terms of 
securing transparency in lobbying.  
 One of the most active European regions is the Western Balkans, where the most 
recent lobbying regulation has been adopted, while few countries are very close to 
the adoption of laws on lobbying. However, there is practically no research on these 
developments in the Western Balkans, mostly due to linguistic barriers for foreign 
researchers. This research will strongly focus on this region in Chapter IV, since it is 
important to update the international research scene on developments in the most 
active lobbying-regulation environment. 
 Regulation of lobbying on national levels is diverse and often followed by regulatory 
failures. Those failures are insufficiently used as references for other countries which 
tend to regulate lobbying, even though they reveal what are the most common 
weaknesses of lobbying-regulation structures. This research will specifically focus on 
this issue as well. 
 The CPI Index has not yet been applied to the countries of the Western Balkans due 
to the language barrier for the international research community and these 
regulations have not been classified within the Threefold theory of lobbying 
regulations. In this research, CPI scores for the Western Balkan countries will be 
calculated and for the first time offered to the international research community. 
 The lobbying-regulation approach of the EU remains one based mostly on self-
enforcement, even though self-enforced transparency has been criticized in the 
literature. 
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6. Section II: The standard tools for assessment of regulation impact – 
Regulatory Impact Assessment Analysis (RIA) and lobbying regulation 
 
   In general, the RIA procedure is a procedure which developed countries use 
before imposing important regulations. The type, scope and depth of the analysis differ 
from case to case.  
  How exactly can RIA methods contribute to this research? The newborn Cost 
Indicator Index is actually based on a mixture of different methodologies, and one of the 
main pillars on which the CII is erected is RIA. As there is a large number of studies on 
RIA methods and their application, and since RIA approach is the major one when it 
comes to practical regulatory assessment, it would be hard to build any special 
regulatory impact assessment tool without referring to standard RIA procedures.  
  In fact, those procedures could be very useful and could additionally enhance the 
methodological background of the CII. Precisely speaking, RIA is useful in explaining 
what is considered to be a cost and what is a benefit in the practical meaning, and what 
are the options for the assessment of both.      
  In addition, this section will also highlight that classical RIA methods are not so 
useful as comparative tools for assessment of lobbying regulations, because they mostly 
focus on the impacts in a specific context, and often even by expressing monetary values. 
Their diversity and complexity prevents them from being applied broadly and simply, 
like the CPI Index in case of lobbying regulation, and in many cases they are simply not 
applied because they either do not exist or their scope of application is too narrow. 
  However, RIA methodologies can be used to improve understanding of the 
nature of lobbying regulation, and to develop a more specific tool, the Cost Indicator 
Index, which will together with the CPI Index provide better assessment of specific 
regulatory models, but also improve comparative assessment of lobbying regulations. 
   
6.1. What do we use RIA for, and what are the most common methods? 
  The idea behind any RIA is to examine the social, legal and economic effect of a 
regulation. RIA is a tool that provides, usually ex-ante, estimates on benefits or costs or 
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associated risks (or combination of some of them) of specific regulation and enables 
policymakers to make more accountable decisions related to regulation. According to the 
official Impact Assessment Guidance of the UK191, an Impact Assessment is both: 
 A continuous process, consistent with the policy appraisal cycle, as set out in the Green 
Book, to help policymakers to fully think through the reasons for government intervention, 
to weigh up various options for achieving an objective and to understand the consequences 
of a proposed intervention; and  
 A tool used by policymakers to assess and present the likely costs and benefits (monetized as 
far as possible) and the associated risks of a proposal that might have an impact on public, 
private or civil society organizations, following the Green Book’s appraisal and evaluation 
techniques.  
   By conducting an RIA, regulators strive to understand what the actual problem 
is that needs to be addressed by a society192. If the problem exists (social, economic, legal, 
etc.), then alternative approaches are short-listed, and each of them is then examined by 
their cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness nature. Regulators then suggest an optimal 
solution for the problem which may be additionally cross-checked through a cost-benefit 
framework in order to get as precise estimates as possible. In addition, RIAs are applied 
not only for discovering what solution is most efficient in terms of social costs, but also to 
support government’s expertise, due process and accountability.  
  Today, countries use different types of methods to justify their regulatory 
activity. Besides the US, Europe also has its own experience in impact assessment of 
regulations193. Most European countries have some kind of tools for assessment of 
regulation, but those tools differ in many aspects - while the US, and generally, countries 
of Western Europe use a more structured approach based on monetizing, some of the 
                                                          
191 Impact Assessment Guidance – When to Do an Impact Assessment, 2011. 
192 For general information on the topic see R. Baldwin, M. Cave and M. Lodge, Understanding Regulation: 
Theory, Strategy, and Practice (Oxford University Press, 2012); A.I. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form And 
Economic Theory (Clarendon Press, 1994); R.W. Hahn and P.C. Tetlock, ‘Has Economic Analysis Improved 
Regulatory Decisions?’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6789 (2008). 
  193 A. Renda, Impact Assessment in the EU: The State of the Art And the Art of the State  (Brussels: Centre for 
European Policy Studies - CEPS, 2006). 
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Eastern European Countries194 rely on reports of a narrative character195. This is yet 
another obstacle which makes comparisons of lobbying regulations' impact quite 
difficult. Even if the countries would apply their respective RIA, the methodological 
differences would not allow clear and informative comparison. 
  The OECD which intensively works on RIA improvements in its member 
countries196, has classified several main types of RIA, and each of them has its own 
application depending of the type of regulation and impacts that could actually be 
analysed in each case: 
Type of the RIA Description 
Cost-Benefit  
Analysis (CBA) 
Regulation is desirable if estimated benefits exceed the costs. 
Cost-
Effectiveness 
Analysis  
Calculation of costs per unit of benefit achieved. Policies that 
can generate the same or higher benefits at no greater cost 
are preferred. 
Risk Analysis Quantitative assessment of the magnitudes of the risk affected 
by the policy and their associated health consequences. 
Risk-risk 
analysis  
Comprehensive assessment of all risk effects of a policy, 
including those in response to costs, to ensure that on 
balance, the policy reduces risk.  
Cost 
assessment 
Assessment of the costs of regulation on business, consumers 
and workers. May include an attempt to ensure that cost 
levels are not too high.  
  
  Those various types of RIA are mostly conditioned by the nature of costs and 
benefits related to different types of regulations. Thus, in order to understand which 
approach fits best for general examination of the regulation of lobbying, it will be useful 
to analyse expected benefits of lobbying regulation from an Impact Assessment point of 
                                                          
194 PROGRESS IN POLICY REFORM IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE MONITORING INSTRUMENTS, 2001, 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/2408446.pdf. 
195 A. Renda, Law and Economics in the RIA World: Improving the Use of Economic Analysis in Public Policy 
and Legislation (Intersentia, 2011). p.82 
196 Regulatory Impact Analysis - Best Practices in the OECD Countries (1997), 1997. p.176 
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view. Understanding their nature is beneficial for optimal choice of the tools for 
assessment of a lobbying regulation’s impact.  
 
6.2. The nature of the benefits of lobbying regulation 
  In the world of the RIA, the benefits of regulatory intervention should be 
precisely quantified in all situations where this is possible, especially if benefits could be 
monetarily expressed.  Sometimes, impacts could be of a non-economic nature, such as 
social197 and environmental benefits, which are harder to estimate in a monetary sense.  
  In cases where both benefits and costs could be monetized and quantified, it 
would be recommended to conduct as precise as possible a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), 
and to confront those two parameters before regulatory decision.  If benefits dominantly 
exceed costs – the policy could be considered to be desirable. However, the problem with 
application of the CBA, when it comes to lobbying, comes from the nature of the benefits 
associated with lobbying regulation. This is why the nature of lobbying regulation 
benefits has to be clarified in the first place, since it is exactly these conditions which 
determine the choice of an appropriate impact analysis.  
  As outlined in Chapter I of this research where relevant literature was examined 
and in Section I of this Chapter where current tendencies were addressed—the benefits 
associated with the regulation of lobbying could be summarized under the concepts of 
transparency, accountability198 and deliberative democracy. All three elements represent 
non-economic benefits199, and thus, they are very hard to directly assess and measure in 
                                                          
197 For instance, the UK’s IA Toolkit (2011) provides a list of examples of the social impacts such as safety at 
work, education, impacts on human rights, etc.   
198 See for instance RIA report on lobbying regulation in Ireland - Regulatory Impact Analysis in Relation to 
the Regulation of Lobbying Bill (Dublin, Ireland, 2013). 
199 Even the mentioned benefits do not look as economic benefits at first sight; they could be seen as 
important factors which could influence the economy of the lobbying market and the level of social cost. For 
instance, it is still uncertain how increased transparency affects the competition among lobbyists and 
lobbying expenditures (P. Denter, J. Morgan and D. Sisak 2011) which are often seen as inefficient (G. 
Tullock 1967; J. Buchanan et al. 1983; J.C. Heckleman and B. Wilson 2013; G. Stigler 1971; P. 
Denter, J. Morgan and D. Sisak 2011). This illustration just reveals that what is considered to be 
beneficial from political or legal sciences perspective does not necessarily have to be equally beneficial from 
an economic perspective. Hence, more research in this direction would be beneficial for better 
understanding of these relations and design of policies which would take into consideration both important 
dimensions. Even though this research does not provide an explicit answer on these relations, for the first 
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monetary terms. From an RIA perspective, this means that a partial RIA200 could be more 
appropriate for assessing regulatory impacts of lobbying regulations. 
  The benefits of regulations, in general, are usually easy to guess in most cases 
just by looking into the motivation for the intervention stated at the beginning of any 
regulatory procedure.  The only problem remaining is that identified benefits could be 
very difficult to quantify and express monetarily. “However, determining the size of these 
benefits and, in particular, trying to express them in monetary terms can be very difficult. 
This is because many regulatory benefits involve things that do not have an obvious market 
value – such as lives saved, injuries avoided and pollution or environmental degradation 
prevented”201. This is pretty much the case with the regulation of lobbying, where 
societies tend to regulate lobbying almost exclusively driven by non-economic reasons, 
which are by default difficult to monetize and conform to costs that could be more easily 
estimated. 
  Having explained that, the nature of benefits associated with the regulation of 
lobbying suggests that analysis which mostly focuses on cost (cost assessment approach) 
seems to be more optimal than a complete CBA. However, this approach does not mean 
that benefits are completely neglected in the assessment. In fact, the CPI analysis will be 
used as an original method for assessment of benefits associated with lobbying 
regulations, while classical RIA methods will be used to construct a complementary tool 
for the costs assessment. Used together, the CII and the CPI could be considered as a 
special RIA tool for lobbying regulations.    
 
6.3. Cost assessment in practice – the UK’s Cost Compliance Assessment as an 
example 
  Due to the scope of this research, it will be inutile to review all existing methods 
in Europe. Instead, focus will be given to the UK Impact Assessment procedure (one of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
time it discusses in detail the economic costliness of regulation of lobbying which is also an important 
contribution in the direction of economic analysis of regulation of lobbying.  
200 Partial RIA could be the one that refocuses only on cost or only on benefits. A business impact analysis or 
cost effectiveness analysis could be a partial RIA, for instance. 
201 Introductory Handbook for Undertaking Regulatory Impact Analysis (OECD Publishing, 2008)., p.13. 
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the previous versions applied in the UK) which was among the pioneering ones in the 
Europe, and which focuses mostly on costs borne by regulations. 
  It has to be mentioned that this analysis is not a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA), but 
more a partial impact analysis which focuses mostly on costs, while leaving benefits aside 
due to their hardly measured nature. The reason why some countries use a partial CBA 
(regularly or sometimes) is that in some cases, like in the case of lobbying, benefits might 
be pretty difficult to monetize. Furthermore, this analysis helps regulators to estimate 
how large the burden of regulation is, both on the private and public sector.  
  The UK has pioneered the use of RIA in Europe, almost immediately after the US 
(1985)202, by adopting and institutionalizing the Impact Assessment procedures for 
upcoming laws, which should estimate in a monetary sense all feasible economic and 
social costs and benefits. This means that all proposals which affect the private sector 
and third parties are subject to examination, unless they go below a specifically 
prescribed threshold.  
  Even though the UK kept improving Impact Assessment procedures over time 
(from a Cost Compliance Analysis to a more complete CBA), the one which is most 
interesting for this research is the Compliance Cost Assessment approach, which 
dominated the UK’s Impact Assessment methodology before the latest changes were 
introduced in Impact Assessment documents in 2011203.  
  The UK Compliance Cost Analysis (CCA) is a method used to determine the 
actual cost of compliance of the industry, but it also focuses on non-economic impacts 
such as social and environmental parameters.  The analysis is applied both on primary 
and secondary legislation (which is wider in scope than the US RIA). 
  This CCA tool used the UK is a tool for both qualitative and quantitative impact 
analysis. The structure of the CCA is based on the following steps 204: 
 Title: name of the proposed measure; indication of whether the CCA is draft or final. 
                                                          
202 Which is currently run by a special executive organ – the BRI (Better Regulation Executive). The BRI has 
to run, as early as possible, an Impact Assessment analysis for any regulation that creates costs to third 
parties.  
203 Those changes are defined in the Impact Assessment Guidance – When to Do an Impact Assessment 
(2011)., The Impact Assessment Toolkit (2011); ‘Impact Assessment Overview’, 2011; Green Book - Appraisal 
and Evaluation in Central Government (London, 2003, updated in 2011). 
204 Regulatory Impact Analysis - Best Practices in the OECD Countries (1997)., p.60. 
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 Purpose: describe the purpose of the proposed measure and its intended effects. 
 Options: describe the alternative approaches to achieving the objectives and say why these 
were not favoured. 
 Sectors: identify the business sectors or types of business likely to be affected; estimate the 
total number of businesses involved; comment on the numbers of small firms or self-
employed in the sector. 
 Consultation: show what sources were used and describe any consultations with business, 
including the length of time allowed for responses. 
 Business costs: estimate the compliance costs for a ‘‘typical’’ business in each of the specific 
sectors identified. Costs are split into ‘‘recurring’’ or on-going costs and ‘‘non-recurring’’ or 
one-off costs. Recurring costs include staff costs, consumable materials, inspection and 
periodic license fees, and enforcement. Non-recurring costs include investment in plant and 
machinery, buildings and infrastructure, legal and consultancy fees, training, redundancy 
and IT. 
 SMEs: carry out a specific assessment of the impact on small firms (the Small Business 
Litmus Test). 
 Sector costs: summarize the total estimated compliance costs for all specific sectors or 
types of business likely to be affected. 
  Competitiveness: Describe any effects on the competitive position of UK-based businesses 
in domestic, EU or other markets. 
 Monitoring: state how and when compliance costs will be monitored. 
 Enquiries: provide a contact point for comments. 
  These steps were undertaken every time before a proposal reaches the Council 
of Ministers, but also before it reaches public consultation procedure. This approach 
allows a monetary estimation205 of regulatory cost-effects on third parties and entire 
industries. Since the UK is planning to adopt some type of lobbying rules in the near 
                                                          
205 This estimation is actually made based on the feedback of the Industry, which according to UK 
experience tends to provide reliable information. “Experience has shown that business is much more likely to 
supply good information on costs if departments themselves provide initial cost estimates, no matter how 
rough and ready. We strongly recommend that departments provide such estimates in early CCA drafts and 
that these be circulated for critical comment as part of the consultation process.” Regulatory Impact Analysis 
– best practices in the OECD Countries (1997), p.63. 
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future, it is going to be very interesting to see the results of a more complete CBA analysis 
for a lobbying law.  
  The structure of this CCA is shown in detail, as it might serve as a starting point 
for the creation of cost-indicators for the analysis of lobbying regulation. At its core, it 
strongly focuses on estimation of costs that might be caused by regulation. Also, the 
benchmarks, such as type of the costs and size of the industry, might be well used to build 
up the Cost Indicator Index for lobbying regulation, combined together with some 
additional existing methods and tools. 
  In the case of analysis of a lobbying regulation by this CCA, the method would 
need to be improved by also introducing costs related to the public side, which is 
responsible for enforcement and monitoring of lobbying regulation compliance. Only 
with such an improvement might this technique be used for the development of the cost 
indicators for lobbying regulation since lobbying rules tend to be burdensome both for 
the private and the public sector. And this has to be taken into consideration from the 
very beginning.  
 
6.4. The depth of the analysis – the principle of proportionality in the 
application of Impact Analysis 
  There is an additional important issue to consider in regard to lobbying 
regulation impact assessment strategy. Lobbying regulation is not a common regulation 
that appears in all countries, but rather a specific regulation that only some countries 
have adopted so far. This means that it is not a necessary and important as regulation on 
public finances, banking, stock markets, medical practice, etc. 
  Interpretation of this particularity means that, when adopting lobbying laws, 
most countries do not need to take fully detailed CBA in adoption of lobbying regulation. 
This approach is also clearly stated in the previously mentioned UK’s Impact Assessment 
Toolkit (2011). This Toolkit also deals with proportionality, which refers to “appropriate 
level of resources to invest in gathering and analyzing data for appraisals end evaluations”, 
which depends on factors such as: the level of interest and sensitivity surrounding the 
policy; the degree to which the policy is novel; the scale, duration and distribution of 
expected impacts; the level of uncertainty, etc. 
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  This said, it can be suggested that in cases of a particular regulation, which does 
not have so direct and significant an impact on the overall economy and society, a 
complete and detailed RIA is not necessary. Not only that, but in lobbying regulation 
terms it is usually going to be a partial RIA due to specific non-monetary benefits. 
However, the level of depth and effort also does not need to be at the maximum, 
especially if one talks on national levels in Europe.  
  Hence, one of the main guidelines in creation of general cost indicators for 
lobbying is exactly this one – the level of depth, which does not have to be the most 
detailed one, but rather a level of an indicative nature. In any case, a more detailed 
explanation of the level of depth is going to be given in the next Chapter. This section only 
explained the rationale upon which the optimal level of depth for assessment of lobbying 
regulations is determined. 
 
6.5.  Problem of methodological diversity of RIAs – the scope and application of     
RIA on the regulation of lobbying. 
   Another important limitation of RIAs is that they usually methodologically differ 
over countries, or they are not applied at all in some of them206. Renda (2011) also 
highlights this problem: “That said, RIA systems worldwide differ widely on a number of 
key dimensions such as the scope of the procedure, the purpose for which it was adopted, 
the methodology and the degree of quantification in the analysis of the impacts, the overall 
governance of the system and the effective volume of RIA documents that have been 
produced”207. The author (Renda, 2011) also stresses that the motivation for the 
introduction of RIAs is significantly different, ranging from motives of rational 
policymaking (the US), over-deregulation (Scandinavian cases) to a very symbolic politics 
(the EU and the UK).  
                                                          
206 “Although some developing countries are beginning to apply some form of regulatory assessment, their 
methods are generally incomplete and not applied systematically across policy areas” (Kirkpatrick, Parker and 
Zhang, 2003). - from: Regulatory Impact Analysis in OECD Countries Challenges for Developing Countries 
(2005). p3. 
207 A. Renda, Law and Economics in the RIA World: Improving the Use of Economic Analysis in Public Policy 
and Legislation., p.18  
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  Thus, RIAs divergence in terms of methodology and motives prevents this 
technique from being effectively used for comparison of lobbying legislatures in a simple 
and informative perspective. 
 
6.6. Application of RIA in the US – a problem of the scope of RIA from a lobbying 
regulation perspective 
  In a previous section, it was explained that the US has the most experience in the 
regulation of lobbying. However, it is interesting and significant to note that the US 
(federal level) has not made any profound estimation of the impacts of the introduction 
of lobbying legislature. Even though RIA is applied in the US, its limited scope has left 
lobbying rules outside of the analysis, while only a few brief impact reports have been 
released by the Congress. In the following lines, a brief history of US RIA development 
and application will be examined with their relation to existing lobbying rules.  
  RIA in the US208 was firstly introduced in the 1980s under President Reagan’s 
administration, continued to be developed and modified under the administrations of 
Presidents Bush (Sr.), Clinton and Bush (Jr.), and it is also an important pillar in the US 
regulatory activity even today209. 
                                                          
208 For a general overview of RIA in a theoretical sense see C. Radaelli and F. De F., Regulatory Impact 
Assessment (Oxford University Press, 2010); Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, 
Strategy, and Practice; A. Renda, Law and Economics in the RIA World: Improving the Use of Economic 
Analysis in Public Policy and Legislation; J. Froud and A. Ogus, “Rational Social Regulation and Compliance-
Cost Assessment,” Public Administration 74, no. 2 (1996): 221–237. For  comparative studies on RIA see 
reports of the OECD: Regulatory Policy in OECD Countries – from Interventionism to Regulatory Governance 
(2002); Regulatory Impact Analysis in OECD Countries Challenges for Developing Countries (2005); Indicators 
of Regulatory Management Systems (2007); Building an Institutional Framework for Regulatory Impact 
Analysis (RIA): Guidance for Policy Makers (2008); Introductory Handbook for Undertaking Regulatory Impact 
Analysis (RIA) (2008); Regulatory Performance: Ex-post Evaluation of Regulatory Tools and Institutions 
(2004); Determinants of Quality in Regulatory Impact Analysis (2006); Methodological Guidance and 
Frameworks of RIA (2007); Regulatory Impact Analysis - Best Practices in the OECD Countries (1997).  
209 We can find the continuation of this policy even today within the administration under the President 
Obama. Section I of Executive Order 13563 from January 2011 states: Section 1. - General Principles of 
Regulation (a): “Our regulatory system must protect public health, welfare, safety, and our environment while 
promoting economic growth, innovation, competitiveness, and job creation. It must be based on the best 
available science. It must allow for public participation and an open exchange of ideas. It must promote 
predictability and reduce uncertainty. It must identify and use the best, most innovative, and least burdensome 
tools for achieving regulatory ends. It must take into account benefits and costs, both quantitative and 
qualitative. It must ensure that regulations are accessible, consistent, written in plain language, and easy to 
understand. It must measure and seek to improve, the actual results of regulatory requirements”  - Executive 
Order 13563 (White House - EO, n.d.).  
82
76 
 
  The RIA procedure in the US210 has certain limits when it comes to its scope, 
which is especially important for the regulation of lobbying.  The main problem is that it 
is not automatically applicable to all legislation, but only to regulations created by federal 
agencies. This means that bill proposals by the US Congress, like lobbying legislation, are 
not subject to the RIA procedure. 
  The regulations that are subject to the RIA, further on, have to have a character 
of significant regulatory action in order to be examined by RIA. Details on what should be 
considered as significant are given in EO 12866: 
‘‘Significant regulatory action’’ means any regulatory action that is likely to result in a rule 
that may: (1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely 
affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, 
jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or 
communities; (2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken 
or planned by another agency; (3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, 
grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or (4) 
Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President’s priorities, or 
the principles set forth in this Executive order. 
  As one can see from the rules issued in EO 12866, the RIA is not applied 
automatically and there are clear rules when it is going to be applied. According to the 
limits mentioned in EO 12866, and the fact that lobbying rules have been adopted in a 
regular legislative procedure and not introduced by independent agencies, except the 
rules created by EO 13563, the RIA has not been applied in cases of lobbying disclosure 
rules in the US so far. Hence, even the US, which has the largest lobbying regulations 
tradition, has not built lobbying rules on the basis of RIA. 
  However, when it comes to impact analysis of lobbying rules, one of the rare 
official impact analyses that has been conducted and released is the report “Lobbying 
Registration and Disclosure: Before and After the Enactment of the Honest Leadership and 
                                                          
210 Executive Order 12866 (White House - EO, 1993); Executive Order 13258 (White House - EO, 2002); 
Executive Order 13422 (White House - EO, 2007); Executive Order 13563 (White House - EO, 2011). 
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Open Government Act of 2007”,211 but this analysis does not include any economic 
indication of the cost of the new lobbying rules from 2007 nor any other lobbying rules 
before, because the Congress has been left outside of the scope of the RIA, as already 
mentioned. This report mostly deals with the comparison of previous and new lobbying 
rules in terms of introduced changes and compliance levels. 
  This does not necessarily mean that Congress is not interested in having at least 
some type of cost-estimation for bill proposals. In fact, as Renda (2011) noticed, the 
Congress actually runs its own cost-estimation for almost all bills it deals with through 
the Congressional Budget Office. Even though the methods used in this case are much 
simpler, they serve as navigation tool for decision-makers to get an idea about the cost of 
proposals, and their gross burden on the federal budget. 
  There is an additional, but similar, type of brief impact analysis done for the 
current lobbying regulation - Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (2007). It is a 
2-page report212 which gives an estimate of the cost of the HLOGA in a very broad way: 
“Subject to the availability of appropriated funds, CBO estimates that implementing the bill 
would increase administrative costs of the House of Representatives and the Senate by less 
than $500,000 a year.  Enacting the bill would not affect direct spending or revenues. The 
bill contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act (UMRA) and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments. H.R. 2317 
would impose private-sector mandates, as defined in UMRA, on the lobbying industry.  The 
bill would require registered lobbyists that bundle contributions to submit additional 
reports and disclosures to the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives.  The bill also would require those lobbyists to notify the recipients of those 
bundled contributions about their intent to file a report on such contributions.  Based on 
information from the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House, CBO estimates that 
the aggregate direct cost of all of those mandates would fall below the annual threshold 
                                                          
211 J.R. Straus, Lobbying Registration and Disclosure: Before and After the Enactment of the Honest Leadership 
and Open Government Act of 2007, 2011. 
212  H.R. 2317 - Lobbying Transparency Act of 2007. 
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established by UMRA for private-sector mandates ($131 million213 in 2007, adjusted 
annually for inflation)”. 
  This report was probably the only estimate made by US authorities regarding 
the cost-impact of the HLOGA both on the private sector (below the annual threshold of 
the UMRA) and the public sector (approximately $500,000). It represents a rough 
estimation, but it provides an overall view of the burden of the regulation of lobbying in 
the case of the HLOGA.  
  The US approach indicates that lobbying regulation is not considered as a 
particularly costly one. It also confirms the assumption that enforcement costs and 
compliance cost214 are not analysed in-depth even in countries with a long tradition of 
lobbying regulation. Actually, costliness of a regulation is a relative term. In the case of 
the US, it is not as costly compared to the size of the sector that is the subject of the 
regulation and the size of the US federal budget. In smaller countries, such are Slovenia, 
Macedonia, Lithuania and Montenegro, $500,000 would have an entirely different 
meaning. 
  Even though the RIA procedure in the US was introduced for better 
policymaking by adopting policies with the lowest possible cost, and even though 
estimated yearly savings were approximated to the amount of $20 billion, part of the 
academic community was not as optimistic about its effect, and they even claimed that 
the regulatory burden kept rising over the time215.  
  From the short overview of the application of the RIA in the US with regards to 
lobbying regulation, two important conclusions emerge: 
 Firstly, the RIA in the US suffers from important imperfections when it comes to the 
scope and application on lobbying rules. In addition, part of the academic community 
was sceptical about its ability to properly assess actual cost and benefits.  
                                                          
213 The threshold for 2011 was set to be $144 million - http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43151, but since it 
moved up, the HLOGA impact on private-sector mandates could be even farther from the new threshold. 
214 The only part of the report that deals with compliance costs estimates costs in a quite deliberative way: 
“Because the bill would require quarterly (rather than semi-annual) reporting, it would increase the number of 
reports filed by registered lobbyists. Since such entities already collect the information requested in the 
disclosure reports, however, CBO estimates that the incremental costs associated with the new reporting 
requirements in the bill would be minimal.” 
215 A. Renda, Law and Economics in the RIA World: Improving the Use of Economic Analysis in Public Policy 
and Legislation. p.40. 
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 Secondly, since lobbying regulation (the actual one - HLOGA from 2007) was under 
legislative competence of the US Congress, no RIA has been specifically dealing with 
it. The only official document that provided some estimates was the report prepared 
by the Congressional Budget Office, which only provided a rough estimate on the cost 
of the HLOGA. It is impossible to say precisely how much the estimates were, but 
they were expected to be under the specific threshold (under $131 million for the 
public sector) and about $500,000 for the private sector. Since closer estimates are 
not available, it is hard to establish a more precise relation of the cost (compliance 
and enforcement) and the benefits (level of strength), and consequently, to discuss 
the efficiency of the regulatory model. 
  On the other hand, this rough estimation reveals an additional issue related to 
the measurement of the economic impact of lobbying regulation. It suggests that benefits 
are extremely difficult to measure, since the only ones ever measured ex-post were 
compliance levels within the Congressional report216 which states its purpose clearly: 
“This report focuses on changes made to lobbying registration, termination, and disclosure 
requirements and provides analysis of the volume of registration, termination, and 
disclosure reports filed with the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of 
the Senate before and after the HLOGA’s passage”. This method might be used to indicate 
compliance levels, but not to indicate the level of transparency relative to a compliance 
level. This is why the CPI still remains the best tool when it comes to lobbying regulations 
benefits measurement. 
  Another important issue related to costs is that they were also difficult to 
measure precisely for the private side217, which confirms the deliberative estimation in 
                                                          
216 J.R. Straus, Supra n.211. 
217 Since public finances all around the world are under pressure, there are even ideas that the large part of 
costs, which would have been normally public, gets transferred to the private side.  This tendency could be 
found in the approach of the UK. The HM Government, Consultation paper - “Introducing a statutory 
Register of Lobbyists”, January 2012: “Public finances are under unprecedented pressure at the moment, and 
there are no public funds set aside for a register. The Government proposes that the cost of running the register 
and meeting any ancillary costs arising from it should be met on a self-funding basis by the lobbying industry. 
Experience of other registers (see Annex A for examples) suggests that individual registration, in return for an 
initial and then annual registration fee, provides a practical and effective basis for funding a register. The 
actual cost of running the register would depend on how many registrants there were, the range of 
information the register held, how often it was updated and what (if any) further responsibilities, such as the 
‘policing’ of industry standards, the register’s operator was given.” This approach, in fact, is clearly advising 
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the above-mentioned report218. Thus, the results were more of an indication than a 
precise estimation, but it seems that the indication is not such a bad option if confronted 
with a complicated and more costly RIA which also has its own problems, as shown 
before. The option of the US CBO to conduct a brief study does not have to be necessarily 
related with insufficient RIA methodology but with the issue of analysis depth. Since the 
HLOGA was estimated to have no so significant effect, the depth of analysis remained 
quite simple and non-systematic. By introducing the CII scale, the level will still remain 
simple but more systematic and useful for comparative application over different 
regulations within single or different jurisdictions.  
  Further on, this means that development of the Cost-Indicator Index might be 
quite useful for quicker comparisons and indication of the costs of lobbying regulation 
based on specific cost-indicators, like in the case of the CPI Index.  
 
7. Section III: Tools for (comparative) assessment of lobbying regulation 
  
7.1. What is the CPI index and when do we use it? 
   Lobbying regulation, like any other regulation, can be the subject of a regulatory 
impact assessment analysis under the impact assessment procedure of any jurisdiction. 
But besides regular procedures adopted by different countries,  the scientific community 
was also continuously interested in debating lobbying regulations, and it developed 
several tools that are used to qualitatively or quantitatively assess the specific impacts of 
lobbying rules – stringency, restrictiveness, strength or the direction of rules evolution 
over time. These methods were, unfortunately, rarely used by countries219 for impact 
assessment of their lobbying rules, even though some of the methods could be 
successfully used for an ex-ante impact assessment of the benefits of lobbying 
regulations.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
shifting the cost of operation of the registry to the private side, while running the register should be 
delegated to the public side. It is an interesting mechanism, as most of the registers are either fully funded 
and managed by the public side or they are voluntary – funded and maintained by the private side. 
However, a similar approach has been discussed in Serbia as well. 
218 Under $500,000 for the public and under specific threshold for the private side ($131 million). 
219 R.W. Hahn and P.C. Tetlock, “Has Economic Analysis Improved Regulatory Decisions?” (2008). 
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As lobbying regulations started to emerge firstly in the US, this country was the 
first one where pioneer academic tools for the assessment of lobbying regulation were 
developed. Even though the CPI Index represents the most widely and commonly used 
tool, a few other tools developed before that have to be mentioned. 
   The first one is the Opheim’s Index220 for measurement of the stringency of 
lobbying regulation through three different dimensions: the scope of definition of the 
lobbyist, the degree of disclosure and the level of enforcement. This index mainly shows 
that the stringency of lobbying regulation depends on the administrative capacity of the 
legislators, and that better administrative capacity allows legislators to be less dependent 
on lobbyists, but it hardly provides any information on the relation of stringency and the 
cost of the lobbying regulation.  
   The second important tool—Brinig et al. Index221, which was developed shortly 
afterwards—was more focused on measuring the restrictiveness of lobbying regulations. 
The authors observe lobbying regulation as a screening mechanism (regulation creates 
entry costs) that allows regulators to distinguish high-demanders for access from low-
demanders for access. As complying with regulation is assumed to be costly, those who 
comply also indicate their “willingness to pay” to influence regulations, and enable 
regulators to screen and identify more reliable partners in the legislative process.  
   The third interesting tool is Newmark’s Index222 which analyses how lobbying 
has been changing over time in the US, and its application suggests that lobbying 
regulation was getting stricter and more complex over time in most jurisdictions in the 
US. In essence, it cannot be used for the optimization of lobbying law structures. 
The most important one was already mentioned—the CPI Index that got its name 
after the institution that developed it: the Center for Public Integrity223. This Index 
represents an evolution from Opheim’s and Brinig et al.’s indices in the sense that it has 
the ability to more deeply and systematically evaluate lobbying regulations. The CPI has 
                                                          
220 Got its name after Cynthia Opheim who introduced this tool in 1991: C. Opheim, “Explaining the 
Differences in State Lobby Regulation,” Political Research Quarterly 44, no. 2, 405–421. 
221 M.F. Brinig, R.G. Holcombe, and L. Schwartzstein, “The Regulation of Lobbyists,” Public Choice 77 (1993). 
222 A.J. Newmark, “Personal Relationships and Information Provision in State Lobbying: The Nature of 
Relationships and the Factors Affecting Them (Thesis),” 2003; A.J. Newmark, “Measuring State Legislative 
Lobbying Regulation, 1990–2003,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly (2005). 
223 http://www.iwatchnews.org/.   
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developed this index through a procedure named “Hired Guns” (2003) – a ranking system 
that assigns a score to each state based on a survey containing a series of questions 
regarding state lobbying disclosure224.  
This index focuses on the measurement of the strength of lobbying regulation 
through scores that are assigned by answering 48 questions, within eight specific areas 
(unlike Opheim’s which focuses on three): 
 Definition of lobbyists (7 points maximum) 
 Individual registration (19 points maximum) 
 Individual spending disclosure (29 points maximum) 
 Employer spending disclosure (5 points maximum) 
 Electronic filling (3 points maximum) 
 Public access (20 points maximum) 
 Enforcement (15 points maximum) 
 Revolving door provision (2 points maximum) 
         The “strength” refers to transparency and accountability that are, as explained 
before, generally perceived to be the main motives for the introduction of lobbying 
regulation. Both terms, from the perspective of RIA, can be seen as non-monetary 
benefits of the regulation of lobbying. Depending on the answers, the maximum amount 
of points attributed to one regulation is 100, which means that the lobbying rules are 
expected to provide the highest possible level of transparency and accountability. Also, 
all scores above 70 are considered to be very good, from 69-60 moderate and below 60 
are unsatisfactory. This Index, however, does not provide any information on the 
costliness of different transparency levels; it simply provides an indication of regulatory 
strength.  
 At the same time, this is its main weakness from the RIA perspective. It only 
looks at the strength component, which can be associated with the benefits of lobbying 
regulations, but it completely neglects the cost component, which is equally important. 
Hence, the main contribution of this research is that it offers a solution to this problem 
and a tool which focuses on the costs while complementing the CPI analysis.  
                                                          
224 http://www.iwatchnews.org/2003/05/15/5914/methodology.   
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 Firstly, this index was applied in the US to all states and on the federal level. The 
results of this analysis indicated that the highest score in the US was Washington State 
with 87 points, while Pennsylvania ended up with 0 as there were are no lobbying rules 
in place at the time of analysis.  
 Besides its application to the US, it was also applied over some European 
regulations (Chari, Murphy and Hogan 2007; 2010). These results indicate, for instance, 
the quite modest and rather low strength level of Hungarian lobbying rules which were 
consequently recently abandoned (score 45), Lithuania (score 44), Poland (score 27), 
European Commission-old register (score 24), European Parliament (score 15), Germany 
(score 17).  
 All these results were taken based on ex-post evaluation of existing lobbying 
laws or rules. Laws from Macedonia, Slovenia and Montenegro still have not been subject 
to CPI analysis nor have proposals from Serbia and Croatia. Even though ex-post analysis 
provides some information on the quality of regulation, doing it ex-ante would be more 
useful as it would allow regulators to estimate the strength before they actually adopt the 
law, which may prevent regulatory failure, like in the cases of Macedonia, Montenegro 
and Hungary. Thus, this tool has great potential to be used not only for regulatory 
rankings, but also for practical policymaking, and that is why it is useful to explain how it 
is applied. In the table below are systemized CPI questions and scoring explanations that 
are used for analysis: 
 
Table 1 - The CPI Index 
 DEFINITION OF LOBBYIST  
1. In addition to legislative lobbyists, does the definition recognize executive 
branch lobbyists?   
No – 0 points; Yes – 3 points 
2. How much does an individual have to make/spend to qualify as a lobbyist 
or to prompt registration as a lobbyist, according to the definition?                      
More than $500 made/spent – 0 points; More than $100 made/spent – 1 point; 
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More than $50 made/spent – 2 points; $50 or less made/spent – 3 points; 
Lobbyists qualify and must register no matter how much money made/spent – 4 
points 
 INDIVIDUAL REGISTRATION 
3. Is a lobbyist required to file a registration form?                                                             
No – 0 points; Yes – 3 points 
4. How many days can lobbying take place before registration is required?            
16 or more days – 0 points; 11 to 15 days – 1 point; 6 to 10 days – 2 points; 1 to 5 
days – 3 points; 0 days – 4 points 
5. Is subject matter or bill number to be addressed by a lobbyist required on 
registration forms?                                                                                                                         
No bill number/subject matter required – 0 points; Subject matter only required 
– 1 point; Bill number required – 3 points 
6. How often is registration by a lobbyist required?                                                            
Once only – 0 points; Every two years – 1 point; Annually or more often – 2 points 
7. Within how many days must a lobbyist notify the oversight agency of 
changes in registration?                                                                                                               
16 – or more days – 0 points; 11 – 15 days – 1 point; 6 – 10 days – 2 points; 1 – 5 
days – 3 points; 0 days – 4 points 
8. Is a lobbyist required to submit a photograph with registration?                            
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
9. Is a lobbyist required to identify by name each employer on the registration 
form?                                                                                                        
No – 0 points; Yes – 1point 
10. Is a lobbyist required to include on the registration form any additional 
information about the type of lobbying work he or she does (i.e., 
compensated or non-compensated/contract or salaried)?                                         
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No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
 INDIVIDUAL SPENDING DISCLOSURE  
11. Is a lobbyist required to file a spending report?                                                               
No – 0 points; Yes – 3 points 
12. How often during each two-year cycle is a lobbyist required to report 
spending?                                                                                                                           
0 to 3 filings – 0 points; 4 to 6 filings – 1 point; 7 to 9 filings – 2 points; 10 or more 
filings – 3 points 
13. Is compensation/salary required to be reported by a lobbyist on spending 
reports?                                                                                                       
 No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 
14. Are summaries (totals) of spending classified by category types (i.e., gifts, 
entertainment, postage, etc.)?                                                                                                   
No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 
15. What spending must be itemized?                                                                                          
No spending required to be itemized – 0 points; More than $100 – 1 point; More 
than $25 – 2 points; $25 and below – 3 points; All spending required to be 
itemized – 4 points 
16. Is the lobbyist employer/principal on whose behalf the itemized 
expenditure was made required to be identified?                                                           
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
17. Is the recipient of the itemized expenditure required to be identified?                
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
18. Is the date of the itemized expenditure required to be reported?                            
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
19. Is a description of the itemized expenditure required to be reported?                 
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No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
20. Is subject matter or bill number to be addressed by a lobbyist required on 
spending reports?                                                                                                                           
No bill number/subject matter required – 0 points; Subject matter only required 
– 1 point; Bill number required – 3 points 
21. Is spending on household members of public officials by a lobbyist required 
to be reported?                                                                                                                                 
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
22. 
 
Is a lobbyist required to disclose direct business associations with public 
officials, candidates or members of their households?                                                  
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
23. What is the statutory provision for a lobbyist giving and reporting gifts?            
Gifts are not reported – 0 points; Gifts are reported – 1 point; Gifts are limited and 
reported – 2 points; Gifts are prohibited – 3 points 
24. What is the statutory provision for a lobbyist giving and reporting 
campaign contributions?                                                                                                             
Campaign contributions allowed and not required to be disclosed on spending 
report/prohibited during session – 0 points; Campaign contributions allowed and 
not required to be disclosed on spending report/allowed during session – 0 
points; Campaign contributions allowed and required to be disclosed on spending 
report/prohibited during session – 1 point; Campaign contributions allowed and 
required to be disclosed on spending report/allowed during session – 1 point; 
Campaign contributions prohibited – 2 points 
25. Is a lobbyist who has done no spending during a filing period required to 
make a report of no activity?                                                                                                     
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
26. Is an employer or principal of a lobbyist required to file a spending report?     
No – 0 point; Yes – 3 points 
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27. Is compensation/salary required to be reported on employer/principal 
spending reports?                                                                                                                           
No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 
 ELECTRONIC FILLING  
28. Does the oversight agency provide lobbyists/employers with online 
registration?                                                                                                                   
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
29. Does the oversight agency provide lobbyists/employers with online 
spending reporting?                                                                                                                       
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
30. Does the oversight agency provide training about how to file 
registrations/spending reports electronically?                                                                
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
 PUBLIC ACCESS  
31. Location/format of registrations or active lobbyist directory:                             
Photocopies from office only – 1 point; PDF or image files on the Web – 2 points; 
Searchable database on the Web – 3 points; Downloadable files/database – 4 
points 
32. Location/format of spending reports:                                                                              
Photocopies from office only – 1 point; PDF or image files on the Web – 2 points; 
Searchable database on the Web – 3 points; Downloadable files/database – 4 
points 
33. Cost of copies:                                                                                                                                   
25 cents or more per page – 0 points; Less than 25 cents per page – 1 point 
34. Are sample registration forms/spending reports available on the Web?             
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
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35. Does the state agency provide an overall lobbying spending total by year?        
No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 
36. Does the state agency provide an overall lobbying spending total by 
spending-report deadlines?                                                                                                       
No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 
37. Does the state agency provide an overall lobbying spending total by 
industries lobbyists represent?                                                                                                
No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 
38. How often are lobby lists updated?                                                                                         
Semi-annually or less often – 1 point; Monthly – 2 points; Weekly – 3 points; Daily 
– 4 points 
 ENFORCEMENT 
39. Does the state have statutory auditing authority?                                                           
No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 
40. Does the state agency conduct mandatory reviews or audits?                                   
No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 
41. Is there a statutory penalty for late filing of lobby registration form?                   
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
42. Is there a statutory penalty for late filing of a lobby spending report?                  
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
43. When was a penalty for late filing of a lobby spending report last levied?           
More than 5 years – 0 points; 4 to 5 years – 1 point; 2 to 3 years – 2 points; 0 to 1 
year – 3 points 
44. Is there a statutory penalty for incomplete filing of a lobby registration 
form?  
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
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45. Is there a statutory penalty for incomplete filing of a lobby spending report?   
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
46. When was a penalty for incomplete filing of a lobby spending report last 
levied?                                      
More than 5 years – 0 points; 4 to 5 years – 1 point; 2 to 3 years – 2 points; 0 to 1 
year/agency does not accept incomplete filings – 3 points 
47. Does the state publish a list of delinquent filers either on the Web or in a 
printed document?                                                                                                                         
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
 REVOLVING DOOR PROVISION 
48. Is there a “cooling off” period required before legislators can register as 
lobbyists? 
No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 
 
  The structure of the CPI is simple, but nevertheless, it is a structured and user-
friendly tool, which is important especially for policymakers who might think of using it 
in their analysis. From this reason, the CII index, which is going to be introduced in 
following chapters, will mimic its structure in order to stay as compatible and simple as 
possible, which should result in an increase of its policymaking potential.  
  
7.2. Classification of lobbying regulations 
 In the theory of lobbying regulation, it is generally accepted that the CPI method 
represents the most useful tool when it comes to the assessment of lobbying rules225. It 
not only allows the strength indication of formal rules to be assessed – binding laws 
(Poland, Lithuania, etc.), and soft-law mechanisms (The EU Commission and the EU 
                                                          
225  R. Chari, J. Hogan, and G. Murphy, “Regulating Lobbyists: A Comparative Analysis of the United States, 
Canada, Germany and the European Union.”, p.3 
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Parliament), but it also allows very simple and informative comparisons between 
different solutions and their respective impacts on strength.  
 Due to these reasons, the CPI methodology was additionally used to create 
classification of lobbying regulations based on their strength, and independent of their 
nature – soft or binding law. The Threefold classification was developed by Chari et al. 
(2009, 2010) with the intention to systemize common trends in the development of rules 
for lobbying regulation. This classification divides lobbying regulations into those 
belonging to low-regulation systems, medium-regulation systems and high-regulation 
systems, based on the strength. Also, it reveals common elements for each of the systems 
in a qualitative sense and strives to offer a qualitative footprint for each of three 
categories: 
 
Table 2 - The Threefold theory of lobbying regulations 
 Low-regulation 
systems 
Medium-
regulation 
Systems 
High-regulation 
systems 
Registration  
regulation  
Rules on individual 
registration, but few 
details required  
Rules on 
individual 
registration, more 
details required 
Rules on individual 
registration are 
extremely rigorous 
Spending 
Disclosure 
No rules on 
individual spending 
disclosure, or 
employer spending 
disclosure 
Some regulations 
on individual 
spending 
disclosure; non-
employer 
spending 
disclosure  
Tight regulations on 
individual spending 
disclosure, and 
employer spending 
disclosure 
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Electronic  
filling  
Weak online 
registration and 
paperwork required 
Robust system for 
online 
registration; no 
paperwork 
necessary 
Robust system for 
online registration; no 
paperwork necessary 
Public access  List of lobbyists 
available, but not 
detailed, or updated 
frequently 
List of lobbyist 
available, detailed 
and updated 
frequently 
List of lobbyists and 
their spending 
disclosure available; 
detailed and updated 
frequently 
Enforcement   Little enforcement 
capabilities invested 
in the state agency 
In theory, state 
agency possesses 
enforcement 
capabilities, 
though 
infrequently used 
State agency can, and 
does, conduct 
mandatory 
reviews/audits 
Revolving 
door  
No cooling-off period 
before former 
legislators can 
register as lobbyists 
There is a cooling-
off period before 
former legislators 
can register as 
lobbyists 
There is a cooling-off 
period before former 
legislators can register 
as lobbyists  
 
 Low-regulation systems are those with CPI scores up to 29, medium-regulated 
systems up from 30 to 59 and high-regulated systems from 60 to 100. Besides 
quantitative belonging to the specific category, regulations within one of three ranges 
were also found to have common qualitative characteristics which is shown in the upper 
table226. 
  The authors also highlight that “high” does not necessarily means better and vice 
versa. This reserve confirms that for judging the entire impact of lobbying rules, 
                                                          
226  R. Chari, J. Hogan, and G. Murphy, “Lobbying Regulation Across Four Continents: Promoting 
Transparency?”. 
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additional criteria may be necessary, and this additional criteria might be found in 
comparison of the strength criteria (benefits) to the cost criteria  (cost indication for 
lobbying regulation) - which is exactly what this research wants to offer. 
 
7.3. Limits of the CPI method: ex-ante or only ex-post application? 
 The main problem with the CPI methodology, and the Threefold classification 
directly linked to it, is that they provide just one kind of information on the impact of 
lobbying rules. In short, they evaluate and classify different rules (qualitatively and 
quantitatively) based on the indication of their non-monetary benefits. Here it also has to 
be underlined that the CPI actually provides only indicative information on positive 
impacts, as it looks on the structure of rules and not on the actual compliance and 
enforcement levels – which is anyways more appropriate for an ex-post impact analysis. 
To be fully precise, the CPI looks into compliance levels, though in a small portion.  In 
questions 43, 46 and 47 it is impossible to give an answer without using the CPI method 
ex-post, as these questions can be answered only by looking into actual data from an 
enforcement agency. The rest (great majority) of the questions can be used to evaluate 
rules even before they are officially adopted in a law.  Moreover, applying the CPI even 
ex-ante might be fully acceptable in cases where answers to the following questions are 
negative, which can be answered straight from a bill proposal: 
 Question 42: Is there a statutory penalty for late filing of a lobby spending 
 report? 
 Question 44: Is there a statutory penalty for incomplete filing of a lobby  spending 
report? 
  If the answers are negative, there are automatically negative answers on  
questions 43 and 46 as well: When was the penalty for late filling of a lobby spending 
report last levied? When was the penalty for incomplete filling of a lobby spending report 
last levied? This means that the application of the CPI even ex-ante cannot be fully 
excluded, if the above mentioned conditions are satisfied. For instance, the CPI could be 
easily applied ex-ante on the New Transparency Register of the EU.  
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 Ex-post Impact Assessment in general requires a more precise approach with as 
much monetization of costs and benefits as possible (due to better availability of data), 
while ex-ante provides more methodological freedom in estimation of both sides of the 
medal.  
 As argued before, in order to be able to have more informative and complex 
information on the impact of regulation, it is necessary to look the other side of the 
impacts medal – costs, which the CPI method fully neglects. Thus, the CPI method fails to 
provide information on this important issue and it only concentrates on indication of the 
strength – which may be misleading as the higher CPI score does not necessarily appear 
to be a better regulatory solution, because there is no information on costs for any 
transparency level which is achieved. Similarly, the threefold classification (Chari et al.) 
suffers from the same shortcoming, and luckily authors are quite aware of that.  
 
8. Conclusion of Chapter II 
Chapter II provided an insight into the EU and US approaches to world's lobbying 
regulation. It was shown where and how these traditions differ. While the US has been 
regulating lobbying for a long time, the EU has had small improvements in this sense and 
it still does not have an enforceable law. However, the growing public pressure might 
lead to the introduction of some type of lobbying regulation in the future, since this is 
already happening in some European countries. 
The chapter also provided insights into the RIA world and concluded that RIA 
methods have had very limited application and contribution to the regulation of lobbying. 
However, the foundations and practical tools which are developed under the scope of RIA 
could be further used to contribute to the creation of other more custom-made tools for 
the assessment of lobbying laws. Also, RIA tools were not found to be applicable in 
comparative assessments of lobbying laws due to their diversity and the diversity of 
environments in which they would be applied. On the other hand, the new tool developed 
in this research (CII) has better potential for comparative assessment of lobbying 
regulations. In fact, this is one of its main strengths and contributions. 
The analysis clearly shows the limits of the CPI Index (and other mentioned tools) 
in terms of RIA, as it only looks at one side of regulatory impacts. Both researchers and 
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policymakers could profit from another tool which would be able to provide at least 
some sort of answer to the other part of the problem - the analysis of the costs of 
lobbying regulations.  
The next chapter explains the development of the cure for spotted weaknesses, 
and expands the analysis to the other side of the coin. Therefore, the Cost Indicator Index 
(CII) will be created and introduced to expand the scope of the assessment of lobbying 
regulations, and to complement the results obtained by the CPI.  
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Chapter III - Development of the Cost Indicator Index (CII) 
 1.  Introduction 
  In the previous Chapter, it was shown how lobbying rules in most countries with 
lobbying regulations are set in a deliberative manner, without significant foundations in 
standard RIA procedures. This approach has led to either constant and frequent 
regulatory reconstructions or even to complete regulatory failures where lobbying 
regulation was withdrawn or there were no lobbyists officially registered after the 
adoption. Even though the academic community offered several interesting tools for 
analysis of the different aspects of lobbying regulations, only the CPI index has been 
sufficiently used but mostly by researchers.  
  As policymakers tend to underestimate the importance of the assessment of the 
cost and benefits of lobbying regulations ex-ante, it would be beneficial to offer them a 
tool which would be easy to apply on their legislative proposals before their final 
adoption. This application would allow them to have an indicative estimate of the costs 
and benefits associated with their legislative proposal, and allow them to make necessary 
corrections before they adopt the final version. The same tool will allow them to compare 
their proposals both with earlier legislation and with international legislation, which 
should increase their knowledge on the comparative and timeline value of their 
proposals. In this Chapter, a tool will be introduced which should help in overcoming 
these obstacles, and improve both international research and policymaking.  
  Hence, this chapter will demonstrate the evolution of the CII. It will explain the 
methodological and empirical foundations and discuss and categorize the obtained 
results. This will be followed by an introduction of a simple theoretical framework - the 
Ninefold theory. Lastly, the limits and methodological concerns will be discussed 
together with recommendations for potential remedies in future studies.  
 
2. General features of the Cost Indicator Index 
  Before discussing the methodological foundations, it is useful to define the 
boundaries of the CII and its relation to the CPI. This is important because they are 
applied separately, even though their results could be successfully unified at a later stage. 
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At this juncture, their main joint features and individual characteristics are going to be 
explained.  
1. The CII is a separate index from the CPI index – which means that the CII is not 
completely identical to the CPI in terms of the questions and scoring technique. It does 
mostly rely on the CPI methodology and questions, but since it measures a different type 
of impacts. Some changes were made to properly meet all important questions for the 
indication of costs estimate. 
2. The CII is designed to be applied separately from the CPI index – which means that 
the results obtained by application of the CPI cannot be used for the CII, since it has 
several different questions and a different scoring technique.  In order to get results from 
both methods, they have to be applied separately.  
3. The CII can be equally successfully applied ex-ante and ex-post. The CPI should 
normally be applied ex-post, but in some cases it can be successfully applied ex-ante if the 
structure of a law allows it. The CII can be applied both ex-post and ex-ante, and it serves 
to indicate the overall magnitude of the burden for specific legal solutions. 
4. Scoring values – The values appearing in the CPI (0-4) are used to reflect different 
degrees of benefits of specific items within lobbying regulations. Their aggregate sum 
reflects the overall “strength” of the regulation. On the other hand, the values of the CII 
range from 2 to 8, and they are based on an empirical survey for each specific item. The 
scoring scale of the CPI, on the other hand, is more of a deliberative type, as it is not clear 
how the scoring values were set. However, even though the CII has a different scoring 
technique, the final score is normalized at the end to reflect an identical scale as of the 
CPI, which means that the scales of both tools range from 0 - 100, which enables the 
fusion of both results and their systematic interpretation within Ninefold theory. 
 
3.  What can be learned from RIA with regards to cost indication? 
  The main idea behind the application of RIA is that legal rules are justified if an 
analysis proves that benefits outweigh the costs. The rules per se create costs due to 
bargaining and information activities, which are costly for the subjects of regulation or 
for those who enforce the rules. Hence, pointing out these costs in terms of lobbying 
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regulation is also necessary, and RIA offers methods to address the impacts of these 
costs. Besides these direct and relatively easily measurable costs, there might be other 
costs associated with lobbying regulation. Those types of costs would be the costs that 
society would face as a consequence of changed rules in the lobbying arena, such as the 
higher deadweight losses which would arise from harsher competition among lobbyists, 
as a consequence of increased transparency (Denter, Morgan, Sisak 2011). However, 
these costs are not studied sufficiently in the case of lobbying regulation, and it would be 
difficult to capture and measure them. This research acknowledges those potential costs, 
but it focuses on direct compliance and enforcement costs which are the very subject of 
this analysis.  
  However, RIA also highlights that assessing the costs and benefits is not a simple 
task. Benefits do not necessarily have to be economic and they are often difficult to 
quantify227. It also points out that in certain cases it is only reasonable to apply partial 
analysis due to the high transaction costs that would be necessary to measure the 
benefits. This is similarly true for the costs, especially when it comes to the dilemma of 
how precisely they have to be measured.  
  Another important message from the RIA world is that only some regulations 
have to be closely pre-examined before they get introduced. Those are usually laws 
which are expected to have a large impact on society, the economy, environment, 
security, etc. In other cases where proposed regulations are of a less significant impact, 
or they address relatively small groups, RIA accepts a more relaxed approach and less 
precise estimations. Hence, sometimes only an indicative assessment of costs is 
acceptable as estimating them precisely would not be an easy task, and the subject of 
regulation does not require a profound approach. The mentioned US and Ireland 
examples are good proxies to demonstrate this principle.  
  If one talks about social costs from an RIA perspective, as defined in the Green 
Book (2011) of the UK Government, social cost should be referred to as “the total cost to 
society of an economic activity - the sum of the opportunity costs of the resources used by 
the agent carrying out the activity, plus any additional costs imposed on society from the 
                                                          
227 Regulatory Impact Analysis - Best Practices in the OECD Countries (1997). p 176; Introductory Handbook 
for Undertaking Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) (2008).  
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activity” 228. In addition, for clarity on opportunity costs, we can say that “…a cost is 
imposed only if some valued resource use is displaced, and the amount of the cost is the 
value that is foregone. This is the basic economic concept of opportunity cost; if a regulation 
diverts no valued resources, it imposes no costs”229.    
  Having clarified this, it becomes clearer that the development of the CII could be 
useful for the creation of a custom-made cost-benefit impact assessment tool, which can 
be developed by combining the CPI index, which may be used to measure the indication 
of benefits (non-monetary benefits), and the Cost-Indicator Index (CII) for the indication 
of costs. This is why the CII has to take into consideration not only the RIA methods, but 
also the CPI methodology and the Threefold theory developed from it. 
  Besides clarification of the methodological foundations, there is another 
important issue to be discussed - the depth of the analysis. In the RIA world, costs are 
usually addressed differently depending on various factors such as the availability of 
data, relevance and scope of the regulation, the size of the market affected, etc. In the 
previous pages, it was highlighted that lobbying regulation is usually considered as a 
subsidiary anti-corruption legislation, which is not expected to produce a high burden in 
terms of social costs. This is why it mostly stays outside the bounds of profound RIA 
procedures. Thus, before determining the type of costs and methodology for their 
identification, it would be useful to determine the depth of the cost impact analysis in this 
research.  
 
4. What is an optimal depth level of the analysis?  
  The depth refers to the level of effort invested in the detection and analysis of 
regulatory impacts. While crucial laws which are expected to have a high impact on 
markets (health or financial regulation, for instance) deserve a more precise and deeper 
approach, subsidiary legislation or less important laws (which directly affect a relatively 
small portion of business or the population, such as lobbying laws), with assumable 
lower direct impacts, do not require as deep and costly analysis as the first category.  
                                                          
228 Supra n.191, p.109 
229 Supra n.196, p.26. 
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  Besides the relevance and generally low expected impacts of lobbying 
regulations, the depth of cost analysis should take into consideration the depth of the CPI 
method as well. As the intention is to combine these two scales to some extent, they have 
to be on depths that are as close as possible. Thus, firstly the analytical depth of the CPI 
methodology has to be determined. 
  The CPI uses a scoring technique that labels investigated regulatory rules with 
values of 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4 points at the maximum. The sum of points attached to each of 48 
questions gives a score from 0 to 100, which is later used to classify regulations by the 
Threefold classification on high, medium and low-regulation systems. These three levels 
may be considered, from an RIA perspective, as levels of impacts in terms of benefits of 
lobbying regulations. A regulation, depending on its structure and indication of strength 
(benefits), indicates high, medium or low impact on transparency and accountability.   
  Referring back to the RIA, there is a similar classification of impacts mentioned 
in the UK’s latest Impact Assessment toolkit230. This document dedicates special 
attention to the level of effort that has to be given to each particular impact assessment in 
order to have “proportionate analysis”. This concept refers to “appropriate level of 
resources invested in gathering and analyzing data for appraisals and evaluations”. The 
most important factors that determine the depth of the analysis are: 
 the level of interest and sensitivity surrounding the policy (which in the case of lobbying is 
increasing in many countries, as shown in earlier sections); 
 the degree to which the policy is novel, contentious or irreversible;  
 the stage of policy development;  
 the scale, duration and distribution of expected impact;  
 the level of uncertainty around likely impacts;  
 the data already available and resources required to gather further data;  
 the time available for policy development.  
  All mentioned criteria should serve as a proper setting of the level of depth of 
analysis. The IA Toolkit distinguishes five different levels, depending on the mentioned 
criteria that are met in each case. These levels are: 
                                                          
230 Supra n.197, Chapter II 
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1. Level 1 – description of who will be affected by the proposals – defining which business 
groups, consumers and parts of the public sector will be affected. 
2. Level 2 – full description of the impacts (positive or negative on any group) and order of 
magnitude (low, medium, high). 
3. Level 3 – quantify the effect (1000 planning applications per year, 100 hours of 
management time, etc.) 
4. Level 4 - put a value on the scale of impacts by monetising the effect. It may be the case 
that the costs but not benefits can be monetised. The use of indicators may help further 
qualify non-monetised costs and benefits 
5. Level 5 – monetize fully all costs and benefits.  
  This IA Toolkit suggests that, depending on the mentioned factors, a 
proportionate level for each case should be identified and applied. The same document 
also suggests that for earlier stages of policy formation, levels 1 and 2 are most 
appropriate. This also means that for an ex-ante impact assessment of non-crucial laws, 
such as lobbying laws, these levels (1 or 2) seem to be the most appropriate, especially if 
the size of the industry does not imply a large expected aggregate burden.  
 Upon referring back to the structure of the CPI and the Threefold classification, it 
can be seen that their analytical depth almost perfectly fits Level 2 of the IA Toolkit. The 
CPI index identifies the affected sectors (public and private) and provides a scoring 
method, which later on serves for classification of impacts by magnitude on high, 
medium and low within the Threefold classification theory. Thus, the same level of depth 
should also be adopted for the CII as it is important to keep it complementary to the CPI 
Index, and to enable fast and easy comparative application of both scales. This is just one 
of the reasons for staying on this level of depth (IA Toolkit - Level 2), but there are 
additional more important ones in favour of this choice. 
 This level of depth is, at the same time, appropriate from the RIA perspective due 
to the nature and significance of lobbying regulation. Lobbying regulation usually (except 
the EU level231 and Canada232 with approximately 5,000 registrants,  and the US federal 
                                                          
231 Transparency Register – statistics for register: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/mainstatistics.do?action=prepareView&loc
ale=en#en 
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level with approximately 12,000233 registrants) burdens a relatively small business 
category. In Macedonia, for a long time there was only 1 registered lobbyist, while 
membership in professional lobbying associations in Serbia234, Croatia235, Slovenia236 and 
Montenegro hardly exceeds a hundred firms and individuals, according to their public 
membership databases. In other bigger countries, the number of registrant is indeed 
higher, but not significantly higher237.   
 Also, lobbying regulation is an exception rather than a rule, as in many countries 
general laws on corruption prevention are considered to be efficient enough in the 
protection of public integrity and fostering transparency. 
  Another reason is correlated with the motivation of the research regarding the 
application of the CII. Since one of the main intentions of this research is to improve the 
tools for comparative impact assessment of lobbying regulations, undertaking a deeper 
analysis with monetization of costs is not necessary due to the desired simplicity of 
comparisons of both indices. The reason for this is that monetizing of costs and 
comparing them within different institutional and market environments does not give 
immediate comparative information on the quality of lobbying regulation. For instance, if 
the costs of enforcement are approximated to be up to $500,000, it also matters how big 
a part of a public budget (or percentage of the GDP) this is, and how many lobbyists are 
expected to be regulated. In other words, comparisons would be more complicated and 
demanding, and for information on the quality of regulations, additional information 
would have to be included. Another problem is whether some of this information is 
available at all for all countries. Hence, simplicity should remain as one of the priorities. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
232 In June 2012, according to the Canadian registerm there were 5169 registered lobbyists of all types 
(https://ocl-cal.gc.ca/app/secure/orl/lrrs/do/slctRprt?action=selectReport&lang=eng)  
233 http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/index.php - based on data from the Senate Office of Public Records, 
from 2012. 
234 Register of members of Serbian lobbying Association, 68 members of the association (June 2012): 
http://www.drustvolobistasrbije.org/organizacija/clanovi/ 
235 Register of members of Croatian lobbying Association, 99 members of the association (June 2012): 
http://www.hdl.com.hr/members.php 
236 Slovenian Commission for prevention of corruption – register of lobbyists, in total 61 registered 
lobbyists (June 2012), https://www.kpk-rs.si/sl/lobiranje-22/register-lobistov 
237 French register has 150 registered interest representatives (http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/representants-interets/liste.asp), Israeli register (at the webpage of the Knesset) has (June 
2012) 115 registered interest representatives with permanent access.      
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  Similarly, if the level of analysis remains less deep and focuses on the magnitude 
of impacts (low, medium, high), this would enable comparisons over different 
jurisdictions regardless of the monetary expression of the costs – in the same way as the 
CPI and Threefold theory are used. 
  Lastly, another important goal of this research is to provide policymakers with a 
useful ex-ante lobbying regulation impact assessment tool. If the analysis is conducted ex-
post, it could be much easier to estimate the cost in a monetary sense, at least for the 
public side, which has to have a budget item dedicated for enforcement. However, one of 
the goals of this research is to provide a tool that can be used in the early policy stages 
where the costs are yet unclear on both sides, and to depict the relation between the 
indication of benefits and costs. This information, combined with the estimated size of 
the lobbying sector and available budget, could improve the design of the rules before 
they become officially adopted and potentially cause regulatory failure, like in the cases 
of Hungary, Montenegro and Macedonia.  
 
5. General regulatory cost indicators as a starting point for the CII 
design 
 The problem of defining cost indicators is more a practical than a theoretical 
problem. Different regulatory solutions affect different parts of society and the economy 
in specific ways, which causes the assessment technique to diverge from case to case. 
However, it is possible to outline some general directions which serve as a guideline for 
those who work on the regulatory impact of any type of costs.  
 First of all, it has to be clarified as to how regulation imposes costs on society. It 
might be said that the costs of regulation are distributed by the allocation of separate 
burdens towards affected parties. “The burden might be defined as any adverse effect 
experienced in the private sector from such regulation”238.     
The same holds true for the public sector as well. But an interesting question is 
always how the burden is distributed between the two sides, and specifically between 
the different groups within the private sector. In cases of lobbying, this is an especially 
                                                          
238 Supra no.197, p.263. 
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important question, as some countries (the US) impose a much higher compliance 
burden on lobbyists than other ones (the EU).  
 The OECD has probably the largest experience in gathering and systemizing 
different practices of RIAs. Based on that, this organization has issued a series of reports 
and toolkits which provide concrete recommendations on how to develop cost indicators 
for regulatory assessment, based on general cost indicators and different types of 
analysis (cost-benefit, cost-effectiveness, cost assessment, benefits assessment, risk 
assessment analysis, etc.) 
 In chapter 11 of the report “Regulatory Impact Analysis-best practices in the 
OECD countries” from 1997, an overview is given of the most important steps for 
development of the general indicators of regulatory costs. These indicators will serve in 
this research to develop the Cost-Indicator Index for lobbying, as they represent a 
general fusion of different approaches and techniques.  
The following list introduces those indicators: 
• regulatory agency personnel 
• regulatory agency spending 
• other measures of regulatory agency activity 
• compliance spending–an incremental perspective  
• compliance spending–a survey-based perspective 
• compliance spending–synthetic indicators 
• more sophisticated indicators of burden 
 It is important to mention that these are defined only to be indicators of costs, 
because measuring of a precise aggregate burden can be very difficult, and depends on 
the nature of regulation and availability of reliable and systematic data. Costs represent 
burden either for the public or for the private side, or both of them. This also means that 
the availability of data is influenced by the structure and size of both sides, which makes 
precise measurement difficult, especially an ex-ante assessment which is based on 
predictions.   
 Another problem is that regulation may produce additional indirect costs on 
other related markets, where effects are as well hard to identify and quantify as 
mentioned in the introduction. In the case of lobbying regulations, those could be costs 
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which may arise from changes in competition levels after imposing regulation, or 
changes in price of services that lobbyists charge their clients – which alters more or less 
corporate funds towards lobbying, etc. This is why using only indicators of costs makes 
more sense in this, but also on other similar cases.  
 In the regulation of lobbying, distribution of costs is almost always directed to 
both sides, but the design of rules strongly affects the distributional pattern. Sometimes, 
public burden will be minimal if there is not an enforcement agency, if there are no new 
staff employed, if there is no frequent auditing involved – simply if the enforcement is 
weak or delegated to an existing administrative unit. The same would be true for the 
private side if lobbyist would be asked not to register or would be required to report 
rarely with few details in electronic format.  
 
6. The CPI index as methodological foundation for the Cost Indicator 
Index 
 As mentioned above, OECD general cost indicators are in fact very useful for the 
development of specific cost indicators for the regulation of lobbying. These indicators 
will be used to classify the cost-sensitive parts of lobbying regulations, which are already 
listed and defined under the CPI method, and grouped by their magnitude effect under 
the Threefold classification theory.   
 First it is going to be determined which general OECD cost indicators can be 
correlated with the Threefold theory sections. Then, each of those indicators and 
corresponding Threefold sections will be correlated with specific CPI questions. The map 
below gives an overview of the methodological structure of the CII. The left side refers to 
the methodological pillars of the CII, and the right side shows where those elements 
come from: 
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  Below, Table 3 shows in detail the fusion and evolution of these elements. 
Interpreting it from the left - the first column indicates whether costs burden the public 
or the private side. The second column indicates which OECD general cost indicator is 
applied. The third column indicates which Threefold theory section is applied, and the 
forth column indicates the CPI question. These elements and the fusion technique are 
discussed immediately after the table.  
General cost indicators 
 
Threefold  theory 
sections 
The CPI questions and 
additional 
questions 
The new scoring 
system of the CII 
Regulatory Impact 
Assessment methodology 
Theory on classification of lobbying 
regulation 
Methodology for assessment of “strength” 
of lobbying rules - Hired Guns 
New scale with the scoring system 
based on cost-compliance survey. 
(indication of costs) 
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6.1 Methodological framework – the analysis of funding elements of the CII 
 
  Table 3 represents the fusion of all methodological building blocks used in 
creation of the CII. It has four columns, and they refer to (from the left): 
1. The first column shows the division of items into the public and private compliance 
dimension. In other words, it shows questions belonging to the private or public sector 
in terms of the burden they produce. Questions from 1 to 26 are associated with the 
burden imposed on the private sector, while questions from 27-47 are concerned with 
the burden imposed on the public sector.  
PRIVATE 
BURDEN 
 
PUBLIC  
BURDEN 
 
 
2.   The second column indicates the link of the questions to the OECD’s general indicators 
of regulatory costs.  All burden associated with the private sector belongs to the 
general cost indicator – compliance spending. Similarly, all burden associated with the 
public sector is correlated with three general cost indicators: regulatory agency 
personnel, regulatory agency spending and other measures of regulatory agency activity. 
 OECD general regulatory cost 
indicators  
PRIVATE 
BURDEN 
Compliance spending 
PUBLIC  
BURDEN 
 
Regulatory agency personnel, 
Regulatory agency spending, 
Other measures of regulatory 
agency activity 
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3.    The third column indicates the relation between the second one and the fourth 
one. In this column are listed the Threefold theory lobbying regulation sections. It is 
indicated to which of the specific OECD general cost indicators they are linked to.   
 OECD general regulatory 
cost indicators  
Threefold theory 
classification of lobbying 
regulation elements 
PRIVATE 
BURDEN 
Compliance spending Registration regulation  
Spending disclosure 
PUBLIC  
BURDEN 
 
Regulatory agency 
personnel,  
Regulatory agency 
spending, 
Other measures of 
regulatory agency activity 
Electronic filling 
Public access 
Enforcement 
Revolving door 
 
4.    The fourth column is composed of 47 individual questions, mostly taken directly 
from the CPI in their original form, or slightly modified. There is only one entirely new 
question introduced. All questions are grouped under the Threefold theory sections 
they belong to. The Threefold theory sections are grouped under the OECD general 
cost indicators they belong to, and those indicators are in the last stage grouped based 
on their burden effects - public or private burden. 
 OECD general 
regulatory cost 
indicators  
Threefold theory 
classification of 
lobbying regulation 
elements 
The Cost Indicator 
Index (CII) 
questions 
PRIVATE 
BURDEN 
 
Compliance 
spending 
Registration 
regulation 
Spending disclosure 
- 
- 
- 
PUBLIC  
BURDEN 
 
Regulatory agency 
personnel,  
Regulatory agency 
spending, 
Other measures of 
regulatory agency 
activity 
Electronic filling 
Public access 
Enforcement 
Revolving door 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
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  The CII questions are mostly identical to those from the CPI scale, with several 
necessary modifications that had to be introduced for methodological reasons. First of all, 
the CPI has 48 questions while the CII has 47. This is a consequence of the fact that some 
questions have been eliminated, some new ones introduced, while some of them were 
slightly but necessarily modified. The details on all introduced changes could be 
summarized in the following way: 
 Questions No. 43240 and 46241 were eliminated from the CII as they prevent it (and the 
CPI as well in some cases) to be applied as an ex-ante tool. These questions can be 
answered only by investigation of actual enforcement of lobbying rules in a particular 
country. Since the CII is designed with the influence of the RIA methods, it primarily 
serves as an ex-ante mechanism, but its application in an ex-post manner is not excluded 
at all after this elimination. In fact, this modification enables both applications instead of 
only ex-post application. 
  One additional question was introduced as it was not part of the CPI scale, but from a 
cost-indication point of view it is very relevant for the CII. It is question No. 45: 
Structure/type of oversight agency 
- Already existing administrative unit with attributed tasks of enforcement of lobbying 
rules? 
- Entirely new administrative agency? 
  This question should indicate the cost-effects of different lobbying regulations 
enforcement options. In some cases, enforcement is delegated to an already existing 
agency (Commission for prevention of the corruption in Slovenia, for instance), while in 
some other situations a special agency (usually called Register) has been set up with a 
particular task of enforcement of lobbying rules regardless (Canada, New Transparency 
Register of the EU, the Serbian proposal on Law on lobbying). Logically, it is expected to 
have lower enforcement costs (and public burden) if the law’s rules are implemented 
with the same number of public employees than if a new agency with new staff has to be 
set up for enforcement purposes.  
                                                          
240 When was the penalty for late filling of a lobby spending report last levied? 
241 When was the penalty for incomplete filling of a lobby spending report last levied? 
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   Another change that might potentially mislead at the very first sight if two scales are 
compared is that they do not start with the same question. The reason for this is that 
question No.1 from the CPI was moved in the CII and it is placed under No. 38 
(enforcement section which belongs to the public burden), in order to achieve better 
organization of questions according to their dependence to general cost indicators and 
Threefold classification sections.  
   A portion of questions from the CPI has also been modified in the CII in order to better 
match recent tendencies and purpose of the newborn index. Those are the following 
questions (the CII table, marked with "*" – 1, 3, 6, 11, 14, 22, 23, 32, 46.  Table 4 allows a 
better overview of the introduced changes: 
Table 4 - modified CPI questions in the Cost Indicator Index 
Reasons and arguments in favour of 
the adopted change 
1. The CPI 
(original) 
question 
How much does an individual have to 
make/spend to qualify as a lobbyist 
or to prompt registration as a 
lobbyist, according to the definition?     
-Qualification threshold: More than 
$500 made/spent – 0 points  
-Qualification threshold: More than 
$100 made/spent – 1 point  
-Qualification threshold: More than $50 
made/spent – 2 points  
-Qualification threshold: $50 or less 
made/spent – 3 points  
-Lobbyists qualify and must register no 
matter how much money made/spent – 
4 points 
The main reason why threshold qualifications 
are changed is that existing ones did not offer 
monetary span which was large enough to 
capture the industry's cost-sensitiveness. 
Since lobbying contracts usually involve fees 
that are higher than $500, the span with the 
maximal value that is just set as higher than 
$500 did not offer much space. 
Instead, in order to better measure the cost-
sensitiveness of the industry, the new 
monetary values introduced are taken from 
the current US lobbying regulation practice - 
Honest Leadership and Open Governments 
Act (HLOGA, 2007), reporting section. This 
law has set registration thresholds as follows: 
$2,500 for individuals and $10,000 for the 
firms. 
The new scale now has a span from $0 over 
$2,500 to $10,000 and it allows better 
estimation of the cost-sensitiveness of the 
industry. The previous scale would, 
The CII 
(modified) 
question 
How much does an individual have to 
make/spend to qualify as a lobbyist 
or to prompt registration as a 
lobbyist, according to the definition?     
-Qualification threshold: More than 
$10,000 made/spent  
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-Qualification threshold: More than 
$2,500 made/spent  
-Qualification threshold: regardless of 
the amount made/spent  
regardless of the threshold, indicate that 
lobbyist will have to register for almost any 
activity, as contracts are almost always over 
$500. This is why the separation of costs on 
values lower than $500 does not make much 
sense, taking into consideration the purpose 
of the CII. 
3. The CPI 
(original) 
question 
How many days can lobbying take 
place before registration is required?   
-16 or more days – 0 points                            
-11 to 15 days – 1 point                                   
-6 to 10 days – 2 points                                    
-1 to 5 days – 3 points                                      
-0 days – 4 points 
The values in this question also had to be set 
to be wider within the CII, since the proposed 
time span within the CPI was too narrow for 
the purpose of this research. The new value of 
6 months was set as a very broad threshold 
(previously existing in the US Lobbying 
Disclosure Act, 1995), while the threshold of 
72 hours (3 days) was taken from the Real 
Time Lobbying Disclosure Act (RTLDA)242, 
which is a proposal on lobbying reform that 
suggests one of the shortest, if not the 
shortest, registration deadlines.   
The CII 
(modified) 
question 
How many days can lobbying take 
place before registration is required?   
-6 months or more  
-Up to a month  
-Up to 3 days 
6. The CPI 
(original) 
question 
Within how many days must a 
lobbyist notify the oversight agency 
of changes in registration? 
-16 – or more days – 0 points  
-11 to 15 days – 1 point  
-6 to 10 days – 2 points  
-1 to 5 days – 3 points  
-0 days – 4 points 
The same logic as for question 3 is applied 
also in this case. 
The CII 
(modified) 
question 
Within how many days must a 
lobbyist notify the oversight agency 
of changes in registration?     
-6 months or more  
 -Up to a month 
-Up to 3 days  
                                                          
242 Supra n.111. 
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11. The CPI 
(original) 
question 
How often during each two-year 
cycle is a lobbyist required to report 
spending?                                                            
-0 to 3 filings – 0 points  
-4 to 6 filings – 1 point  
-7 to 9 filings – 2 points  
-10 or more filings – 3 points 
Here, due to reasons of clarity, the question 
has been narrowed to three options. These 
new options offer a wide variety of time 
options: once in 2 years, every 6 months (the 
LDA, 1995) and at least one in 3 months (the 
HLOGA, 2007) or even more often (RTLDA). 
The CII 
(modified) 
question 
How often within a year is a lobbyist 
required to report spending?                    
-Once (or once in 2 years)  
-Twice  
-Every three months or more often 
14. The CPI 
(original) 
question 
What spending must be itemized? 
-No spending required to be itemized – 
0 points  
-Itemization threshold: More than $100 
– 1 point  
-Itemization threshold: More than $25 – 
2 points  
-Itemization threshold: $25 and below – 
3 points  
-All spending required to be itemized – 
4 points 
In this question, the first item was removed 
since absence of reporting activity is not 
expected to cause any additional burden to 
lobbyists. This practically means there is no 
compliance, and consequently no costs. 
 
The other 3 items were kept, but the financial 
span was again expanded as in previous 
questions.  
The CII 
(modified) 
question 
What spending must be itemized?           
-All spending above $500 must be 
itemized  
-All spending above $100 
-All spending required to be itemized  
22. The CPI 
(original) 
question 
What is the statutory provision for a 
lobbyist giving and reporting gifts? 
-Gifts are not reported – 0 points  
-Gifts are reported – 1 point 
-Gifts are limited and reported – 2 
points     
-Gifts are prohibited – 3 points 
In this question, the first item (no reporting) 
and third one (type of gift received) were not 
relevant from the CII perspective, and thus 
they were eliminated. The only issue that 
matters here is if there is or there is not an 
established duty of reporting gift giving, so 
the question was accordingly adjusted in this 
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The CII 
(modified) 
question 
What is the statutory provision for a 
lobbyist giving and reporting gifts?      
Gifts are not reported –  
 Gifts are reported –  
sense.  
23. The CPI 
(original) 
question 
What is the statutory provision for a 
lobbyist giving and reporting 
campaign contributions? 
-Campaign contributions allowed and 
not required to be disclosed on 
spending report/prohibited during 
session – 0 points  
-Campaign contributions allowed and 
not required to be disclosed on 
spending report/allowed during 
session – 0 points    
-Campaign contributions allowed and 
required to be disclosed on spending 
report/prohibited during session – 1 
point  
-Campaign contributions allowed and 
required to be disclosed on spending 
report/allowed during session – 1point     
-Campaign contributions prohibited – 2 
points 
Similar to the previous question. The only 
aspect relevant for the CII analysis is if there 
is an established duty to report campaign 
contributions or not. This is why three items 
were not included in the CII system. 
The CII 
(modified) 
question 
What is the statutory provision for a 
lobbyist giving and reporting 
campaign contributions? 
-Campaign contributions not required 
to be disclosed on spending 
report/prohibited during session  
-Campaign contributions allowed and 
required to be disclosed on spending 
report/allowed during session  
32. The CPI 
(original) 
question 
Cost of copies:                                                   
25 cents or more per page – 0 points 
Less than 25 cents per page – 1 point 
Within the CPI and the CII this question was 
the only one with a monetary value involved. 
Since the CII was designed to deal with the 
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The CII 
(modified) 
question 
Cost of copies: 
Interested parties pay for the copies of 
available reports  
Interested parties do not have to pay for 
the copies of available reports 
indication of costs and not monetary 
expression of costs, this question had to be 
changed in order to preserve methodological 
coherence.  
It also has to be mentioned that, nowadays, 
simple printouts of reports should not cause 
significant costs to anyone, especially due to 
tendencies of making databases available in 
an online form, like in the US.  
Thus, here it could be relevant only if the cost 
of copies that are provided goes at the budget 
of an oversight agency or not. In case it does, 
costs still cannot be considered as important 
ones as it can hardly exceed 0.10 EUR cents at 
this moment.  
46. The CPI 
(original) 
question 
Is there a “cooling off” period 
required before legislators can 
register as lobbyists? 
-No – 0 points  
-Yes – 2 points 
The question was just reformulated to 
emphasize the mandatory obligation of 
compliance. This reformulated question 
emphasizes that a state agency would have to 
conduct mandatory control of the cooling-off 
period. The CII 
(modified) 
question 
Is there a mandatory revolving door 
compliance?  
-No  
-Yes  
 
7. Empirical evidence – calibrating the values of the CII 
 
  The main challenge with the construction of the CII was to properly set values 
that indicate the magnitude of each question. In order to discover if lobbying rules 
produce any costs, and in order to have information on the magnitude of the burden, it is 
important to have at least some type of empirical backup. This is especially important 
since the CPI has already been widely used, even though it is not clear where the values 
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attached to each question come from243.  This is why values in the CII, ranging from 2-8, 
were not set in a provisional way but based on empirical survey.  
        The survey was quantitative and qualitative. In quantitative terms, the 
anecdotal244 evidence provided aggregate information on the cost perception for 
different cost indicators. In qualitative terms, several interviews were conducted in order 
to get additional information from the field on the nature of the costs of lobbying 
regulation. Both types of results were used as a foundation for the CII cost indication 
values.  
 
7.1 Questionnaires – anecdotal evidence from the public and private sector 
  Questionnaires used in this research were designed to measure compliance cost-
perception both of the lobbying industry and of the public sector that deals with 
enforcement. There were two types of questionnaires – one for the private and another 
one for the public side. Both are methodologically of the same construction, but with 
different questions for different sides. Those that were sent to the private side 
(containing 26 questions) were meant to measure the cost perception of compliance with 
lobbying regulations, while those sent to the public side (containing 21 questions) were 
aimed at discovering the cost perception of the enforcement of lobbying regulation. 
 The questionnaires are deliberately divided into two categories – one for the 
public and one for the private side, even though there was a dilemma as to whether to 
send all questions to both categories of respondents. This would, to some extent, provide 
a more robust foundation, but at the same time it would not make much sense to require 
the private sector to estimate the costs of public enforcement, as they probably have very 
limited information on the level of public expenses.  
 Asking the public sector to estimate the cost of private sector compliance would 
make more sense, but as it was shown in the previous chapter, globally the public sector 
has a tendency of introducing lobbying regulations without estimating the private sector 
                                                          
243 For the purpose of this research, the Centre For Public Integrity was contacted several times in order to 
discover which methodology was used in construction of the CPI and its values. However, no response was 
ever received while in the literature it is not possible to find an answer on CPI scores' methodology. 
244 It would be hard to call it statistical evidence due to the small sample. Hence, an empirical or anecdotal 
evidence is probably better and more safe term. 
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burden. Hence, instead of mixing questions, each sector was invited to estimate its own 
burden, because it is assumed they are able to estimate their own costs more precisely. 
 The design of the questionnaires was particularly challenging. In fact, since it 
was important to have a sound methodological background, the experts on market 
research and statistical methods were engaged in the design of the questionnaires. 
Precisely speaking, the design of the questionnaires was developed with the generous 
help of the team of IPSOS Puls Croatia (local branch of the IPSOS international), which I 
visited in 2012 specifically for this purpose.  
 IPSOS is one of the regional and global leaders in the market research services 
and their input was crucial. Their experts have offered valuable assistance in designing 
the questionnaire in terms of its length, precision and efficiency in measuring the results 
according to the objectives set forth by the research. They also provided help in 
designing the cover letter which was sent together with the questionnaire.  
 Initially, respondents were expected to reply within a month’s time, but in order 
to get all the answers back it took almost three months. The private sector respondents 
were generally more open and interested in responding, but it was difficult to get their 
answers in time due to their lack of time. The public sector was even more difficult to 
reach and involve.  
 Some of the respondents only offered written comments and did not fill in the 
questionnaires (the US). These comments were used to backup the data that was 
collected through the survey, and these qualitative statements matched the results of the 
quantitative analysis quite well. Some respondents provided both qualitative responses 
and elaborated on the questions additionally in a separate letter (Slovenia). Some of them 
even participated in extensive phone interviews, as they found this means of 
communication the most suitable (UK, Belgium/Brussels).  
 Hence, the data collection took more time than estimated, which also slowed 
down entire process of the analysis. The data collection at the end resulted in both 
quantitative and qualitative empirical findings. Despite the decreased size of the 
qualitative sample, the qualitative answers were actually very valuable as they were in 
line with the findings.  
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In Table 5 is shown a sample question (from the public sector questionnaire), which 
shows the general features and questionnaires’ design. In the left column is the question 
in its original form in the CII, while in the right column reflects the question from the 
questionnaire. 
129
123 
 
130
12
4 
 Ta
bl
e 
5 
- t
he
 d
es
ig
n 
of
 th
e 
su
rv
ey
 q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
s 
- a
n 
ex
am
pl
e 
 
Th
e 
or
ig
in
al
 q
ue
st
io
n 
fr
om
 th
e 
CI
I 
Th
e 
qu
es
tio
n 
as
 it
 a
pp
ea
re
d 
in
 th
e 
qu
es
tio
nn
ai
re
  
47
. L
oc
at
io
n/
fo
rm
at
 o
f r
eg
is
tr
at
io
ns
 o
r 
ac
ti
ve
 lo
bb
yi
st
 
di
re
ct
or
y:
  P
ho
to
co
p
ie
s 
fr
om
 o
ff
ic
e 
on
ly
 –
 
P
D
F 
or
 im
ag
e 
fi
le
s 
on
 t
he
 W
eb
 –
   
Se
ar
ch
ab
le
 d
at
ab
as
e 
on
 t
he
 W
eb
 -
  
D
ow
n
lo
ad
ab
le
 fi
le
s/
d
at
ab
as
e 
- 
Th
e 
lo
ca
ti
on
/f
or
m
at
 o
f r
eg
is
tr
at
io
ns
 o
r 
ac
ti
ve
 lo
bb
yi
st
 d
ir
ec
to
ry
 m
ig
ht
 
af
fe
ct
 a
ge
nc
y 
ex
pe
ns
es
 d
iff
er
en
tly
. P
le
as
e 
in
di
ca
te
 y
ou
r 
op
in
io
n 
on
 th
e 
le
ve
l o
f c
os
t s
ep
ar
at
el
y 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 o
f t
he
 a
lte
rn
at
iv
es
: 
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 r
eg
is
te
re
d/
ac
ti
ve
 lo
bb
yi
st
s 
ar
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
as
 p
ho
to
co
pi
es
 
fr
om
 th
e 
re
gi
st
er
 o
nl
y 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 r
eg
is
te
re
d/
ac
ti
ve
 lo
bb
yi
st
s 
ar
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
as
 P
D
F 
or
 
im
ag
e 
fil
es
 o
n 
th
e 
W
eb
 (r
ea
da
bl
e 
on
ly
)  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 r
eg
is
te
re
d/
ac
ti
ve
 lo
bb
yi
st
s 
ar
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
th
ro
ug
h 
se
ar
ch
ab
le
 d
at
ab
as
e 
on
 th
e 
w
eb
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 r
eg
is
te
re
d/
ac
ti
ve
 lo
bb
yi
st
 a
re
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
th
ro
ug
h 
do
w
nl
oa
da
bl
e 
fil
es
/d
at
ab
as
e 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
131
125 
 
  Respondents did not know what the original CII question was, but they were 
asked to answer a set of questions as they appear in the right column. In cases where CII 
questions contained multiple choice answers, these answers were divided in 
questionnaires into separate questions – from now on called burden indicators. This is 
why the questionnaires contain 67 burden indicators (individual questions), while there 
are in total 47 CII questions. This separation was necessary since it was important to 
further categorize burden indicators into cost-indication categories. 
  Low, Medium and High are the magnitude levels chosen to depict the impact of 
costs on both the private (compliance) and the public sector (enforcement), based on 
previously discussed OECD depth of analysis recommendations. These magnitude levels 
will be used to label a regulation after it has been granted with its CII score, which will 
further on be classified to one of the three magnitude levels.             
  The scale for answering questionnaires was chosen on purpose to be from 1-10, 
where one refers to insignificant cost impact and 10 stands for an extremely burdensome 
cost impact of a rule.  This scale was chosen in order to have a more delicate view on cost 
perception, and to be able to calculate the mean for each question of the CII. The mean 
values of each question are further on associated with one of three possible impacts – 
low, medium and high. This allows observation of different legal rules independently and 
connects them to the magnitude indicators of desired analytical depth.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 
 
LOW MEDIUM 
 
HIGH   
   
  Numerical values could be even individually associated with magnitude 
categories, but this is not necessary since they are categorized in a more profound way in 
the next phase of the data analysis.  However, in case of direct linking, the values that are 
between 2-3 could be associated with low burden impact, from 4-7 with medium burden 
impact and from 8-10 with high burden impact. The reason for skipping the values of 1, 9 
and 10 is that they do not appear as a means of any of burden indicators. This fact led to 
narrowing the scale from a 10 to a 7 digit-scale.  
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  This is also the reason why the magnitude categories do not reflect the 10-digit 
scale, as in that scale 7 would belong to the medium impact zone, while after the 
adjustment it belongs to the high impact zone. The value of 7 would be reflecting 
different weight on 10-digit (1-10) and would remain under medium category. However, 
7 has different weight on 7 digit scale (which starts with 2 and ends with 8), and this is 
why it was moved to the high category.  
  This choice can certainly be criticized. The main critique would be related to the 
decision to shrink the scale from 10 to 7 digits. Still, under the 10-digit scale most of the 
results would probably be ending under the medium zone, which would ultimately make 
differentiation between the results more difficult. For instance, a regulation that would 
end up in range between 7 and 8 and would be regarded as same as the regulation which 
are just above 4 (on 10-scale). However, by slightly narrowing of the medium category it 
would be more easy to see how big the difference is between a regulation with the score 
of 4 and 7, as they would fall under two categories instead of one. 
  Hence, this was a conscious choice which was undertaken in order to make the 
tool more illustrative, even though it can be seen as arbitrary. But still, this is the first 
step in the development of the tool, and hence, more fine tuning would be welcome and 
useful with a more complete statistical analysis in the future.    
 
7.2. The sample 
  Even though it would be better to have a sample large enough to provide more 
reliable statistical data, in the case of this survey it was not possible to easily obtain such 
a sample, due to time, material and factual constraints. The time was also the constraint 
since the answers had to be collected within the period of three months.  
  The main challenge was surveying the public sector. At this moment, there are 
very few states that have regulated lobbying and just some of them have organized 
special units for the enforcement of lobbying regulations. Having four of them reply is not 
insignificant, since there are not many more available in any case. Another alternative 
would be to interview some of the RIA offices in countries where lobbying is not 
regulated, but in that case two types of respondents would have to be mixed. Hence, the 
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major problem within the sample is that it is small, but at the same time it would be 
difficult to enlarge it due to the factual constraints.  
  Unfortunately, this survey was also unable to involve Australia and the US in 
terms of the public sector. The US Senate and US House (they have separate databases) 
refused to participate in the survey claiming they have no right to participate in any 
research projects—“as a federal agency we cannot participate in your survey”. Even 
though the information from the US could be very useful due to the complexity and 
history of lobbying enforcement in that country, relevant institutions have not found the 
means or interest to participate in the survey. 
On the other hand, there are thousands of lobbying firms all around the world, but 
due to the material245 and time constraints, it was decided to shift the focus to official 
lobbying associations, or associations which represent lobbyists and other public affairs 
professionals. These organizations officially represent an aggregate interest of their 
members, and they are by default involved in regulatory affairs related to their 
profession. This also means they have very good information on the needs of the 
industry, and costs that the industry faces in complying with different regulatory rules. 
Moreover, some of them derive legitimacy from large membership, and one of their main 
roles is to provide information on the general interest of their members. Involving 
associations, instead of lobbying firms directly, helped in bypassing material constraint. 
Thus, the sample is small in terms of statistical size, but in terms of empirical evidence it 
can be considered as a relevant source due to the quality and legitimacy of the 
respondents. The number of respondents should not mislead, because they all (except 
the American Bakers’ Association) legitimately represent a large number of lobbyists.  
 Another important factor that supports the empirical evidence is the use of 
significant effort required in answering the questionnaires. A profound understanding of 
the effects of transparency was necessary to formulate the answers, and the information 
obtained from respondents could be treated as high quality information. Those who 
                                                          
245 Mostly referred to the need of contacting them by phone more than several times in order to get 
someone to respond. Emails gets easily disregarded which was the case in this survey. Fortunately, 
participation was secured by phone calls and multiple emails, but still not in all cases. 
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decided to respond have probably provided answers based on a profound understanding 
of regulatory mechanisms and their burden. 
  The respondent rate was– 12 out of 18 potential ones (for the private side) and 4 
out of 6 potential ones (for the public side.) However, not all of the respondents who 
participated agreed to fill in the questionnaire. One of them offered a phone interview 
instead, while another two sent extensive and detailed written testimonies as their 
answers on questions. It was important to stay flexible and allow them to contribute as 
they preferred, even though the objective was to get answers which can be further used 
to calculate the means for each question. On the other hand, the thoughts expressed in an 
open and extensive way certainly improved the qualitative part of the analysis.  
  The answering time was initially limited to one month, but it was extended to 
three months as it was very difficult to convince respondents to participate in the 
research. In fact, phone conversations and multiple reminders were necessary in order to 
secure the current response rate. The persistence was ultimately fruitful as people who 
were actually responding to the questionnaires were usually presidents of interviewed 
associations or directors of registries, which gives some additional weight to their 
answers. Table 6 provides the list of participating institutions and information on their 
membership. Hence, the answers obtained are valuable even though the sample is small, 
but under available resources and constraints it could hardly have been larger. Further 
on, in the review of the Regulatory Independence Indices literature, it will be shown that 
even small samples can produce acceptable results. This is especially true in this case as 
these were additionally supplemented with a qualitative analysis through letters and 
phone calls.  
   
Table 6 - List of participants in the survey 
 PRIVATE SIDE RESPONDENTS N = 12 
1. Croatian Society of Lobbyists 
www.hdl.com.hr  
(99 members) 
Survey completed 
2. Serbian Lobbying Association  
www.drustvolobistasrbije.org  
(67 members) 
Survey completed 
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3. Slovenian Society of Lobbyists  
www.slovenski-lobisti.si 
(61 member) 
Survey completed 
5. Chartered Institute of Public Relations, 
Association of Professional Political 
Consultants and Public Relations Consultants 
Association in the UK    (CIPR) 
(Almost 10,000 members – information on a 
portion of lobbyists/public affairs 
professionals is not available) 
Phone interview with Mr Phil 
Morgan, Director of Policy and 
Communications  
6. Society of European Affairs Professionals 
www.saep.be 
(255 members) 
Survey completed 
7. Association of Accredited Lobbyists to the 
EU – AALEP 
www.aalep.eu 
(not available) 
Survey completed 
8. American Baker’s Association 
www.americanbakers.org  
Trade Association from the US 
Survey completed. Since the 
American League of Lobbyists 
did not fill the questionnaire, 
the ABA was contacted in 
order to have at least one 
qualitative data source from 
the US. However, since the ABA 
is not a lobbying association 
but a lobbying organization, 
their answers are not as heavy 
as those from associations. 
9. American League of Lobbyists 
(1200 members) 
www.alldc.org  
www.ippaaglobal.org  
 
Written, extensive testimony 
of Mr Wright Andrews, ex 
president and board member 
of the American League of 
Lobbyists; American Bar 
Association – task force on 
lobbying reform member; 
Director of the International 
Public Policy Advocacy 
Association. 
10. Italian Public Affairs Association  Survey completed  
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www.pa-association.it 
11. Association of Professional Lobbyist in 
Poland 
www.splp.pl 
 
Survey completed 
12. Macedonian Centre for Lobbying  
(30 members, not accredited lobbyists)  
 
Survey completed 
 PUBLIC SIDE RESPONDENTS  N = 5 
1. Office of the Commissioner of lobbying of 
Canada 
Survey completed 
2. Commission for prevention of corruption of 
Slovenia 
Survey completed 
3. The New Transparency Register of the EU Survey completed 
4. Mr Dusan Protic, a member of the working 
group for drafting the Serbian Law on 
Lobbying  
(Assistant Minister at Ministry of Trade and 
Commerce of Serbia which is responsible for 
enacting the law on lobbying) 
Survey completed 
5. The Australia Government Register of 
Lobbyists 
Written answer 
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8.        Results of the survey and their incorporation into the CII 
 
The data from the questionnaires are analysed in an aggregate way only, as 
respondents insisted that their answers not be disclosed individually. Based on all 
available answers, only the means for each question are exposed. Nine completed 
questionnaires were analysed on the private side with four being examined for the public 
sector. The data processing was done separately in Excel for each of the 67 questions, 
and some of them were afterwards re-bundled as they were originally part of one 
multiple-choice question. Here only the means for each and every answer are included 
and introduced246. Hence Table 7 (below) contains calculated mean values for each 
question based on the data collected through the survey, and not the separate responses 
from each interviewed party. 
The CII is composed of 47 questions, but they were further divided into 67 
individual burden indicators in the questionnaires. There were more indicators than 
questions due to the observation of alternatives within one question in an individual way. 
For instance, questions where four alternatives were offered were divided into four 
separate burden indicators. This also means that within a single CII question, different 
burden categories might appear, depending on the answer during its application.  
The means of each question range in values from a minimum of 2 to a maximum of 
8. Even though there were individual answers with values from 1 to 10, after the 
aggregation they range from 2 to 8. This means that the scale within the CII is practically 
composed of 7 categories of cost impacts, where 2 is the lowest and 8 is the highest cost 
impact category. In other words, the aggregate results indicate that there are no 
extremely expensive rules to comply with (9 and 10), but also that there are no 
completely insignificant compliance costs (1). 
Using this scale with values that are based on anecdotal evidence, the maximal 
possible score that one regulation might achieve is 288. In other words, this would be the 
most burdensome lobbying regulation. Achieving this score in practice means that all 
                                                          
246 Of course, the data is still available through the returned questionnaires and can be shared upon request. 
Calculating the means calculating is a relatively simple procedure, and the room for error is practically zero.   
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questions are answered positively (no zeros), and that among cost-impact alternatives, 
the one with the highest value was marked.  
Since it is possible to distinguish the private (1-26) and the public burden (27-47), 
it is also possible to look at the burden on those sides individually as well. The maximum 
score for the private side is 157, while for the public side it is 131. This would 
additionally allow observation of cost distribution between the public and the private 
side, which is very useful when several regulatory alternatives are compared. In an 
assumed situation where two lobbying regulations would result in the same overall 
score, comparisons between their respective cost distributions would open a room for 
additional insight into their quality. Besides the overall CII result of a regulation, it is 
important to see which part of society is bearing higher compliance pressure.  
In questions 6, 32 and 37, some important adjustments were made regarding their 
scores. The results in questions 6 and 37 were to some extent controversial because 
those were the only ones within all the questions which were not following the general 
logic of costs associated with lobbying regulation. The main idea that arises from all the 
anecdotal evidence (both questionnaires and the interviews) suggests that more 
detailed247 and more frequent248 activities were imposing a greater burden on those who 
were expected to perform them. In other cases, those detailed and frequent tasks were at 
least considered to be of the same cost as their less complex and frequent alternatives, 
but they should not be more burdensome in any case. More complex and frequent 
reporting was found to have a higher cost impact than infrequent and simple reporting. 
The same holds true for the management and contents of transparency databases by an 
oversight agency.  
                                                          
247 W. Andrews “...If detailed reporting is required, one would have to keep a logbook. This clearly would be 
burdensome, costly and inevitably involve many errors, however inadvertent, that could expose one to legal 
liability for noncompliance.” S. Dreven “If summaries (totals) of spending have to be classified by category 
types. On my opinion this should take some extra work, that is why, yes, this would influence the costs more. 
Description of the itemized expenditure - this certainly takes a bit more work, so yes, it affects cost.”  
248 W. Andrews “...The filing frequency issue is, like the level of detail required, a key consideration of the 
business costs/risks involved.   Personally, I do not believe that filing once every year or two years is 
meaningful.   While filing every 3 months is somewhat more costly/burdensome, it is quite reasonable, and in 
most cases certainly should not be very costly, unless the reporting also involved requiring disclosure of 
extensive detail, or perhaps if many reports are involved for various clients.  The potential much higher cost 
filing concern relates in some cases to the frequency one has to file amendments to registrations/reports due to 
rapidly changing circumstances as to the issues, amendments, etc. that are being lobbied on.” 
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 Still, in the two mentioned questions this was slightly different, probably due to 
the small size of the sample which led to a few controversial results. For instance, the 
results in question No. 6 indicated that it is cheaper for a lobbyist to notify an oversight 
agency in changes to his registration if the deadline is 3 days (4) than if the deadline is 
one month from the change (5). It is highly unlikely that this is the case, since the shorter 
the deadline means less time to react and requires more diligent paperwork249. Thus, the 
cost impact of both is at least the same and both values are set to be 5 in this question. A 
similar adjustment was made with question No. 37, where data suggested that if an 
oversight agency has to update lobbying lists monthly (7) it is more costly than updating 
them on a weekly basis (6). However, it is more likely that working on administrative 
tasks four times a month instead of once a month is more demanding in terms of agency 
resources. 
The last remark pertains to question No.32,  which was one of the questions that 
was modified from the CPI. This question deals with expenses related to provision to the 
public of transparency reports that are collected from lobbyists. Many of these reports 
are nowadays available online for the public. Despite that, even if the oversight agency 
would have to provide copies of some data to an interested party, by simply printing the 
data sheets – this could hardly be a costly activity. This is why the only provisory value in 
the CII is set to be 3, in cases that reports are printed at the expense of the public 
authority when an interested party wants to have them. 
  In some cases, alternatives are considered to be equally burdensome, regardless 
of their complexity which is the case with question 14250. This result indicates that 
spending itemization is considered to be burdensome per se for the industry, and that the 
level of detail does not always have a high impact on actual costs.   
                                                          
249 W. Andrews “..In today’s computer driven world, I see no reason why one should not be required to register 
on behalf of a client within 10 to 14 business days of being retained, or having made contacts in the case of ‘in-
house’ corporate lobbyists. There is little public benefit in disclosing activity long after it is completed as it 
certainly often is if a 6 month time period is allowed.  On the other hand, requiring registration within 3 days, 
when one is extremely busy and say a sole operator, seems unreasonably short and clearly more burdensome, 
although perhaps not a significant cost concern apart from legal risk if there is strong enforcement.” 
 250 What spending must be itemized? 
 All spending above $500 must be itemized – 8 points 
 All spending above $100 – 8 points 
 All spending required to be itemized – 8 points 
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  Another odd result can be found in question 7, which is related to the 
submission of a photograph of a lobbyist within the registration. This should not be 
expected to be a costly requirement, but the data have suggested it has a score of 5, 
which is in the middle of the scale. Again, the small sample most likely contributed to this 
odd result. 
Table 7 - The CII with incorporated values from the survey 
The Cost Indicator Index with the survey’s values attached 
The overall maximal score is 288 
Private side questions from 1 - 26 
Public side questions from 27 - 47 
1.  How much does an individual have to make/spend to qualify as a lobbyist or to 
prompt registration as a lobbyist, according to the definition?               
Qualification threshold: More than $10,000 made - 4 points          
Qualification threshold: More than $2,500 made -  6 points            
Qualification threshold: regardless the amount made - 7  points   
2. Is a lobbyist required to file a registration form?                                                                               
No – 0 points  
   Yes – 5 points 
3. How many days can lobbying take place before registration is required?                        
6 months or more – 4 points  
Up to a month – 5 points   
Up to 3 days – 5 points 
4. Is subject matter or bill number to be addressed by a lobbyist required on 
registration forms? 
No bill number/subject matter required – 0 points  
Subject matter only required –  4 points  
Bill number required –  5 points 
5. How often is registration by a lobbyist required? 
Once only –  2 points  
Every two years – 4 points  
Annually or more often – 4 points 
6. Within how many days must a lobbyist notify the oversight agency of changes in 
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registration?                                                                                                                                                           
6 months or more – 4 points  
Up to a month –  5 points  
Up to 3 days – 5 points 
7. Is a lobbyist required to submit a photograph with registration? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 5 points 
8. Is a lobbyist required to identify by name each employer on the registration form? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 6 points 
9. Is a lobbyist required to include on the registration form any additional information 
about the type of lobbying work he or she does (i.e., compensated or non-
compensated/contract or salaried)? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 6 points 
10. Is a lobbyist required to file a spending report?                                                                        
No – 0 points  
Yes – 8 points 
11. How often within a year is a lobbyist required to report spending?                                             
Once (or once in 2 years) – 5 points  
Twice - 6 points  
Every three months or more often – 7 points 
12. Is compensation/salary required to be reported by a lobbyist on spending reports?         
No – 0 points  
Yes – 5 points 
13. Are summaries (totals) of spending classified by category types (i.e., gifts, 
entertainment, postage, etc.)?  
No – 0 points 
Yes – 8 points 
14. What spending must be itemized? 
 No spending required to be itemized – 0 points  
 All spending above $500 must be itemized – 8 points 
 All spending above $100 – 8 points 
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 All spending required to be itemized – 8 points 
15. Is the lobbyist employer/principal on whose behalf the itemized expenditure was 
made required to be identified? 
No – 0 points                                                                                                   
Yes – 7 points 
16. Is the recipient of the itemized expenditure required to be identified? 
No – 0 points 
Yes – 6 points 
17. Is the date of the itemized expenditure required to be reported?     
No – 0 points  
Yes – 8 points 
18. Is a description of the itemized expenditure required to be reported? 
No – 0 points                          
Yes – 7 points 
19. Is subject matter or bill number to be addressed by a lobbyist required on spending 
reports? 
No bill number/subject matter required – 0 points  
Subject matter only required – 6 points  
Bill number required – 5 points 
20. Is spending on household members of public officials by a lobbyist required to be 
reported? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 7 points 
21. Is a lobbyist required to disclose direct business associations with public officials, 
candidates or members of their households? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 6  points 
22. What is the statutory provision for a lobbyist giving and reporting gifts?                                 
Gifts are not reported – 0 points  
Gifts are reported – 6 points  
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23. What is the statutory provision for a lobbyist giving and reporting campaign 
contributions? 
Campaign contributions not required to be disclosed on spending report/prohibited during  
session – 0 points 
Campaign contributions allowed and required to be disclosed on spending report/allowed       
during session – 6 points 
24. Is a lobbyist who has done no spending during a filing period required to make a 
report of no activity? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 4 points 
25. Is an employer or principal of a lobbyist required to file a spending report?                          
No – 0 point  
Yes – 5 points 
26. Is compensation/salary required to be reported on employer/principal spending 
reports?                                                         
No – 0 points  
Yes – 5 points     
27. Does oversight agency provide lobbyists/employers with online registration?                     
No – 0 points  
Yes – 4 points 
28. Does oversight agency provide lobbyists/employers with online spending reporting?     
No – 0 points  
Yes – 5 points 
29. Does oversight agency provide training about how to file registrations/spending 
reports electronically? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 4 points 
30. Location/format of registrations or active lobbyist directory: 
Photocopies from office only – 6 points  
PDF or image files on the Web – 3 points  
Searchable database on the Web –  4 points  
Downloadable files/database – 4 points 
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31. Location/format of spending  reports: 
 Photocopies from office only – 7  points  
PDF or image files on the Web – 3 points  
Searchable database on the Web – 4 points  
Downloadable files/database – 4 points 
32. Cost of copies: 
Interested parties pay for the copies of available reports – 0 points 
Interested parties do not have to pay for the copies of available reports – 3 points 
33. Are sample registration forms/spending reports available the Web? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 3 points 
34. Does oversight agency provide an overall lobbying spending total by year?                           
No – 0 points  
Yes – 6 points 
35. Does oversight agency provide an overall lobbying spending total by spending-report 
deadlines? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 8 points 
36. Does oversight agency provide an overall lobbying spending total by industries 
lobbyists represent? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 8 points 
37. How often are lobby lists updated? 
Annually or less often – 6 points   
Monthly – 7 points  
Weekly  - 7 points 
38. In addition to legislative lobbyists, does the definition recognize executive branch 
lobbyists? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 3 points 
39. Does the state publish a list of delinquent filers either on the Web or in a printed 
document? 
No – 0 points  
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Yes – 4 points 
40. Does the state have statutory auditing authority? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 7 points 
41. Does oversight agency conducts mandatory reviews or audits? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 8 points 
42. Is there a statutory penalty for late filing of lobby registration  
form? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 8 points 
43. Is there a statutory penalty for late filing of a lobby spending 
report? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 8 points 
44. Is there a statutory penalty for incomplete filling of a lobby registration form?                    
No – 0 points  
Yes – 8 points 
45. Is there a statutory penalty for incomplete filling of a lobby spending report?                       
No – 0 points 
Yes - 8 points 
46. Structure/type of oversight agency? 
Already existing administrative unit with attributed tasks of  enforcement of lobbying rules   
 – 6  points 
 Entirely new administrative agency – 8 points 
47. Is there a mandatory revolving door compliance  
 No – 0  
 Yes – 8 points 
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9.  Additional empirical information on nature of the costs of lobbying 
 regulation  
         Even though the survey offered respondents the ability to reply in an 
anonymous way, some of them have refused to participate in the quantitative form and 
offered their feedback through written testimonies and interviews, and agreed to be 
individually named251.  
It is important to highlight that interviewed professional lobbyists, like other 
studies have shown252, are not necessarily opposed to the regulation of lobbying and the 
cost that comes along with it253 as long as the cost is “reasonable”. From the regulatory 
capture point of view discussed earlier, this makes sense, as the lobbyist might actually 
be interested in being regulated as long as regulation protects them to restrict the 
competition. Some type of empirical evidence for this is the position of the Serbian 
Lobbyists Association (discussed in the next Chapter) which strongly advocates the 
                                                          
251 Those are Mr Wright Andrews who is ex-president of the American League of Lobbyists where he 
currently serves as a board member and member of the American Bar Association – lobbying reform task 
force. He is also one of the funders and current director of the International Public Policy Advocacy 
Association. Additionally, a phone interview was conducted with Mr D. Gueguen who is president of the 
Pacteurope, a lobbying firm based in Brussels. Mr. D. Gueguen is a prominent lobbyist and a well-known 
author on lobbying issues with about thirty years of experience in European lobbying issues. Useful written 
comments on the top of the completed questionnaire were sent as well by Mr Simon Dreven from the 
Slovenian Lobbying Association. 
252 Most other lobbyists surveyed in Europe seem to agree that lobbyist registration should be mandatory. 
As shown in Figure 5.5, more than 61% of all respondents believe that a lobbyist registration and 
transparency program should be “mandatory for all lobbyists”. About 18% of respondents prefer a 
voluntary system of registration and disclosure, and 15% are “neutral” on the issue. This support for a 
mandatory lobbyist registry again runs the gamut of all categories of lobbyists, with 80.6% of not-for-profit 
lobbyists favouring a mandatory system, 57% of contract lobbyists supporting mandatory registration and 
disclosure, and 56% of corporate lobbyists supporting the same. Mandatory versus voluntary registration 
and disclosure of lobbying activity is simply not an area of much dispute – at least not within the lobbying 
community; Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust - Promoting Integrity through Self-Regulation (Volume 
2)., p 87. 
253 “First, let me note my personal position or perspective on lobbying disclosure laws generally:  in essence, 
I believe that it is very important to provide for a relatively high level of transparency in lobbying activities 
in order to foster public trust in and support for the democratic process by enabling the public (largely via 
media study and reports rather than by normal citizen’s review of lobbying reports) to have a better 
understanding of how lobbying is being conducted via information contained in public disclosure of 
lobbying reports. Reporting can also help address concerns over corruption. For such reports to be truly 
meaningful, they obviously must contain a reasonable level of information regarding such basic things as 
who is acting as a lobbyist, who has hired them, what issues are they lobbying on, what they are getting 
paid, what they are spending, who they are contacting, and at least what types of activities are involved in 
their lobbying efforts. The problem becomes, of course, what is from the perspective of your project what 
and how information can be disclosed at a reasonable business cost.” by Wright Andrews.  
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regulation of lobbying, and who has even suggested the regulatory design for this very 
purpose. Bearing in mind that they are advocating the adoption of their own proposed 
law on lobbying, it might be argued that this type of initiative could be more harmful than 
beneficial to the public interest (Stigler 1971). 
The term “reasonable” could be interpreted differently depending on perspective. 
If we look at it from the CPI perspective (which is closer to the public side perspective), 
the minimal reasonable cost would be the one which provides a CPI score of at least 60 – 
the passing threshold.  However, achieving this threshold does not necessarily mean that 
the private side would agree to this standard. A CPI score of 60 is actually quite a high 
score, especially for Europe254, while in the US, 25 out of 50 states managed to get a 
passing grade255. What would have probably been acceptable for an EU lobbyist could be 
summarized through the position of Daniel Gueguen who thinks that “…regulating only 
some basic rules and principles would be desirable from a conceptual and a cost point of 
view”. Otherwise, regulation would probably be too burdensome. Gueguen is strongly in 
favour of mandatory regulation of basic rules and principles, but wide enough in scope to 
capture law firms as well. He also argues that the current New transparency register is 
inefficient, especially due to a lack of effective enforcement mechanisms. From this point 
of view, it is a waste of public resources, according to him.  
Mr Gueguen also highlighted that voluntary solutions already exist within 
professional associations like the SEAP, but the compliance control and enforcement over 
its members is insignificant256. On the other hand, the revolving door problem in the 
Commission has to be solved as soon as possible, because it strongly compromises the 
institutional credibility of the EU.  
The interview with Daniel Gueguen has just confirmed the major problems of the 
EU lobbying regulation issues. From the cost perspective, his remarks led to the 
                                                          
254 Hungarian lobbying rules which were anyways recently abandoned (score 45), Lithuania (score 44), 
Poland (score 27), European Commission-old register (score 24), European parliament (score 15), Germany 
(score 17). 
255   R. Chari, J. Hogan, and G. Murphy, Supra n.76. 
256 Quite the same conclusion comes from the report PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND TERRITORIAL 
DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE, Lobbyists, Government and Public Trust: Promoting Integrity by Self-
Regulation. p 83.  
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conclusion that the New transparency register of the EU does not effectively contribute to 
higher transparency, while it certainly creates public expenditures. In terms of 
compliance costs, he believes that complex requirements would be an undesired and 
unnecessary burden to the industry. This attitude generally reflects European lobbyists’ 
approach towards the regulation, but it also supports critics of the voluntary registration 
system without efficient enforcement mechanisms.  
Mr Wright Andrews shares this opinion as well when it comes to the US. What 
usually concerns both is that definitions of lobbyist or lobbying are set too narrowly, and 
that they do not require everyone who actually lobbies to be registered. Mr Andrews has 
highlighted this issue in the US scenario: “I also should note that I, like many other 
experienced lobbyists, do not believe that the current U.S. Lobbying Disclosure Act is 
adequate as it is filled with loopholes or flaws that enable many to avoid registering and 
even when registered to report relatively little and/or inadequate information”. 
This factor is relevant not only from a fairness and transparency point of view, but 
also from a costs impact point of view. Continuous pressures from currently registered 
lobbyists in this direction would definitely, if taken into consideration, lead to a higher 
number of registrants in the future. This might especially be relevant in national 
scenarios (outside the US), where the number of registered lobbyists is usually low. On 
the other hand, this will increase overall spending of the industry as more lobbyists will 
be expected to register and comply; likewise, the public sector will have to deal with 
more registrants. Expansion of the definitions in both directions would increase the 
social costs associated with lobbying regulation while at the same time contributing to 
more transparent decision-making257. Once again, it is important that the definitions of 
lobbying and of lobbyist are based on a compromise between transparency and social 
costs. This just illustrates the importance of an analytical approach in choosing a proper 
                                                          
257 W. Andrews “....In the U.S., we now have literally hundreds of millions of dollars spent on activities designed 
to influence legislative decisions, but which are never reported because our law requires that the person 
conducting such activities make a written or oral direct communication with a covered public official.   Persons 
engaging, for example, in massive grass roots and/or media campaigns designed to sway public opinion and 
have members of the public contact legislators to support or oppose a measure, but who do not themselves 
write, email or contact these officials, are not required to register and report.  We also currently have 
provisions that allow many ‘lobbyists’ to avoid registration and reporting because the percentage of the time 
they spend engaging in lobbying related activities for the particular client does not reach the required 20% 
level”. 
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definition.258 It also means that deliberative choices might lead to an unjustified increase 
of the social costs, or cause unequal treatment of parties in lobbying markets. 
The CPI and the CII also deal with the definition of a lobbyist. In question 38 of the 
CII, regulators were asked to answer if they thought that the public cost would be 
influenced if the definition includes executive branch lobbyists besides the legislative 
branch lobbyists. The answer (3) does not imply a strong correlation between overall 
costs of enforcement in case the definition of lobbyist includes executive branch lobbyists 
as well. The reason for such an answer might be the fact that once the system for 
registration and transparency exists, managing more registrants is not as costly as it 
seems from the outside, especially if they have low compliance requirements. In any case, 
public expenditures would probably not be increased tremendously. On the other hand, 
more registrants would influence the aggregate burden imposed on the private side in a 
negative way. 
  In sum, from written and oral testimonies of respondents, two main conclusions 
can be derived: 
 There should be a mandatory lobbying regulation system enforced by a public agency. 
 Transparency is important, but compliance costs should be kept low. If requirements 
not involve much detailed and frequent paperwork, the cost would be “reasonable” 
and probably not overly burdensome. 
  How could these conclusions be interpreted from the theoretical framework 
point of view? The data from this research (especially from interviews) suggest that 
lobbyists are not as opposed to regulation as one might think. Moreover, in some cases 
                                                          
258  The reason why this research does not introduce any definition as a proper one is that defining lobbyists 
is dependent on various factors such are political tradition, economic system, institutional and/or 
constitutional framework. These factors determine what lobbying will look like and who would be generally 
engaged in it. Hence, suggesting an optimal definition would be possible in a case-by-case scenario where all 
these factors would have to be analysed prior to defining what lobbying is. A similar position is taken by 
L.H. Mayer (2008) who analysed different types of definitions and discussed their optimality in different 
scenarios. As an illustration, one can compare the US approach where lobbying activity comes under the 
regulatory radar only when its value exceeds certain financial threshold. This definition in the US case 
makes sense as it improves the screening process and helps the law to focus on lobbying of larger scale. A 
similar method in the case of a smaller country with less than 100 registered lobbyists would make little 
sense as most of them would fall under the radar based on the US thresholds. Thus, setting a proper 
lobbying definition in the regulatory sense would require lots of research for every particular case. 
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such as the Serbian or Montenegrin which will be addressed in the last chapter, they even 
actively lobby(ed) for lobbying regulation. 
  This should not cause much surprise if one looks back at Stigler (1971), 
Peltzman (1976), Tirole (1986) and other founders of the capture approach. It does not 
surprise that the lobbying industry, in fact, prefers to be regulated as long as they can 
have a high impact on the regulatory design, which in turn can be used to erect entry 
barriers and restrict the competition, for instance259.  
  Hence, when lobbying regulations are being designed, the voice of lobbyists 
should certainly be heard, but it should not be the dominating one as regulation should 
first of all protect and promote the public interest  - which does not always have to be in 
line with the interest of lobbyists. This research unfortunately does not offer an answer 
on the relation of lobbying regulation and various (positive and negative) 
macroeconomic outputs of lobbying, but it simply strives to contribute to understanding 
of process of decreasing of direct regulatory costs (compliance and enforcement), while 
keeping certain non-economic benefits as high as possible. In other words, the 
methodologies used here cannot provide an answer on the relation of lobbying 
regulation to general economic effects of lobbying, but they can provide an indicative 
answer on direct burdens imposed on government and the industry, and provide a model 
for improvement of that very cost-benefit ratio. 
 
10. Methodological concerns and limitations of the data   
 The anecdotal method is not a perfect one, but since the sample is quite limited 
due to factual constrains, this was one of the ways to get some empirical backup for 
construction of the CII's scores. For instance, the CPI has not offered any empirical 
backup of their scale of scores, and in this sense, the CII can be perceived as slightly more 
advanced despite all its methodological problems. However, in terms of the CII, there is 
certainly room for improvement of its precision in the future. At this juncture, its 
methodological applicability, robustness and the issue of endogeneity are going to be 
discussed, which is important for understanding the nature of the results obtained 
                                                          
259 "Relating the amount of capture to regulatory outcomes is difficult, mainly because measuring capture is 
tricky" E. Dal Bó, “Regulatory Capture: A Review.”, p.126 
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through application of the CII. Answering these questions will improve understanding of 
the value of its application.  
 
10.1. Robustness  
  In the world of lobbying regulation, robustness appears in two aspects – as an 
adjective to the structure of regulations, or an adjective to the methodology for 
comparative analysis of lobbying regulation. Chari, Murphy and Hogan260 have used this 
term to define lobbying regulations that usually result in a high CPI score. Their 
robustness arises from their complexity and ability to improve transparency by 
addressing a various number of relevant elements that improve the strength of lobbying 
regulation, and the willingness of lobbyists to learn about compliance rules. The more the 
system is robust, the more complex it is in terms of application of enforcement 
mechanisms, in terms of complexity of reporting and disclosure and “the more likely they 
(lobbyists) will feel they have the responsibility to learn what they are. The opposite is also 
true as reflected in the responses from lobbyists in Germany: the less robust are the 
regulations, then the less likely that respondents would feel responsibility to learn about the 
rules as their impact is minimal in any case261”. 
  Robustness is also related to the ability of the CPI to be used as a tool for 
comparative analysis of different regulatory scenarios around the world. According to 
Chari, Murphy and Hogan – the CPI is robust enough as a method to be successfully used 
for analysis and comparisons of lobbying regulation worldwide262. This means that the 
CPI as a method has sufficient resistance to different legal and political environments, 
and that its application outside the US regime (where it was designed) can be effectively 
performed in order to analyse and compare different regulations. These arguments are 
important to remember when discussing features of the CII as well. 
  If talking about the robustness of the CII, very similar arguments can be 
established for it as well, since it is almost completely the same in its structure to the CPI 
index. Besides a few minor changes within the existing questions and one entirely new 
                                                          
260 R. Chari and G. Murphy, Examining and Assessing the Regulation of Lobbyists in Canada, the USA, the EU 
Institutions, and Germany, 2007. p.67 
261 R. Chari, J. Hogan, and G. Murphy, Supra n.76, p.70 
262 R. Chari, J. Hogan, and G. Murphy, Supra n.76, p.62. 
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question which was added, the structure is practically the same. However, it has to be 
underlined that CII structure, in terms of cost indicators choice, is not derived from the 
CPI but rather from a general RIA cost assessment approach (general cost indicators as 
defined by OECD)263, which is melted into the CPI methodology. The choice to use the 
general cost indicators also mitigates the problem of selection of a proper RIA tool as the 
one used in this methodology can be regarded as a general approach. This certainly does 
not mean that there are no more optimal tools, but at least it provides some safety from 
the possibility that a completely wrong approach was taken. 
  An additional contribution to its robustness is the decision to define the impacts 
through different categories of magnitude and not monetary values. Monetization of the 
burden would influence robustness negatively because monetary expressions of burdens 
would require subsequent involvement of additional country-specific parameters, before 
comparisons with other regulations could be established. For instance, the expected 
burden, which is expressed monetarily, would have to be compared with additional 
information from an environment, such are the size of the lobbying industry, the size of 
the government budget, GDP, etc.  
  These are just some of the factors that influence the interpretation of monetary 
results. Again, if the cost of enforcement in the US has been estimated to be $5 million per 
year, and the same estimation was made for Montenegro, it would not mean that both 
countries experience the same burden with regards to enforcement costs. Simply, just by 
looking at monetary value, we do not know if $5 million is considered to be a large or 
insignificant expense, as it largely depends on the observed environment.  Hence, the 
comparison would be impossible before involving a large number of variables. 
  On the other hand, if the burden is expressed in terms of indication of the 
magnitude (high, medium, low), we can more easily compare different lobbying 
regulations regardless of their origins, based on a qualitative and quantitative analysis of 
the regulatory structure. Upon determining the regulatory structure and costliness of 
regulatory elements, a comparison of aggregate burden indication across different 
regulations is much easier.  
                                                          
263 See p. 113 
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  Another important feature of the CII is its ex-ante applicability. By 
simultaneously applying the CPI and the CII in the early regulatory phases (first draft), 
information could be efficiently obtained on the expected magnitudes of both benefits 
and costs, as well as on their correlation. This would allow legislators to reconsider 
regulatory design if the expected burden greatly exceeds expected strength, which will be 
evident through comparison of the CII and the CPI scores.  
  There are a few additional effects that might influence robustness to some 
extent, but they do not threaten to seriously discredit the application of the CII.  
 
10.2. Relation of the actual enforcement and compliance costs – how accurate 
is the CII?  
  One of the elements that should be considered within the robustness of the 
method is the relevance of actual enforcement in determining real compliance costs. It 
has to be noted that the CII is unfortunately completely insensitive to this factor, 
especially because it is designed to be applied ex ante. However, it has been underlined 
that the CII is just an indicative tool and that for a more accurate estimation of costs, 
further analysis is required.   
  But here it is important to highlight that even if the CII would indicate high 
compliance costs in an ex-ante application, the accuracy of this estimation will mostly 
depend on the oversight of the agency’s future enforcement level. If the enforcement is 
weak, even though the regulatory structure indicates high compliance costs, real 
compliance costs will probably be lower. 
  This was also pointed out in the interview with Mr Wright Andrews, who claims 
that enforcement on the US federal level is not sufficient, and that this is also reflected in 
the compliance costs. Low enforcement normally makes compliance activities (filing, 
paperwork, reporting all details, respecting deadlines, etc) less diligent, which generally 
lowers reporting-related costs. Consequently, a higher degree of enforcement would be 
expected to produce higher compliance costs.  
  A similar reasoning could be applied in cases of reporting which involved 
detailed disclosure. Firms would dedicate more resources to comply with the rules, and 
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even then a margin for error would exist.  Hence, a failure to fully comply could provoke a 
sanction towards a firm, which would result in additional costs imposed on it.  
  These thoughts clearly show that actual compliance might be quite different than 
predicted, which would certainly affect the magnitude of the burden, especially on the 
private side. This is why it is crucial to highlight that the CII assumes that enforcement is 
perfect. The CII is unable to predict what the actual magnitude of burden would be, but it 
predicts magnitude of burden based the assumption of perfect enforcement.  
Another issue is the applicability of the CII globally. It is to some extent also a 
critique of its robustness. One can argue that a more precise estimation of burden would 
be better if the scores in the CII were set exclusively on surveys for each country 
individually. This would mean that for each country that has to be analysed, an individual 
special survey on cost-perception would have to be done. Only then, with results from 
these “custom-made” CII scores, would further comparative assessment make sense. 
On the other hand, this should not be treated as a major problem as the CPI is also 
successfully applied as a comparative tool, even though its scores were set specially for 
each case. The scoring technique of the CPI is the same in all cases, even though it is not 
clear how the values for each question were initially determined.  
Similarly, the CII does not necessarily need to be a custom-tailored tool. Its scores 
are based on averages of all respondents and they reflect the general perception of 
burden of most common regulatory mechanism for lobbying regulation. Making the CII 
fully custom-made would increase its precision for each regulation, but it would have at 
the same time decreased its comparative value, since now all regulations are evaluated 
by subjecting them to a general compliance and enforcement perception.  
However, it has to be noted that assessing costs in different jurisdictions is a very 
complex issue. It can be argued that different cost indicators have different weights in 
different settings and that due to this the CII might have a robustness problem. Even 
though the CII relies not only on CPI but also on general RIA cost indicators, this may be 
true to some extent. Still, the methodology introduced here represents a sound 
groundwork for more advanced fine tuning that could be done in the future in terms of 
robustness as well. A larger sample would allow more precise thresholds setting and 
would positively influence the robustness of the results and the methodology overall.  
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10.3. The CII and literature on Central Banks Independence and Regulatory 
Independence. How does CII look in comparison with other indices? 
 The CII is designed in a manner which allows it to be applied in a parallel way 
with the CPI index. This choice was additionally enforced by linking the CII design with 
the theory and practice of Regulatory Impact Assessment. However, it may also be useful 
to reflect this choice with the literature on Central Bank Independence (CBI) Indices and 
Regulatory Independence Indices, in order to have some sort of additional benchmark for 
judgment of the choice that was made.     
The CII and CPI approaches, on the one hand, and (CBI) and Regulatory 
independence indices on the other hand are very different. While the first two tend to 
provide an indicative answer on the level of costs and benefits of lobbying laws, the latter 
two deal with the measurement of institutional independences. Conversely, the CPI and 
CII do not strive to test any independence of lobbying regulatory authority, but simply 
provide a helicopter view of expected outcomes associated with certain designs of 
lobbying regulation.  
Still it might be useful to compare the assessment methods of both approaches and 
see whether the CII could profit from structural choices in Central Banks and Regulatory 
Independence theory. 
 Generally speaking, this literature strives to explain the relation of 
macroeconomic indicators to independence of central banks from their governments. 
Even though central banks largely enjoy formal independence from governments, there 
are many channels through which government can influence the policies of central banks, 
such as appointments of board members, participation in voting procedures, auditing 
control mechanisms, etc. 
There are different techniques and indices created for measuring and ranking the 
Central bank independences (CBI). One of the first pioneer indices was introduced by 
Bade and Parkin (1982)264 and this method concentrated exclusively on de-facto analysis 
                                                          
264 M. Parkin and R. Bade, “Central Bank Laws and Inflation - A Comparative Analysis,” 1982 (working 
paper, University of Western Ontario). Even though this has remained a working paper, it is widely cited as 
one of the first, if not the first, attempts of measurement of the CBI.  
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of independence by looking at central banks' charters. A decade later, Grilli, Masciandaro 
and Tabellini (1991)265 offered a more advanced tool to analyze CBI through various 
factors that influence public debt, its sensitivity to political frameworks, and the relation 
of monetary policies to economic performances. Alesina and Summers (1993)266 
practically combine the previous two approaches by linking the independence indicators 
with the average inflation rate, and confirming the negative relation between the CBI and 
inflation.  
 One of the most cited indices developed in this period is Cukierman et al. 
(1992)267 who combine a 16-variable index (where each variable ranges 0-1) with 
questionnaires sent to experts, while Mathew (2006)268 combines numerical values 
attached to different legal attributes and combines them with annual inflation rates to 
confirm once again their negative relation. Pisha (2011)269 proposes new "Eurozone 
indices" which combines existing de-jure approaches with the analysis of CBI legislation, 
EU pre-accession requirements and EC's and European Central Bank's reports.   
 By looking at the mentioned indices and methodologies they are based upon, the 
first impression is that approaches significantly vary in technique and often in criteria for 
evaluation of the CBI. The evolution of these indices shows that they evolved from rather 
simple (de-facto) legal factors analysis, which over time included other variables (such as 
inflation) for more accurate, de-jure CBI measures.  
Indices were usually constructed by adding different numerical values to specific 
legal attributes (similarly to CPI and CII), and in more advanced versions the scores 
belonging to specific sections were also differently weighted, which is not the case with 
CPI and CII. Cukierman et al. (1992) for instance used special questionnaires sent to 
experts as a means of supporting the analysis, which is also the approach used for the 
development of the CII. 
                                                          
265 V. Grilli, D. Masciandaro, and G. Tabellini, “Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial 
Policies in the Industrial Countries,” Economic Policy 6 (1991). 
266 A. Alesina and L.H. Summers, “Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some 
Comparative Evidence,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 25 (1993): 151–62. 
267 A. Cukierman, S.B. Webb, and B. Neyapti, “Measuring the independence of central banks and its effect on 
policy  outcomes,” World Bank Economic Review 6 (1992): 353–398. 
268 J.T. Mathew, “Measuring Central Bank Independence in Twenty- Five Countries: A New Index of 
Institutional Quality,” The IUP Journal of Monetary Economics 4, no. 1 (2006): 6–18. 
269 A. Pisha, Eurozone Indices: A New Model for Measuring Central Bank Independence (Athens, 2011). 
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 One of the main critiques of CBI indices in general is the arbitrariness of the 
scores and values they use in their schemes (Mangano 1998)270. The CPI can also be 
criticized from the same standpoint, but in case of the CII, an attempt was made to 
minimize the arbitrariness of the scores by using special questionnaires that were sent to 
experts in order to determine the scores for all legal attributes and by calculating means 
for each of them separately.  
Of course, the size of the CII sample did not allow any proper statistical analysis of 
the data, which does to some extent negatively influence the overall robustness of the 
analysis. Still, it can be said that most of the CBI indices suffer from the same problem 
(Cargil 2013).271 In any case, the CII can be perceived as evolutionarily more advanced 
than the CPI, whose scores are set in a quite arbitrary way.   
 Another general critique of CBI indices is that they systematically suffer from 
subjectivity and personal judgments in regard of selection of criteria that are included in 
indices (criteria bias), the interpretation of these criteria (interpretation bias) and 
weights attributed to specific criteria (weighting bias).272 The CII may be also affected by 
a certain amount of subjectivity in regard to these three issues.  
When it comes to the first bias, CII to a large extent mirrors CPI and it can be said 
that criteria bias is minimal as the criteria were borrowed from another index. Yet it is not 
certain how much the CPI itself suffers from this problem. The CPI is generally perceived 
as a robust method (Chari et al. 2007), but it does not mean that its robustness could not 
be better if additional elements of lobbying regulations were included. The other two 
biases could also be a potential threat to the CII, especially the weighting bias, which in 
case of CII is reflected within thresholds settings.  
 Finally, maybe the main difference between CII and the mentioned indices is that 
they mostly look into actual (de-jure) conditions in which relevant legal CBI benchmarks 
exist. Being aware of the differences between the de-facto and de-jure environment, 
modern CBI methods apply different statistical techniques on performances and outputs 
                                                          
270 G. Mangano, “Measuring Central Bank Independence: A Tale of Subjectivity and of Its Consequences,” 
Oxford Economic Papers 50 (1998): 468 –492. 
271 F.T. Cargill, “A Critical Assessment of Measures of Central Bank Independence,” Economic Inquiry 51, no. 
1 (2013): 260–272., p.12. 
272  G.Mangano, “Measuring Central Bank Independence: A Tale of Subjectivity and of Its Consequences.” 
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of Central Banks in an attempt to provide an answer on de-jure independence of a Central 
bank.  
 Contrary to this, the CII is designed mostly as an ex-ante mechanism that 
analyses legal norms primarily in their de-facto perspective. Of course, this approach can 
be criticized from the CBI perspective, but from the RIA perspective, an ex-ante approach 
has much more support and makes much more sense.  
 Similar conclusions could be derived by looking into the regulatory 
independence indices, because some of them were inspired by CBI indices. For instance, 
the Gilardi (2002)273 index evolved from Cukierman et al. (1992). The new index also 
examines four different dimensions which are additionally sub-divided and scored with 
values from 0 to 1. The CPI and the CII are similarly structured and organized through 
sections (registration, reporting, revolving door, etc) where each section contains specific 
pool of questions, and where each question has different weight attached.  
 In terms of its reliability, it seems that CII is not necessarily behind the indices 
from the regulatory independence world. For instance, the Independence index of Sander 
Johannsen (2003)274 based on inputs from special questionnaires shows that from the 16 
regulators that the questionnaire was sent to, only 8 have responded to it. In the case of 
CII, the response rate was 12/18 for the private side and 4/6 for the public side. These 
response rates in both cases demonstrate the difficulty in collecting answers through 
complex and often time-consuming questionnaires. In its design, this index reflects the 
CII's structure, and shows that other indices could be functional, despite small samples 
which are statistically insignificant, but still provide the valuable empirical findings. 
 Of course, there are other indices which involve complex econometric tools used, 
for instance, for measurement of independence for telecommunication regulators 
(Montoya and Trillas 2007)275. Still, these complex and more precise methods are largely 
inapplicable to the CII model, due to the small sample and the selected depth level based 
on RIA methodologies. This is why CII should be considered to be a strong prototype 
                                                          
273 F. Gilardi, “Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Comparative 
Empirical Analysis,” Journal of European Public Policy 9, no. 6 (2002): 873–893. 
274 K. Johannsen Sander, “Regulatory Independence in Theory and Practice. – a Survey of Independent 
Energy Regulators in Eight European Countries,” 2003. 
275 A.M. Montoya and F. Trillas, “The Measurement of the Independence of Telecommunications Regulatory 
Agencies in Latin America and the Caribbean,” Utilities Policy (2007): 182–190. 
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version, with clear potential for some fine-tuning in the future. Yet, these more advanced 
methods for indices construction are good indicators for the directions in which some 
more advanced versions of CII could be developed within a larger sample.   
 Hence, the relation of CII and CBI and Regulatory Independence Indices shows 
that CII does not necessarily differ to a large extent from all indices mentioned in this 
section, especially from those which were introduced in the early 90s. Construction of 
some of those is structurally close to CII, but the development tendency shows that 
indices should take into consideration both de-facto and de-jure perspectives for more 
accurate measurements.  
In the future, CII could definitely profit from this, but at this moment and under 
current assumptions the CII is still able to produce desired results which are compatible 
with CPI and which have foundations in the RIA world.  
The most important lesson is that CII could be improved in the future by enlarging 
the response rate, involving more legal criteria (above current 47) for the improvement of 
robustness, and having more accurate statistical analysis for more precise results. The 
comparison actually shows that the CII can be perceived as an early-stage tool, but it also 
shows that it can evolve into a more precise tool with some fine-tuning and more data 
involved.  
 
11. Categorization and general features of burden indicators 
 
 In order to further understand the cost impacts of different regulatory 
mechanisms, it is useful to group them according to their burden indication effect. This 
would allow additional advanced analysis of regulatory structures, in terms of 
understanding which parts of lobbying regulations are more or less burdensome for the 
private sector and public sector.  
  In this part are not observed questions as they appear in the CII, but as they 
appear in the survey questionnaires – like individual burden indicators (67 of them). The 
purpose of this ranking is to categorize burden indicators in different burden categories. 
This is not the same as ranking the CII questions based on burden indication, because 
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some questions are composed of several burden indicators which might belong to 
different categories.   
  This ranking will improve indication of the expensive regulatory mechanisms 
and improve the debate on their alternatives. There could be alternatives with higher 
“strength” effect (CPI) which are not necessarily more burdensome. There could also be 
mechanisms which do not contribute meaningfully to the regulatory “strength”, but are     
found to indicate significant burden. This classification will enable easier comparison 
between the strength and cost indications of different regulatory mechanisms. In 
practice, this approach could be used for comparing alternative individual regulatory 
mechanisms, which should allow for a more optimal structuring of a regulation as a 
whole. 
  Burden indicators are classified in 7 categories, ranging from 2 to 8 (since the 
lowest average scores that were found were 2 and 8), where 2 stands for least costly 
indicators and 8 for the most costly indicators. Even though it is clear that 8 > 7 >6…>2; it 
does not necessarily mean that in a monetary sense that items from category 8 are four 
times larger than those from category 2, but in terms of cost perception it is assumed to 
be true. Besides quantitative, these categories also have qualitative features, which are 
defined to be the general main characteristics of all indicators belonging to one category. 
Table 8 shows the distribution of burden indicators in burden category, separately for 
the private and public side: 
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  Table 8 shows the full structure of lobbying regulation burden indicators. It 
reveals the parts of lobbying regulations with the highest and lowest burden indication, 
which is useful for practical policymaking. It also reveals the distribution of burden 
indicators by their magnitude across both the private and public sector. In order to 
additionally clarify the results of categorization of burden indicators, Figure 2 and Figure 
3 are showing the aftermath for the private and public sector individually. 
 
Figure 2 - structure of burden indicators for the private sector 
 
 
Interpretation of Figure 2 suggests that compliance with most of the lobbying 
regulatory mechanisms is expected to create costs of a medium impact for the industry. 
As shown, most of the burden indicators are located within categories 6, 5 and 4 that are 
located in the middle of the graph. This is useful to see graphically, since the middle of 
this graph also corresponds to the middle of the 1-10 CII scale276 that represents the 
medium cost indication zone. Within this category 28 out of 40 analysed burden 
indicators are located. Eleven indicators belong to the high impact zone, while in the low 
impact zone there is only one burden-indicator.  
Interpreted freely, the results suggest that complying with lobbying regulations is 
generally not perceived to be highly burdensome nor insignificantly burdensome, but 
rather of a medium impact. Hence, most of the regulatory mechanisms observed 
independently would have a moderate influence on compliance costs. The specific 
                                                          
276  See Table 5. 
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combination of those mechanisms in an aggregate way could also lead to lower or higher 
burdensome solutions. Hence, the average value of private burden indicators belongs to 
the medium range, but their combinations with other mechanisms could push the overall 
score of the regulation both to lower and higher burden indication zone. 
 
 
Figure 3 - structure of burden indicators for the public sector 
 
 
 Figure 3, unlike the previous figure, does not reveal any general tendency of the 
burden related to the public sector. Still 13 out of 30 burden indicators are located in 
categories with the highest cost indication zone (8 and 7). In the medium cost indication 
zone (6, 5 and 4) are 12 and only 5 in the low cost indication zone. According to the 
results, the enforcement mechanisms are expected to be either quite costly or quite 
cheap to enforce. This finding suggests that a careful choice of mechanisms could indeed 
prevent regulations from creating high enforcement costs, and vice versa. Of course, the 
selection of instruments from the low cost indication zone would have to be supported 
with their higher CPI scores in order to avoid that both costs and benefits remain low. 
This type of cross-index analysis will be discussed in details in Chapter IV. 
 These results suggest that the most costly mechanisms are those dealing with the 
mandatory auditing of lobbying reports, and mandatory compliance enforcement 
through investigative activities and fines. Also, the establishment of a new enforcement 
agency is found to be the most costly.  This is not surprising, since empirical evidence 
confirms such a prediction. For instance, the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of 
Category 8 Category 7 Category 6 Category 5 Category 4 Category 3 Category 2
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Figure 4 - Overview on overall burden indicators structure of the CII 
for both sectors   
Canada has 28 full-time employees, an annual budget of $4.6 million CAD (approximately 
3.5 million EUR)277 and it is certainly not a small administrative unit.  Just for reviews 
and investigations under the “Lobbying Act and Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct”, the 
expenses were 1,029,656 CAD.278 By looking to the same source, it can be also concluded 
that the greatest part of the resources is actually related to staff, and investigations and 
review.  The survey results from Figure 3 practically confirm this – indicating that the 
most costly part of enforcement are new agency personnel, mandatory auditing and 
enforcement of sanctions. This at the same time proves that the CII can be a very useful 
tool, if interpreted carefully and properly. 
  
Figure 4 shows the overall distribution of burden indicators for both sectors 
cumulatively. The results show that the average value of all burden indicators belongs to 
the medium burden impact category, as most of the 67 indicators are located in the 
medium burden impact zone. Also, it can be noted that there are more burden indicators  
                                                          
277 Annual Report 2011/12, The Office of the Lobbying Commissioner of Canada. 
278Financial Statements (unaudited) for the Year Ended March 31, 2011 - http://www.ocl 
cal.gc.ca/eic/site/012.nsf/eng/00532.html. 
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Figure 5 - Comparison of the  structure of indicators of burden for the 
private and the public side (%) 
Public Sector
Private sector
 
at the far left (14) than on the far right (1), which means that if a rule does not belong to 
the medium impact zone, it is more likely to be a more burdensome than less 
burdensome rule. In other words, there are very few rules considered to have very low 
burden effect. They are usually of the moderate, or even high burden indication. 
  Figure 5 shows parallel structures of burden indicators (in percentages) for both 
sectors. Again it is possible to conclude that the burden indicators in the private sector 
have a general tendency of being of the medium burden impact, while those from the 
public side are either of a high burden or of a low burden impact.  
  The high burden group of indicators within the public sector is largely 
associated with establishing permanent institutional enforcement mechanisms. The lack 
of those would probably positively affect the public side's costs, and most likely the 
compliance costs which may be expected to be lower in the absence of enforcement 
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tools.279 Hence, even when the costs would go down the benefits could go down as well. 
The CPI and CII are able to predict this only to some extent, but further researches which 
would take more into account actual de-jure enforcement would be a valuable 
contribution. 
  Figure 5 unfortunately does not offer information on perception of the overall 
regulatory costs by two different groups, as each was asked to give the estimation only 
for the costs associated with them. This figure illustrates the dichotomy nature of the 
costs of enforcement which are perceived either as highly or lowly burdensome, while 
the compliance costs seem to be mostly in between the lower and the upper category, 
perceived as medium-burdensome.  
  While the public sector theoretically can escape high enforcement costs by 
applying only low-burden mechanisms, for the private sector this could be much more 
difficult as very few of the mechanisms are found to be lowly-burdensome. Hence, the 
public side seems to have more choice and more options in keeping their part of the costs 
low.   
12. Qualitative analysis of the burden categories 
  Besides categorization of burden indicators quantitatively, it is possible to 
discuss each quantitative category’s common characteristics qualitatively as well. This 
will be the empirically based foundation for creation of the CII-Threefold which divides 
lobbying regulations into low, medium and highly burdensome systems. The framework 
for qualitative analysis is borrowed from the Threefold classification theory280, and the 
                                                          
279  C. Lindstedt and D. Naurin, “Transparency Is Not Enough: Making Transparency Effective in Reducing 
Corruption.” but also confirmed by Mr. Andrews: "I believe that this is an important factor in the cost of 
reporting. If there is lax enforcement as there is here in the U.S., registrants (and those who do not register and 
report, but should) will be (and are) far less diligent in their filings and this typically will lower whatever costs 
are involved." 
280 See Table 2. 
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new CII-Threefold theory follows the logic of the original Threefold theory based on the 
CPI.  The results of the qualitative analysis are disclosed in the Table 9:  
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13. The CII score thresholds  
   In order to make the CII as compatible as possible to the CPI and the Threefold 
classification, but also in order to satisfy the methodological depth level (OECD Level 2), 
it is necessary to determine where the low, medium and high thresholds are on the CII 
scale, and where the general "pass level" is for a regulation. Yet, the proper setting of the 
thresholds is not an easy task and it influences the perception and interpretation of the 
results. Despite these challenges, decisions on thresholds had to be taken.   
   The first step would be to transform the CII current scale from 0-288 to 0-100 
scale, which will make it intuitively and methodologically compatible with the CPI. This 
will be simply done by dividing the CII scores by 2.88. This will scale down the results 
and in cases of results with decimals it will be scaled up to the nearest whole number.  
  Secondly, the thresholds for low, medium and high impacts have to be determined. 
The CPI pass level threshold is 60, while the Threefold theory thresholds are for the low 
regulated systems (CPI from 1-29), the medium regulated systems (30-59) and the high 
regulated systems (60-100). In determining the thresholds for the CII, it is useful to refer 
back to the categorization of burden indicators.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 
 
LOW MEDIUM 
 
HIGH   
   
  The burden indicators are mostly based on results from the empirical survey 
questionnaires. In those, originally the least burdensome impact was considered to be 
between values of 1 to 3, the medium from 3 to 7 and the high from 7 to 10. Since the 
actual results have narrowed this scale, which now starts from to 2 to 8, the burden 
impacts zones are also slightly narrowed, so the new interpretation would be low impact 
zone from 2 to 3, medium for 4, 5 and 6, and high for 7 and 8. The middle is still left to be 
slightly larger than the two other categories.  
  This idea can be further expanded to the pass level threshold setting on the 0 to 
100 CII scale. If upper logic is applied directly, the scores on the CII would be 1 to 29 for 
the low burden impact zone, 30-69 for the medium impact zone and 70 to 100 for the 
high impact zone.  
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Thresholds would be 30 and 70, (86 and 202 out of 288 on the original scale).  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
Not 
applicable 
LOW MEDIUM 
 
HIGH  Not applicable 
0-29 
(0-85) 
30 -69 
(86 - 202) 
70 and over 
>203 
 
14. The CII Threefold theory and the Ninefold theory 
14.1.  The CII Threefold theory 
  In previous sections the theoretical model and application of the Threefold 
theory based on the CPI index was explained. This theory provides a theoretical 
framework for the classification of the lobbying regulation system according to their 
strengths (composed of the transparency, accountability and robustness281 of lobbying 
regulation). It analyses lobbying regulations qualitatively through six dimensions: 
registration regulation, spending disclosure, electronic filling, public access, enforcement 
and revolving door.  
  The structure of the CII is almost the same as the structure of the CPI, aside from 
some miniscule necessary adjustments. The CPI index application produces scores from 
1-100, and divides lobbying regulations into those that have scores more than 60 (pass) 
and lower than 60 (fail). This means that only the systems with a score above 60 have 
demonstrated a sufficient level of strength. However, it has to be noted that this 
benchmark has been set on 60 points in quite a deliberative manner. Moreover, the 
values which are attached to different questions (from 1-4) are also probably set in a 
deliberative manner. It is not clear why some rules have a value of 4 points, while other 
ones are equal to 1.  
  Additional extension of this theory was further done by the previously 
mentioned Threefold classification of lobbying regulation, which has divided regulatory 
solutions qualitatively by similar features, and quantitatively by splitting the CPI scale 
into three zones. This theory has classified regulatory environments on low-regulated 
                                                          
281 Robustness is mostly used as a term in natural sciences. However, its application is not exclusively 
limited to this area. For more on application of concept of robustness in social sciences, see J.M. Anderies, M. 
Janssen, and E. Ostrom, “A Framework to Analyze the Robustness of Social-Ecological Systems from an 
Institutional Perspective,” Ecology and Society (2004). 
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systems (CPI from 1-29), medium-regulated systems (30-69) and high-regulated systems 
(70-100). Besides this quantitative division, each system was analysed qualitatively and 
for each of those systems a common set of characteristics has been found. While the CPI 
suggests that a higher score is better, the Threefold classification does not strongly imply 
this, but still it gives a solid confirmation in this direction from a qualitative point of view.  
  In case of the CII, the same analogy can be applied for establishing the CII 
Threefold theory. The only difference is that in this case, the lower the score is – the 
smaller the cost impact is. Without involving other criteria at this point, it can be said that 
it is desired to keep the cost burden as low as possible. Thus, having the lowest CII score 
is more desirable than having a higher CII score. In this sense, the CII works on the same 
foundations as the CPI, and the only difference is that in the case of the CII, lower scores 
indicate lower costs while higher CPI scores indicate higher benefits. In other words, it is 
desired to have as high a CPI score and as low a CII score.  
  According to this and from the burden perspective, we could divide lobbying 
regulation systems into the low-burdensome, medium-burdensome and high-
burdensome systems, with thresholds that are the same as in the case of the CPI. At the 
same time, these categories are not exclusively defined by CII thresholds, but they are 
found to have common qualitative characteristics as well.  Table 9 describes the 
qualitative features of different burden categories which are mentioned at this point. It is 
found that regulations which belong to highly burdensome systems usually have 
characteristics of burden categories 8 and 7, which are usually mixed with some from the 
medium-burdensome systems. Medium-burdensome systems mostly have features of 
burden categories 5 and 4. Similarly, lowly burdensome systems usually have 
characteristics of burden categories 2 and 3, which could be mixed perhaps with some of 
the burden categories from the medium-burdensome systems.  
 Qualitative features 
Highly burdensome 
>70  
Regulations mostly have features of burden 
categories 8 and 7 
Medium burdensome 
30-69 
Regulations mostly have features of burden 
categories 6, 5 and 4  
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Lowly burdensome 
1-30 
Regulations mostly have features of burden 
categories 2 and 3 
   
     This could be defined as the core of the CII Threefold theory - there are three systems 
which classify lobbying regulations qualitatively and quantitatively on highly 
burdensome, medium-burdensome and lowly burdensome systems. 
 
14.2. The Ninefold theory  
  So far, this analysis was exclusively focused on costs, without taking into 
consideration their relation with the benefits, which is crucial for assessing regulatory 
quality. The relation of those two key elements can be additionally discussed under a 
new theory - The Ninefold theory that will be introduced here. This theory combines the 
Threefold theory of classification of lobbying regulation (based on the CPI) and the CII 
Threefold theory of classification of lobbying regulation (based on the CII). By combining 
these two theories, it is possible to introduce another framework for a more structured 
assessment and classification of lobbying regulations, both by indication of benefits and 
costs. 
As shown in Graph 1, it is commonly accepted that, in the case of lobbying 
regulation, society prefers to have the highest transparency and accountability as 
possible, while at the same time keeping the costs associated with these goals as low as 
possible – preferably at zero. The X-axis depicts this preference while the Y-axis shows 
the CPI and the CII scales where the maximum is 100. The far right of the X-axis would 
reflect a utopian situation where full transparency is achieved at zero cost, but in reality, 
regulations will probably fall somewhere in the middle of the X-axis.282  
                                                          
282 It is important to note that this graph was actually created by combining two separate graphs on CII and 
CPI. Their intersection in Graph 1 is just a sample intersection and it does not reflect a model trade-off 
point. This intersection just illustrates the situation where CII and CPI scores are balanced at levels of 50 
each. The regulation with this type of score could be improved by adopting the mechanisms which will 
increase the CPI score and at the same time decrease the CII.  Thus, all points at the X axis which fall closer 
to the right side could be perceived as more desired ones, while the ones which would fall close to the left 
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At that point, it becomes important for costs and benefits to be well balanced, and 
it would be generally desired that the indication of costs is lower than the indication of 
benefits. This would mean that the benefits outweigh the costs, indicatively of course. 
 
Graph 1 - Relation of CPI and CII and social cost  
 
  This general logic can be applied in a more profound way in order to establish a 
framework for using both scales’ scores for determining the status of a regulation in 
terms of both the costs and benefits. Indeed, the Ninefold theory is comprised of a 
combination of two Threefold theories – the one based on the CPI and the one based on 
the CII. Even though the CII and the CPI could be compared directly to some extent, 
Threefold theories are more profound since they involve both the qualitative and 
quantitative elements. Hence, by positioning a regulation in one of the nine categories of 
the Ninefold theory, it will be possible to predict its general qualitative description and 
value. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
side would need to be re-structured in order to push them back to the right side. The re-structuring of 
lobbying laws, in order to improve their cost-benefit ratio, will be demonstrated in Chapter IV. 
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High regulated 
systems 
(60-100) 
 
High – Low 
 
High - Medium  
 
High – High 
Medium regulated 
systems 
(30-59) 
 
Medium – Low 
 
Medium - Medium 
 
Medium –High 
Low regulated 
systems 
(0-29) 
 
Low - Low 
 
Low - Medium 
 
Low – High 
CPI 
 
                                CII 
Lowly burdensome 
systems 
(0-29) 
Medium burdensome 
Systems 
(30-69) 
Highly 
burdensome 
Systems 
(70-100) 
 
The Ninefold theory framework offers nine different types of lobbying regulation 
systems, based on their qualitative and quantitative characteristics obtained by the 
application of the CPI and the CII. The upper left field (High - Low) would stand for an 
extreme example of a regulation with high strength and low burden, while the opposite 
extreme would be the lower right field (Low - High). In between there are additional six 
fields which correspond to other possible outcomes depending on the actual regulatory 
structure. Through simultaneous application of both indices, it is possible to place 
regulations in one of nine fields, which give an indication of their cost-benefits structure, 
and their general position in regard to other regulations.  
This framework is also useful in practical policymaking, since it is possible to 
monitor the evolution of regulatory proposals, if they are measured in each drafting 
phase. For instance, if a first proposal of a law on lobbying indicates low strength and 
high burden, it is possible to see whether it shifted to another category after 
improvements, which could be for instance medium strength and medium burden. 
Hence, this tool allows continuous evaluation of legislative proposals in all phases of the 
drafting process.    
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Keeping in mind that an acceptable lobbying law proposal would have to satisfy 
the condition that the costs do not outweigh benefits, by simultaneous application of both 
tools ex-ante, it would be possible to determine if a proposal is generally acceptable from 
a costs-benefits point of view. Generally speaking, all proposals which have a higher 
strength than burden should be considered as good, while those where categories are in 
middle categories could be considered as acceptable but improvable. Unacceptable 
solutions would be the ones where the CII category is larger than the CPI category. In any 
case, a more detailed explanation on the use of these results will be given in the final 
chapter, which will deal with application of the Theory. 
 
15. What is the relation between burden (CII) and transparency 
indication (CPI)? 
 
  One additional thing that is important to observe is the relation of different CPI 
and CII scores, by comparing their individual values from both indices. In other words, 
this section will examine what are indicative cost-benefits features of individual lobbying 
regulations mechanisms. They will now be observed isolated from indices, in order to 
have as clear an image as possible on what are really very smart and efficient regulatory 
tools, and what are not. 
   Higher transparency would usually mean higher costs and vice versa. However, 
this presumption will be tested by assessing the transparency and cost indication values 
(values obtained by questionnaires and given values from the CPI) for each single CII cost 
indicator. In this section, burden indicators in each cost category will be rearranged in 
descending order, which should reflect their CPI strength (4-0). This will reveal, for each 
cost category, what the most desirable mechanisms are. Table 10 shows the entire 
overview starting with burden category 8. As in this category, burden indicators are 
rearranged by descending CPI values. This means that indicators with the highest CPI 
score are placed at the top of each category, and at the bottom are the lowest. This allows 
an easy and intuitive interpretation of the table. 
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  Besides information for each cost category, it will be possible to look at the 
general trade-off between the strength and cost indication, and argue which regulatory 
mechanisms are more preferable for regulation of lobbying in different cases.  
184
17
8 
 
Ta
bl
e 
10
: R
el
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
CP
I i
nd
ic
at
or
s 
(b
en
ef
it
s)
 a
nd
 th
e 
CI
I i
nd
ic
at
or
s 
(c
os
ts
)  
 
Q
u
es
ti
on
s 
w
it
h
in
 e
ac
h
 c
os
t 
ca
te
go
ry
 a
re
 s
h
ow
n
 in
 t
h
ei
r 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 in
d
ic
at
io
n
 in
 d
es
ce
n
d
in
g 
or
d
er
, f
ro
m
 4
 t
o 
0
. 
CII category 
Th
e 
CI
I p
ri
va
te
 b
ur
de
n 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 
    
CPI 
score 
Th
e 
CI
I p
ub
lic
 b
ur
de
n 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 
CPI 
score 
  
   
(8
)   
W
ha
t s
pe
nd
in
g 
m
us
t b
e 
it
em
iz
ed
? 
 A
ll 
sp
en
d
in
g 
re
q
u
ir
ed
 t
o 
b
e 
it
em
iz
ed
 –
 8
 p
oi
n
ts
 
 4 
35
. 
D
oe
s 
ov
er
si
gh
t a
ge
nc
y 
pr
ov
id
e 
an
 o
ve
ra
ll 
lo
bb
yi
ng
 
sp
en
di
ng
 to
ta
l b
y 
sp
en
di
ng
-r
ep
or
t d
ea
dl
in
es
? 
Y
es
 –
 8
 p
oi
n
ts
 
 2   
W
ha
t s
pe
nd
in
g 
m
us
t b
e 
it
em
iz
ed
? 
 A
ll 
sp
en
d
in
g 
ab
ov
e 
$1
0
0
 –
 8
 p
oi
n
ts
 
3 
Is
 a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 fi
le
 a
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
re
po
rt
? 
Y
es
 –
 8
 p
oi
n
ts
 
3 
W
ha
t s
pe
nd
in
g 
m
us
t b
e 
it
em
iz
ed
? 
 A
ll 
sp
en
d
in
g 
ab
ov
e 
$5
0
0
 m
u
st
 b
e 
it
em
iz
ed
 –
 8
 p
oi
n
ts
 
2 
 
36
. 
D
oe
s 
ov
er
si
gh
t a
ge
nc
y 
pr
ov
id
e 
an
 o
ve
ra
ll 
lo
bb
yi
ng
 
sp
en
di
ng
 to
ta
l b
y 
in
du
st
ri
es
 lo
bb
yi
st
s 
re
pr
es
en
t?
 
Y
es
 –
 8
 p
oi
n
ts
 
2   
185
17
9 
 
 (8
) 
 
Ar
e 
su
m
m
ar
ie
s 
(t
ot
al
s)
 o
f s
pe
nd
in
g 
cl
as
si
fie
d 
by
 c
at
eg
or
y 
ty
pe
s (
i.e
. , 
gi
ft
s,
 e
nt
er
ta
in
m
en
t, 
po
st
ag
e,
 e
tc
.)?
  
 
 Y
es
 –
 8
 p
oi
n
ts
 
2 
41
. 
D
oe
s 
ov
er
si
gh
t a
ge
nc
y 
co
nd
uc
t m
an
da
to
ry
 r
ev
ie
w
s 
or
 a
ud
it
s?
 
Y
es
 –
 8
 p
oi
n
ts
 
2 
Is
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f t
he
 it
em
iz
ed
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 b
e 
re
po
rt
ed
? 
    
Y
es
 –
 8
 p
oi
n
ts
 
1 
4
7
. 
Is
 th
er
e 
m
an
da
to
ry
 r
ev
ol
vi
ng
 d
oo
r 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e?
 
Y
es
 –
 8
 p
oi
n
ts
 
2 
 
 
  
   
     
4
2
. 
Is
 th
er
e 
a 
st
at
ut
or
y 
pe
na
lt
y 
fo
r 
la
te
 fi
lin
g 
of
 a
 lo
bb
y 
re
gi
st
ra
ti
on
 fo
rm
? 
Y
es
 –
 8
 p
oi
n
ts
 
1  
4
3
. 
Is
 th
er
e 
a 
st
at
ut
or
y 
pe
na
lt
y 
fo
r 
la
te
 fi
lin
g 
of
 a
 lo
bb
y 
sp
en
di
ng
 r
ep
or
t?
 
Y
es
 –
 8
 p
oi
n
ts
 
1  
4
4
. 
Is
 th
er
e 
a 
st
at
ut
or
y 
pe
na
lt
y 
fo
r 
in
co
m
pl
et
e 
fil
lin
g 
of
 
a 
lo
bb
y 
re
gi
st
ra
ti
on
 fo
rm
? 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
   
Y
es
 –
 8
 p
oi
n
ts
 
1 
4
5
. 
Is
 th
er
e 
a 
st
at
ut
or
y 
pe
na
lt
y 
fo
r 
in
co
m
pl
et
e 
fil
lin
g 
of
 
a 
lo
bb
y 
sp
en
di
ng
 r
ep
or
t?
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
  
Y
es
 -
 8
 p
oi
n
ts
 
1 
4
6
b
 
St
ru
ct
ur
e/
ty
pe
 o
f o
ve
rs
ig
ht
 a
ge
nc
y?
 
E
n
ti
re
ly
 n
ew
 a
d
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
ag
en
cy
 –
 8
 p
oi
n
ts
 
X  
  (7
) 
H
ow
 m
uc
h 
do
es
 a
n 
in
di
vi
du
al
 h
av
e 
to
 m
ak
e/
sp
en
d 
to
 
qu
al
ify
 a
s 
a 
lo
bb
yi
st
 o
r 
to
 p
ro
m
pt
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
n 
as
 a
 
lo
bb
yi
st
, a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 th
e 
de
fin
it
io
n?
    
    
    
   
Q
u
al
if
ic
at
io
n
 t
h
re
sh
ol
d
: r
eg
ar
d
le
ss
 t
h
e 
am
ou
n
t 
m
ad
e 
- 
7
  p
oi
n
ts
   
 4 
 3
7
c 
H
ow
 o
ft
en
 a
re
 lo
bb
y 
lis
ts
 u
pd
at
ed
? 
 W
ee
kl
y 
– 
7
 p
oi
n
ts
  
3 
 3
7
b
 
H
ow
 o
ft
en
 a
re
 lo
bb
y 
lis
ts
 u
pd
at
ed
? 
 M
on
th
ly
  -
 7
 p
oi
n
ts
 
2  
H
ow
 o
ft
en
 w
it
hi
n 
a 
ye
ar
 is
 a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 r
ep
or
t 
sp
en
di
ng
? 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
E
ve
ry
 t
h
re
e 
m
on
th
s 
or
 m
or
e 
of
te
n
 –
 7
 p
oi
n
ts
 
2 
4
0
. 
D
oe
s 
th
e 
st
at
e 
ha
ve
 s
ta
tu
to
ry
 a
ud
it
in
g 
au
th
or
it
y?
 
Y
es
 –
 7
 p
oi
n
ts
 
2  
186
18
0 
 
Is
 th
e 
lo
bb
yi
st
 e
m
pl
oy
er
/p
ri
nc
ip
al
 o
n 
w
ho
se
 b
eh
al
f t
he
 
it
em
iz
ed
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 w
as
 m
ad
e 
re
qu
ir
ed
 to
 b
e 
id
en
ti
fie
d?
 
Y
es
 –
 7
 p
oi
n
ts
 
1 
3
1
. 
Lo
ca
ti
on
/f
or
m
at
 o
f s
pe
nd
in
g 
 r
ep
or
ts
: 
P
h
ot
oc
op
ie
s 
fr
om
 o
ff
ic
e 
on
ly
 –
 7
  p
oi
n
ts
  
1  
Is
 a
 d
es
cr
ip
ti
on
 o
f t
he
 it
em
iz
ed
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 b
e 
re
po
rt
ed
?  
Y
es
 –
 7
 p
oi
n
ts
 
1  
 
 
 
Is
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
on
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
 m
em
be
rs
 o
f p
ub
lic
 o
ffi
ci
al
s 
by
 a
 
lo
bb
yi
st
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 b
e 
re
po
rt
ed
?  
Y
es
 –
 7
 p
oi
n
ts
 
 
1 
 
 (6
)   
H
ow
 m
uc
h 
do
es
 a
n 
in
di
vi
du
al
 h
av
e 
to
 m
ak
e/
sp
en
d 
to
 
qu
al
ify
 a
s 
a 
lo
bb
yi
st
 o
r 
to
 p
ro
m
pt
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
n 
as
 a
 
lo
bb
yi
st
, a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 th
e 
de
fin
it
io
n?
    
    
    
   
Q
u
al
if
ic
at
io
n
 t
h
re
sh
ol
d
: M
or
e 
th
an
 $
2
,5
0
0
 m
ad
e 
- 
 6
 p
oi
n
ts
   
   
   
   
2 
3
4
. 
D
oe
s 
ov
er
si
gh
t a
ge
nc
y 
pr
ov
id
e 
an
 o
ve
ra
ll 
lo
bb
yi
ng
 
sp
en
di
ng
 to
ta
l b
y 
ye
ar
?  
Y
es
 –
 6
 p
oi
n
ts
 
2 
Is
 a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 id
en
tif
y 
by
 n
am
e 
ea
ch
 e
m
pl
oy
er
 
on
 th
e 
re
gi
st
ra
ti
on
 fo
rm
? 
Y
es
 –
 6
 p
oi
n
ts
 
1 
3
0
a 
Lo
ca
ti
on
/f
or
m
at
 o
f r
eg
is
tr
at
io
ns
 o
r 
ac
ti
ve
 lo
bb
yi
st
 
di
re
ct
or
y:
 
P
h
ot
oc
op
ie
s 
fr
om
 o
ff
ic
e 
on
ly
 –
 6
 p
oi
n
ts
  
1  
Is
 a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 in
cl
ud
e 
on
 th
e 
re
gi
st
ra
ti
on
 fo
rm
 
an
y 
ad
di
ti
on
al
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t t
he
 ty
pe
 o
f l
ob
by
in
g 
w
or
k 
he
 o
r 
sh
e 
do
es
 (i
.e
., 
co
m
pe
ns
at
ed
 o
r 
no
n -
co
m
pe
ns
at
ed
/c
on
tr
ac
t o
r 
sa
la
ri
ed
)?
 
Y
es
 –
 6
 p
oi
n
ts
 
1 
3
7
a 
H
ow
 o
ft
en
 a
re
 lo
bb
y 
lis
ts
 u
pd
at
ed
? 
A
n
n
u
al
ly
 o
r 
le
ss
 o
ft
en
 –
 6
 p
oi
n
ts
   
 
1 1  
H
ow
 o
ft
en
 w
it
hi
n 
a 
ye
ar
 is
 a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 r
ep
or
t 
sp
en
di
ng
? 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
T
w
ic
e 
- 
6
 p
oi
n
ts
  
1 
4
6
a 
St
ru
ct
ur
e/
ty
pe
 o
f o
ve
rs
ig
ht
 a
ge
nc
y?
 
A
lr
ea
d
y 
ex
is
ti
n
g 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
u
n
it
 w
it
h
 a
tt
ri
bu
te
d
 
ta
sk
s 
of
  e
n
fo
rc
em
en
t 
of
 lo
b
by
in
g 
ru
le
s 
 –
 6
 p
oi
n
ts
 
x 
187
18
1 
   
(6
) 
Is
 th
e 
re
ci
pi
en
t o
f t
he
 it
em
iz
ed
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 b
e 
id
en
ti
fie
d?
 
Y
es
 –
 6
 p
oi
n
ts
 
1   
 
 
 
Is
 s
ub
je
ct
 m
at
te
r 
or
 b
ill
 n
um
be
r 
to
 b
e 
ad
dr
es
se
d 
by
 a
 
lo
bb
yi
st
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
on
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
re
po
rt
s?
 
Su
b
je
ct
 m
at
te
r 
on
ly
 r
eq
u
ir
ed
 –
 6
 p
oi
n
ts
  
 
1 
 
Is
 a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 d
is
cl
os
e 
di
re
ct
 b
us
in
es
s 
as
so
ci
at
io
ns
 w
it
h 
pu
bl
ic
 o
ffi
ci
al
s,
 c
an
di
da
te
s 
or
 m
em
be
rs
 
of
 th
ei
r 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
? 
Y
es
 –
 6
  p
oi
n
ts
 
 
1 
 
W
ha
t i
s 
th
e 
st
at
ut
or
y 
pr
ov
is
io
n 
fo
r 
a 
lo
bb
yi
st
 g
iv
in
g 
an
d 
re
po
rt
in
g 
gi
ft
s?
 
G
if
ts
 a
re
 r
ep
or
te
d
 –
 6
 p
oi
n
ts
  
1   
 
W
ha
t i
s 
th
e 
st
at
ut
or
y 
pr
ov
is
io
n 
fo
r 
a 
lo
bb
yi
st
 g
iv
in
g 
an
d 
re
po
rt
in
g 
ca
m
pa
ig
n 
co
nt
ri
bu
ti
on
s?
 
C
am
p
ai
gn
 c
on
tr
ib
u
ti
on
s 
al
lo
w
ed
 a
n
d
 r
eq
u
ir
ed
 t
o 
be
 d
is
cl
os
ed
 
on
 s
p
en
d
in
g 
re
p
or
t/
al
lo
w
ed
 d
u
ri
n
g 
se
ss
io
n
 –
 6
 p
oi
n
ts
 
1 
 
 (5
) 
Is
 a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 fi
le
 a
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
n 
fo
rm
? 
Y
es
 –
 5
 p
oi
n
ts
 
 3 
2
8
. 
D
oe
s 
ov
er
si
gh
t a
ge
nc
y 
pr
ov
id
e 
lo
bb
yi
st
s/
em
pl
oy
er
s 
w
it
h 
on
lin
e 
sp
en
di
ng
 
re
po
rt
in
g?
 
Y
es
 –
 5
 p
oi
n
ts
 
1 
Is
 s
ub
je
ct
 m
at
te
r 
or
 b
ill
 n
um
be
r 
to
 b
e 
ad
dr
es
se
d 
by
 a
 
lo
bb
yi
st
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
on
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
n 
fo
rm
s?
 
B
il
l n
u
m
b
er
 r
eq
u
ir
ed
 –
  5
 p
oi
n
ts
 
3  
 
 
 
188
18
2 
 
  (5
) 
Is
 s
ub
je
ct
 m
at
te
r 
or
 b
ill
 n
um
be
r 
to
 b
e 
ad
dr
es
se
d 
by
 a
 
lo
bb
yi
st
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
on
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
re
po
rt
s?
 
B
il
l n
u
m
b
er
 r
eq
u
ir
ed
 –
 5
 p
oi
n
ts
 
 3 
 
Is
 a
n 
em
pl
oy
er
 o
r 
pr
in
ci
pa
l o
f a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 fi
le
 a
 
sp
en
di
ng
 r
ep
or
t?
 
Y
es
 –
 5
 p
oi
n
ts
 
3  
 
H
ow
 m
an
y 
da
ys
 c
an
 lo
bb
yi
ng
 ta
ke
 p
la
ce
 b
ef
or
e 
re
gi
st
ra
ti
on
 is
 r
eq
ui
re
d?
 
U
p
 t
o 
a 
m
on
th
 –
 5
 p
oi
n
ts
   
 
3 
 
W
it
hi
n 
ho
w
 m
an
y 
da
ys
 m
us
t a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 n
ot
ify
 th
e 
ov
er
si
gh
t 
ag
en
cy
 o
f c
ha
ng
es
 in
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
n?
  
u
p
 t
o 
a 
m
on
th
 –
  5
 p
oi
n
ts
  
 
3 
 
Is
 c
om
pe
ns
at
io
n/
sa
la
ry
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 b
e 
re
po
rt
ed
 b
y 
a 
lo
bb
yi
st
 o
n 
sp
en
di
ng
 r
ep
or
ts
?  
Y
es
 –
 5
 p
oi
n
ts
 
 2 
 
Is
 c
om
pe
ns
at
io
n/
sa
la
ry
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 b
e 
re
po
rt
ed
 o
n 
em
pl
oy
er
/p
ri
nc
ip
al
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
re
po
rt
s?
 
Y
es
 –
 5
 p
oi
n
ts
   
  
2  
 
Is
 a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 s
ub
m
it
 a
 p
ho
to
gr
ap
h 
w
it
h 
re
gi
st
ra
ti
on
?  
Y
es
 –
 5
 p
oi
n
ts
 
1  
 
H
ow
 m
an
y 
da
ys
 c
an
 lo
bb
yi
ng
 ta
ke
 p
la
ce
 b
ef
or
e 
re
gi
st
ra
ti
on
 is
 r
eq
ui
re
d?
 
0 
 
189
18
3 
 
U
p
 t
o 
3
 d
ay
s 
– 
5
 p
oi
n
ts
 
 
W
it
hi
n 
ho
w
 m
an
y 
da
ys
 m
us
t a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 n
ot
ify
 th
e 
ov
er
si
gh
t 
ag
en
cy
 o
f c
ha
ng
es
 in
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
n?
  
U
p
 t
o 
3
 d
ay
s 
– 
5
 p
oi
n
ts
 
0  
 
H
ow
 o
ft
en
 w
it
hi
n 
a 
ye
ar
 is
 a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 r
ep
or
t 
sp
en
di
ng
?  
O
n
ce
 (
or
 o
n
ce
 in
 2
 y
ea
rs
) 
– 
5
 p
oi
n
ts
 
0  
 
 
(4
)   
(4
) 
H
ow
 o
ft
en
 is
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
n 
by
 a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 r
eq
ui
re
d?
 
A
n
n
u
al
ly
 o
r 
m
or
e 
of
te
n
 –
 4
 p
oi
n
ts
 
2  
3
0
d
 
Lo
ca
ti
on
/f
or
m
at
 o
f r
eg
is
tr
at
io
ns
 o
r 
ac
ti
ve
 lo
bb
yi
st
 
di
re
ct
or
y:
 
D
ow
n
lo
ad
ab
le
 fi
le
s/
d
at
ab
as
e 
– 
4
 p
oi
n
ts
 
4 
Is
 s
ub
je
ct
 m
at
te
r 
or
 b
ill
 n
um
be
r 
to
 b
e 
ad
dr
es
se
d 
by
 a
 
lo
bb
yi
st
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
on
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
n 
fo
rm
s?
 
Su
b
je
ct
 m
at
te
r 
on
ly
 r
eq
u
ir
ed
 –
  4
 p
oi
n
ts
 
1 
3
1
d
 
Lo
ca
ti
on
/f
or
m
at
 o
f s
pe
nd
in
g 
 r
ep
or
ts
: 
D
ow
n
lo
ad
ab
le
 fi
le
s/
d
at
ab
as
e 
– 
4
 p
oi
n
ts
 
4 
H
ow
 o
ft
en
 is
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
n 
by
 a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 r
eq
ui
re
d?
 
E
ve
ry
 t
w
o 
ye
ar
s 
– 
4
 p
oi
n
ts
 
1 
3
0
c 
Lo
ca
ti
on
/f
or
m
at
 o
f r
eg
is
tr
at
io
ns
 o
r 
ac
ti
ve
 lo
bb
yi
st
 
di
re
ct
or
y:
 
Se
ar
ch
ab
le
 d
at
ab
as
e 
on
 t
h
e 
W
eb
 -
 4
 p
oi
n
ts
 
3 
Is
 a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 w
ho
 h
as
 d
on
e 
no
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
du
ri
ng
 a
 fi
lin
g 
pe
ri
od
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
a 
re
po
rt
 o
f n
o 
ac
ti
vi
ty
? 
Y
es
 –
 4
 p
oi
n
ts
 
1 
3
1
c 
Lo
ca
ti
on
/f
or
m
at
 o
f s
pe
nd
in
g 
 r
ep
or
ts
: 
Se
ar
ch
ab
le
 d
at
ab
as
e 
on
 t
h
e 
W
eb
 –
 4
 p
oi
n
ts
  
3 
H
ow
 m
uc
h 
do
es
 a
n 
in
di
vi
du
al
 h
av
e 
to
 m
ak
e/
sp
en
d 
to
 
qu
al
ify
 a
s 
a 
lo
bb
yi
st
 o
r 
to
 p
ro
m
pt
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
n 
as
 a
 lo
bb
yi
st
, 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
de
fin
it
io
n?
    
    
    
   
Q
u
al
if
ic
at
io
n
 t
h
re
sh
ol
d
: M
or
e 
th
an
 $
1
0
,0
0
0
 m
ad
e 
- 
4
 p
oi
n
ts
   
   
   
 
0 
2
7
. 
D
oe
s 
ov
er
si
gh
t a
ge
nc
y 
pr
ov
id
e 
lo
bb
yi
st
s/
em
pl
oy
er
s 
w
it
h 
on
lin
e 
re
gi
st
ra
ti
on
? 
Y
es
 –
 4
 p
oi
n
ts
 
1 
H
ow
 m
an
y 
da
ys
 c
an
 lo
bb
yi
ng
 ta
ke
 p
la
ce
 b
ef
or
e 
re
gi
st
ra
ti
on
 is
 r
eq
ui
re
d?
    
    
    
    
    
   
 
6
 m
on
th
s 
or
 m
or
e 
– 
4
 p
oi
n
ts
 
0 
2
9
. 
D
oe
s 
ov
er
si
gh
t a
ge
nc
y 
pr
ov
id
e 
tr
ai
ni
ng
 a
bo
ut
 h
ow
 
to
 fi
le
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
ns
/s
pe
nd
in
g 
re
po
rt
s 
el
ec
tr
on
ic
al
ly
? 
1 
190
18
4 
 
  
Y
es
 –
 4
 p
oi
n
ts
 
W
it
hi
n 
ho
w
 m
an
y 
da
ys
 m
us
t a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 n
ot
ify
 th
e 
ov
er
si
gh
t 
ag
en
cy
 o
f c
ha
ng
es
 in
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
n?
 
6
 m
on
th
s 
or
 m
or
e 
– 
4
 p
oi
n
ts
  
0 
3
9
. 
D
oe
s 
th
e 
st
at
e 
pu
bl
is
h 
a 
lis
t o
f d
el
in
qu
en
t f
ile
rs
 
ei
th
er
 o
n 
th
e 
W
eb
 o
r 
in
 a
 p
ri
nt
ed
 d
oc
um
en
t?
 
Y
es
 –
 4
 p
oi
n
ts
 
1 
 
(3
) 
Co
st
 o
f c
op
ie
s:
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
In
te
re
st
ed
 p
ar
ti
es
 d
o 
n
ot
 h
av
e 
to
 p
ay
 fo
r 
th
e 
co
p
ie
s 
of
 a
va
il
ab
le
 
re
p
or
ts
 –
 3
 p
oi
n
ts
 
 
X 
3
8
. 
In
 a
dd
it
io
n 
to
 le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
lo
bb
yi
st
s,
 d
oe
s 
th
e 
de
fin
it
io
n 
re
co
gn
iz
e 
ex
ec
ut
iv
e 
br
an
ch
 lo
bb
yi
st
s?
 
 Y
es
 –
 3
 p
oi
n
ts
 
3
 
3
0
b
 
Lo
ca
ti
on
/f
or
m
at
 o
f r
eg
is
tr
at
io
ns
 o
r 
ac
ti
ve
 lo
bb
yi
st
 
di
re
ct
or
y:
 
P
D
F 
or
 im
ag
e 
fi
le
s 
on
 t
h
e 
W
eb
 –
 3
 p
oi
n
ts
  
2  
3
1
b
 
Lo
ca
ti
on
/f
or
m
at
 o
f s
pe
nd
in
g 
 r
ep
or
ts
: 
P
D
F 
or
 im
ag
e 
fi
le
s 
on
 t
h
e 
W
eb
 –
 3
 p
oi
n
ts
  
2  
3
3
. 
Ar
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
re
gi
st
ra
ti
on
 fo
rm
s/
sp
en
di
ng
 r
ep
or
ts
 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
th
e 
W
eb
? 
Y
es
 –
 3
 p
oi
n
ts
 
1 
3
2
. 
Co
st
 o
f c
op
ie
s:
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
In
te
re
st
ed
 p
ar
ti
es
 d
o 
n
ot
 h
av
e 
to
 p
ay
 fo
r 
th
e 
co
p
ie
s 
of
 
av
ai
la
b
le
 r
ep
or
ts
 –
 3
 p
oi
n
ts
 
X 
(2
) 
H
ow
 o
ft
en
 is
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
n 
by
 a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 r
eq
ui
re
d?
 
O
n
ce
 o
n
ly
 –
  2
 p
oi
n
ts
  
 
0  
 
 
 
191
185 
 
 
 Graph 2 provides information on the relation of the CII scores and the CPI scores, 
based on quantification of the results from Table 10. It is the snapshot of the results from 
the previous 3-page table, showing the distribution and the nature of CPI and CII 
elements seen in the fusion. It shows how many CPI values (3-4) have how many CII 
values (2-8) and vice versa. It clearly indicates, as assumed at the beginning of this 
research, that higher transparency and accountability (strength) usually comes along 
with higher costs. In short, more transparency is expected to be more costly than less 
transparency. 
Graph 2 - Overview on overall relations of CII and CPI scores 
 
 
  As shown in the upper graph, most of the observed items are located within the 
middle and left part of the table, which corresponds with medium and higher cost 
indication. In the lowest cost categories (3 and 2), barely any strength indication can be 
found. In other words there are practically no regulatory benefits, without at least some 
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costs involved. However, it can hardly be said that there is a strong tendency of mutual 
exponential increase of costs with an increase of strength. Although the table suggests that 
there is a slight tendency which supports the idea that growth of costs follows the growth of 
strength, it cannot be concluded that high transparency necessarily invokes high costs.  
  Also, it cannot be concluded that the most effective mechanisms for transparency 
improvement are at the same time the most costly ones. From the perspective of 
policymakers, this means that complex and expensive regulation does not necessarily mean 
high transparency, and vice versa.  
  The results, on the other hand, suggest that within each category of cost there are 
more efficient and less efficient mechanisms, and this is what is actually beneficial for 
policymaking. Similarly, it can be said that for each transparency category there are 
mechanisms with different cost indication. Thus, when making a regulatory proposal it is 
necessary to look further into these alternatives in order to determine which mechanisms 
have the best cost-benefits ratio. This will help to determine which option, among similar 
alternatives, should be preferred and what are preferable mechanisms for the regulation of 
lobbying in general.  
 
16. Cost-Benefit labels 
  To have a better understanding of the practical value of these results, another 
methodological tool named Cost-Benefit Labels will be introduced. The special labels 
mechanism has transformed the results from Table 10 into a policymaking tool which could 
contribute to a more efficient design of lobbying regulation structures. This tool can be very 
useful during periods of regulatory drafting where priority should be given to mechanisms 
with a better cost-benefit ratio, especially when alternatives are discussed.  
  Before discussing the application, the structure of the tool has to be explained. The 
regulatory mechanisms from Table 10 are divided in three general categories which are 
called cost-benefit labels (CBLs): A, B and C. Label A stands for all mechanisms where 
expected benefits outweigh expected costs, label B where expected benefits are on the same 
or almost the same level with expected costs, and label C where expected costs outweigh 
expected benefits. In short, A is preferred to B, B is preferred to C, while A is also preferred 
to C, which can be expressed this way - A?B?C. 
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  Each CBL is subdivided on three sublevels: A (A1 ? A2 ? A3), B (B1 ?B2 ? B3) and 
C (C1 ? C2 ? C3). This subdivision will allow even more precise classification of all 
considered mechanisms, based on their cost-benefit ratio obtained from the CPI and CII 
scores.  
  To determine which category mechanisms belong to, it is necessary to compare 
their CII and CPI scores. Since this information is taken from different scales (CPI ranges 
from 1-4 and CII from 2-8), the scores should be interpreted in the following way, taking 
into consideration impact magnitudes: low, medium and high.  
Low (L) Medium (M) High (L) 
CII 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
CPI 1 (and 0)    2            3                 4 
 
Table of Cost Benefits Labels (CBL)   
A B C 
A1 stands for CPI H / CII L B1 stands for CPI H / CII H C1 stands for CPI L / CII M 
A2 stands for CPI H / CII M B2 stands for CPI M / CII M C2 stands for CPI M / CII H 
A3 stands for CPI M / CII L  B3 stands for CPI L /   CII L  C3 stands for CPI L / CII H283 
 
A1 ≻ A2 ≻ A3 ≻ B1 ≻ B2 ≻ B3 ≻ C1 ≻ C2 ≻ C3 
 
  For instance, label A1 means that a certain mechanism has great transparency and 
accountability contribution at very little cost (CPI H / CII L), while on the opposite side of 
the scale is the C3 label, which reflects a mechanism with low transparency and 
accountability contribution and high costliness (CPI L / CII H). However, it has to be 
underlined that regulations with mechanisms solely based on the A-label would probably 
be incomplete, and would not make much sense in practice, since there are a limited 
number of mechanisms with this label. In other words, there are not A-label alternatives for 
                                                          
283 The letters “H” and “L” respectively mean High and Low.   
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all regulatory mechanisms, but just for some of them. However, in cases where several 
regulatory alternatives are considered, it is possible and advisable to select an alternative 
with a better CBL. This will be clearly demonstrated in Chapter IV during the application of 
the CBL tool. 
  After developing this tool, it is possible to integrate it in the CII index, and the final, 
complete version of the index is shown below in Table 11:  
Table 11: 
The Cost Indicator Index  
 
 
CBL 
(CCI/CPI) 
1. How much does an individual have to make/spend to qualify as a lobbyist or to prompt 
registration as a lobbyist, according to the definition?               
Qualification threshold: More than $10,000 made - 4 points          
Qualification threshold: More than $2,500 made -  6 points            
Qualification threshold: regardless the amount made – 7 points 
C3 
(4/0) 
B2 
(6/2) 
B1 
(7/4) 
2. Is a lobbyist required to file a registration form?                                                                                    
No – 0 points  
Yes – 5 points 
B2 
(5/3) 
3. How many days can lobbying take place before registration is required?                        
6 months or more – 4 points  
Up to a month – 5 points   
Up to 3 days  – 5 points 
C3 
(4/0) 
C1 
(5/1) 
B2 
(5/3) 
4. Is subject matter or bill number to be addressed by a lobbyist required on registration 
forms? 
Subject matter only required –  4 points  
Bill number required –  5 points 
C1 
(4/1)  
B2 
(5/3) 
5. How often is registration by a lobbyist required? 
Once only –  2 points  
Every two years – 4 points  
Annually or more often – 4 points 
C3  
(2/0) 
C1 
(4/1) 
B2 
(4/2) 
6. Within how many days must a lobbyist notify the oversight agency of changes in 
registration?                                                                                                                                                             
6 months or more – 4 points  
Up to a month –  5 points  
Up to 3 days – 5 points 
C3 
(4/0) 
C1 
(5/1) 
B2 
(5/3) 
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7. Is a lobbyist required to submit a photograph with registration? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 5 points 
 
C1 
(5/1) 
8. Is a lobbyist required to identify by name each employer on the registration form? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 6 points 
C1 
(6/1) 
9. Is a lobbyist required to include on the registration form any additional information 
about the type of lobbying work he or she does (i.e., compensated or non-
compensated/contract or salaried)? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 6 points 
C1 
(6/1) 
10. Is a lobbyist required to file a spending report?                                                                        
No – 0 points  
Yes – 8 points 
  C2 
(8/3) 
11. How often within a year is a lobbyist required to report spending?                                               
Once (or once in 2 years) – 5 points  
Twice – 6 points  
Every three months or more often – 7 points 
 
C3 
(5/0) 
C1 
(6/1) 
C2 
(7/2) 
12. Is compensation/salary required to be reported by a lobbyist on spending reports?           
No – 0 points  
Yes – 5 points 
C1 
(5/2) 
13. Are summaries (totals) of spending classified by category types (i.e., gifts, 
entertainment, postage, etc.)?  
No – 0 points 
Yes – 8 points 
C2 
(7/2) 
14. What spending must be itemized? 
 No spending required to be itemized – 0 points  
 All spending above $500 must be itemized – 8 points 
 All spending above $100 must be itemized – 8 points 
All spending required to be itemized – 8 points 
C2 
(8/2) 
C2 
(8/3) 
B1 
(8/4) 
15. Is the lobbyist employer/principal on whose behalf the itemized expenditure was 
made required to be identified? 
No – 0 points                                                                                                   
C3 
(7/1) 
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Yes – 7 points 
16. Is the recipient of the itemized expenditure required to be identified? 
No – 0 points 
Yes – 6 points 
C1 
(6/1) 
17. Is the date of the itemized expenditure required to be reported?     
No – 0 points  
Yes – 8 points 
C3 
(8/1) 
18. Is a description of the itemized expenditure required to be reported? 
No – 0 points                          
Yes – 7 points 
C3 
(7/1) 
19. Is subject matter or bill number to be addressed by a lobbyist required on spending 
reports? 
No bill number/subject matter required – 0 points  
Subject matter only required – 6 points  
Bill number required – 5 points 
C1 
(6/1) 
B2 
(5/3) 
20. Is spending on household members of public officials by a lobbyist required to be 
reported? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 7 points 
C3 
(7/1) 
21. Is a lobbyist required to disclose direct business associations with public officials, 
candidates or members of their households? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 6  points 
C1 
(6/1) 
 
 
22. What is the statutory provision for a lobbyist giving and reporting gifts?                                   
Gifts are not reported – 0 points  
Gifts are reported – 6 points  
C1 
(6/1) 
23. What is the statutory provision for a lobbyist giving and reporting campaign 
contributions? 
Campaign contributions not required to be disclosed on spending report/prohibited during  
session – 0 points 
Campaign contributions allowed and required to be disclosed on spending report/allowed       
during session – 6 points 
C1 
(6/1) 
24. Is a lobbyist who has done no spending during a filing period required to make a 
report of no activity? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 4 points 
C1 
(4/1) 
25. Is an employer or principal of a lobbyist required to file a spending report?                            B2 
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No – 0 point  
Yes – 5 points 
(5/3) 
26. Is compensation/salary required to be reported on employer/principal spending 
reports? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 5 points     
B2 
(5/2) 
27. Does oversight agency provide lobbyists/employers with online registration?                       
No – 0 points  
Yes – 4 points 
C1 
(4/1) 
28. Does oversight agency provide lobbyists/employers with online spending reporting?        
No – 0 points  
Yes – 5 points 
C1 
(5/1) 
29. Does oversight agency provide training about how to file registrations/spending 
reports electronically? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 4 points 
C1 
(4/1) 
30. Location/format of registrations or active lobbyist directory: 
Photocopies from office only – 6 points  
PDF or image files on the Web – 3 points  
Searchable database on the Web – 4  
Downloadable files/database – 4 
C1 
(6/1) 
A3 
(3/2) 
B2 
(4/3) 
A2 
(4/4) 
31. Location/format of spending  reports: 
Photocopies from office only – 7  points  
 
PDF or image files on the Web – 3 points  
 
Searchable database on the Web – 4 points 
 
Downloadable files/database – 4 points 
C3 
(7/1) 
A3 
(3/2) 
B/2 
(4/3) 
 
A2 
(4/4) 
32. Cost of copies: 
Interested parties pay for the copies of available reports – 0 points 
Interested parties do not have to pay for the copies of available reports – 3 points 
CPI score 
missing 
33. Are sample registration forms/spending reports available on the Web? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 3 points 
B3 
(3/1) 
34. Does oversight agency provide an overall lobbying spending total by year?                              B2 
(6/2) 
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No – 0 points  
Yes – 6 points 
35. Does oversight agency provide an overall lobbying spending total by spending-report 
deadlines? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 8 points 
C2 
(8/2) 
36. Does oversight agency provide an overall lobbying spending total by industries 
lobbyists represent? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 8 points 
C2 
(8/2) 
37. How often are lobby lists updated? 
Annually or less often – 6 points   
Monthly – 7 points  
Weekly  – 7 points 
C1 
(6/1) 
C2 
(7/2) 
C2 
(7/3) 
38. In addition to legislative lobbyists, does the definition recognize executive branch 
lobbyists? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 3 points 
A3 
(3/3) 
39. Does the state publish a list of delinquent filers either on the Web or in a printed 
document? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 4 points 
C1 
(4/1) 
40. Does the state have statutory auditing authority? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 7 points 
C2 
(7/2) 
41. Does oversight agency conduct mandatory reviews or audits? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 8 points 
C2 
(8/2) 
42. Is there a statutory penalty for late filing of lobby registration  
form? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 8 points 
C3 
(8/1) 
43. Is there a statutory penalty for late filing of a lobby spending 
report? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 8 points 
C3 
(8/1) 
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17. Conclusion of Chapter III 
      This chapter introduced the Cost Indicator Index. First the methodological 
pillars of the index were shown, which evolved from a combination of CPI and RIA and 
OECD tools which were combined in order to produce a custom-made tool with specific 
depth, choice of legal attributes and scoring technique. 
       As CII scores needed to be empirically determined, it was necessary to run the 
empirical survey which included both qualitative and quantitative tools that resulted in 
more accurate CII scores setting. The empirical survey may raise some concerns, but 
mostly due to the small sample. Methodologically, the Index could have been more 
precise if a larger sample was involved. However, some other analysed indices show that 
a large sample is not always the condicio sine qua non.   
At the end of the Chapter was the introduction of the Ninefold theory, which 
provides a qualitative framework for analysis of the results. 
Lastly, the scores were divided in special cost-benefit labels (CBLs) which allow 
cost-benefit comparison of similar regulatory mechanisms, and an intuitive employment 
of those with the best cost-benefit value. 
 
 
 
 
 
44. Is there a statutory penalty for incomplete filling of a lobby registration form?                      
No – 0 points  
Yes – 8 points 
C3 
(8/1) 
45. Is there a statutory penalty for incomplete filing of a lobby spending report?                          
No – 0 points 
Yes - 8 points 
C3 
(8/1) 
46. Structure/type of oversight agency? 
Already existing administrative unit with attributed tasks of enforcement of lobbying rules   
 – 6 points 
Entirely new administrative agency – 8 points 
CPI score 
missing 
47. Is there a mandatory revolving door compliance?  
No – 0  
Yes – 8 points 
C2 
(8/2) 
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Chapter IV  - Application of the CII in policymaking  
1.   Introduction to the application of the CII Index   
This chapter focuses on the application of the CII in policymaking. The focus will 
be on the Western Balkans (WB), where lobbying regulation has recently been dynamic, 
and where countries have either poor or zero regulatory impact assessment tools at 
their disposal. The core of the chapter is the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the 
Serbian proposal on the Law on Lobbying.  
The analysis will start by assessing the official motivation for regulation of 
lobbying, legislative procedures and the RIA capacity of Serbia, and will end with the 
simultaneous application of the CPI and the CII on the proposal. After a comprehensive 
study of its structures, practical suggestions for its improvements will be offered, taking 
into account other relevant country-specific information. 
The last part of the chapter will be dealing with a comparative application of the 
CII, where quantitative CPI and CII methods will be applied to Slovenia, Macedonia and 
Montenegro and merged with the results from Serbia. This analysis will for the first time 
reveal not only the CII, but also the CPI scores for these countries, and demonstrate the 
added value of CII in terms of comparative assessments.  
 
2. Regulation of lobbying in South East Europe – corruption fighting or    
something else? 
 European countries mostly have not dealt with lobbying directly by specific 
regulations. This, however, should not be regarded as indifference towards the 
importance of the transparency and integrity of the public institutions. Yet, most 
European countries have general laws in effect prohibiting conflict of interest, criminal 
laws and laws which generally prevent corruption and undue behaviour in the 
interaction of the public and private sector.  
The  SEE284, and within it especially the Western Balkans, have had a turbulent 
past in the last two decades. After the dissolution in the 90s, the former Yugoslavian 
                                                          
284 The SEE and Balkans are not quite the same, although there is a lot of misunderstanding and 
equalization of the two. The SEE includes: Italy, Slovakia, Austria, Slovenia, Ukraine, Hungary, Romania, 
Moldova, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia and Slovenia. 
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countries decided to take their own paths towards democratization and an open-market 
economy, at the same time striving to become full EU-member states. This means they 
had to engage themselves in a rapid Stabilization and Association Process (SAP)285 of 
which the aim was to allow them to become candidates for EU membership and 
ultimately full members at some point later on.  
One of the most important stages in this process is the harmonization with the EU 
laws, and eventually additional criteria that are set by the European Commission. 
However, this process itself is not enough to explain why some countries in SEE286 have 
imposed, or are attempting to impose, lobbying regulations while most of the EU still 
does not have these laws. The harmonization is certainly not the answer to explain this 
tendency.  
From an EU-accession point of view, this tendency might be seen as premature 
and ambitious, but at the same time it can be interpreted as an attempt at further 
strengthening the rule of law and corruption prevention.  On the other hand, an analysis 
of the reasons for lobbying regulations in some of the SEE countries (Serbia, Slovenia, 
Montenegro and Macedonia) may indicate another motivation which is more connected 
to the imposition of entry barriers in the lobbying market287. Considering those reasons 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
At the same time, the term Balkans has a narrower meaning since it refers to countries located on the 
Balkan Peninsula: Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia (although the last one is often not included). Another, even narrower 
category is defined as the Western Balkans (WB). The WB refers to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro. 
285 The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) is the European Union's policy towards the Western 
Balkans, established with the aim of eventual EU membership. Western Balkan countries are involved in a 
progressive partnership with a view of stabilising the region and establishing a free-trade area. The SAP 
sets out common political and economic goals although progress evaluation is based on a country’s own 
merits (The EC, DG Enlargement -  http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/sap_en.htm).  
286 Hungary, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia and Croatia 
287 For instance, the position of the Montenegrin Lobbying Association (MLA), in regard to the fact that one 
year after the adoption of a law on lobbying there are no registered lobbyists in Montenegro, is that 
lobbyists are not interested in registration, since according to the law, anyone can register to be a lobbyist. 
Precisely, the position of the MLA is that only people with university education should have an opportunity 
to register as lobbyists. However, this rule does not exist anywhere else in the world, and thus it is hard to 
give any rational explanation for such a claim, except that this association tends to create conditions where 
only a few could enter lobbying market, which from a capture theory perspective makes sense. This is, to 
some extent, incomprehensive since in one year there were no registered lobbyists at all, including those 
without university education. Thus, claiming that these persons could “harm the reputational capital” 
cannot be taken too seriously if there were no registrations of these people at all. The position of the MLA 
can be found at the following link: http://www.cdm.me/drustvo/crna-gora/u-crnoj-gori-nema-
registrovanih-lobist. A similar rule existed in the Macedonian Law on Lobbying (2008), but the 
constitutional court ruled it was unconstitutional due to its discriminatory effects.   
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in greater depth could be useful in properly understanding the real motives that 
inaugurated the WB as a current leader in lobbying regulation in the European context. 
  
3. Strengthening of the Rule of Law and Corruption Fighting as a Reason for 
Lobbying Regulation in the Western Balkans – is regulation of lobbying as 
relevant as it seems to be? 
 One can speculate that elevated corruption levels could be a reason for the 
regulation of lobbying in the Western Balkans. While developed European countries 
with a stronger rule of law have enough strong general legislation which seems to be 
sufficient to protect the integrity of the public sector and deter corrupt practices, the 
Western Balkans countries have, on top of existing anti-corruption regulation, 
introduced (or are about to introduce) additional legal mechanisms to improve the rule 
of law and enforcement of corruption fighting efforts. Does this motivation have any 
empirical foundation? 
 Analysis of this phenomenon can start by referring to the Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (TI-CPI) from 2012, which offers the 
possibility of comparison of corruption perceptions in the SEE/WB and the rest of the 
EU (especially the northern EU). By looking at the figures, the results are in favour of 
such a claim, in the sense that high corruption risk definitely exists, and might be 
considered as one of the relevant reasons for adoption of lobbying regulations. For 
instance, Table 12 shows corruption perceptions for WB and some of EU countries:  
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Table 12 - TI-CPI Scores for North Europe and the Western Balkans 
 
Comparing the scores of some of the developed EU countries with the ones from 
the countries from the Western Balkans, it is easy to conclude that the latter ones are 
still mostly far behind the first ones. Even though this index does not directly measure 
the strength of the rule of law, it can reflect the state of the actual enforcement of the 
anti-corruption rules which exist in the mentioned countries. Hence, it can be said that 
the Western Balkans probably suffer from a weaker rule of law and higher corruption 
levels, especially in comparison to the rest of Europe. This could also be a relevant point 
when it comes to the regulation of lobbying, as it primarily serves to prevent undue 
relations between private interests and the public sector representatives.    
Another important question in this analysis is the relation of stronger rule of law 
and lower corruption levels (indicated by a high ranking on the TI-CPI) at one side, and 
existence of lobbying regulation on the other side. In other words – is lobbying 
regulation an inevitable part of an environment with a strong rule of law? Referring once 
again to the TI-CPI results (2012) indicates that the answer to this dilemma is probably 
                                                          
288 Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is 
perceived to be. A country or territory’s score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a 
scale of 0 - 100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 100 means it is perceived 
as very clean. A country's rank indicates its position relative to the other countries and territories included 
in the index. 
289 It is interesting to note that the same score was obtained by Italy as well. 
Rank 
(out of 
176) 
Country (EU) Score288 Rank Country (WB) Score 
1. Denmark 90 37. Slovenia 61 
4. Sweden 88 62. Croatia  46 
9. Netherlands 84 69. Macedonia 43 
13. Germany 79 72. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
42289 
17. The United 
Kingdom 
74 75. Montenegro 41 
22. France 71 80. Serbia 39 
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negative. Among the top twenty countries on the TI-CPI list, only five countries have 
some type of lobbying regulation and out of these just three have binding lobbying 
regulations. This means that lobbying regulation should not be perceived as a condicio 
sine qua non for a strong rule of law.    
For high scores on the TI-CPI list, the key issue is likely enforcement and not just 
the formal regulatory framework. This conclusion arises from the fact that none of the 
mentioned EU countries from the left column of Table 12 actually has a proper law on 
lobbying290, even though they have scored high on the list. Exactly this fact implies that 
the perception of corruption is not so dependent solely on the presence of lobbying 
regulation, but rather on the level of enforcement of standard transparency rules, rules 
on the prevention of conflict of interest291, and general strengthening of the rule of law.  
A similar conclusion can be made if one just looks  a cross-comparison of the 
Corruption Perception Index scores for the same countries before and after they 
introduced (or reinforced) lobbying regulations. In countries where the TI-CPI scores 
were high anyway, introduction of lobbying regulation could have been responsible for 
the slight increase (or even no increase at all) in the rankings a year after the 
introduction. However, Slovenia and Taiwan have been downgraded a year after they 
adopted lobbying laws (Table 13). This means there is not a very strong positive or 
negative correlation between the adoption of lobbying laws and corruption perception 
in observed countries. Thus, it is questionable if the introduction of lobbying regulations 
into legislative frameworks with already low TI-CPI scores could make significant 
improvement in transparency and accountability.  
It is more likely that lobbying regulation could effectively serve its purpose only in 
the countries where basic sunshine laws292 are implemented well, and the rule of law is 
already quite strong. In those systems (such as the USA, Australia and Canada) lobbying 
regulations were a useful upgrade which came on the top of the existing legal 
framework.  However, introducing lobbying regulations in a system with a weaker rule 
of law did not seem to have any positive effect on progress within the TI-CPI scores. 
                                                          
290 Germany and France have some soft-rules which deal with lobbying within their parliaments, while 
Denmark and the UK are preparing to introduce lobbying regulations.  
291 Which many countries in the Western Balkans anyways have, such those from Montenegro: The Law on 
Prevention of Conflict of Interests, “Official Gazette of the Montenegro”, No. 1/2009. 
292  This term is used in policymaking to reflect all legislation which improves transparency. 
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Certainly, this cannot be taken as proof of the inefficiency of these lobbying regulations, 
but at the same time it might indicate they did not make any significant positive 
contribution to score changes.  
The conclusion that arises from this brief analysis based on the relation between 
lobbying regulation and the TI-CPI scores suggests that there is not such a strong 
influence of lobbying regulation on the perception of corruption. It can also be said that 
lobbying regulation is not the condition for a high TI-CPI ranking. 
Table 13 provides an overview of the TI-CPI scores/rankings of several countries 
the year before the introduction of lobbying regulation and the year after:293 
 
  
                                                          
293 Comparison is made with a year after rather than with a year when the lobbying regulation was 
introduced. This should ensure at least one year of lobbying regulation in place, which means there was 
enough time for it to contribute to transparency and accountability effects.   
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Table 13 - TI-CPI scores for the year before and the year after the introduction of lobbying regulations 
 
 
 
 
Country Year of the introduction or improvement 
of lobbying regulation and the name of 
the regulation 
The score 
on the 
year 
before 
adoption 
of 
lobbying 
regulation 
The score 
on the 
year after 
adoption 
of 
lobbying 
regulation 
Australia The Australian Government introduced a 
Lobbying Code of Conduct and established 
a Register of Lobbyists, in force from 2008 
8.6 
(CPI 2007) 
8.7 
(CPI 2009) 
The USA The Honest Leadership and Open 
Government Act (HLOGA),  
P.L. 110-81, 2007 
7.3 
(CPI 2006) 
7.3 
(CPI 2008) 
Canada  Lobbying Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 44 (4th Supp.),  
in force from 2008 
8.7 
(CPI 2007) 
8.7 
(CPI 2009) 
Hungary Act XLIX of 2006 on Lobbying Activities, 
Government Decree 176/2006 (VIII. 14.) on 
the Implementation of Act XLIX 
of 2006 on Lobbying Activities 
5.0 
(CPI 2005) 
5.3 
(CPI 2007) 
Lithuania Law on Lobbying Activities No. VIII-1749 of 
27 June 2000 
3.8 
(CPI 1999) 
4.8 
(CPI 2001) 
Poland  Act of 7 July 2005 on legislative and 
regulatory lobbying 
3.5 
(CPI 2004) 
3.7 
(CPI 2006) 
Slovenia Zakon o integriteti in preprečevanju 
korupcije, Uradni list RS, št. 69/2011  
6.4 
(CPI 2010) 
61 (6.1) 
(CPI 2012) 
Macedonia Zakonot za dopolnuvanje na Zakonot za 
lobiranje, Sl. vesnik na R. Makedonija, 
br.135/2011 
4.1 
(CPI 2010) 
43 (4.3) 
(CPI 2012) 
Taiwan Lobbying Act, in force from 2007 5.9 
(CPI 2006) 
5.7 
(CPI 2008) 
Israel Amendment No.25 to the Knesset Law, 2008 6.1 
(CPI 2007) 
6.1 
(CPI 2009) 
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4. Magnitude of lobbying in Western Balkans as a reason for regulation 
 An additional important reason to mention, in the analysis of the motivation for an 
introduction of lobbying regulations, is the necessity for regulation based on the 
magnitude294 of lobbying. While corruption is perceived to happen more often in the 
Western Balkans, is the same true for the magnitude of lobbying? Do countries in the 
Western Balkans also deal with more lobbying that the rest of Europe, and thus, have an 
increased necessity to regulate lobbying? In other words, is the intensity of lobbying in 
the Western Balkans so strong that it requires lobbying to be regulated by special 
binding laws? 
 To answer this question – at least three elements have to be discussed: 
1. Relation of lobbying and corruption – an economic standpoint 
2. Size of the lobbying market 
3. Political systems in place in the Western Balkans 
 
4.1. Relation of lobbying and corruption – an economic standpoint 
     For understanding the necessity for regulation of lobbying in the Western 
Balkans, and for proper understanding of the magnitude of lobbying which might be the 
reason for regulation, it is essential to understand how lobbying and corruption interact 
together. Lobbying and corruption seem to be very similar to the general public, even as 
much as some people tend to say that lobbying is “legalized corruption”. However, these 
two are essentially different in terms of both law and economics. In terms of law, it is 
quite simple – bribery is a criminal offence. 
    Economically speaking, both lobbying and corruption have the same goal – an 
advancement of a narrower partisan interest. This interest does not necessarily have to 
be economic, but in the corporate world it is almost exclusively an economic interest.  
 
4.1.1. Economic implications where lobbying and bribery are both allowed 
The relation between lobbying and corruption should be firstly analysed through a 
hypothetical scenario where both are legal and equally available as strategic options for 
                                                          
294 Magnitude refers to level of lobbying which can be more precisely described either by number of 
registered lobbyists or amounts spent on lobbying. In the WB, both criteria could be hard to measure since 
there are no systematic data, except in Slovenia. 
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firms. A company which is interested in the protection or promotion of its economic 
position or interest by influencing decision-makers can chose between two – bribing or 
lobbying. The final choice will depend on several factors, but in this scenario lobbying 
tends to be less preferred than bribery. 
 At the beginning, let us look at lobbying as a method of economic signalling295. If a 
firm tends to send an informative signal to decision-makers (who decide on 
redistribution and the regulatory environment) about its importance for the national 
economy, this signal has to be adequately strong in order to be efficient. In terms of 
lobbying, it means that information transmitted towards government has to be reliable, 
specific, relatively novel and politically relevant in order to be influential. Further on, 
this means that corporate signalling (and corporate lobbying is practically just a type of 
signalling) is quite costly to perform, if it tends to be efficient.  
This problem inevitably invokes large costs since sending an informative signal 
can be very costly, especially in a competitive environment. Thus, the cost of sending a 
signal is an important economic factor when companies chose between bribery and 
lobbying, in a hypothetical scenario where both are legal. Knowing this, companies 
would probably opt for bribery since it largely excludes classical signalling and 
transaction costs. Bribery in this case allows circumvention of the signalling process, 
which is an important factor in terms of costs.  
 Lobbying can be perceived as more costly than bribing from yet an additional 
perspective. Sending an informative signal is costly per se, but it becomes even more 
costly in a highly competitive environment where a large number of players/companies 
strive to lobby for scarce resources. One of the reasons why lobbying may become more 
competitive and include more players is transparency. As argued by Denter, Morgan and 
Sisak (2011)296, enhancement of transparency makes the lobbying battle harsher, with 
more resources dissipated and larger deadweight loss than society suffers from 
                                                          
295  Lobbying has been widely considered as a signalling mechanism even in political sciences. To see how 
the signalling model has been used to explain gaining political power, look at P. Bernhagen and T. 
Bräuninger, “Structural Power, Information Asymmetry and Public Policy: A Signaling Model of Business 
Lobbying in Democratic Capitalism,” 2nd ECPR Conference (2003). Also see supra n.9. and n.10. 
296 P. Denter, J. Morgan, D. Sisak, Supra n.26. 
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unproductive competition297. At the same time, authors argue that with higher 
competition in the lobbying arena, the probability that a firm with the most pressing 
interest wins becomes lower, and overall allocative efficiency in society simultaneously 
declines.  
 Hence, the insight in the relation of lobbying and corruption from these 
perspectives suggests that lobbying might be, strictly economically speaking, less 
desirable than bribery for firms. Also, bribery seems a better redistributive tool than 
lobbying from a social costs point of view. However, the authors have neglected other 
allocative problems that could arise from bribery such are hold-up problems298. 
Moreover it is an illegal activity which vastly changes the whole course of the discussion. 
  
4.1.2. Economic implications where lobbying is allowed and bribery is prohibited 
 Now, let us consider another, more realistic scenario where bribery is illegal. In 
the previously described situation where companies would have an option between 
lobbying and bribery, the regulation of lobbying would not make any sense and would 
just make it more expensive due to increased transparency and newborn compliance 
costs. Even though previous theories suggest that bribery is economically more 
reasonable to lobbying, this would make sense only in a hypothetical scenario. In the 
real world environment, bribery is a criminal offence which significantly changes the 
flow of the analysis.  
  In cases where a criminal charge on bribery becomes proven in court, conviction 
is usually followed by serious sanctions. In terms of economics, these sanctions could be 
huge economic losses for a corporation which is found to be involved in bribery. Besides 
direct monetary losses which appear as administrative fines, indirect losses could also 
include losses associated with damages of reputation, loss of consumer trust, etc. These 
types of potential losses, thus, represent a very important factor when companies decide 
how to exert their influence.  If a fine or the probability of detection is high enough, it 
                                                          
297 Even though this might be true, it has to be underlined that corporate lobbying expenditures still do not 
represent great costs in comparison with overall corporate costs of a similar nature. L. Drutman well 
notices that “Companies still spend a relatively small amount on politics (roughly $3 billion) as compared to 
the $200 billion a year they spend on advertising or the $350 billion they spend a year on research and 
development.” – L. Drutman, “The Business of America Is Lobbying,” 2011.  
298 B. Harstad and J. Svensson, Supra n.63. 
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becomes unlikely that companies would engage in bribery so easily as if there were no 
fines at all299.    
Exactly this condition, according to Harstad and Svensson (2010) becomes crucial 
for firms to prefer lobbying to bribery. They argue that bribery is preferred only when 
the level of capital of the firm is small. But as a firm grows, the bribery “prices” grow as 
well and ultimately the firm will find it more optimal to lobby for regulation. Similarly to 
Campos and Giovannoni300 (2008), Harstad and Svensson (2006)301 find that bribery 
and lobbying act as substitutes, and that firms are more incentivized to lobby when the 
amount of corporate capital is high, the political system is more predictable and the 
economy is stronger302. 
This comes as a consequence of the fact that firms cannot rely on enforcement of 
“deals” based on bribing, since bribery is legally un-enforceable, bureaucrats can always 
ask for new bribes, or they can simply be replaced by other bureaucrats. All these risks, 
including the cost associated with higher probabilities of detection under stronger rule 
of law, are moving the cost of bribery over the cost of compliance to regulatory regimes. 
In short, the effort to obtain an exemption from regulatory compliance becomes more 
costly than compliance itself.  
 Firms then have incentives to shift towards lobbying which has more permanent 
effects (changing of law or even deregulation) if it is successfully accomplished. In fact, 
firms that are engaged in lobbying are less likely to pay bribes – according to mentioned 
studies.  
 It is maybe worth mentioning that deregulation can happen from various reasons. 
From a public interest theory point of view, it can take place when the market failures 
diminish for instance (due to new technologies for example) and there is no more need 
for regulation. The motivation for deregulation can also come from the side of firms.  
                                                          
299 This is very general statement though and in cases of corruption it may be not fully correct. N. F. Campos 
and F. Giovannoni (Supra n.64) argue they should not be very high, especially in the poor countries. The 
reason is that high penalties lead to higher bribes and thus discourage investment incentives which may 
lead a country into a “bribing equilibrium”.  
300 N. F. Campos and F. Giovannoni, 2006, Supra n.64. 
301 B. Harstad and J. Svensson, Supra n.63. 
302  “(b) firm size, age, ownership, per capita GDP and political stability are important determinants of lobby 
membership” - Supra n.63. 
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Equally, as firms show interest in "buying" regulations, under specific 
circumstances firms may be seeking deregulation as well. This might be the case in all 
those situations when conditions change over time, and the subject of regulation might 
even find more interest to be in an unregulated market for instance.303  
The bottom line is that firms who seek to maximize their own benefits by 
influencing the regulatory framework can be equally interested in regulation, re-
regulation and deregulation depending on what improves their profit maximization. 
 
4.2. The size of the lobbying market  
4.2.1. Macroeconomic preconditions for the development of a lobbying market 
 From the above-mentioned studies on the relation between bribery and lobbying, 
it can be argued that in cases of lobbying as a substitute to corruption in countries 
where the political system is predictable enough, the rule of low is becoming stronger, 
firms keep accumulating capital and national GDP has tended to grow. However, are 
those conditions satisfied in the Western Balkans?  
 In the last two decades, Western Balkans countries have made huge steps towards 
market liberalization, democratic and institutional capacity building and strengthening 
of the rule of law through EU accession processes304. At the same time, their economies 
have kept growing.  
 Table 14305 gives a useful overview of the development of the main economic 
trends for the Western Balkans countries. Quite positive economic trends have 
contributed to the creation of a generally better business environment, the arrival of 
multinational companies, an increase in FDI and accumulation of capital.  
                                                          
303 "At least four causes of deregulation can be derived from the Chicago theory of regulation. In the first place, 
shifts can come about in the relative political power of pressure groups, for example, as a result of the more 
efficient combating of free-riding, the more efficient use of media or as a result of special entrepreneurship 
(Ralph Nader). In the second place, deregulation can arise when politically effective groups believe that they 
can better promote their economic interests in an unregulated market, for example by self regulation. In the 
third place, deregulation can be the result of declining profits, so that the political yield of regulation declines. 
The fixing of prices or the introduction of entry restrictions in sectors consisting of multiple companies, such as 
airlines or freight, will result in competition taking place in other dimensions of the product. Competition in 
the area of service, such as the frequency of transport, will result in a decline in profits... Finally, deregulation 
can be accounted for by increasing deadweight costs." - J. A. den Hertog, “Review of Economic Theories of 
Regulation,” Discussion Paper Series / Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute 10 (2010):p.3. 
304 See: Thematic Evaluation of Rule of Law, Judicial Reform and Fight against Corruption and Organised 
Crime in the Western Balkans (Service Contract Ref. No 2010/ 256 638), 2013. pp.35-36.   
305 European Economy, 2006. 
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Table 14 - Main Economic Trends, Western Balkans  
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Real GDP growth % 4.1 4.0 4.3 3.9 5.7 4.7 
Inflation (average) % n.a. 24.5 6.7 4.5 3.9 6.4 
Total revenues % of GDP n.a. 40.3 41.0 42.1 42.6 41.3 
Total expenditures % of GDP n.a. 45.3  45.0 45.4 45.5 43.0 
General  government 
balance 
% of GDP n.a. -5.0 -3.9 -3.3 -2.9 -1.7 
Export billion EUR 9.5 10.2 10.2 11.1 12.9 13.0 
Import billion EUR 19.4 22.9 26.6 29.0 32.5 31.8 
Trade balance with 
world 
billion EUR -9.8 -12.8 -16.4 -17.9 -19.6 -18.8 
Trade balance with EU billion EUR -6.9 -8.6 -10.5 -10.6 -11.7 -11.9 
Current account  
balance 
% of GDP -3.9 -5.3 -9.8 -8.5 -8.8 -8.3 
Foreign direct  
investment 
million EUR 1.649 2.317 1.796 3.572 2.397 3.856 
 
Besides the FDI increase in the West Balkans area and its contribution to GDP 
growth, there was an additional economic improvement in terms of participation of the 
gross domestic investment, as illustrated in Table 15: 
  
213
207 
 
Table 15 - Gross Domestic Investments in the SEE, The World Bank, IBRD: Western Balkan 
Integration and the EU, Edited by S. Kathuria, 2008 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Change 
2000-05 
SEE 19.1 20.5 20.5 21.9 23.5 23.5   4.4 
Albania 27.4 28.8 26.1 25.4 26.1 23.5 -3.9 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
17.0 15.6 16.9 16.9 15.5 15.9 -1.2 
Croatia 21.8 21.8 22.3 29.6 29.9 29.9   8.1 
Macedonia 22.3 19.1 20.6 20.0 21.4 20.0 -2.3 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
10.9 19.5 11.7 11.4 17.3 14.2   3.2 
 
These figures clearly show that the WB economies have significantly improved in 
the last decade, and they were probably favourable to strategic decisions of the firms to 
engage in lobbying and avoid engagement in bribery.  
Along with the economic growth, bribery prices have grown as well, which  
Harstad and Svensson (2010) claimed to be additional reason for the firms to 
strategically shift towards investing in lobbying. 
This tendency, where bribery prices grow along with the GDP, while at the same 
time firms report less frequent bribing, can be found in Serbia for instance306. It well 
reflects the above-mentioned theory and might be an important indicator that firms 
were actually incentivised to start shifting to lobbying from bribery. Graphs 3 and 4 
illustrate changes in the “price of the bribery” from 2005 to 2008.307  
 
                                                          
306 In the same period, Serbia had continuous GDP growth rates: 5.4 (2005), 3.6 (2006), 5.4 (2007), 3.8 
(2008);     Source: World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG).  
307 The data is taken from the World Bank report BEEPS At-A-Glance 2008 Serbia, 2010. January 2010. 
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Graph 3 - Bribe frequency: Percentage of firms saying unofficial payments are frequent (Left side) 
Graph 4 - Unofficial Payments: Government Contracts - Percentage of contract value typically paid 
to secure a government contract, for all firm (Right side). 
According to the data, firms reported that unofficial payments have decreased in 
the same period in which the price of bribery increased. In other words, the price of 
bribery increased while the frequency of bribery decreased significantly - by almost 
50%. The increase in bribery prices was probably not the only reason for this trend, but 
it can be seen as one of the important reasons, especially from a point of view of above 
mentioned theory. 
Economically speaking, a brief analysis shows that formal, economic conditions for 
the growth of lobbying have been mostly achieved in the WB. Strengthening of the rule 
of law together with economic growth, accumulation of capital, increase in bribery 
“prices” were some of the conditions whose specific interaction opened a door for 
development of lobbying market.  
 
4.2.2. The size of the lobbying market 
One of the important indicators of the magnitude of lobbying can be the size of 
the lobbying market. The size of the lobbying market is usually determined either by 
annual gross expenditures on lobbying (usually NGOs or governmental estimates) or by 
the number of registered lobbyists in cases where data allow this. The problem with the 
first method is related to its accuracy. Even in countries where lobbying is regulated and 
lobbyist have to disclose their finances publicly, it is still hard to capture the entire scale 
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of the lobbying market because reporting thresholds308 and imperfect enforcement 
always leave some room for error. On the other hand, the scope of the definition of 
"lobbyist" has a great influence on the estimation of the size of the market based on the 
number of lobbying players, and depending on who is required to register, the final 
number of lobbyists can change dramatically.  
In Chapter III some figures were mentioned for countries where lobbying is 
already regulated. The number of lobbyists ranges from about 13,000 at the US federal 
level, around 5,500309 at the EU level310 and in Canada, less than two hundred in France 
and Israel, and less than one hundred in Balkan countries311, with just one registered 
lobbyist in Macedonia,312 and zero in Montenegro, even a year after the adoption of the 
law313. 
The size of the market is definitely an important factor which has to be taken into 
consideration whenever regulation is discussed. It is an important factor which may be 
crucial, firstly in determining the proper RIA method, but also in determining how 
complex the regulatory structure is going to be and how many public resources are 
going to be needed for its implementation. For instance in Macedonia and Montenegro, it 
is very unlikely that laws on lobbying were necessary from an efficiency point of view, if 
there is only one registered lobbyist (Macedonia) or no registered lobbyists at all 
(Montenegro). Other mechanisms such as amending existing legislation could probably 
be a better solution. 
The examples of Montenegro and Macedonia maybe deserve more discussion. 
There might be two main reasons for the weak results of lobbying laws and they might 
depend on the actual promoter of these regulations. If regulation was introduced on the 
initiative of the public sector, then it might be the case that the lobbying law was 
adopted in order to demonstrate the accountability of the state (or as a response to a 
                                                          
308 Only lobbying contracts above a certain value are reported. 
309 Supra n.186. 
310 While some estimates go to about 100,000 lobbyists, including those who work indirectly on lobbying 
activities in the EU member states, D. Gueguen (2007). 
311 Except Slovenia and Macedonia, where the membership level was determined by the official lobbying 
registries, in other WB countries the number of lobbyists is approximated to membership of respective 
lobbying associations.   
312 Under the first law on lobbying which was additionally amended for its inefficiency by  Zakonot za 
dopolnuvanje na Zakonot za lobiranje, Sl. vesnik na R. Makedonija, br.135/2011.  
313 http://www.antikorupcija.me.  
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scandal),314 but without a proper analysis of the lobbying market which practically does 
not exist, or is very small. Hence, the law was made just to calm the public concern but 
real effects were missing.  
Another reason, in cases that law was demanded by lobbyists, is that they indeed 
strived to capture the regulator, but since the enforcement is still lacking315 or it is very 
weak, they may still find it more optimal to lobby unregistered (Djankov et al. 2002), 
and keep being competitive by avoiding to comply with the regulation costs. In these 
circumstances, as argued previously, it might even be the case that lobbying is still being 
predominated by bribing as its substitute.316   
Hence, few or zero registered lobbyists after the adoption of lobbying laws would 
suggest that either the motivation for regulation may not have taken into consideration 
economic but rather social reasons, or that enforcement mechanisms are insufficiently 
functioning. Of course, this is not the list of definite reasons but rather an opinion as to 
possible reasons.  
 In essence, in the Western Balkans, the number of potential or registered lobbyists 
hardly exceeds 100 registrations per country, including individuals and lobbying firms. 
Due to political system constraints that are going to be described in the following 
section, it is very unlikely that even a majority of those will actually be in a position to 
practice lobbying permanently. This should be an important indicator of the size of the 
market and an important sign for those who structure lobbying regulation. That 
regulation should be efficient, but in terms of engagement of public expenditures it 
should be tailored to fit the size of the lobbying market. A small number of players, with 
insignificant financial impact, should be treated in as simple and least costly way as 
possible. Otherwise, regulatory costs could easily exceed the benefits and become an 
undesired social cost.  
 The second important issue to consider is the effect of a heavier regulative 
approach of entry. Lobbying regulation is also an entry regulation. If the regulatory 
approach is heavier, especially in a weak enforcement environment, it may potentially 
                                                          
314 D. Lowery and V. Gray, “How Some Rules Just Don’t Matter: The Regulation of Lobbyists.” 
315 Nor Macedonia nor Montenegro have a special agency which enforces lobbying rues. 
316See N.F. Campos and F. Giovannoni, “Lobbying , Corruption and Political Influence in Transition 
Countries”; B. Harstad and J. Svensson, “Bribe to Bend or Lobby for Change.” 
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lead to the new substitution cycle from lobbying to bribery, or in the best case to illegal 
lobbying317. If entry barriers are too high, this can indeed deter firms from complying 
with lobbying regulation, and re-incentivise some of them to alternative methods of 
influencing. Djankov et al. (2002), in their empirical work on the regulation of entry, find 
this phenomenon quite obvious: “We find that heavier regulation of entry is generally 
associated with greater corruption and a larger unofficial economy, but not with better 
quality of private or public goods. We also find that the countries with less limited, less 
democratic, and more interventionist governments regulate entry more heavily, even 
controlling the level of economic development”318. 
 This finding could also be adapted to some extent to the lobbying regulation in the 
Western Balkans. Heavy regulation could be counter-productive and incentivize off-
record lobbying and corruption in case entry becomes expensive. Actually, the entry 
itself does not have to be extremely expensive, but if the lobbying industry remains 
small and generates on average moderate income for lobbyists, as it is expected to be in 
the Western Balkans, then even moderate entry-requirements could be considered 
burdensome. In that case, engaging public resources for regular enforcement of lobbying 
regulations319 could be even less justified.  
 As a conclusion in regard to the market size, lobbying in the Western Balkans is 
more in the initial than in a mature phase of development. Further development will be 
mostly connected to global economic trends and domestic economic growth, which is in 
any case very modest since 2008. Further on, a very complex structure of regulation of 
lobbying under current circumstances might not be the best idea since it can lead to 
additional public expenditures which could be hard to justify if the size of the market 
remains as small as it is. Moreover, the excessive regulation could, as discussed, create 
counter-incentives and redirect firms from lobbying to bribery or unreported lobbying.  
 
 
                                                          
317 Which per se does not have to be corruption, but just any unreported lobbying which is sanctioned 
administratively or criminally, depending on national laws.  
318 S. Djankov et al., “The Regulation of Entry,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics (2002): 1–37. 
319 Like in Canada where a specific public unit monitors and enforces lobbying regulation. 
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4.3. Political systems in the Western Balkans as a factor that influences the 
lobbying market 
 Lobbyings always takes place in a political system. The type and the dynamics of 
this system strongly influence the types and dynamics of lobbying320. This is why 
lobbying tends to be very different in different political systems. Generally, lobbying 
appears in legislative and executive branches, and only in the US does it appear in an 
indirect way in the judiciary, at the level of the Supreme Court of the US321. 
 Hence, lobbying is actually limited to the legislative and executive branch. In the 
legislative branch lobbying, the target is in most cases the National Assembly, more 
precisely members of the National Assembly and senior staff who work on setting the 
agenda setting and drafting laws. In the executive branch, lobbyists strive to influence 
legislative initiatives, legislative drafting and enforcement of laws, by targeting 
ministries and independent agencies. In federal countries where decision-making is 
multi-layered, lobbying also follows the specific constitutional separation of powers and 
lobbyists are usually active in different levels of decision-making. The same holds for the 
EU, even though most of the European lobbyists are working in Brussels.  
 How do different political systems actually influence lobbying, and why is lobbying 
not incentivised by the Western Balkans' political systems? To answer this, one should 
first understand why the US has a larger lobbying industry than the EU. Maybe the most 
fundamental condition which allowed lobbying to grow as large as it is today is the 
friendliness of the US congressional voting system. Bennendsen and Feldmann (2000) 
share this opinion as well:  “Key institutional feature to explain the different behaviour of 
interest groups is that in the congressional system, majority coalitions can differ across 
policy issues and transcend party lines, whereas in a parliamentarian system the majority 
coalition is given for the duration of a government…We show that the flexibility of creating 
majorities in the Congress creates an incentive for interest groups to play an active role in 
the design of policy in the congressional system, while the voting cohesion in the 
                                                          
320  M. Bennedsen and S.E. Feldmann, “Lobbying Legislatures.”, 2002. 
321 L.A. Solowiej and P.M. Collins, “Counteractive Lobbying in the US Supreme Court,” American Politics 
Research no. 5759 (2009): 670–699; G.A. Caldeira and J.R. Wright, “Lobbying for Justice: Organized 
Interests Supreme Court Nominations, and United States Senate,” American Journal of Political Science no. 
October (1998): 499–523.  
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parliamentary system dissuades interest group’s incentive to engage in information 
provision”322. 
 In the US, the political majority required for passing a law is not as solid as in 
European style parliamentary systems323, where a coalition usually passes laws until it 
stops existing. In the US, members of Congress are not necessarily obliged to follow the 
voting direction of their party. Before they vote, they always take into consideration the 
sensitivity of the issue among their local electorate and their own state. This is why it is 
not surprising to have both Republicans and Democrats voting for the same bill, if it is in 
the interest of their state and their own electorate. In fact, their local electorate is the 
one which is important for re-election and this behaviour should not be surprising. 
 It is exactly this flexibility in majority building that creates a great channel for 
lobbyists to communicate their messages and transmit information. They know that 
convincing information may influence decision-making with undecided members of the 
Congress, which can affect the voting record at the end. On the other hand, in more rigid 
parliamentarian systems where the majority usually remains stable or where 
government simply loses a majority, the room for influence is much more restricted.  
 The main problem in European parliamentarian systems, with regards to lobbying 
potentials, is that voting decisions are made firstly within political clubs of 
parliamentarian political groups, and usually later coordinated between leaders of 
political groups that have a parliamentarian majority. Moreover, in cases where only one 
or two parties in a coalition have the required majority – decision-making is usually 
made at one or two places, and usually it is very conditioned upon the approval by a 
head of a political party. This at the same time means that lobbying becomes much more 
limited, and practically directed towards very few people. Under these circumstances, 
the voting majorities become more predictable324 and simultaneously they provide less 
incentives for lobbying. It also means that lobbyist could either shift their focus towards 
the executive branch, but only if it proves to be a more accessible point. Another 
alternative would be financing of the political parties which are in power, but this is in 
                                                          
322 M. Bennedsen and S.E. Feldmann, “Lobbying Legislatures.”, 2002. 
323 E. Helpman and T. Persson, “Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining,” Advances in Economic Analysis & 
Policy 1, no. 1 (2001).  
324 However, these majorities tend to have several equilibriums, according to E. Helpman and T. Personn 
(1998).  
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many countries regulated (contributions are limited or prohibited at specific time) in 
details, in order to prevent possibilities of corruption and conflict of interest. 
 What comes as a conclusion is that parliamentarian systems that are common in 
Europe, as well as in the Western Balkans, tend to be less fertile grounds for lobbying, 
especially in the legislative branch. This becomes even truer in the case of the Western 
Balkans where political parties tend to have very efficient controlling mechanisms325 of 
their parliamentarians, and the entire parliamentary system suffers from the chronic 
democratic deficit since parliamentarians tend to be more representatives of their 
parties than of their electorate.326 
This said, lobbying in the legislative branches in the Western Balkans does not 
have huge space to grow if the political system remains unchanged, and especially if 
economic growth does not return to levels from before 2008. This also means that the 
regulation of lobbying should acknowledge this fact and be better adapted to current 
lobbying magnitudes than to the potential ones. In other words, it should remain as 
simple and least burdensome as possible, but at the same time fulfil the main goals 
related to transparency improvement.  
 
5. Lobbying in Serbia 
 In this section, the research will focus in detail on Serbia, and afterwards also on 
Montenegro, Macedonia and Slovenia. Currently, Serbia is working on the adoption of a 
law on lobbying, and for this reason it has been chosen as a country for a pioneer ex-ante 
application of the CII method. This application will demonstrate both policymaking and 
comparative academic use of the CII. But before applying the tool, it is important to 
examine the political and legal background of the lobbying regulation debate.  
 It is very difficult to estimate when the word “lobbying” was used for the first time 
in Serbia in its accurate meaning. However, the word “lobbying” has been in daily use in 
                                                          
325 The practice of so-called “Blank resignation letters” was prohibited from 2012 in Serbia. This practice 
meant that elected and appointed members of parliament (MP), who were elected under a political party 
list, had to submit their resignation letter to their parties at the beginning of their term. This letters had a 
blank space for the date, and political parties used them in cases when the MP started disobeying orders 
from the party’s leadership or in if he/she decided to change the party. This method was introduced to 
prohibit political “selling” of individual MPs, but it is found to be undemocratic and even unconstitutional.  
326 D. Rodin, “Dva Problema Hrvatskog Parlamentarizma,” Anali Hrvatskog Politološkog Društva 2, no. 1 
(2006). 
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the media, politics, public debates and Serbian society in general for at least fifteen 
years. In most of the cases, the term was abused and misunderstood, so the society still 
has quite an unclear perception of the real meaning of the word. This can be further 
illustrated by the results of the survey “The Perception of Lobbying in Serbia”:327 
 
Graph 5 
As we can see in Graph 5, in 2009 only half of the population had heard of the 
term lobbying, and most of them (70%) were living in the capital – Belgrade. However, 
in Vojvodina (northern region), the familiarity with the term was still quite low (38%). 
These indicators are unexpected to some extent, since Vojvodina tends to be the main 
generator of industrial and agricultural activity, with great participation in the national 
foreign direct investments portfolio. Moreover, it was the first region of Serbia to engage 
in direct lobbying in Brussels328 through the Office for European Affairs which was 
established in 2006. This means that Vojvodina started officially to lobby quite early in 
comparison to other parts of Serbia329, but still, not many people could say they even 
heard of lobbying.   
                                                          
327 The Perception of Lobbying in Serbia (Belgrade, 2009).  
328 www.vojvodinahouse.eu.  
329 Such as city of Nis (established in 2011) and city of Kragujevac (established in 2011). 
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Graph 6 
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Graph 6 is showing the public perception of the main subjects engaged in 
lobbying. Most of the people have attached politicians with lobbying (as those who 
lobby), which indicates that the public has an incomplete image of the process. 
Nevertheless it is true that politicians are involved in lobbying on the side of the 
demand, but it seems that the public has failed to recognize that fact. This means that 
they probably do not distinguish the role of those who lobby and those who are lobbied, 
and it is most likely they believe that the politicians are actually those who also do 
lobbying.  
Graph 7 reflects public opinion in regard to areas where lobbying usually takes 
place. Serbian citizens mostly associate lobbying with foreign and internal policy affairs, 
and immediately after comes business. A surprising fact is that quite a large percentage 
of associates lobby within the judiciary, which in continental legal systems (where 
Serbia belongs to as well) should definitely not be an arena for lobbying.         
 Graph 7 
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This can be to some extent explained by the fact that corruption is still present in the 
Serbian judiciary, and that citizens often misperceive lobbying and equalize it with 
corruption in the judiciary. In Graph 8 this can be partially confirmed since 35% of 
people believe that lobbying is actually just a nice term for “fishy” activities. Even though 
this was quite imprecisely defined, the term “fishy”, which is used in this survey, can be 
easily correlated with activities that are not ethically or even legally just.  
The results of the survey generally indicate that in Serbia there is a low 
understanding of the concept of lobbying, and it also seems that lobbying is not on the 
top of the mind or concerns of the Serbian population. Thus, the only reason why Serbia 
decided to regulate lobbying is hardly the high public concern on the possible negative 
effects of lobbying, but rather a combination of reasons where the public concern plays 
just a partial role.   
 
 
 
 Graph 8 
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6. Legal and institutional framework for lobbying in Serbia 
 In this section the actual legal and institutional circumstances in Serbia, which are 
important for understanding the idea of regulation of lobbying and the actual capacities 
of the state to address this task properly will be described. Firstly, the legal framework 
will be addressed through an analysis of the relevant legislation. The next step will be an 
evaluation of the regulatory impact assessment capacity of Serbia, and finally the 
motivation for the introduction of lobbying regulation will be examined.  
 
6.1. Constitutional foundations for lobbying in the Republic of Serbia  
 The Republic of Serbia is a parliamentarian democracy. It has an executive branch 
with a government and president, a unicameral parliament (the National Assembly) and 
an independent judiciary. In order to understand the position of lobbying in the Serbian 
legislative and political system, one should firstly refer to the Constitution of the 
Republic of Serbia from 2006330. 
Lobbying, of course, has not been mentioned directly in the Constitution. However, 
as lobbying is nothing more than a protection of interests, one should look at the 
constitution from this perspective, and look for the rules which provide a general legal 
basis for such activities. Generally speaking, some of most famous constitutional articles 
that provide a foundation for lobbying are the right of assembly and the right of petition. 
In this sense, the Serbian constitution might be considered as lobbying-friendly. More 
precisely, the following articles of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia provide 
general legal foundations for the exercise of lobbying in Serbia: 
Article 51 – Right to information 
Everyone shall have the right to be informed accurately, fully and timely about issues of 
public importance. The media shall have the obligation to respect this right. 
                                                          
330 The latest Constitution of the Republic of Serbia was adopted on 30 September 2006. Due to the specific 
political circumstances at the moment of adoption, this constitution was additionally approved by the 
people in October 2006. For more on Constitutional law and lawmaking in Serbia see: D. Milovanovic, N. 
Nenadic, and V. Todoric, Survey on the Improvement of the Legislative Process in the Republic of Serbia 
(Belgrade, 2012).; Law Drafting and Legislative Process in the Republic of Serbia - An Assessment, 2011.; V. V. 
Rakic, M. Reljanovic, and A.K. Bojovic, “Judicial Reform in Serbia 2008-2012,” Ssrn PAPERS (2013), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2262349.; R.Markovic, Ustavno Pravo i Politicke 
Institucije (Belgrade: Sluzbeni glasnik, 1998). 
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Everyone shall have the right to access information kept by state bodies and organizations 
with delegated public powers, in accordance with the law. 
In the context of lobbying, free access to publicly relevant information is crucial. 
Everyone, according to Article 51, has the right to be informed about the political, social 
and economic strategies of the government, public expenditures, lawmaking process, 
etc. This article officially states that the public sector is open for information exchange, 
and that everyone has a right to be informed about actions that the country took or is 
about to take, except in situations where public access is limited (confidential 
information), which is regulated by special laws.  
This possibility is essential since lobbying largely consists of accurate knowledge 
of information related to the public sector - mainly about its regulatory activity, 
distributional policies, labour laws, taxation, entry regulation, etc. 
Article 54 – Freedom of assembly 
Citizens may assemble freely. 
Assembly held indoors shall not be subjected to permission or registering. 
Gathering, demonstrations and other forms of assembly held outdoors shall be reported to 
the state body, in accordance with the law. 
This article, together with Article 56, provides the legal foundation for what is called 
“grassroots lobbying”331. This form of lobbying means that pressure is exercised on the 
decision-makers from the local communities, which act in an organized way. Some of the 
actions that could be considered as grassroots lobbying actions are organized public 
events, protests, performances, etc. All these activities are legally permitted within 
freedom of assembly. 
Article 55 – Freedom of association 
Freedom of political, union and any other form of association shall be guaranteed, as well 
as the right to stay out of any association. 
Associations shall be formed without prior approval and entered in the register kept by a 
state body, in accordance with the law. 
Secret and paramilitary associations shall be prohibited. 
Constitutional Court may ban only such associations the activity of which is aimed at 
                                                          
331 J. Milyo, Moving down the Grassroots, (Institute for Justice, 2010). 
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violent overthrow of constitutional order, violation of guaranteed human or minority 
rights, or inciting of racial, national and religious hatred. 
Judges of Constitutional Court, judges, public prosecutors, Defender of Citizens, members of 
police force and military persons may not be members of political parties. 
 
Article 55 provides an important legal foundation for interest representation, 
especially representation of the organized interest. Freedom of association allows 
individuals, professionals, corporations and other subjects to act in an organized way in 
regard to their common interest. All professional associations, NGOs, trade unions, 
syndicates and other forms of associations derive their legitimacy from this article of the 
Constitution. 
Article 56 – Right to petition 
Everyone shall have the right to put forward petitions and other proposals alone or 
together with others, to state bodies, entities exercising public powers, bodies of the 
autonomous provinces and local self-government units and to receive reply from them if 
they so request.  
No person may suffer detrimental consequences for putting forward a petition or proposal. 
No person may suffer detrimental consequences for opinions stated in the petition or 
proposal unless they constitute a criminal offense. 
 
Article 56 is yet another fundamental constitutional provision related to 
lobbying. The right on petition provides legal foundations for the protection of specific 
interest. Each individual, and moreover any group within a society, has a right to 
communicate their opinion and interest to the public sector and ask for improvement of 
its social, economic or political position within the society.  
The above-mentioned articles 51, 54, 55 and 56 represent core provisions of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Serbia which provide room for the legal exercise of 
lobbying within the Serbian institutional and political system. Thus, even though it is not 
yet regulated and acknowledged as a special profession, there are no constitutional 
barriers for further regulation of lobbying as a profession and specific processes for the 
promotion of interest. 
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6.2. Legislative process and consultations with civil society in Serbia  
  Nowadays modern democracies tend to be as transparent as possible, and 
allow wider participation of citizens and various organizations in the creation of public 
policies and lawmaking. Similarly to the EU, Serbia at least officially welcomes the 
participation of the civil sector in rulemaking. Official channels for civic participation in 
lawmaking do not fully reflect the actual lobbying pressure on decision-makers, but they 
reflect the potential for lobbying activity development. Thus, an understanding of 
lawmaking procedures of the Government and the National Assembly are crucial for 
understanding both the potential for lobbying and also its actual level within each of the 
institutions. Hence, for a better understanding of this approach, it is necessary to 
understand how laws in Serbia are actually made and from where the legislative 
initiative comes.  
 According to the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia332, the ability to propose 
legislation belongs to the National Assembly, Government, assemblies of autonomous 
provinces or at least 30,000 voters. Within the same article, this right is delegated to the 
National Bank of Serbia and the Civic defender (Ombudsman), but only within their 
special competences.   
 
6.2.1. Legislative role of the Government - preparation of legislative proposals  
 From a purely legislative competence point of view, it can be said that the 
institutional framework in Serbia generally incentivizes lobbying. This is especially true 
in the case of the executive branch, which is the most important legislative initiator in 
Serbia. As a matter of fact, the Serbian Government is accountable for about 98% of all 
legislative initiatives in the country, according to estimates of the OSCE Mission in 
Serbia333. Such dominance in agenda setting makes the executive branch the most 
important target for lobbyist in Serbia, since the Government comprises both important 
legislative roles – an important role in lawmaking (initiating primary legislation)334 and 
the implementation of adopted laws (secondary legislation or subordinate legislation).  
                                                          
332 Article 107 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. 
333 Law Drafting and Legislative Process in the Republic of Serbia - An Assessment. p.20. 
334 In accordance with the Annual Action Program of the Government. 
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 The task of adopting legislation is exclusively delegated to the National Assembly, 
which is the only institution that has primary legislative competence, while the 
Government has the ability to create subordinate legislation which accelerates and 
advances implementation of the primary legislation. Of course, subordinate legislation 
has to comply fully with the primary legislation, which is defined in the Constitution by 
articles on the hierarchy of legal norms335. 
 The Government initiates legislation within the competences of each ministry, 
where special drafting groups work on legislative proposals. Those groups are usually 
composed of the internal staff of the ministries and external members336 who are 
engaged on an ad-hoc basis337. Proposals that are created within these groups are 
afterwards sent to the General Secretariat of the Government, which has to determine 
that all formal conditions defined by the Government rules of procedure have been 
fulfilled.  If this check proves positive, the proposal is forwarded to one of four special 
committees338 of the Government, which have to give an opinion on proposals within 
their respective competences.  
 A competent special committee of the Government which was appointed to deal 
with the proposal can, at the behest of the respective working group, initiate the process 
of public consultations339. This process is not initiated automatically for all proposed 
legislation, but only for legislation which is perceived to be of a greater public concern. 
The process of public consultation starts after its public announcement on the official 
webpage of the initiating Ministry and the webpage of the E-government. Within this 
                                                          
335 Article 145 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia.  
336 Which opens room for very effective lobbying since representatives of interested social and economic 
groups might be included in this process. Of course, the composition of the task force groups is decided by a 
discrete decision of the head of the task force group. 
337 It is also interesting to mention that the delegation of the legislative initiative to the individual ministries 
does not always reflect the nature of the legislation in the Western Balkans. A good example of this is the 
fact that the drafting of the law on lobbying in Serbia is delegated to the Ministry of trade and 
telecommunication while the same task in Croatia falls under the ministry of Justice (Independent Sector 
for Suppression of the Corruption). 
338 Poslovnik Vlade Republike Srbije (Government rules of procedure), article 25, paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4.  
339 Poslovnik Vlade Republike Srbije (Government rules of procedure), article 41. The public consultations 
are generally open to everyone, not only industries but also to NGOs, unions, academia, etc. This is 
essentially an important feature of the process of public consultations as it suggests that there may be a 
competition between opposed groups, which per se, does not have to produce negative outcomes and it 
may even lead to an efficient regulation (G. Becker 1983). This does not mean that resources spent on 
lobbying are not wasted, but rather that competition among pressure groups has a beneficial impact on 
regulatory activity.  
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process, all relevant information and materials regarding the proposal are publicly 
available, and the initiating Ministry decides on the deadlines and methods for public 
participation, which in Serbia does not have a universal character in terms of the 
procedure on participation. After the expiration of the public consultation period, the 
initiating Ministry has to publish a report on the outcomes of the public consultation 
within a period of fifteen days.  
 In cases where public consultation is not required, all relevant material and 
documents should be made publicly available no later than before the drafting group 
officially recommends the Government to proceed with the legislation340.  
 
6.2.2.  Legislative role of the National Assembly – adoption of laws 
 The Government, after preparing a proposal with all necessary follow-up materials 
and inter-ministerial consultations, passes the proposal to the National Assembly.341 
From this step, the entire procedure is regulated by the Rules of procedure of the 
National Assembly342. This act defines that the government (or another legitimate 
initiator) submits their proposals to the National Assembly in the form of a complete 
draft together with an explanatory document. Besides specific parts of the explanatory 
document343, this explanation should contain the impact assessment study, if required. 
 Upon the submission of proposals, if the President of the National Assembly 
acknowledges that all formal conditions for submission are fulfilled, the proposal will be 
                                                          
340 Poslovnik Vlade Republike Srbije (Government rules of procedure), article 42. 
341 The legislative procedure explained here is the regular legislative procedure. The Rules of the National 
Assembly also recognize the abbreviated procedure (Article 93) and the urgent procedure (Article 167). 
342 Poslovnik Narodne Skupstine Republike Srbije (Rules of procedure of the National Assembly) - 
http://www.parlament.gov.rs/narodna-skupstina-/vazna-dokumenta/poslovnik-(precisceni-
tekst)/uvodnа-odredbа.1330.html.   
343 Rules of procedure of the National Assembly, Article 151: “The rationale shall contain the following: the 
constitutional, and/or legal basis for adopting the regulation; the reasons for adopting the regulation, in 
particular: an analysis of the current situation, problems that shall be resolved by the regulation; objectives to 
be attained by the regulation, the discussed options for resolving the problems without regulation adoption 
and the answer to the question why the regulation adoption is the best way to resolve the problem(s); 
explanation of the basic legal institutions and individual solutions;  an estimate of the funds necessary to 
implement the regulations, including the sources of those funds; the general interest owing to which the 
retroactive effect is being proposed, if the Bill contains provisions with retroactive effect;  reasons for adopting 
the Bill by an urgent procedure, if an urgent procedure has been proposed for the adoption of the Bill; reasons 
for proposing the regulation to come into effect before the eighth day following its publication in the Official 
Gazette of the Republic of Serbia; a list of the provisions of the valid regulation which are being amended (by 
crossing out the part of the text being modified, and inserting the new text in capital letters).”  
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passed to the competent parliamentarian committee, and the proposal shall be promptly 
(at least 15 days later) formally discussed within the assembly. With regards to 
competences of parliamentarian committees, the proposal will be sent to the most 
competent one or even a few of them at the same time. In some situations, several 
committees will address the proposal from different perspectives. This process usually 
involves representatives of the proposers which can participate at the sessions. 
 Among regular committees, the most important are the Constitution and 
Legislative Affairs Committee and the Committee on Finance, State Budget and Control 
of Public Spending, and they will normally be expected to provide information on all 
proposals. In addition to them, other relevant committees will also provide their 
opinions via appointed rapporteur. Moreover, the National Assembly may establish if 
necessary inquiry committees which are composed of parliamentarians or inquiry 
commissions which may involve external participants344. 
 The main purpose of the work of the committees is to assess if the proposal is in 
accordance with the constitution and other legislation, to clarify the issues that might 
appear in terms of interpretation of some articles, to propose amendments and to give a 
principled opinion on the proposal.  
 The proposal is afterwards set for the debate in principle, on the plenum of the 
National Assembly. Between the debate in principle and a debate in detail, the 
competent committee might decide to submit additional amendments to the National 
Assembly. The second stage is the debate in detail, which is the final stage before the 
voting of the sitting National Assembly, which does not have to take place consequently 
after the debate in detail (in cases the proposal has to be re-framed and harmonized 
based on the debate). After voting, the president of the National Assembly is required to 
pass the law to the President of the Republic for its promulgation. Laws that are 
promulgated are afterwards published in the Official Gazette and they come into force 
no earlier than 8 days from the day of publication, or even earlier in specific cases of 
necessity345.  
                                                          
344 Rules of procedure of the National Assembly, Article 68 
345 The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Article 196. 
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 From the brief description of the legislative procedure with the main milestones of 
the process, the roles of the government and the parliament, it can be noted that both 
institutions provide some room for lobbying. Specifically, within the Government which 
initiates legislation there is room for influence during the proposal drafting process. The 
influence might be exercised by direct participation within working groups (but the 
places are very limited and attributed by the discrete decision of the president of the 
working group). Another way is participation through public consultations, but the level 
of influencing in this way might not be as effective as the previous one, especially due to 
the lack of standardized and precise procedures for public participation. Moreover, 
consultations with civil society are not always available, and even if they are, the time 
and method for participation are limited346. In fact, the available data suggest that in the 
best case, consultations took place in up to 20% of the Government bills, while the 
average time dedicated to this process was from 30 to 45 days347. 
 As far as the National Assembly is concerned, the room for lobbying certainly 
exists, but it is expected to be much more limited. The main reason is that parliamentary 
committees do not rely much on external participation. Secondly, influencing members 
of the parliament through the inquiries and individual meetings would probably remain 
ineffective since there is a strong party discipline which makes their voting more of a 
symbolic process. However, access to a head of the engaged committee could be a better 
channel since this person takes most of the responsibility for the eventually proposed 
amendments. This position is especially powerful within the Constitution and Legislative 
Affairs Committee.  
 
7.      Regulatory Impact Assessment procedure in Serbia  
 An important issue to address here is the role of the regulatory impact assessment 
procedure, which is under the competence of the Government. Articles 40 and 46 of the 
Government rules of procedure state that the Ministry has duty to provide, together 
with other information defined in article 39, an analysis of the effects of the proposed 
                                                          
346 Similar conclusion can be also found in the Report: Law Drafting and Legislative Process in the Republic 
of Serbia, An Assessment, December 2011, page 43. 
347 Supra n.330, p.44. 
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legislation. The impact assessment should contain a definition of the target group(s) 
addressed by the legislation, estimates of the involved social costs, cost and benefits 
ratio of the legislation, general market and antitrust effects of the legislation, 
information on participation of outside parties to the drafting and estimates of the 
resources that are necessary for the implementation.  
 However, the regulatory impact assessment procedure is not mandatory. In cases 
where the proposing ministry estimates that it is not necessary to have an impact 
assessment for the proposed legislation, it only has to formally explain the reasons for 
that decision, and submit it together with an opinion of the Office for Regulatory Reform 
and Regulatory Impact Assessment, which confirms that the RIA is not necessary in that 
particular case.  
 Official RIA methodology was introduced in Serbia in October of 2004, and it was 
inspired by the OECD recommendations on RIA procedures. The regulatory impact 
assessment analysis, which a competent ministry has to submit with the proposal, has to 
be completed by the internal staff of the ministry following the methodology of the 
Office for Regulatory Reform and Regulatory Impact Assessment348. This methodology is 
in the details explained within the “RIA toolkit”, which serves as a guidebook for staff 
who work on proposal writing within individual ministries.  
 The quality assurance process for RIAs conducted within ministries is delegated to 
the secretariat of the Council for Regulatory Reform. This means that ministries submit 
their preliminary RIAs to the Council for Regulatory Reform for an opinion on the 
quality of the assessment. The Council will assess the quality of the analysis, suggest 
possible improvements and finally give a positive opinion on it, before returning it to the 
proposer.  
The RIA in Serbia is based on two fundamental principles: 
 Proportionality principle - As discussed in Chapter II, an effective RIA should be as 
proportionate as possible to the importance and expected effects of the legislation. In 
Serbia, this principle also plays an important role, since detailed analysis is only 
necessary for legislation that has a significant impact on the environment, public health, 
consumers or competition. In addition to these cases, a detailed RIA is recommended 
                                                          
348 www.ria.gov.rs  
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when the initial immediate compliance costs are expected to exceed 500,000 EUR, or 
5,000,000 EUR cumulatively for the first five years.   
  Precaution principle – This principle suggests that the scope and the level of the 
analysis should correspond to the estimated risk of undesired effects that may result as a 
consequence of the introduction of the legislation. This principle is especially important 
in the areas where it is highly difficult to assess the risk of the effects of certain legislation 
on the environment, population, wildlife, etc.  
 In regard to the possible assessment of regulation of lobbying in Serbia, it is highly 
questionable what type of RIA analysis will be conducted in this case. Moreover, it is 
questionable if there will be a RIA at all, if the proposer decides not to submit it and, this 
choice gets approved by the Office for Regulatory Reform and Regulatory Impact 
Assessment. In any case, since the lobbying market in Serbia tends to be small, the only 
RIA that could eventually be created would probably not be a profound one, especially 
due to the nature of the benefits of lobbying regulation that are mostly discussed in a 
non-monetary and non-economic perspective349. Moreover, the idea for the adoption of 
such legislation in Serbia is not solely motivated by public interest, but also by the 
private interest of the lobbying industry.  
 
8. Anti-corruption bodies and legislation in Serbia  
 
 Whenever the regulation of lobbying is discussed, one must take into account the 
fact that very few countries in the world have actually regulated this process directly. 
Nevertheless, most European countries still have not directly regulated lobbying. One of 
the reasons for this is certainly the belief that a standard anti-corruption and conflict of 
interest-regulation are sufficiently effective tools to counterbalance the possible 
negative effects of lobbying. And indeed, as shown in the previous analysis of the 
Transparency International’s CPI, most of these countries have low corruption 
perceptions, even though they have not regulated lobbying.  
                                                          
349 This view comes from the officially stated reasons for lobbying regulations. Of course, the benefits from 
introduction of lobbying regulation could be observed also in an economic dimension, depending on the 
approach (as discussed on page 13.) 
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 There is yet another category of countries, which stands in between those who 
have special lobbying legislation and those who just have well-enforced standard anti-
corruption legislation. For instance, Israel and Slovenia have added an additional part to 
already existing legislation to specifically address lobbying. In Israel, this was done by 
amending the law on the Knesset (National Assembly of Israel), while in Slovenia it was 
done by upgrading the Law on Integrity and Corruption Prevention, Section VIII350. 
 The Republic of Serbia, like most countries, until now has relied on standard 
legislation for corruption prevention and prevention of conflict of interest. The 
enforcement of existing legislation is divided within a complex framework of 
institutions, agencies and public bodies who deal with different aspects of corruption 
prevention, prevention of money laundering, auditing and public procurement. The 
most important bodies in the Republic of Serbia, from the lobbying regulation 
dimension, are the following ones: 
 Anti-Corruption Agency351 was established in 2008; it is the most notable among the 
bodies and it is directly accountable to the National Assembly. The main 
competences of this body include: supervision over the implementation of the 
National Strategy for Combating Corruption, resolution of conflict of interest, 
establishes and maintains property register for public officials, creates guidelines 
and strategies for integrity improvement for both the public and the private sector, 
monitors funding of political parties, etc. 
 Anti-Corruption Council352 is an expert council established by the Government and 
has an advisory role to it. This consultative body proposes different measures for 
corruption fighting and publishes reports on the progress of corruption fighting in 
Serbia.  
 Public Procurement Office353 was established in 2002 as an independent 
governmental agency. The main task of this body is to “help the establishment of 
sound procurement procedures and practices ensuring that public funds are spent in 
                                                          
350 Zakon o Integriteti in Preprečevanju Korupcije (Slovenian).  
351 www.acas.rs.  
352 www.antikorupcija-savet.gov.rs.  
353 www.ujn.rs.  
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an efficient and transparent way, thus complementing the government's overall drive 
in containing corruption”.  
 All these bodies, and especially the Anti-Corruption Agency, are in charge of 
monitoring, and to some extent implementation, of Serbian “sunshine” legislation. 
Among the most important legislation in this sense is the National Strategy for 
Combating Corruption354, the Anti-Corruption Agency Law355 and the Law on Financing 
Political Activities356. 
 However, difficulties in the enforcement of these laws and a lack of institutional 
capacity and integrity within the Anti-Corruption Agency357 are retarding the 
corruption-combating process, which still has not brought Serbia to the group of 
countries with lower corruption levels.  Hence, these institutional mechanisms have not 
proven to be as effective, which confirms Serbia’s position on the Transparency 
International CPI. 
 
9.  Motivation for regulation of lobbying in Serbia – transparency or 
something else? 
 As discussed in previous chapters, transparency and accountability are generally 
perceived as the most relevant reasons for the introduction of lobbying regulation. Those 
reasons are undoubtedly related to the improvement of democratic procedures and the 
integrity of the public sector in a country. Similarly, lobbying is also perceived in Serbia 
as an activity that might negatively affect the integrity of the public sector, and the state 
was officially the first to announce regulation of this process  (through the National 
Strategy for Combating Corruption from 2005) in order to prevent  assumed negative 
effects of interest groups on the integrity of the public sector.  
 These potentially negative effects still raise significant concerns within various 
levels of public, private and NGO sectors: "The interviewees also noted that specific 
                                                          
354 Created by the decision of the National Assembly from 08.12.2005.  
355 Official Gazette of Republic of Serbia No 97/2008 and 53/2010.   
356 Official Gazette of Republic of Serbia No 43/2011. 
357The Council of the Anti-Corruption Agency has, for instance, dismissed the Agency director Z. Markovic 
unanimously by its decision from 09.11.2012. This affair seriously compromised the work of the Agency 
since the director was accused of attempting to secure hold of the state-owned apartment that was at the 
disposal of the Agency.  
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provisions of a number of laws were primarily enacted to satisfy the interests of the 
stakeholders or specific private interests, rather than to realise public interest. There is also 
the related fact that the matter of lobbying has not been legally regulated; this raises the 
issue of e.g. the nature, stage and way in which the stakeholders are participating in the 
legislative process. In addition, law does not define the remit of state administration 
authorities in developing this law. Finally, another factor impacting on the course and 
results of the legislative process is its non-transparent element, i.e. the party coalition talks 
and agreements; the political accountability of these subjects for the (political) decisions 
taken within the legislative process needs to be emphasised in that respect."358 
 The regulation of lobbying was mentioned for the first time in the National 
Strategy for Combating Corruption (2005), which was adopted by the National 
Assembly. Chapter II of the Strategy introduces a set of recommendations for combating 
corruption within the political system. One of those recommendations was directly 
dedicated to the necessity of introducing lobbying regulations: Enacting of law on 
lobbying and ensuring transparency in lobbying. This clearly proves the motivation of the 
state to work to improve transparency procedures through the regulation of lobbying. 
 Another relevant source which confirms this motivation can be found in a 
follow-up document of the Strategy. That is the Action Plan for the Implementation of 
the National Strategy for Combating Corruption. This document represents a more 
detailed plan with exact methodologies for the implementation of the recommendations 
from the Strategy. This document states that, by at least 2008, the following tasks should 
have been done: 
The Government and the National Assembly are responsible for 
 Establishing a working group for the creation of the Lobbying Law draft, within a 
competent ministry of the Government 
 Establishing a set of responsibilities for the Serbian Lobbying Association  
 
 
                                                          
358 D. Milovanovic, N. Nenadic, and V. Todoric, Survey on the Improvement of the Legislative Process in the 
Republic of Serbia.p.45. 
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Lobbyists359 are responsible for: 
 Formal establishment of the Serbian Lobbying Association 
 Introduction and adoption of the code of conduct for lobbyists 
 The Action Plan acknowledges that potential obstacles to the implementation of 
the stated activities might be created by lobbyists who are opposed to regulation. At the 
same place, this document outlines the list of goals that have to be achieved by 
implementation of the planned activities. In other words, the official motivation for the 
adoption of the Law on Lobbying, according to the Action Plan is: 
 Decrease the risk of corruption in the public sector 
 Increase in transparency levels and an upgrade of transparency procedures 
 Creation of uniform standards for the professional conduct of lobbyists 
 
 It is not hard to notice that this Action Plan has not been successfully implemented, 
especially in terms of the deadlines. Actually, the activities that were under the 
competence of the state have only been partially completed (the working group for 
drafting was established within the Ministry for trade and telecommunications), while 
lobbyists established the Serbian Lobbying Association (SLA)360 in 2009, based on the 
recommendations from the National Strategy and the Action Plan. The SLA has, 
promptly upon its establishment, introduced a mandatory code of conduct for its 
members361. 
 The fact that the private sector has fully met the expectations defined in the Action 
Plan, while the public sector showed only symbolic interest, suggests that the private 
sector represented by the SLA has a more profound motivation for the adoption of 
lobbying regulation than the public sector, which is not generally expected to happen. 
However, in the case of Serbia, there might be several possible explanations for this: 
1. Reputation capital 
2. Restriction of entry 
                                                          
359 It is difficult to determine who was held responsible for this part of the implementation of the Action 
Plan, since at that moment there was no official association of lobbyists in Serbia. 
360 www.drustvolobistasrbije.org  
361 http://www.drustvolobistasrbije.org/eticki-kodeks.html  
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 The first explanation is more of a general reputational nature. Most of the lobbyists 
around the world have acknowledged that bad reputation negatively influences their 
profits, and this is why they generally362 do not oppose some sort of regulation. In the 
lobbying sector, even one scandal can severely damage the reputation of the entire 
profession363. 
 The same argument has also been officially used by the SLA. Since its beginnings, 
this organization has strongly supported the regulation of lobbying in Serbia364. The 
main reasons for such persistent support are the protection of the profession’s 
reputation, proper recognition of the significance of lobbying, and recognition of the 
benefits of political lobbying for Serbia abroad.  
 Still, this intention can be interpreted differently, especially after analysis of the 
proposal of the Law on Lobbying that was initially created by the SLA. Numerous 
provisions of this proposal are restrictive in terms of into the market. The proposal 
suggests special licences for lobbying, a specific level of education for aspiring lobbyists, 
fees to be paid to Chamber of Lobbyists, special conditions for legal entities that provide 
lobbying services, etc. These provisions are, in comparison with other similar laws365, 
more restrictive in terms of entry requirements. 
 From a capture standpoint (Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976; Tirole 1986; Helm 
2006), it does not surprise that lobbyists actually prefer to influence the design of the 
lobbying regulation. By being able to affect its design and propose mechanisms, they can 
profit in various ways, but most importantly they can better control the entry. In the 
Serbian case, this becomes quite clear due to the complex list of conditions one has to 
meet in order to be able to officially exercise lobbying.  
 The brief analysis of the factors which are involved in the debate on lobbying 
regulation suggests that both the private and the public sector have clear undisputed 
motivation to regulate lobbying. Determined public motivation is clearly stated once 
                                                          
362 61% of all lobbyists believe that transparency of lobbying activity should be mandatory; OECD Report: 
Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Supra n.209, p.82. 
363 A nice illustration is the “Jack Abramoff –scandal” in 2006 in the US. This scandal accelerated lobbying 
reform in the US and the following year The Honest Leadership and Open Governments Act was adopted.  
364 “Crowning accomplishment at the end of the initial formative period for SLA will be the introduction of the 
Law on lobbying in the parliamentary procedure, to be followed shortly thereafter by formation of the Serbian 
Chamber of Lobbyists.”; taken from the webpage of the SLA. 
365 Polish Law on Lobbying; Lithuanian Law on Lobbying.  
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again within the new Action plan of the New National Strategy for Combating Corruption 
(2008 - 2013), where adoption of the Law on Lobbying is planned latest by 2017366.  
However, the private side might be interested in the creation of certain entry barriers, 
together with the legitimate need for reputational capital building and its protection. 
Hence, the specific structure of the initial draft of the law should be interpreted taking 
this into account. 
 
10. Analysis of the Serbian proposal of the Law on Lobbying  – an analysis 
of the structure 
 
Before conducting the CPI and the CII analysis for the Serbian proposal, its general 
structure and main qualitative features should be analysed in order to have a complete 
assessment. One of specific reasons for this is that both indices, despite their robustness, 
probably do not have scopes large enough to capture all the specific articles and 
mechanisms used in this proposal. And since the CII and the CPI methodologies only 
serve as indicative tools, other available analytical tools should not be excluded a priori, 
but rather used as complementary tools to support the overall analysis. 
Since the working group of the Ministry of Trade and Telecommunication of Serbia 
has not officially published the new draft on the Law on Lobbying, this analysis will be 
conducted on the first proposal of the Law on Lobbying367 proposed by the Serbian 
Lobbying Association. This is the only official available proposal and the next official 
proposal that will be issued by the working group is not expected to be largely different 
than this one.  
 
10.1. General structure of the proposal on the Law on Lobbying  
  In the previous chapters, the Threefold theory was mentioned, which 
provides a qualitative framework for the analysis of lobbying regulations. This theory is 
based on six key-pillars of lobbying regulations: Registration regulation, Reporting and 
                                                          
366  The Action Plan of the New National Strategy for Combating Corruption in Republic of Serbia (2008 - 
2013), (Belgrade, 2013). - goal No.3.1.3 
367 Revised version of the proposal, from 2011. Available in Serbian only. The Ministry is still on the version 
analysed here (22.06.2013.). 
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spending disclosure, Electronic filing, Public access, Enforcement, Revolving door 
provision; and these are exactly the analytical sections that are going to be used here as 
a starting point for the structural analysis.  
 At the very beginning of this proposal, Article 1 (paragraph 2) states that the goal 
that is to be achieved by this law is protection of the public integrity through lobbying 
activities control, especially in order to prevent corruptive and other illegal influencing 
within the primary and the secondary legislative process. This statement clearly defines 
this law as a sunshine law, whose purpose is the protection of the public interest from 
undue influencing. What is more important, it recognizes lobbying both in the legislative 
and executive branch, which perfectly reflects the current Serbian political and 
legislative system.  
 Moreover, lobbying is clearly defined in Article 2 as an activity that should be 
recognized both at the state, provincial and local levels. This additional precise widening 
of the scope of the proposal to include all important decision-making levels should be 
considered as beneficial to the main regulatory goal, but it also well reflects the actual 
political and legislative reality in Serbia.  
  
10.1.1.  Registration rules – scope of the definition of lobbyist 
 Setting the scope of the definition of lobbyist is always a challenging task, as too 
narrow or imprecise a definition could leave room for an entire army of “invisible” 
lobbyists. Thus, the definition of lobbyist and lobbying should describe as precisely as 
possible all those persons, both natural and legal, involved in all situations which may be 
regarded as lobbying.   
 In the world of lobbying, there are usually two or three parties involved in the 
process, and those are decision-makers, lobbyists and their eventual clients in cases of 
contract lobbying. In cases of so-called in-house lobbying, lobbyists are part of the 
corporate organizational structure and they lobby directly for their corporations. In 
those cases, the lobbying process includes only two parties. The proposal recognizes two 
of these three categories and gives a definition for each of them in the Article 2. In-house 
lobbyists have unfortunately not been recognized, which might cause additional 
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problems for transparency and lead to discriminatory treatment of contract lobbyists in 
respect of in-house lobbyists.  
 Under the proposal, lobbying is defined in following way (Section II, Article 3):  
Lobbying is a specialised service for legitimate influencing on public policies and the public 
decision-making process. Lobbying is conducted by professional lobbyists who have 
acquired this status under the provisions of this law. Lobbyists receive compensation for 
their services in exchange for legitimate decision-making influencing.  
 Besides the positive definition, Article 7 additionally offers negative remuneration 
of what is not to be considered to be lobbying. Lobbying activities are not activities of: 
 Experts invited by public bodies to contribute to the legislative drafting, and 
explanation of the specific issues, regardless the compensation 
 Journalists who regularly analyse and cover specific legislative processes 
 Public expression of personal or organizational attitude towards regulations 
 Natural persons who act on behalf of their private personal interest 
 Other procedural activities before public bodies. 
 The definition deserves profound analysis, as it suggests several things. Even 
though there is a positive and negative approach which should offer as precise a 
definition of the actors and the process as possible368. The first part of the definition, the 
positive one, can be considered as a standard definition based on the compensation 
element369. However, lobbying, according to this definition, cannot be offered pro bono, 
which is the case within some of the largest lobbying firms today both in the US and the 
EU. It is hard to explain why this article contains such restriction, and it remains unclear 
if influencing free of charge could be perceived as an undue lobbying. This part of the 
article, in any case, does not improve the quality of the proposal and there should not be 
formal restrictions to pro bono lobbying.  
 The second part, where exclusions are considered, leaves room for 
misinterpretations. For instance, experts that participate by invitation in the legislative 
                                                          
368 In fact, structurally speaking, this proposal completely follows the definition recommendations of the 
OECD that are based on comparative regulatory analysis. See OECD Report: Lobbyists, Governments and 
Public Trust. 
369 Definitions based on the same element as are present in the 2007 US regulation (where registration is 
based on the financial thresholds), in Poland in 2005 (definition of professional lobbying), in the abandoned 
Hungarian law from 2006 (…under contract for economic consideration), etc.  
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drafting process at any level are considered not to be lobbyists. This opens a large room 
for undue influencing, since experts are not prohibited from supporting arguments 
beneficial to different industries. Since the experts are not required to register, and thus 
they do not have to disclose their business relations with different private entities, their 
“price” on the influence market is expected be high in this case.  
 A similar practice, with proven problems in this sense, is the consultation 
procedure within the EU Commission. The Consultation procedure involves a large 
number of expert groups which provide technical know-how and support in legislative 
drafting within the Commission. However, even though the expert-members officially 
act in their personal capacity, some studies have clearly showed that a large number of 
independent experts are actually strongly biased towards the industry they come from, 
and that experts groups are not as independent as suggested by the Commission370. 
 The main drawback of the proposal in regard to the definition of lobbyist remains 
the lack of recognition of in-house lobbyists, who probably account for the majority of 
lobbyist in Serbia. All those representatives of large companies, syndicates, chambers of 
commerce and professional associations will remain invisible for transparency 
measures designed by the proposal. Their employment clearly suggests what they lobby 
for in general, but nevertheless they should be subject to the same disclosure 
requirements as professional lobbyists.  
 The proposal deals with these categories, to some extent, in Article 11 which 
regulates conditions for the invalidity of lobbying contracts. The invalidity of a lobbying 
contract is automatic in cases where any of the above-mentioned associations or 
companies agrees to promote or protect the interest of third parties. This, at the same 
time, means that the above-mentioned legal entities can be engaged in the promotion of 
their own interest, while remaining fully exempt from the transparency requirements of 
the proposal. The only problem appears in case they agree to lobby for third parties. 
 The lack of recognition of in-house lobbyists does not reflect international practice 
in lobbying regulation, since direct lobbying is quite common in other countries. A 
similar division on professional and in-house lobbyists was made in the Slovenian 
                                                          
370 Bursting the Brussels Bubble, Supra, pp.76-87. 
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law371, which defines in-house lobbyists as "un-registered lobbyists", while professional 
lobbyists, which represent the interest of another party, are defined as "registered 
lobbyists". The main difference between the two categories is that professional lobbyists 
have to be officially registered in the Registry for lobbyists of the Republic of Slovenia, 
while in-house lobbyists do not have to be registered since they can act only on behalf of 
their organization. However, the rules which regulate the duty to report lobbying 
contacts with public officials are the same for both categories. In this sense, the Serbian 
proposal could have been more sensitive to this important issue, and follow the 
Slovenian solution as a minimum transparency requirement for the treatment of in-
house lobbying.  
 
10.1.2.  Register of lobbyists  
    To be able to officially act as a lobbyist, one has to be admitted and subscribed 
into the Registry of lobbyists which is operated by the Chamber of Lobbyists. The 
inscription is linked to the cumulative satisfaction of the following conditions: 
 Citizenship of the Republic of Serbia372 
 A university degree 
 Successfully completed lobbying exam373 
 Absence of criminal record or similar offence which would make a person 
incompatible with the lobbying profession374 
 Absence of prohibition issued by the Chamber of Lobbyists 
 Absence of another employment or work in a free profession (advocates) 
 Absence of cooling-off restriction (Article 22) 
 Undisputed reputation and dignity  
 Oath in regard to the Code of conduct 
 
                                                          
371  Article 4, par. 15 of the Zakon o integriteti in preprečevanju korupcije, Uradni list RS, št. 69/2011. 
372 Which is not a standard in international regulating practice. For instance, in the US and Slovenia, there 
are no obstacles for lobbyists from other countries.  
373 Which will be established by the Chamber of Lobbyists. 
374 Absence of criminal record as a condition makes much sense due to the sensibility of the profession and 
its fragile reputation. 
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The inscription in the Register is valid for 5 years, and it can be renewed. 
Lobbyists also have to inform the Registry of any information relevant to the conditions 
for the inscription within 15 days of that change. Also, lobbyists are expected to 
immediately inform the Register if the conditions for their inscription are no longer fully 
satisfied, and to ask to be removed from the Register. Upon successful inscription, a 
lobbyist becomes entitled to carry a badge which serves as their formal identification in 
interaction with public officials. 
 This list of conditions that have to be met seems to be over-demanding. It is not 
clear why potential lobbyists necessarily have to have a university degree. In many 
situations, leaders of professional associations of free professions are not necessarily 
graduated, but rather regular members of a profession that does not require university 
education per se (agriculture, restaurants, tourism). This condition, perhaps, could also 
be interpreted to be discriminatory and unconstitutional375. 
 Another odd condition is the incompatibility of the lobbying profession with other 
professions. It is hard to explain why one should be restricted to having any other 
employment, especially if this employment has a logical compatibility with lobbying. A 
classical example for this would be lawyers, who often lobby both in the US and EU. Of 
course, in the Serbian case there is a dual problem related to this since Article 6 of the 
                                                          
375 A similar provision was abolished in Macedonia by the Constitutional Court of Macedonia as 
discriminatory and unconstitutional (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, 10/2010), as the 
Macedonian law on lobbying (106/2008) defined the obligation for lobbyist to have an university degree in 
the area of the subject they are lobbying about (energy, agriculture, etc). If lobbying would be similarly 
conditioned in the case of Serbia, there are at least three possible infringements with the following articles 
of the Constitution: Article 21 (Prohibition of discrimination - All are equal before the Constitution and law. 
Everyone shall have the right to equal legal protection, without discrimination. All direct or indirect 
discrimination based on any grounds, particularly on race, sex, national origin, social origin, birth, religion, 
political or other opinion, property status, culture, language, age, mental or physical disability shall be 
prohibited. Special measures which the Republic of Serbia may introduce to achieve full equality of 
individuals or group of individuals in a substantially unequal position compared to other citizens shall not 
be deemed discrimination), Article 46 (Freedom of thought and expression - The freedom of thought and 
expression shall be guaranteed, as well as the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through speech, writing, art or in some other manner.) Article 56 (Right on petition - Everyone shall have 
the right to put forward petitions and other proposals alone or together with others, to state bodies, 
entities exercising public powers, bodies of the autonomous province and local self-government units and 
to receive reply from them if they so request. No person may suffer detrimental consequences for putting 
forward a petition or proposal. No person may suffer detrimental consequences for opinions stated in the 
petition or proposal unless they constitute a criminal offense). For instance, imagine if an official 
representative (in house lobbyist) of a bakers association would be prevented from lobbying just for not 
having a university degree.   
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Legal Profession Act376 (2011) of the Republic of Serbia also prohibits lawyers from 
having other employment or side professional engagements. Hence, these rules are quite 
uncommon and they will probably not survive very long if they remain as they are in the 
proposal. 
 Under certain conditions, lobbyists can be unsubscribed from the Register (Article 
20). A lobbyist will be unsubscribed from the Register ex officio if:  
 If conditions for subscription are found to be invalid during the inspection, or if 
they are not satisfied at some point after the successful subscription 
 If the Chamber issues a temporarily licence withdrawal  
 In case of violation of reporting procedures defined by the Ministry 
 Upon request of a lobbyist  
 
10.1.3.    Reporting and spending disclosure and (lack of) electronic filing  
   The core of every lobbying regulation is its disclosure requirements. Disclosure 
refers to the amount of details that lobbyists have to disclose to the public, and the 
frequency of this duty. Usually, lobbyists are required to disclose their clients, targets, 
represented interest, finances, contacts with public officials, etc. The extent of disclosure 
has to be set as to contribute to transparency as much as possible, while keeping the 
process meaningful and simple for compliance and enforcement. Meaningful disclosure 
means that lobbying activity has been disclosed in its key elements, while the degree of 
details can be sometimes more burdensome than useful, and this should certainly be 
avoided. In essence, the typical key elements which are to be disclosed in regard to 
lobbying are: 
 Beneficiaries: lobbyists and their clients, amount of compensation involved 
 Lobbying intentions: area of lobbying, legislation in focus, precise definition of 
bills 
 Targets: institutions and/or individuals involved in the process  
Article 40 of the Proposal deals with reporting, and according to it, lobbyist are required 
to submit two types of reports: the yearly report (until 15 of February, for the previous 
year) and the individual report (upon a request of the ministry, no later than 15 days 
                                                          
376 Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia (Sl. Glasnik RS, br. 31/2011). 
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after the request). Additional extraordinary reporting is defined in Article 41, which 
explains that in the case of voluntary un-subscription from the lobbying register, a 
lobbyist has to submit an extraordinary report, for the period after the submission of his 
last regular report until the date of the un-subscription. Article 40 also defines 
mandatory elements for reports: 
 Contracts with clients, and precise identification of clients   
 Description of legal acts that were the subject of interest377 
 Amount of the compensation received 
 Decision-makers that were contacted378 
 List of gifts or services provided to decision-makers 
 It can be said that the list of requirements that have to be disclosed are not scarce  
(from a comparative CPI disclosure perspective). By having publicly available all this 
information, it would be relatively easy to track and reconstruct the lobbying processes. 
First of all, it is good that all contracts on lobbying have to be disclosed regardless the 
amount spent on lobbying379.  From these reports one can have full information on who 
lobbies and for what, what resources are involved and which public officials were 
contacted380. 
                                                          
377 The detailed description of the acts that are the subject of lobbying is actually quite an advanced 
method, but all modern regulations are moving towards a more precise definition of the cause of lobbying 
(what is lobbied for) and the targets of lobbying (who and where is lobbied). A similar precise approach is 
present in the Canadian Lobbying Act (2008), Section 5 – Registration of lobbyists.  
 378 This requirement seems to be well set, even from the perspective of lobbyists themselves. For instance, 
Wright  Andrews (American League of Lobbyists) similarly suggests, in regard to US HLOGA (2007): “If a 
lobbying law requires, as does ours, that the report disclose only that a contact was made in say the U.S. 
Senate, without identifying the name of the Senator or staff member contacted, the date, issues discussed, 
number of times contacted, etc., then the burden is not great. On the other hand, I would argue that to have 
effective disclosure and meaningful transparency of the lobbying process, at least the person contacted 
probably should be noted”. 
379 While in the US there are financial thresholds for reporting. These thresholds, even though quite low, 
leave some room for legally unreported lobbying.  
380 It is probably better not to require extremely detailed disclosure, since this can be hard to enforce. For 
instance, the Canadian Lobbying Act (2008) requires lobbyists to disclose even certain details of their oral 
communication with designated public office holders, while public office holders should confirm this. This 
could generally improve transparency, but it is clear that it will be practically impossible to enforce it. A 
similar rule is present in Slovenian lobbying regulation, but a complicated and imprecise rule, which is at 
the same time time-consuming for both the lobbyist and public office holders, making this rule completely 
neglected by both sides. According to the Slovenian law, public office holders should report all contacts 
with lobbyists within 72 hours of the contact, and include all relevant information. However, in reality this 
rule did not have too great an effect. 
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 However, reporting frequency remains problematic. The annual report could 
provide sufficient information in terms of transparency, but since it is annual it can be 
questioned how valuable disclosure is one year after lobbying has taken place. On the 
other hand, a report upon request also remains an unclear tool, since it is left to a 
competent ministry (which will have overall competence on lobbying monitoring) to 
decide the conditions for the submission of this type of report. At this point of analysis, it 
is difficult to know how frequent this reporting will be, but it would be advisable to have 
reporting more frequently than annually381. 
 When it comes to filing, it is still unclear if the submission will be electronic or 
traditional - hard copy. In transparency and disclosure issues, speed plays a key role, so 
it would be desirable to have an electronic filing system in place. In addition, the results 
from the empirical evidence show that electronic filing is much more efficient than 
traditional filing (see Table 11, questions 30. and 31.) in terms of the public burden 
associated with the disclosure. Moreover, interviewed lobbyists have expressed a clear 
preference towards the electronic disclosure, which they also consider less 
burdensome382. Similar conclusions can be also found in the relevant literature on this 
topic383. Thus, the Serbian lobbying regulation should definitely acknowledge this 
option, which may decrease both the costs of the private and the public side, increasing 
at the same time the depth of transparency.  
 
10.1.4. Public access  
  The degree of public access, its form and simplicity are the key elements 
whose design and cumulative combination influences the degree of transparency. The 
fact that the disclosure is meaningful and requires lobbyists to fully disclose their 
activities does not mean by itself that transparency will be as high as expected. A poor 
access to disclosed information can significantly reduce transparency efforts, and make 
                                                          
381 Annual reporting is also a choice of the Lithuanian Law on Lobbying (2000). On the other hand, the 
current regulation of the US (HLOGA, 2007) is based on quarterly reporting, which replaced the semi-
annual reporting standard (LDA, 1995). In Slovenia, reporting is regularly annual, and extraordinary in the 
case of voluntary cancelation from the register, no later than 30 days.  
382 Mr Wright Andrews (American League of Lobbyists): “Once again, some of the burdens and costs can be 
minimized by having online reporting with drop-down options”. 
383 See OECD Report: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust: Building a Legislative Framework for 
enhancing transparency and accountability in lobbying, p. 65. 
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the whole disclosure procedure meaningless. Thus, coordination and synchronisation of 
these two factors is essential in order to maintain a satisfactory level of transparency.  
  Article 19 of the draft deals with public access. This article defines the duty of the 
Chamber of lobbyists to maintain the lobbying register and to create conditions for 
public access to the registry of lobbyists. However, the main problem with this rule is 
that it does not efficiently promote and support transparency. Besides the availability of 
the names of lobbyists, which provides minimal transparency, it would be very positive 
to make other relevant documents available online as well. For instance, lobbying 
contracts384 and reports could also be available online, at least quarterly. Having 
everything available less often would put in doubt the transparency effects.  
 The empirical data from the research also strongly supports the establishment of 
the electronic system with downloadable files/database, both in terms of registrations 
and spending reports. The comparative cost-benefit features (CBLs) show that this 
option belongs to the A2 – efficiency label, which is the second-best efficiency category, 
just below the A1. An acceptable alternative to this would be PDF/image files available 
on the web, which is labelled as the A3. In any case, once the database is scanned and 
posted on the web, it does not take much effort to make it downloadable. Hence, the first 
option should be adopted as the final solution, since it gives the best cost-benefit ratio 
among all discussed solutions.  
 
10.1.5. Public enforcement 
  The enforcement can be delegated either to an independent agency which 
is set only for this purpose385, or to another public body which is in charge of other 
                                                          
384 The list of all registered contracts of US lobbyists and their clients, which contain a satisfactory level of 
details in regard to the clients, lobbying area and compensation received, is available through a searchable 
online database on the web pages of the House and the Senate. Canadian disclosure is based on public 
access to the registry where no reports are available, but in addition to this the Registry quarterly publishes 
information about travel and hospitality expenses for selected government officials; contracts entered into by 
the Government of Canada for amounts over $10,000 (with only limited exceptions such as for those relating to 
national security); the reclassification of positions; and the award of grants and contributions over $25,000. 
Lithuanian Law established quarterly publishing of the updated lobbying registry. All registries allow 
additional access to publicly available information upon specific requests.  
385 Canada – The Office of the Commissioner for Lobbying. 
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similar tasks386. In some cases, enforcement is delegated to lobbyists and compliance is 
checked through the autonomous rules of their own associations387. 
 The Serbian proposal dedicates a lot of attention to the enforcement, offering a 
genuine structural solution. Section 5 of the proposal is entirely dedicated to the 
enforcement issues and it establishes the Chamber of Lobbyists. Article 26 serves as a 
funding article for the Chamber, which is meant to be an independent, professional 
association of registered lobbyists. The membership in the Chamber is obligatory for all 
lobbyists. This practically means that the public sector establishes a professional 
association which is not part of the public sector, and delegates the enforcement to it. In 
other words, enforcement is by law delegated to one professional organization outside 
of the public sector. However, the structure and the purpose of this Chamber are set by 
the law on lobbying. 
This approach is definitely complicated, since it delegates enforcement to a body 
which seems to be outside of the control of the public sector. Moreover, weak 
enforcement cannot be fully excluded due to the problems associated with self-
enforcement in transparency388. 
The Chamber is in charge of the following tasks: 
 Adopting of the Code of Conduct 
 Adopting the curriculum for the lobbying exam and certification 
 Adopting the rules for continuous improvement of educational standards for 
lobbyists 
 Running the lobbying registry 
 Running investigations on breaches of the Law on Lobbying and the Code of Conduct 
 Issuing publicly available information upon request 
 Providing dispute resolution for its membership 
 Synchronizing domestic lobbying regulation with international best practices 
 Cooperating with other lobbying associations internationally 
 Publishing an annual report 
                                                          
386 The US, Slovenia, Australia, Israel, etc. 
387 Mostly their compliance to the internal code of conduct. The control is not systematic, but associations 
react upon an inquiry or report.  
388 C. Lindstedt and D. Naurin, Supra n.189. 
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 Dealing with other tasks delegated by the bylaws of the Chamber 
 The scope of the tasks delegated to the Chamber is not narrow. Besides standard 
tasks for a Chamber, the Chamber also runs some tasks traditionally delegated to the 
public sector such as investigative activities, issuing information and general running of 
the registry. While it completely makes sense that the Chamber controls compliance 
with the Code of conduct, it is unusual that it has competences to monitor the 
compliance to the articles of a law. However, even the bylaws of the Chamber, which 
more specifically define its role, have to be approved by the Government of Serbia. This 
could be seen as an additional insurance that the Chamber will act as a part of the 
executive branch, even though it is formally a professional association outside of it. At 
the same time, the Chamber is not exclusively financed through the budget of the state, 
but also by the membership fees, fees and services related to licensing and education, 
and different private donations. In any case, the supremacy of the state has been defined 
in Article 39, where the overall supervision over the Chamber is delegated to a 
competent Ministry (to be determined) which receives regular lobbying reports, and has 
the right of extraordinary investigations and control both of the Chamber and its 
members. Thus explained, it is not difficult to see that a certain overlapping of the 
competences exist between the Chamber and the responsible Ministry, since the latter 
one has the task of collecting lobbying reports.  
 Another alternative solution would be to simply delegate all enforcement tasks to 
the Anti-Corruption Agency and let lobbyists have their own, truly independent 
professional association. As this agency works on monitoring the issues similar to 
lobbying anyway, it could be a good starting point for the enforcement of lobbying in 
Serbia. A similar solution is adopted in Slovenia and Macedonia.   
 The Chamber has its assembly, president, executive board, supervisory board, 
court of honour and officer for the enforcement of the responsibility of lobbyists. Among 
the most important and genuine are the court of honour and the officer. The role of the 
court of honour is to investigate breaches and pronounce adequate sanctions. The 
officer, similarly, has a role to protect the reputation and act as appointed prosecutor in 
the process against lobbyists who are under a charge.  
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 The Chamber has two general sanctions on disposal against lobbyists that were 
found in breach of the Law or of the Code of Conduct. These sanctions are aimed at the 
protection of the professional standards and they have an internal disciplinary 
character, which can generally be found in bylaws of other free professions. Depending 
on the degree of the breach, the Chamber can issue: 
1. Temporary licence withdrawal, from 6 to 24 months, for minor breaches 
2. Temporary licence withdrawal, from 6 to 24 months, and ban from participation in 
organs of the Chamber, for major breaches  
For both types of breaches, the Chamber can issue a public or an internal warning. An 
interesting fact is that the proposal does not mention any type of permanent licence 
withdrawal, which would especially make sense in situations where a lobbyist was 
found guilty of a criminal offence related to influence (bribery for instance). However, 
this will probably be upgraded within a separate section (Section 9 - sanctions) which is 
still uncompleted in the draft that is examined in this analysis.  
 
10.1.6. Revolving door 
  The proposal specifically deals with the revolving door provision. 
Article 22 sets the cooling period for two years, which can be considered as an 
advanced389 cooling off rule. This practically means that public officials from any level, 
appointed or employed, are restricted from performing lobbying for a period of at least 
two years after their public engagement/employment is ended. Economically speaking, 
this rule is designed so as to prevent possible negative revolving door effects on 
regulatory performance in light of the capture theory390. 
 
10.1.7. Lobbying contract 
   The proposal of the Serbian Law on Lobbying is very novel in terms 
of specification of the type and formal elements of the lobbying contract. Similar rules 
exist also in Montenegro and Macedonia. Article 6 defines that a lobbying contract has to 
                                                          
389 Maybe the Canadian cooling-off clause is more advanced (Lobbying Act 2008), which sets this period at 
five years, with several exceptions though. Lithuanian Law, for instance, uses one year as a standard, which 
may be insufficient and stimulate conflicts of interest.  
390 D. Salant, “Behind the Revolving Door: A New View of Public Utility Regulation”; Y.Che, “Revolving Doors 
and the Optimal Tolerance For Agency Collusion.” 
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be in a written form. In this sense, the written form represents a formal condition for 
contract validity. This at the same time means that lobbying based upon informal 
agreements, or agreements which do not contain specific elements defined in Article 6, 
will not be considered as valid. Formal elements of the lobbying contract are: 
 Information on parties of the contract 
 Information and description of an interest which has to be represented  
 Description of activities that lobbyists have to undertake while representing the 
interest defined in the previous clause 
 Precise amount of compensation involved 
 The formality of this contract form could be beneficial from a transparency point 
of view, since a lobbying contract is going to be an integral part of lobbying reports, as 
defined in Article 40. The formality, in this case, will guarantee a sufficient degree of 
transparency since all major elements related to lobbying will have to be disclosed by 
default. In addition, this formality eliminates a priori the possibility of incomplete 
disclosure, which could have been the case if lobbying contracts were concluded in 
more informal forms.  Informal and diverse contracts would have be an obstacle, 
since they could not guarantee the uniform disclosure of all transparency-relevant 
elements.  
 Another relevant provision related to lobbying contracts is set in Article 10. This 
article defines the type of obligation that exists between lobbyists and their clients, 
and provides an explanation on the interpretation of the rights and duties of both 
sides in cases of a dispute. According to this article, a lobbyist is bound by an 
obligation of merit, and he has a duty to conduct his work lege artis. This practically 
means that a lobbyist has a position similar to other free professions with the same 
type of obligation (lawyers, artists), and that according to this he cannot conclude a 
contract where he issues a guarantee of success. In other words, a lobbyist cannot 
guarantee he will succeed nor can a client refuse to pay the compensation in case of 
an inability of a lobbyist to change a law. 
 Consequently, compensation that only has elements of a success fee would make 
a lobbying contract invalid. This does not mean that a success fee cannot be an 
additional compensation element, but it cannot be the only one. In this type of 
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obligation, the provider of a service reserves a right to compensation if he had 
provided his service professionally and diligently. In the case of unprofessional or un-
diligent conduct of lobbyist, a client has a right to compensation upon general rules 
on responsibility for damages defined by the Serbian Law on Obligations391. 
 
10.2. The final breakdown of the proposal on the Law on Lobbying  
  Generally said, the first draft of the proposal on the Law on Lobbying of 
Serbia represents a mixture of regulatory techniques from other countries with some 
genuine elements and solutions. The main features of the proposal could be 
summarized as follows: 
 Definition of lobbyists – the definition neglects in-house lobbyists and leaves 
them outside transparency requirements. However, in-house lobbyists are not 
prohibited from exercising lobbying. There is a great risk regarding “independent 
experts”, which act in a personal capacity within government bodies.  
 Registration – available only for citizens of Serbia. Limited to professional 
lobbyist who do not have any other employment besides lobbying. Lawyers 
formally prohibited from exercising lobbying.  
 Lobbying contract – the proposal defines the form and nature of the obligation 
between the client and professional lobbyists. 
 Enforcement delegation – enforcement is delegated to the Chamber of Lobbyists, 
which is established by the state and responsible to the state, even though it is 
not formally part of the public sector. The Chamber is financed through public 
funds, self-financing and private donations. The ministry is competent in terms of 
the extraordinary control of the Chamber and lobbyists. The Chamber imposes 
disciplinary sanctions over its membership. 
 Public access – publicly available information is managed both by the Chamber 
which runs the register, and the competent Ministry which receives lobbying 
reports. Thus, the information is not centralized and synchronized. While the 
registry is available online, it still remains unclear where and in which format the 
                                                          
391 For more on the interpretation and position of the lobbying contract within the legal system of Serbia, 
see (in Serbian) Ekonomsko i politicko lobiranje, B. Kascelan and D. Krsmanovic, Zavod za udzbenike, Srbija 
2012; Drugi deo: Ugovor o lobiranju.   
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reports will be available. Reporting deadlines are quite long – one year. However, 
the scope of the reporting is satisfactory.  
 Revolving door – set at two years. 
 
11. Application of the CPI and the CII on the Serbian proposal of the Law on 
Lobbying 
          After analysing the proposal qualitatively and underlining it strengths and 
weaknesses, the application of a quantitative methodology will additionally help to 
understand its cost-benefits quality. For assessing these features from another point of 
view, the CPI and the CII will be applied in order to obtain an indication of the benefits 
and costs392.  The application process has two rounds. In the first, the CPI and the CII will 
be applied to the current, initial Serbian proposal on the Law on Lobbying. In the second 
round, both indices will be applied again for an assessment of the integrated version of 
the Serbian proposal on the Law on Lobbying. The difference between the two versions 
is discussed in the following section.  
 
11.1. Application of the CPI on the initial Serbian proposal on the Law on 
Lobbying 
The application of the CPI should reflect the quality of the proposed legislation by 
forecasting its transparency and accountability features. However, due to the partially 
genuine structure of the proposal, the CPI application will probably not reflect all the 
dimensions to the full extent. On the other hand, the application will allow the 
comparison of the proposal with other lobbying regulations and reveal its comparative 
position within other regulations, which were CPI analysed worldwide.  
There are two main challenges in the application of the CPI to the Serbian 
proposal. The first is that the CPI will be applied to the proposal of a law instead of on an 
existing legislation. However, since there are only two questions of the CPI interfering 
with ex-ante application, normally this should not be a problem and it would not 
significantly change the CPI score. The second problem is related to the incompleteness 
of the Serbian proposal on the Law on Lobbying. The proposal is just a first draft, which 
                                                          
392  For the CPI scores see Annex 1 and for the CII scores see Annex 2 
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still fails to address sanctions and some of the crucial rules, like the format of the public 
disclosure and registrations design, that are meant to be determined in the future by the 
administrative rule of the ministry. This definitely creates a greater problem in the 
analysis since all these potentially positive solutions cannot be taken into account 
straight ahead, before they are actually written down. In most cases, these solutions are 
just announced by the proposal, but their actual form has to be set by an administrative 
rule. Thus, to counter-balance this problem, the CPI will be calculated both for the 
current proposal and for the integrated version of the proposal. The integrated version 
includes all the rules which are announced to be introduced later on by secondary 
legislation. Even they are not formally going to be a part of the proposal, they affect the 
overall effect of the legislation and they should be taken into account.  
Thus, the application of indices on the original proposal is evaluating only the 
currently existing rules in the proposal, while the other ones which are not still included 
were evaluated by the score of zero. However, in case that those rules get adopted in an 
upgraded proposal of the law or in the additional administrative rules, they would 
significantly improve the proposal and bring it over the CPI-pass level of 60 points. More 
importantly, it would move the proposal from the medium regulated systems (30-59) to 
the category of highly regulated systems (60-100). 
In fact, the CPI score of the proposal solely based on the existing tools is 46393, 
and it shows much room for improvement. But even in these conditions, the Serbian 
proposal scores quite well in comparison with other CPI scores from Europe394 and with 
possible improvement it could be the European legislation with the highest CPI score. 
However, before giving a final judgment on its quality, the initial CII has to be applied in 
order to have an insight into the compliance and enforcement burden.  
 
11.2. Application of the CII on the Serbian proposal of law on lobbying 
Application of the Cost Indicator Index (CII) should allow reflection of the CPI 
scores in their costs side. The CII score should also provide information on the overall 
burden indication, but also the information on individual burdens for the public and the 
                                                          
393 See the Annex 1 
394 Lithuania 44, Poland 27, Germany 17, Hungary (abandoned) 45. 
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private sector. At the end, the cost-benefits labels (CBLs) will be additionally used for 
proposing possible improvements of the draft. 
The calculation of the CII faces a similar challenge like the calculation of the CPI, 
with the only difference being that the CII can be successfully applied both to ex-ante 
and ex-post solutions. However, the same problem related to the incompleteness of the 
proposal remains. The score that is obtained by the calculation of the existing elements 
is 51395. This score, interpreted through the CII scoring index, places this proposal into 
the medium-burdensome regulatory systems (30-69). 
 Another interesting thing to mention is the division of the burden between the 
private and the public sector. The CII indicates that almost 2/3 (68%) of the burden is 
associated with the compliance of the private sector, while about 1/3 (32%) is 
associated with the enforcement. This ratio cannot be taken as a precise measure of the 
burden structure, but it indicates that the private sector might expect higher costs 
associated with compliance, especially since lobbyists are expected to pay for licenses 
and education. This also means that reflection of the burden structure might be even 
more inclined towards the private sector, since the CII automatically associates the 
enforcement agency with public expenditures. In the Serbian case, on the other hand, 
the Chamber is supposed to be financed both from the public and private funds.  
 
11.3. Integration of the results from both Indices and their interpretation in  
regard to the possible cost-benefits improvements  
   Results from both indices can be incorporated into the Ninefold theory visual 
matrix, which allows their easy interpretation. The current scores from both the CPI and 
the CII suggest that the Serbian proposal has a balanced cost-benefit nature. Both results 
belong to the medium range of their own scales. On the other hand, there is still a 
significant degree of uncertainty since part of the rules that are planned to be adopted 
are still not entirely clarified, which makes final judgement more difficult, in case 
analysis remains based on the initial uncompleted proposal. 
 
                                                          
395 See the Annex 2 
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Table 15 – The Ninefold theory - initial position of the Serbian Proposal on the Law on 
Lobbying 
Highly 
regulated 
systems 
     (60-100) 
 
High – Low 
(C-B ratio: 
Excellent) 
 
High – Medium 
(C-B ratio: Good) 
 
High – High 
(C-B ratio: 
moderate) 
Medium 
regulated 
systems 
(30-59) 
 
Medium – Low 
(C-B ratio: Good) 
 
Medium (46) 
- 
Medium (51) 
(C-B ratio: moderate) 
 
Medium – High 
(C-B ratio: 
unsatisfactory) 
Lowly 
regulated 
systems 
     (0-29) 
 
Low – Low 
(C-B ratio: 
moderate) 
 
Low – Medium 
(C-B ratio: 
unsatisfactory) 
 
Low – High 
(C-B ratio: 
absolutely 
unsatisfactory) 
CPI 
 
 
 
 
 
                     CII 
Lowly    
burdensome 
systems 
(0-29) 
Medium 
burdensome 
systems 
(30-69) 
Highly 
burdensome 
systems 
(70-100) 
 
The Ninefold theory position of the draft reveals that, in case it remains completely 
unchanged, it still has a satisfactory balance of costs and benefits, and that the indicated 
transparency and accountability do not produce undue burden. Of course, it would be 
more desirable to have lower costs while keeping the benefits at least at the present 
level. However, this preliminary score cannot be the starting point for improvement 
suggestions, since it does not indicate real CPI – CII equilibrium. Thus, an integrative 
approach to the Serbian proposal should provide a more accurate position for the re-
application of both indices. 
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11.4. Fixing the odd structure of the proposal – getting the real CPI and the CII 
scores 
 
The Serbian proposal leaves much room for improvement, mostly because a 
significant part of the rules have not been fully specified in the proposal itself, but left to 
be specified with subordinate legislation in the later phase which is under the 
competence of the Government of Serbia. Since there are no clear reasons for such a 
choice, the first thing that can be done in terms of suggestions is an integration of all the 
rules into a single legislation where all the norms will have the same legal power. This 
also eliminates possible interpretational problems which may arise from the conflict of 
legal norms of primary and secondary legislation.  
Hence, by carefully adding the rules which were announced and meant to be 
included into the draft later, the new CPI score is already significantly improved as a 
result of this integration, and now it is 62. This change, however, resulted in the change 
of the CII score as well. The new integrated CII score is 78396. 
The simple integration of all the rules not only moved the costs to the upper 
category (from Medium to High), but it further increased the costs in regard to the 
benefits. While in the original scenario the inter-score difference between the two scores 
was just 5 points (46:51), in the new integrated version, this difference is 16! It becomes 
immediately clear that simple adoption of all available mechanisms would not be the 
optimal choice from a cost-benefit point of view, even though it would significantly 
improve the transparency/accountability. This also means that additional adjustment of 
the entire regulatory design could be necessary.  
 
 
 
                                                          
396 See the Annex 4 
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Table 16 - The Ninefold theory, the position of the Serbian proposal after the integrative intervention 
Highly 
regulated 
systems 
(60-100) 
 
High – Low 
 
High – Medium 
 
CPI 62 
- 
CII 78 
 
High - High 
 
Medium 
regulated 
systems 
(30-59) 
 
Medium – Low 
 
Medium -Medium 
 
 
Medium – High 
Lowly 
regulated 
systems 
(0-29) 
 
Low – Low 
 
Low – Medium 
 
Low – High 
CPI 
 
 
 
 
 
CII 
Lowly 
burdensome 
systems 
(0-29) 
Medium 
burdensome 
systems 
(30-69) 
Highly 
burdensome 
systems 
(70-100) 
 
As shown above, the simple integration of all the rules into a single legislative act 
did not provide satisfactory effects, even though this integration was necessary for 
having a more accurate estimation of the CII and the CPI scores.  
The fact that all the rules were not in a single act does not automatically mean that 
analysis should be focused only on those within the proposal. Nevertheless, the analysis 
has to consider all the rules in an integrated manner in order to properly assess their 
effects. Exactly by integrating the rules in the single act was it possible to assess the 
overall nature of the legislation. And this result is actually the result which should serve 
as a starting point for improvement.  
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Besides quantitatively obtained information on the CPI and the CII scores, the 
Threefold theories (both for the CPI and the CII) could offer an additional qualitative 
mapping of the key-features of the proposal. The following table summarizes the general 
characteristics of the Serbian proposal in respect to the two theories:  
 
 
 Highly-regulation 
Systems  (CPI) 
Highly-burdensome 
Systems (CII) 
Actual matching with the  
Serbian proposal 
Registration  
regulation  
Rules on individual 
registration are extremely 
rigorous 
Registration regardless the 
amount spent on lobbying 
The proposal fully matches 
with both dimensions. 
Spending 
Disclosure 
Tight regulations on 
individual spending 
disclosure, and employer 
spending disclosure 
Detailed reporting, including 
dates and itemization, 
relation of the spending with 
the principal, reported 
spending on household 
members of public officials  
The proposal fully matches 
with both dimensions, 
except the fact that the 
employer does not have to 
submit an employer report. 
Electronic  
filling  
Robust system for online 
registration; no paperwork 
necessary 
Online or/and paperwork 
registration system and 
reporting available, 
trainings on how to 
compile reports  
The proposal fully complies 
with both dimensions. 
Public access  List of lobbyists and their 
spending disclosure 
available; detailed and 
updated frequently. 
Agency provides to public 
overall lobbying spending 
totals by each spending-
report deadline. These 
reports could have spending 
totals by industries or other 
similar criteria. 
The proposal fully complies 
with both dimensions except 
the fact that reporting 
deadlines are regularly 
yearly, but there are also 
extraordinary reports which 
might be more frequent.  
Enforcement   State agency can, and does, 
conduct mandatory 
reviews/audits. 
Enforcement authority 
exists; it conducts 
mandatory reviews and 
audits of reports and 
imposes fines for delays in 
filings and incomplete filings 
of reports and registration 
forms. 
The proposal fully complies 
with both dimensions. 
Revolving door  There is a cooling-off period 
before former legislators 
can register as lobbyists.  
There is a mandatory 
revolving door, compliance 
investigated 
The proposal fully complies 
with both dimensions. 
 
Qualitatively speaking, the Serbian proposal largely coincides to predicted general 
qualitative features of the two theories, with only minimal discrepancies. Both theories 
have successfully predicted the main qualitative features of the proposal, based on the 
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indication from the respective scores and previous qualitative analysis. This is an 
important illustration of the amount and the type of information that could be obtained 
from the CPI and the CII analysis. 
Full matching was not expected in any case, since these theories are of an 
indicative nature and they can hardly fully match a law in all seven layers of the analysis.  
Their primary purpose is to serve as a guideline for legislators who are in the early 
legislative phases, since they give the general impression on the regulatory structure 
and the cost-benefits ratio, while indicating where eventual improvements could be 
introduced. Moreover, they also allow easier comparative assessment of different 
regulatory solutions worldwide, and their qualitative and quantitative comparison. 
 
12.  Interpretation of the results and policy recommendations  
 
12.1. Regulatory improvement from an efficiency point of view – what can be 
considered as an improvement of lobbying regulation? 
 The main idea behind the combined use of the CPI and the CII is not just to 
describe a regulation, but rather to contribute to its improvement. Used separately, 
these indices can serve as an indication of the transparency/accountability and overall 
burden created by a lobbying regulation. However, a combination of the indices allowed 
creation of another tool which can be used to eventually improve initially obtained 
results.  
 In the previous chapter, the CBL scale was introduced, which gives an individual 
cost-benefit label to every analysed rule. These labels are afterwards put in specific 
order which indicates the cost-benefit nature of each of them and allows their 
comparisons. From one side, this tool can be used as a guide in initial regulatory 
structuring, since it indicates which rules have a more efficient cost-benefit ratio and 
which have a less inefficient cost-benefit ratio. That information could be used in the 
primary selection of rules which are considered to be included in the regulation. In other 
words, those rules which have low transparency/accountability impact could be 
excluded at the very beginning of the drafting process if they are not really necessary for 
some particular reason.  
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 From another side, this tool can be useful even in more mature drafting phases. If 
the overall indication of the first CPI and CII scanning is not satisfactory, a reference to 
the CBLs can reveal if there is room for improvement of the regulatory design. This is 
achieved by exploring if a chosen rule has an alternative with a more preferred CBL. In 
cases where several improvements are possible and applied, regulation can visibly 
improve its cost-benefit ratio.  
 Still, it is important to clarify that the effects of those possible improvements on 
the overall legislative structure could be divided into four specific types of 
improvements. 
 Improvement type I – individual CPI score transitioned up while individual CII 
score transitioned down  
 Improvement type II – individual CPI score remained at the same value while 
individual CII score transitioned down  
 Improvement type III – Both the scores transitioned down, but the CII score 
transitioned down more than the CPI score 
 Improvement type IV – Both the scores transitioned up, but the CPI score 
transitioned up more than the CII score. 
While the first two improvements should be introduced without any doubt, the last 
two improvements might not be as advisable, except in rare situations. For instance, 
Improvement type I can be applied where the regulation is already very burdensome 
and with a high CPI score. In that case, it can be used to relax the burden pressure while 
having minor relaxation of the CPI score. Similarly, if a regulation has very low CPI and 
CII scores, Improvement type III can be applied to increase the CPI score, while having a 
controlled and lower increase of the CII score. However, those rare theoretical situations 
are suggesting full reconstruction of a regulation instead of limited improvements.  
 
The same logic can be applied to the Serbian proposal with regards to the obtained 
results. The Serbian proposal has the scores which indicate a slightly imbalanced 
solution which is inclined more toward the sides of the costs (78), while having a “pass 
level” in terms of the benefits (62). The available tool should be used as to move the CPI 
score as much above the threshold as possible, while moving the CII indication down as 
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much as possible from the current score of 78. Alternatively, the goal might be to 
increase the CPI score as much as possible without keeping the CII score fixed, or to fix 
the CPI score at 62 and decrease the CII score as much as possible. Lastly, if the CII score 
still remains above the CPI score, than the inter-score difference should be as minimal as 
possible, but certainly much lower than 16, as it is now. 
 
12.2. Optimization of the Serbian proposal on the Law on Lobbying – three possible 
roads  
 Three possible roads for the structural improvement are the introduction of new 
rules, substitution and elimination of existing ones. Before looking at the specific CBLs of 
the proposal, once again the CBL categories will be shown and their meaning explained. 
This table provides 3 general labels: A, B and C; where A is preferred to B and C, and B is 
preferred to C. Each general label is composed out of three sub-labels where 1 is 
preferred to 2 and 3, and 2 is preferred to 3. Overall, the labels should be interpreted in 
the following way: 
A B C 
A1 stands for CPI H / CII L B1 stands for CPI H / CII H C1 stands for CPI L / CII M 
A2 stands for CPI H / CII M B2 stands for CPI M / CII M C2 stands for CPI M / CII H 
A3 stands for CPI M / CII L  B3 stands for CPI L /   CII L  C3 stands for CPI L / CII H397 
A1 ≻ A2 ≻ A3 ≻ B1 ≻ B2 ≻ B3 ≻ C1 ≻ C2 ≻ C3 
 
The improvement technique which is applied on the proposal consisted of 
individual assessments of integral parts of the proposal, in order to understand if they 
are really necessary and if their elimination or substitution might lead to better CPI – CII 
equilibrium. Alternatively, where the elimination did not make much sense, either a new 
rule was added or a more efficient alternative to the existing rule was introduced. Still, 
with eliminations, one has to be careful since in some cases extremely inefficient rules 
still have to be left inside of the regulation. Those are, for instance, rules related to 
                                                          
397The letters “H” and “L” respectively mean High and Low.   
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penalties and their enforcement.  As discussed previously, mandatory enforcement 
related to transparency has proven to be much more useful than self-enforcement, 
which makes these rules hard to exclude besides their weak CBL nature. On the other 
hand, their burden effect can be minimized by constructing other rules in a more 
efficient way. 
When it comes to eliminations of the rules, the first rules that were considered to 
be eliminated were those with the lowest efficiency labels, namely C3, C2 and C1. The 
C3-label rules were the first to be eliminated since they suggest that there is an indicated 
cost which does not contribute to the transparency/accountability indication at all (the 
CPI is zero), or contributes minimally compared to other rules which have much lower 
cost indication and much better strength indication.  
Annex 5 and the Annex 6 show which rules have been eliminated and which 
substituted by a rule with a preferred efficiency label. The overall improvement 
aftermath can be summarized in the following way: 
 CPI CII Inter-scores 
difference 
Types of 
improvement: 
Initial scores after the 
integration of the rules 
into one regulation 
62 78 16 - 6 rules were 
substituted with 
a  rule with 
preferred 
efficiency-label 
- 8 inefficient rules 
were eliminated  
- 2 rules were 
added 
The scores after the 
improvement 
 
67 69 2 
Results illustrated by 
the upgrade of the CPI, 
downgrade of the CII 
and inter-scores 
difference: 
            + 5          -9           -14 
 
The upper breakdown-table shows the magnitude of the improvements, and it 
becomes immediately clear that relying on efficiency labels could improve the initial 
regulatory structure. The improvement which was made here has the characteristics of 
Improvement type I, since the CPI score was increased while the CII score was 
decreased. With the proposed improvements, the CPI increased by 5 points while the CII 
decreased by 9 points. Moreover, the inter-score difference is now only 2, which is eight 
times less than in the previous version where it was 16. These differences provide an 
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indication of the cost-benefits balance, and in cases where improvements were made but 
regulation has remained inside the same Ninefold category, it allows an additional 
insight in the level of improvement. After the improvements, the Serbian proposal has 
been moved to CII High – CPI High quadrants to the left. Moreover, this time the CII 
score is not significantly higher than the CPI score like in the previous case. In fact, this 
time they are almost at the same level, which suggests that the high indication of the 
strength does not always cause unjustified burden, like in the case before the 
improvement. 
Table 17 - The Ninefold theory, Results of the improvement of the proposal 
Highly 
regulated 
systems 
(60-100) 
 
High – Low 
 
CPI High 
(67) 
- 
CII Medium 
(69) 
 
 
High – High 
 
Medium 
regulated 
systems 
(30-59) 
Medium – Low Medium – Medium Medium – High 
Lowly 
regulated 
systems 
(0-29) 
 
Low – Low 
 
Low – Medium 
 
Low – High 
CPI 
 
 
 
 
 
CII 
Lowly 
burdensome 
systems 
(0-29) 
Medium 
burdensome 
Systems 
(30-69) 
Highly 
burdensome 
Systems 
(70-100) 
 
The upper Ninefold framework shows that the position of the proposal within the 
general categories positively changed, from the High-High into High (CPI) - Medium 
(CII). This also means that the defined C-B ratio has changed from acceptable to good. 
However, it should to be noted that the CII score is just below the threshold of being in 
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the High category. Still, the level of improvement is best seen through the inter-score 
difference.   
Graph 9 illustrates the level of the improvement and additionally illustrates the 
magnitude of the improvements: 
 
Graph 9 
 In this graph, it is easier to notice what the improvement has done with the scores 
and their inter-score difference. It becomes immediately clear that the improved scores 
have better equilibrium from a cost-benefits point of view. 
 
13. Comparative application of the CII 
One of the main pillars of the CII is its potential for the comparative assessment of 
lobbying laws. As highlighted before, this tool should improve the comparative 
assessment technique in order to contribute to a higher understanding of structural 
differences, including pros and contras, of different regulatory approaches worldwide. 
The comparative CPI and CII assessments should ideally help the policymakers who 
attempt to structure their laws while looking into other countries’ experiences.  
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 Similarly to the CPI, the CII can be applied in two main ways, where each has a 
different purpose: 
1. Vertical application: where it is applied individually or with the CPI in order to 
measure cost-benefit indications of two or more proposals (versions) of the same 
regulation. This application primarily serves for improvement of initial proposals, 
and its application was demonstrated in the previous section. The main goal of this 
type of approach is to improve the regulatory structure throughout its legislative 
evolution.  
2. Horizontal application: this application does not have the intention to improve a  
regulation proposal but to compare different regulatory solutions in different 
jurisdictions. Comparisons could be made proposals to proposals, proposals to 
existing regulations, regulations to regulations, soft-laws to soft-laws, regulations 
to soft-laws.  
In this section, the horizontal application of the CII together with the CPI will be 
demonstrated. Special attention in the selection of the jurisdictions which are about to 
be analysed will be given to countries whose regulations have never been the subject of 
the CPI analysis. In this case, those countries are Slovenia, Macedonia and Montenegro. 
More importantly, those regulations belong to the same area as the Serbian proposal 
and they are the newest regulations in Europe at this time. Thus, a comparison of those 
solutions with the Serbian proposal could prove both interesting and beneficial.  
It is difficult to guess why these regulations have not been analysed before by the 
CPI analysis, but one of the reasons might be that they are quite recent. The second and 
more important reason is that their content is not in English, and thus they are 
inaccessible to most global researchers. Thus, the selection of Slovenia, Macedonia and 
Montenegro has the purpose of demonstrating the comparative use of the CII while at the 
same time contributing to global lobbying regulation research, by offering the latest CPI 
scores for three additional regulations. The following laws will be analysed and 
compared, by going through each of them individually and analysing their provisions and 
articles though the CPI and CII Indices separately (quantitative analysis only), and then 
combining them into one analytical framework where they can be compared to the 
Serbian proposal (which was analysed even qualitatively through the previous case 
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study). The absence of detailed qualitative analysis of three new laws is due to length 
and time constraints and objectives, but the technique would look like the one from the 
vertical application on the Serbian case.  
However, Table 17, where the comparative CII results are presented, offers the 
possibility to see exactly where the differences between different solutions are, and it 
intuitively shows where improvements could be made (by comparing actual and 
alternative CBLs). This allows the reader immediately to compare the mechanisms in 
four laws, and see if there is a room for improvement of a regulation which is analysed. 
Precise names of the analysed laws are listed in the table below. 
Country The name of the 
regulation 
Binding Law / Soft-law  
 
Serbia 
(unimproved version) 
 
The Proposal on Law on 
Lobbying, first draft (2013) 
Binding Act – primary 
legislation 
Macedonia 
 
Zakonot za dopolnuvanje 
na Zakonot za lobiranje, Sl. 
vesnik na R. Makedonija, 
br.135/2011 
Binding Act – primary 
legislation 
Montenegro 
 
Zakon o lobiranju 
Službeni list CG, br. 54/11 
Binding Act – primary 
legislation 
Slovenia Zakon o integriteti in 
preprečevanju korupcije, 
Uradni list RS, št. 69/2011 
Binding Act – primary 
legislation 
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w
ed
 a
n
d
 r
eq
u
ir
ed
 t
o 
b
e 
d
is
cl
os
ed
 o
n
 s
p
en
d
in
g 
re
p
or
t/
p
ro
h
ib
it
ed
 d
u
ri
n
g 
se
ss
io
n
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t;
 C
am
p
ai
gn
 
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
on
s 
al
lo
w
ed
 a
n
d
 r
eq
u
ir
ed
 t
o 
b
e 
d
is
cl
os
ed
 o
n
 
sp
en
d
in
g 
re
p
or
t/
al
lo
w
ed
 d
u
ri
n
g 
se
ss
io
n
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t;
 
C
am
p
ai
gn
 c
on
tr
ib
u
ti
on
s 
p
ro
h
ib
it
ed
 –
 2
 p
oi
n
ts
 
1 
1 
0 
0 
2
5
. 
Is
 a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 w
ho
 h
as
 d
on
e 
no
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
du
ri
ng
 a
 
fil
in
g 
pe
ri
od
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
a 
re
po
rt
 o
f n
o 
ac
ti
vi
ty
?  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t 
1 
1 
1 
0 
2
6
. 
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 a
n 
em
pl
oy
er
 o
r 
pr
in
ci
pa
l o
f a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 
fil
e 
a 
sp
en
di
ng
 r
ep
or
t?
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
t;
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es
 –
 3
 p
oi
n
ts
 
0 
0 
0 
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2
7
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 c
om
pe
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at
io
n/
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ry
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eq
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re
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 b
e 
re
po
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ed
 o
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 p
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 p
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n
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2
8
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D
oe
s 
th
e 
ov
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gh
t a
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y 
pr
ov
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e 
lo
bb
yi
st
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em
pl
oy
er
s w
it
h 
on
lin
e 
re
gi
st
ra
ti
on
? 
   
   
   
   
   
 
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
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 1
 p
oi
n
t 
1 
1 
0 
0 
2
9
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D
oe
s 
th
e 
ov
er
si
gh
t a
ge
nc
y 
pr
ov
id
e 
lo
bb
yi
st
s/
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pl
oy
er
s w
it
h 
on
lin
e 
sp
en
di
ng
 
re
po
rt
in
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0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
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 1
 p
oi
n
t 
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0 
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3
0
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D
oe
s 
th
e 
ov
er
si
gh
t a
ge
nc
y 
pr
ov
id
e 
tr
ai
ni
ng
 a
bo
ut
 
ho
w
 to
 fi
le
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
ns
/s
pe
nd
in
g 
re
po
rt
s 
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tr
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al
ly
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0
 p
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n
ts
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es
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 p
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n
t 
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3
1
. 
Lo
ca
ti
on
/f
or
m
at
 o
f r
eg
is
tr
at
io
ns
 o
r 
ac
ti
ve
 lo
bb
yi
st
 
di
re
ct
or
y:
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
P
h
ot
oc
op
ie
s 
fr
om
 o
ff
ic
e 
on
ly
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t;
 P
D
F 
or
 im
ag
e 
fi
le
s 
on
 t
h
e 
W
eb
 –
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 p
oi
n
ts
; S
ea
rc
h
ab
le
 d
at
ab
as
e 
on
 t
h
e 
W
eb
 –
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 p
oi
n
ts
; D
ow
n
lo
ad
ab
le
 fi
le
s/
d
at
ab
as
e 
– 
4
 p
oi
n
ts
 
3 
2 
1 
1 
3
2
. 
Lo
ca
ti
on
/f
or
m
at
 o
f s
pe
nd
in
g 
re
po
rt
s:
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
P
h
ot
oc
op
ie
s 
fr
om
 o
ff
ic
e 
on
ly
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t;
 P
D
F 
or
 im
ag
e 
fi
le
s 
on
 t
h
e 
W
eb
 –
 2
 p
oi
n
ts
; S
ea
rc
h
ab
le
 d
at
ab
as
e 
on
 t
h
e 
W
eb
 –
 3
 p
oi
n
ts
; D
ow
n
lo
ad
ab
le
 fi
le
s/
d
at
ab
as
e 
– 
4
 p
oi
n
ts
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3
3
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Co
st
 o
f c
op
ie
s:
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
2
5
 c
en
ts
 o
r 
m
or
e 
p
er
 p
ag
e 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; L
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s 
th
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 2
5
 c
en
ts
 
p
er
 p
ag
e 
– 
1
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oi
n
t 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3
4
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Ar
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
re
gi
st
ra
tio
n 
fo
rm
s/
sp
en
di
ng
 r
ep
or
ts
 
av
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la
bl
e 
th
e 
W
eb
? 
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o 
– 
0
 p
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n
ts
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es
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 p
oi
n
t 
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1 
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0 
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5
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oe
s 
th
e 
st
at
e 
ag
en
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 p
ro
vi
de
 a
n 
ov
er
al
l l
ob
by
in
g 
sp
en
di
ng
 to
ta
l b
y 
ye
ar
? 
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0
 p
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n
ts
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es
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 p
oi
n
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3
6
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D
oe
s 
th
e 
st
at
e 
ag
en
cy
 p
ro
vi
de
 a
n 
ov
er
al
l l
ob
by
in
g 
sp
en
di
ng
 to
ta
l b
y 
sp
en
di
ng
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ep
or
t d
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in
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? 
   
   
   
   
   
   
N
o 
– 
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n
ts
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es
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 2
 p
oi
n
ts
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0 
0 
0 
3
7
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D
oe
s 
th
e 
st
at
e 
ag
en
cy
 p
ro
vi
de
 a
n 
ov
er
al
l l
ob
by
in
g 
sp
en
di
ng
 to
ta
l b
y 
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du
st
ri
es
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bb
yi
st
s 
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en
t?
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o 
– 
0
 p
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n
ts
; Y
es
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 2
 p
oi
n
ts
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8
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 o
ft
en
 a
re
 lo
bb
y 
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pd
at
ed
? 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
Se
m
i-
an
n
u
al
ly
 o
r 
le
ss
 o
ft
en
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 1
 p
oi
n
t;
 M
on
th
ly
 –
 2
 p
oi
n
ts
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W
ee
kl
y 
– 
3
 p
oi
n
ts
; D
ai
ly
 –
 4
 p
oi
n
ts
 
1 
1 
1 
3 
 
EN
FO
RC
EM
EN
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3
9
. 
D
oe
s 
th
e 
st
at
e 
ha
ve
 s
ta
tu
to
ry
 a
ud
it
in
g 
au
th
or
it
y?
   
   
   
   
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
 –
 2
 p
oi
n
ts
 
1 
2 
1 
2 
4
0
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D
oe
s 
th
e 
st
at
e 
ag
en
cy
 c
on
du
ct
 m
an
da
to
ry
 r
ev
ie
w
s 
or
 
au
di
ts
? 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
 –
 2
 p
oi
n
ts
 
0 
2 
1 
2 
4
1
. 
Is
 th
er
e 
a 
st
at
ut
or
y 
pe
na
lt
y 
fo
r 
la
te
 fi
lin
g 
of
 lo
bb
y 
re
gi
st
ra
ti
on
 fo
rm
? 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
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 1
 p
oi
n
t 
0 
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12
 
0 
2 
4
2
. 
Is
 th
er
e 
a 
st
at
ut
or
y 
pe
na
lt
y 
fo
r 
la
te
 fi
lin
g 
of
 a
 lo
bb
y 
sp
en
di
ng
 r
ep
or
t?
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4
3
. 
W
he
n 
w
as
 a
 p
en
al
ty
 fo
r 
la
te
 fi
lin
g 
of
 a
 lo
bb
y 
sp
en
di
ng
 r
ep
or
t l
as
t l
ev
ie
d?
 
M
or
e 
th
an
 5
 y
ea
rs
 –
 0
 p
oi
n
ts
; 4
 t
o 
5
 y
ea
rs
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t;
 2
 t
o 
3
 y
ea
rs
 –
 2
 p
oi
n
ts
; 0
 t
o 
1
 y
ea
r 
– 
3
 p
oi
n
ts
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4
1
1
 H
ow
ev
er
 t
h
ey
 d
o 
p
u
b
li
sh
 a
n
 a
n
n
u
al
 lo
b
b
yi
n
g 
re
p
or
t 
w
it
h
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 o
n
 w
h
ic
h
 s
u
b
je
ct
 m
at
te
rs
 a
n
d
 w
h
o 
w
as
 lo
b
b
ie
d
 t
h
e 
m
os
t.
 
4
1
2
 P
ra
ct
ic
al
ly
, t
h
er
e 
is
 a
 p
en
al
ty
 f
or
 t
h
os
e 
w
h
o 
lo
b
b
y 
w
it
h
ou
t 
b
ei
n
g 
re
gi
st
er
ed
. T
h
e 
la
te
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
n
 r
u
le
 s
h
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
te
rp
re
te
d
 a
s 
to
 a
ls
o 
co
n
si
d
er
 
si
tu
at
io
n
s 
w
h
er
e 
th
er
e 
is
 a
 s
ta
tu
to
ry
 p
en
al
ty
 fo
r 
th
os
e 
w
h
o 
lo
b
b
y 
w
it
h
ou
t 
b
ei
n
g 
re
gi
st
er
ed
.  
La
te
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
n
 r
u
le
 in
 c
as
es
 w
h
er
e 
lo
b
b
yi
n
g 
ca
n
n
ot
 s
ta
rt
 
be
fo
re
 t
h
e 
re
gi
st
ra
ti
on
 p
ra
ct
ic
al
ly
 c
an
n
ot
 e
xi
st
 s
in
ce
 l
ob
by
in
g 
is
 a
u
to
m
at
ic
al
ly
 c
on
si
d
er
ed
 a
s 
il
le
ga
l. 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
Sl
ov
en
ia
n
 l
aw
 p
u
n
is
h
es
 t
h
os
e 
w
h
o 
lo
bb
y 
w
it
h
ou
t 
b
ei
n
g 
re
gi
st
er
ed
 (
fo
r 
th
os
e 
w
h
o 
ar
e 
ex
p
ec
te
d
 t
o 
re
gi
st
er
).
 
4
1
3
 A
cc
or
d
in
g 
to
 t
h
e 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
or
t 
on
 L
ob
b
yi
n
g 
A
ct
iv
it
y 
of
 t
h
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
 f
or
 P
re
ve
n
ti
on
 o
f 
C
or
ru
p
ti
on
 o
f 
th
e 
R
ep
u
b
li
c 
of
 S
lo
ve
n
ia
, t
h
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
 
is
su
ed
 1
8
 a
d
m
on
is
h
m
en
ts
, 2
 w
ar
n
in
gs
 a
n
d
 1
 fi
n
e 
in
 2
0
1
2
.  
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4
4
. 
Is
 th
er
e 
a 
st
at
ut
or
y 
pe
na
lt
y 
fo
r 
in
co
m
pl
et
e 
fil
in
g 
of
 a
 
lo
bb
y 
re
gi
st
ra
ti
on
 fo
rm
? 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
 Y
es
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t 
 
1 
 
0 
0 
1 
4
5
. 
Is
 th
er
e 
a 
st
at
ut
or
y 
pe
na
lt
y 
fo
r 
in
co
m
pl
et
e 
fil
in
g 
of
 a
 
lo
bb
y 
sp
en
di
ng
 r
ep
or
t?
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t 
1 
1 
1 
0 
4
6
. 
W
he
n 
w
as
 a
 p
en
al
ty
 fo
r 
in
co
m
pl
et
e 
fil
in
g 
of
 a
 lo
bb
y 
sp
en
di
ng
 r
ep
or
t l
as
t l
ev
ie
d?
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
M
or
e 
th
an
 5
 y
ea
rs
 –
 0
 p
oi
n
ts
; 4
 t
o 
5
 y
ea
rs
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t;
 2
 t
o 
3
 y
ea
rs
 –
 2
 p
oi
n
ts
; 0
 t
o 
1
 y
ea
r/
ag
en
cy
 d
oe
s 
n
ot
 a
cc
ep
t 
in
co
m
p
le
te
 fi
li
n
gs
 –
 3
 p
oi
n
ts
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4
7
. 
D
oe
s 
th
e 
st
at
e 
pu
bl
is
h 
a 
lis
t o
f d
el
in
qu
en
t f
ile
rs
 
ei
th
er
 o
n 
th
e 
W
eb
 o
r 
in
 a
 p
ri
nt
ed
 d
oc
um
en
t?
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t 
1 
1 
0 
0 
 
RE
VO
LV
IN
G 
D
O
O
R 
PR
O
VI
SI
O
N
 
 
 
 
 
4
8
. 
Is
 th
er
e 
a 
“c
oo
lin
g 
of
f”
 p
er
io
d 
re
qu
ir
ed
 b
ef
or
e 
le
gi
sl
at
or
s 
ca
n 
re
gi
st
er
 a
s 
lo
bb
yi
st
s?
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
 –
 2
 p
oi
n
ts
 
2 
24
1
4
 
24
15
 
0 
 
TO
TA
L 
PO
IN
TS
  
 
62
 
57
 
37
 
39
 
    
    
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
4
1
4
 T
w
o 
ye
ar
s 
 
4
1
5
 O
n
e 
ye
ar
 fo
r 
ap
p
oi
n
te
d
 o
r 
el
ec
te
d
 o
ff
ic
ia
ls
. O
rd
in
ar
y 
st
af
f d
o 
n
ot
 h
av
e 
to
 w
ai
t 
an
d
 t
h
ey
 c
an
 lo
b
b
y 
im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
 a
ft
er
 t
h
ey
 le
av
e 
th
e 
p
u
b
li
c 
se
rv
ic
e.
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Ta
bl
e 
18
 
Co
m
pa
ra
ti
ve
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
CI
I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
  C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
bu
rd
en
 
C&
B 
La
be
l 
(C
CI
/C
PI
) 
Se
rb
ia
n 
pr
op
os
al
 
Sl
ov
en
ia
 
M
ac
ed
on
ia
 
M
on
te
ne
gr
o 
1.
 H
ow
 m
uc
h 
do
es
 a
n 
in
di
vi
du
al
 h
av
e 
to
 m
ak
e/
sp
en
d 
to
 
qu
al
ify
 a
s a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 o
r 
to
 p
ro
m
pt
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
n 
as
 a
 lo
bb
yi
st
, 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
de
fin
it
io
n?
    
    
    
   
M
or
e 
th
an
 $
1
0
,0
0
0
 m
ad
e 
– 
4
 p
oi
n
ts
   
   
   
 
M
or
e 
th
an
 $
2
,5
0
0
 m
ad
e 
– 
6
 p
oi
n
ts
   
   
   
   
R
eg
ar
d
le
ss
 o
f t
h
e 
am
ou
n
t 
m
ad
e 
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7
 p
oi
n
ts
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B
2
 
(6
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1
 
(7
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7
 
2.
 Is
 a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 fi
le
 a
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
n 
fo
rm
? 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
  
   
   
 Y
es
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 5
 p
oi
n
ts
 
B
2
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3.
 H
ow
 m
an
y 
da
ys
 c
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 lo
bb
yi
ng
 ta
ke
 p
la
ce
 b
ef
or
e 
re
gi
st
ra
ti
on
 is
 r
eq
ui
re
d?
    
    
    
    
    
    
6
 m
on
th
s 
or
 m
or
e 
– 
4
 p
oi
n
ts
  
U
p
 t
o 
a 
m
on
th
 –
 5
 p
oi
n
ts
   
U
p
 t
o 
3
 d
ay
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 –
 5
 p
oi
n
ts
 
C
3
 
(4
/0
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C
1
 
(5
/1
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B
2
 
(5
/3
) 
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5
 
5
 
5
 
4.
 Is
 s
ub
je
ct
 m
at
te
r 
or
 b
ill
 n
um
be
r 
to
 b
e 
ad
dr
es
se
d 
by
 a
 
lo
bb
yi
st
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
on
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
n 
fo
rm
s?
 
Su
b
je
ct
 m
at
te
r 
on
ly
 r
eq
u
ir
ed
 –
  4
 p
oi
n
ts
  
B
il
l n
u
m
b
er
 r
eq
u
ir
ed
 –
  5
 p
oi
n
ts
 
C
1
 
(4
/1
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B
2
 
(5
/3
) 
5
 
4
 
0
 
4
 
5.
 H
ow
 o
ft
en
 is
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
n 
by
 a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 r
eq
ui
re
d?
 
O
n
ce
 o
n
ly
 –
  2
 p
oi
n
ts
  
E
ve
ry
 t
w
o 
ye
ar
s 
– 
4
 p
oi
n
ts
  
A
n
n
u
al
ly
 o
r 
m
or
e 
of
te
n
 –
 4
 p
oi
n
ts
 
C
3
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/0
) 
2
 
2
 
4
 
2
 
C
1
 
(4
/1
) 
 
 
 
 
B
2
 
(4
/2
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6.
 W
it
hi
n 
ho
w
 m
an
y 
da
ys
 m
us
t a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 n
ot
ify
 th
e 
ov
er
si
gh
t a
ge
nc
y 
of
 c
ha
ng
es
 in
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
n?
 
6
 m
on
th
s 
or
 m
or
e 
– 
4
 p
oi
n
ts
  
U
p
 t
o 
a 
m
on
th
 –
  5
 p
oi
n
ts
  
U
p
 t
o 
3
 d
ay
s 
– 
5
 p
oi
n
ts
 
 
C
3
 
(4
/0
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14. Interpretation of the results 
The comparative application of the CPI and the CII on Slovenia, Macedonia 
and Montenegro has first of all revealed their scores in two indices. Both in terms 
of the CPI and the CII, these scores were calculated for the first time, and here the 
differences of the scores of analysed countries, and their comparison with the 
Serbian proposal, can be seen.  
Besides the informative value obtained, the regional scores are useful for an 
additional evaluation of the Serbian proposal, since existing regional legislation 
seems to be a relevant reference point for the Serbian scenario. Moreover, specific 
problems that Montenegro and Macedonia are dealing with might be very relevant 
for Serbia as well.419 
In terms of the Ninefold theory position of the analysed legislation, the 
results are as follows: 
Highly 
regulated 
systems 
(60-100) 
High – Low 
 
High – Medium 
 
High – High 
Serbian 
unimproved  
proposal (62-78) 
Medium 
regulated 
systems 
(30-59) 
Medium – Low 
 
Medium -Medium 
 
Slovenia (57-69) 
Macedonia: (37:43) 
Montenegro (39:46) 
Medium – High 
 
Lowly 
regulated 
systems 
(0-29) 
Low – Low 
 
Low – Medium 
 
Low – High 
 
CPI 
 
 
 
CI 
Lowly 
burdensome 
systems 
(0-29) 
Medium 
burdensome 
systems 
(30-69) 
Highly 
burdensome 
systems 
(70-100) 
                                                          
419 However, it has to be mentioned that this comparison was made between the qualitatively revised Serbian 
proposal and other unrevised law. Hence, the results only reflect the quantitative side of the comparison. At 
the same time the comparative table reveals which regulatory mechanisms are present and which not, but for 
more accurate comparison the unrevised laws would have to be analysed more precisey in the qualitative 
way as well. 
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As the results suggest, the Serbian proposal is still the most expensive one, 
but also the one with the highest predicted CPI score, keeping it in the moderate C-
B systems group together with Macedonia, Montenegro and Slovenia. However, 
the last three have not passed the CPI threshold of 60 and they belong, in terms of 
the CPI, to the medium-regulated systems. Slovenia, at the same time, has a CPI 
score which is also below 60 but the CII score is almost 70, which places it closest 
to the unsatisfactory C-B group. This problem is clearly indicated by the high inter-
score difference. On the other hand, the inter-score difference of Macedonia and 
Montenegro are low, which theoretically indicates better C-B balance. 
A very important issue to mention is related to the actual effects of the laws 
in Montenegro and Macedonia. These countries are the first neighbours to Serbia, 
albeit much smaller ones though. Before making an important conclusion, again it 
is useful to refer to some relevant data on economic power, lobbying market size 
and perceived corruption in the analysed countries: 
 
Country GDP per 
capita in 
2011420 
(current 
US$) 
Transparency 
international 
CPI Ranking 
(2012) 
Number of 
registered 
lobbyists  
(2013) 
CPI CII 
Macedonia 5,058 43 1 37 43 
Montenegro 7,111 41 0 39 46 
Serbia 6,312 39 0421 62 78 
Slovenia 24,132 61 63 57 69 
 
  This table can be useful to gauge the importance of the economic conditions 
and corruption perception, which can be further on associated with the rule of law 
and the integrity of the public sector. Slovenia is the only country among those 
analysed with a significantly higher GDP per capita. While Macedonia, Montenegro 
and Serbia have GDPs from $5,000 to $7,000 per capita, Slovenia has a four up to 
five times higher GDP per capita. This said, it can be confirmed that the economic 
                                                          
420 Data of the World Bank: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD  
421 There are about 100 members of the Serbian Lobbying Association at the moment.  
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conditions in Slovenia are much better, which is again related to one of the main 
conditions for lobbying development – an economic power with a developed 
market and large firms.  
  Similarly, the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index also 
indicates that Slovenia has a better score than the three mentioned countries – it is 
about 20 places, below while Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia continue being 
neighbours even virtually, on this list. Slovenia is not very far, but is still 
significantly far from them. This suggests that another condition for the 
substitution of the corruption by lobbying is also present to some extent – 
strengthening of the rule of law, and the diminishing tendency of corruptive 
practices.  
  From this brief analysis, it is not hard to notice that Serbia is much closer to 
Montenegro and Macedonia than to Slovenia, in terms of the conditions which 
affect the development and existence of lobbying markets. Thus, the regulatory 
failures (no registered lobbyists) in Macedonia and Montenegro might be a very 
important indicator for Serbia as well. Since Serbian regulation indicates high 
compliance and enforcement costs, one has to ask themselves if the regulation 
should be adopted in its current form, even if it offers satisfactory “strength” 
indication. Similarly, even the improved version could be questionable if no or 
very few lobbyists are expected to register. 
  Bearing this in mind, it is that Serbia either waits for an improvement in the 
conditions of the lobbying market, where a complex regulation can fully serve its 
purpose. Alternatively, more simple regulation should be adopted in order to 
avoid the high costs associated with the establishment of enforcement bodies and 
procedures. In any case, the lessons from Macedonia and Montenegro should not 
be disregarded, but taken as an important message.  
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15.  Conclusion of Chapter IV 
    This Chapter demonstrated the applicability of the CII in not only 
policymaking but also in academia. The detailed analysis of the legal and political 
environment of Serbia showed that legal and institutional systems provide room for 
lobbying, and that the adoption of a law on lobbying is clearly stated within the 
National strategy for combating corruption, and also within the official documents of 
the Serbian Lobbyists Association. Hence, it seems that both sides have their own 
reasons for regulation, but it also seems that lobbyists are more interested in the 
adoption of regulation which would favour their own proposal. 
  The vertical application demonstrated the value of the ex-ante application of 
the CII and CPI. This application enables an early scan of costs and benefits, and with 
reference to CBLs, it enables the improvement of the regulatory structure. This 
improvement was demonstrated in the Serbian case where CII scores were decreased 
while the CPI score was increased, and at the same time the inter-score difference 
was minimized. All these improvements indicate unambiguous improvement in the 
regulatory structure, and hopefully in its performance in real circumstances.  
  The last part of the Chapter demonstrated the comparative advantages of the 
CII combined with the CPI by analysing three new lobbying regulations from 
Macedonia, Slovenia and Montenegro. This part also shows the robustness of the 
method and its easy comparative applicability both for research and policymaking.  
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General conclusion 
 The lobbying process and its regulation are becoming an important issue 
worldwide. Political, legal and economic sciences in the last decade produced large 
amounts of research on its impacts and relations to political systems, democracy, 
rule of law; and its relation to corruption, economic performance, etc.  
 The dynamic regulation of lobbying worldwide requires fast comparative 
learning, while pressures for the reduction of public debts require responsible and 
efficient policymaking. The main intention of this research was to improve both 
comparative assessment and practical policymaking by offering a new tool for the 
assessment of lobbying regulations, both structurally and comparatively.   
 This research primarily represents a contribution to the lobbying regulation 
research arena. It introduces an index which for the first time attempts to measure 
the direct compliance costs of lobbying regulation. The Cost Indicator Index - CII, 
combined with the currently the most advanced and used tool (the CPI Index 
which serves as a proxy for the measurement of the benefits of lobbying 
regulations) offers a brand new platform for qualitative and quantitative 
assessment of adopted lobbying laws and proposals of those laws, both in the 
comparative and the sui generis dimension. 
 In terms of costs seen through the RIA perspective, the CII was designed 
primarily as a tool for regulatory compliance costs assessment. In terms of benefits 
of regulation, this research concentrates on the most discussed reasons which can 
be summarised through the non-economic concepts of transparency and 
accountability. Hence, the research foundations are set on a narrow and specific 
platform which only allows for addressing the specific research question.  
 However, the specific platform and the research focus of the CII does not 
exclude the fact that there might be other, indirect, and less straightforward costs 
or motivations associated with the regulation of lobbying. Some of the main ideas 
in this sense were acknowledged in the introduction, by linking lobbying 
regulation to some of the godfathers of the economic theory of regulation: Coase 
(1960), Stigler and Friedland (1962), Tullock (1967), Akerlof (1970), Stigler 
(1971), Posner (1971,1974), Nelson (1974), Peltzman (1976), Goldberg (1979), 
289
283 
 
Buchanan et.al. (1983), Becker (1983), Tirole (1986), Sappington and Stiglitz 
(1987), and others. Some of their theories were mentioned even later throughout 
the research, but only with the intention to expand the level of thought on certain 
issues, and to highlight where more research would be valuable from the economic 
perspective on lobbying regulation. 
 The major theoretical contribution of this research is contribution in filling 
the gaps in research and policymaking, which focus on regulation on lobbying both 
in a sui generis (Chari, Hogan and Murphy 2011; Chari & O’Donovan 2011; 
Obradovic 2009; Dalia 2011; Greenwood & de Castro Asarta 2011; Naurin 2008; 
ALTER-EU 2010) and in a comparative perspective (Opheim 1991; Brinig et al. 
1993; Newmark 2003; CPI (Center for Public Integrity Index) 2003; Chari, Hogan 
and Murphy 2008, 2009, 2010; Griffith 2008; the OECD special reports from 
2007a, 2007b; Flannery 2010;  Malone 2004; McGrath 2008).  
 The analyzed literature focuses on general comparative studies, the EU-US 
studies, and sui generis studies which observe certain laws in a rather isolated 
manner. Most of the studies focus on the US, which is the largest lobbying market 
and which has gone through several regulatory stages.  However, none of the 
studies analyses lobbying regulation activities in the Western Balkans. Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Slovenia have already regulated lobbying, while Serbia and 
Croatia are on their way to do the same. This research for the first time brings the 
four new countries into the discussion and calculates their CPI and CII scores. The 
scores of Slovenia, Macedonia and Montenegro will be immediately useful for 
classification within the global CPI comparison with states for whom the CPI scores 
are already calculated.  
 Also, the literature generally shows a lack of economic reasoning, especially 
when it comes to studying and measuring the benefits and costs of lobbying 
regulations. When it comes to the benefits, there are several indices which analyze 
lobbying regulation structure, and its elements as proxies for measurement of the 
benefits (Opheim 1991; Biring et al. 1993; Newmark 2003). The most recent, 
advanced and applied is the quantitative CPI Index (2003) developed by the Center 
for Public Integrity. None of these tools focus on the potential costs of lobbying 
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laws, but they solely focus on elements that constitute the strength of lobbying 
laws, and offer global comparisons of lobbying regulations in this dimension only.   
 The CII is not just the only new tool introduced in the last decade, but it is the 
only tool available for comparative assessments of the costs of lobbying 
regulations. The CII offers a completely new platform for discussion and 
comparisons of different lobbying laws, and expands by involving the economic 
perspective as well. On the top of this, CII is methodologically compatible with the 
CPI and applied together they provide indicative information both on benefits and 
costs, which was not possible to do in comparative perspective so far. 
 Lastly, beside the qualitative contribution, the CII introduces an additional 
theoretical framework for complementary qualitative analysis of lobbying laws. 
The framework which is based on CPI and Threefold theory (Chari, Hogan and 
Murphy 2009) introduces the CII Threefold theory for classification of lobbying 
regulations. This framework divides lobbying regulations in three different 
systems: highly burdensome, medium-burdensome and low burdensome systems. 
Each of those reflects the CII score range, but also a set of common qualitative 
features for each of the three systems.  
 This theory was additionally merged with the Threefold theory (Chari et al. 
2009) which allowed another theoretical framework to be constructed - The 
Ninefold theory. By combining these two theories into one, the new more 
advanced framework was created. The Ninefold theory allows a more structured 
assessment and classification of lobbying regulations, both by indication of 
benefits and costs. By positioning a regulation in one of the nine categories of the 
Ninefold theory, it will be possible to predict its general qualitative description and 
value. This can be considered as an important contribution, as it introduced a new 
framework (while at the same time utilizing the older one) for the qualitative 
treatment of lobbying regulations. 
 Lastly, this research introduces so called Cost-Benefit Labels (CBL). These 
labels might improve an ex-ante lobbying regulation impact assessment procedure, 
primarily in the sui generis perspective. IN other words, this tool can be used as a 
mechanism for improvement of the cost-benefit ratio of a proposal before it gets 
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officially adopted. Similarly, the CBL can also serve as a useful tool for 
improvement of the understanding of comparative practices.  
 In sum, this research introduced an important quantitative tool and a 
quantitative framework for further and wider study of lobbying regulations in a 
general cost-benefit perspective.  
 Besides the purely theoretical contribution, this research also contributes to 
the policymaking arena and practices, especially in Europe as the second largest 
lobbying market. Few European countries already have laws on lobbying; some of 
them have only self-enforced rules, while most of them do not have any lobbying 
regulation in place. The EU, similarly, has not yet imposed any mandatory rules on 
lobbying in Brussels, but rising public pressures suggests that this might be done 
in the near future. Few member states have already individually started moving in 
this direction.  
 Hence, the regulation of lobbying still has not reached its full expansion, but 
it can be expected that both EU and non-EU countries will have to introduce some 
sort of mandatory rules. A nice example to demonstrate this are the four analysed 
countries from the Western Balkans. A similar tendency is present in the US as 
well, where the last rules were introduced in 2007 (HLOGA), but their new reform 
has been actively debated since 2011. 
 This research pointed out that one of the main challenges in introducing new 
lobbying regulations is the lack of standard RIA procedures in many countries. In 
those countries where RIA procedures exist, the problem of the scope and the type 
of analysis would either leave the lobbying regulations outside of the assessment, 
or the type of the analysis would remain shallow and descriptive. In the lobbying 
regulation comparative analysis perspective, RIA procedures are not very useful as 
they often significantly vary in approach, type of assessment and scope. 
 Another problem in practical assessment of lobbying regulations is that 
regulators have limited tools to assess comparative solutions and to properly 
understand their structure. Still, they are not immune to mimicking other laws and 
borrowing specific regulatory solutions. The OECD reports which were analysed 
indicate the sensitivity when it comes to the structural choices, but they 
completely neglect the cost-dimensions of these choices. Hence, policymakers have 
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very few available tools and limited insights in all aspects of comparative learning 
when it comes to lobbying regulations.  
 However, the RIA world and its methods were valuable tools for constructing 
and supporting the methodology of the CII. In terms of RIA, the CII can be seen as a 
simple compliance cost analysis (CCA) tool. RIA literature also supports the choice 
of the depth of the analysis, and justifies the indicative nature of the results in this 
case. But what represents the highest contribution to policymaking is that the CII is 
easily applied in a comparative perspective, whether one thinks of comparisons 
within different periods of time or within different countries. It is a user-friendly 
tool with instantly informative results, allowing policymakers to have a better 
early-stage cost-benefit assessment and higher degree of comparative learning at 
the same time.   
 The central part of this research was the introduction of the CII. The Index is 
built on a theoretical framework borrowed from the CPI, OECD and RIA literature; 
and the empirical survey based on the qualitative and the quantitative analysis 
which was used for construction of the scoring system. In addition, this choice was 
compared to the Central Bank Independence and the Regulatory Independence 
indices literature (Bade and Parkin 1982; Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini 1991; 
Alesina and Summers 1993; Cukierman et al. 1992; Mathew 2006; Pisha 2011;  
Cargil 2013; Gilardi 2002; Johannsen 2003; Montoya and Trillas 2007), where it is 
concluded that the CII generally fits into the indices literature (Cukierman et al. 
1992; Johannsen 2003), and it generally suffers from the same weakness as an 
early-stage tool.  
 The survey was quantitative and qualitative. In quantitative terms, the 
anecdotal evidence provided aggregate information on the cost perception for 
different cost indicators. In qualitative terms, several interviews were conducted in 
order to get additional information from the field on the nature of the costs of 
lobbying regulation. Both types of results were used as a foundation for the CII cost 
indication values.  
The sample was unfortunately relatively small (the senior management 
responses represented 16 participating institutions represented), but sufficient for 
obtaining the indicative values, and hence it reached its purpose. In an isolated 
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analysis of studied lobbying rules, the data revealed that compliance costs of 
industry to most of them are expected to be of a moderate impact. Similarly, the 
public sector's responses revealed that enforcement mechanisms are perceived 
either as highly costly or as of insignificant impact on costs.   
 The sample and methodology can certainly be criticized. It is clear that with a 
larger sample and more resources, the scoring technique could be further 
improved which would additionally contribute to the accuracy of the CII. Thus, 
increasing the sample and applying more accurate statistical techniques would be 
beneficial for improving of the accuracy of the CII in the future.    
 Another challenging issue is the choice of the CII thresholds that were 
slightly downgraded, which can be seen as an arbitrary decision. However, it is 
also shown that at this stage the choice does not seem to have a significant impact 
on the interpretation of the results. The real degree of sensitivity will be known 
only after enough of CII scores became available for the analysis. But on the basis 
of four available scores, it does not seem that there is a large sensitivity. In any 
case, this is yet another reason why the CII's results have to be treated in an 
indicative manner. As mentioned earlier, the CII at this stage looks like a well-
functioning prototype tool, which can certainly be improved in terms of accuracy 
in the future. Re-assessment of the thresholds based on more accurate statistical 
data should not be excluded in this sense.  
 In terms of its robustness, CII uses the strengths of the CPI and Threefold 
theory in order to remain a robust tool which can be easily applicable 
comparatively. An contribution to its robustness is the decision to define the 
impacts through different categories of magnitude and not monetary values. If the 
burden is expressed in terms of indication of the magnitude (high, medium, low), 
we can more easily compare different lobbying regulations regardless of their 
origins, based on a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the regulatory structure. 
The application of the CII in comparative perspective confirmed that CII seems to 
be robust enough. Of course, further applications would provide more accurate 
picture on its final robustness and ability to examine different types of laws.  
 Lastly, this research demonstrated that the CII, the Ninefold theory and CBL 
are functional. The focus of the analysis was given to the area of South East Europe 
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which in the last two years had the most active lobbying regulation scene. At the 
same time, this area remained completely outside of the academic radar. Hence, 
this research brings four new countries (Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro and 
Serbia) into the research of lobbying. The reason why these countries have not 
been previously mentioned in other studies is probably that information was 
inaccessible to researchers due to language barriers.  
 The special focus of the application was on Serbia. The Serbian whose 
proposal on the Law on Lobbying has been extensively analysed in qualitative and 
quantitative terms, taking into consideration specific political and economic 
circumstances of the country. The brief economic analysis shows that formal, 
economic conditions for the growth of lobbying have been mostly achieved in the 
Western Balkans. Strengthening of the rule of law together with economic growth, 
accumulation of capital, increase in bribery “prices” were some of the conditions 
whose specific interaction opened a door for development of lobbying market.  
  By focusing first on Serbia is shown that the lobbying regulation idea has 
been debated for several years, and that both the state and lobbyists showed high 
interest in drafting the proposal. This suggests that each side is trying to capitalize 
on the future law, as briefly discussed in the introduction, on rent-seeking. While 
the public sector needs to prove its accountability and integrity by distancing itself 
from undue lobbying influences, the private sector seems to be interested in 
controlling the access to the market, especially in terms of foreign competition. 
Hence, the proposal which just comes from one side should be studied carefully 
before adoption of the law. 
 The quantitative application of the CII on the Serbian proposal revealed its 
cost-benefits nature through calculated CPI and CII scores. Since the results 
implied that there is room for improvement, the CBL scheme was used to improve 
the cost-benefit ratio of the proposal. By using this simple method, the CPI score 
grew for 5 (from 62 to 67) while the CII score went down for 9 points (from 78 to 
69). The total inter-score difference at the same time decreased from 14 to 2 
points, which indicates a more balanced regulatory structure after the 
improvement. 
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 At the very end, the comparative application of CII and CBL was 
demonstrated by analysing already existing laws of Macedonia, Montenegro and 
Slovenia. 
 After reviewing the application of the CPI in policymaking, the only 
remaining issue to be discussed is the future of lobbying regulation studies. By 
analysing the literature and policy approaches, it became clear that the debate is 
not sufficiently involving important economic arguments. We still do not know 
much about the precise economic output of lobbying, and the relation of regulation 
to that output. Also, the benefits and costs of lobbying regulation offer a large 
space for research. Besides these direct compliance costs studied here, there are 
probably many other factors which would be influenced by changing the rules of 
the game in the lobbying arena. Moreover, we still need to learn more on economic 
reasons for lobbying regulation. Besides obvious transparency and accountability 
reasons, it would be beneficial to learn more on economic motives of lobbying 
players and regulators. General economic theory of regulation provides a sound 
starting point for researches which would go in this direction. The results from 
these future researches would be useful to set the CII methodology on firmer 
economic foundation. 
 When it comes to the future of CII there is also a room for improvement. With 
more available resources, it would be useful to re-launch the survey in order to 
have a larger sample which could be treated with more precise statistical methods. 
This would allow more precision, and could lead to re-adjustments of the 
thresholds as well. This at the same time means that the CII in policymaking could 
be used as a tool, after adoption of the proposed improvements in the later stage. 
By then, this analysis mostly provides an important groundwork but not the final 
answer. 
 Besides this, it is still shown that the CII works, but it has to be underlined 
that its results have to be taken with certain reserve at this. The reasons for this 
were discussed in details. Still, the CII will probably find its place within the 
academic and policymaking arena, and will hopefully contribute to a better 
understanding of lobbying regulation. 
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The list of abbreviations: 
ABA   American Bar Association 
CBA  Cost benefit analysis 
CBL  Cost benefit labels 
CBO  Congressional Budget Office 
CCA  Compliance costs analysis  
CII    Cost Indicator Index 
CPI     Center for Public Integrity's Index 
EC  European Commission 
EU  European Union 
FARA  Foreign Agents Registration Act  
FRLA  Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act 
HLOGA Honest Leadership and Open Governments Act 
LDA  Lobbying disclosure Act 
RIA  Regulatory Impact Assessment 
SAP  Stabilization and Association Process 
SEE  South East Europe 
SLA  Serbian Lobbying Association 
TI-CPI  Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 
US  The United States of America   
UMRA  Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 
WB  Western Balkans 
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Annex 1 
 
 Application of the CPI on the Serbian Proposal on Law on lobbying  
 
 
 DEFINITION OF LOBBYIST  Points  
1. In addition to legislative lobbyists, does the definition recognize 
executive branch lobbyists?  No – 0 points; Yes – 3 points 
3 
2. How much does an individual have to make/spend to qualify as a 
lobbyist or to prompt registration as a lobbyist, according to the 
definition?                                                                                                       
Qualification threshold: More than $500 made/spent – 0 points 
Qualification threshold: More than $100 made/spent – 1 point 
Qualification threshold: More than $50 made/spent – 2 points 
Qualification threshold: $50 or less made/spent – 3 points  
Lobbyists qualify and must register no matter how much money 
made/spent – 4 points 
4 
 INDIVIDUAL REGISTRATION  
3. Is a lobbyist required to file a registration form?                                               
No – 0 points; Yes – 3 points 
3 
4. How many days can lobbying take place before registration is 
required?                        
16 or more days – 0 points; 11 to 15 days – 1 point; 6 to 10 days – 2 points; 
1 to 5 days – 3 points; 0 days – 4 points 
4422 
5. Is subject matter or bill number to be addressed by a lobbyist 
required on registration forms?                                                                                 
No bill number/subject matter required – 0 points; Subject matter only 
required – 1 point; Bill number required – 3 points 
0423 
6. How often is registration by a lobbyist required?                                              
Once only – 0 points; Every two years – 1 point; Annually or more often – 2 
0 
                                                          
422 According to the Serbian proposal, lobbying cannot take place before the registrationof a lobbyist.  
423 To be determined by a competent ministry. Thus, even though at the moment of the analysis no 
points can be given, the ex-post application of the CPI could result in a slightly better score in case that 
subject matter or bills become integral parts of registration. On the other hand, the registration 
procedure requires only one registration, and it is questionable if reporting a bill or a field would make 
much sense since these categories would change over time. However, updates on actual lobbying 
activity would be in any case available via lobbying reports.  
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points 
7. Within how many days must a lobbyist notify the oversight agency of 
changes in registration?                                                                                                 
16 – or more days – 0 points; 11 to 15 days – 1 point; 6 to 10 days – 2 
points; 1 to 5 days – 3 points; 0 days – 4 points 
1 
8. Is a lobbyist required to submit a photograph with registration?              
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
0 
9. Is a lobbyist required to identify by name each employer on the 
registration form?                                                                                                       
No – 0 points; Yes – 1point 
0 
10. Is a lobbyist required to include on the registration form any 
additional information about the type of lobbying work he or she 
does (i.e., compensated or non-compensated/contract or salaried)?       
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
0424 
 INDIVIDUAL SPENDING DISCLOSURE   
11. Is a lobbyist required to file a spending report?                                                 
No – 0 points; Yes – 3 points 
3 
12. How often during each two-year cycle is a lobbyist required to report 
spending?                                                                                                                          
0 to 3 filings – 0 points; 4 to 6 filings – 1 point; 7 to 9 filings – 2 points; 10 
or more filings – 3 points 
0 
13. Is compensation/salary required to be reported by a lobbyist on 
spending reports?                                                                                                       
No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 
 
2 
14. Are summaries (totals) of spending classified by category types (i.e., 
gifts, entertainment, postage, etc.)?                                                                          
No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 
2 
15. What spending must be itemized?                                                                             
No spending required to be itemized – 0 points; Itemization threshold: 
More than $100 – 1 point; Itemization threshold: More than $25 – 2 
points; Itemization threshold: $25 and below – 3 points; All spending 
0425 
                                                          
424 Not determined. 
425 Not determined. 
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required to be itemized – 4 points 
16. Is the lobbyist employer/principal on whose behalf the itemized 
expenditure was made required to be identified?                                             
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
1 
17. Is the recipient of the itemized expenditure required to be identified?   
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
0426 
18. Is the date of the itemized expenditure required to be reported?              
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
1 
19. Is a description of the itemized expenditure required to be reported?    
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
1 
20. Is subject matter or bill number to be addressed by a lobbyist 
required on spending reports?                                                                                   
No bill number/subject matter required – 0 points; Subject matter only 
required – 1 point; Bill number required – 3 points 
3 
21. Is spending on household members of public officials by a lobbyist 
required to be reported?                                                                                                
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
1 
22. 
 
Is a lobbyist required to disclose direct business associations with 
public officials, candidates or members of their households?                      
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
1427 
23. What is the statutory provision for a lobbyist giving and reporting 
gifts?                                                                                                                              
Gifts are not reported – 0 points; Gifts are reported – 1 point; Gifts are 
limited and reported – 2 points; Gifts are prohibited – 3 points 
2 
24. What is the statutory provision for a lobbyist giving and reporting 
campaign contributions?                                                                                               
1428 
                                                          
426 Not determined. 
427 The Serbian proposal makes it obligatory to disclose any gifts or services provided to public officials 
and persons correlated with a public official (defined by the Law on Corruption fighting – Official 
Gazette 97/2008). According to this law, a correlated person should be considered to be a spouse or a 
partner of a public official, his family members upon 2nd degree, and other legal and natural persons 
which can be considered to be correlated to a public official.  
428 This is actually regulated by the Law on Financing Political Activities (Official Gazette of Republic of 
Serbia No 43/2011). Campaign contributions are allowed and limited to the amount of 20 average 
salaries (natural person) and to the amount of 200 average salaries (legal entities) annually. Political 
parties have the duty to publicly publish online all donations which exceed the amount of one average 
salary, within 8 days of receiving the donation. Even though this is not regulated by the proposal on the 
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Campaign contributions allowed and not required to be disclosed on 
spending report/prohibited during session – 0 points; Campaign 
contributions allowed and not required to be disclosed on spending 
report/allowed during session – 0 points; Campaign contributions allowed 
and required to be disclosed on spending report/prohibited during 
session – 1 point; Campaign contributions allowed and required to be 
disclosed on spending report/allowed during session – 1point; Campaign 
contributions prohibited – 2 points 
25. Is a lobbyist who has done no spending during a filing period 
required to make a report of no activity?                                                               
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
1 
26. Is an employer or principal of a lobbyist required to file a spending 
report?                                                                                                                             
No – 0 point; Yes – 3 points 
0 
27. Is compensation/salary required to be reported on 
employer/principal spending reports?                                                                   
No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 
0 
 ELECTRONIC FILLING   
28. Does the oversight agency provide lobbyists/employers with online 
registration?                                                                                                                  
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
1 
29. Does the oversight agency provide lobbyists/employers with online 
spending reporting?                                                                                                         
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
0429 
30. Does the oversight agency provide training about how to file 
registrations/spending reports electronically?                                                  
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
1430 
 PUBLIC ACCESS   
31. Location/format of registrations or active lobbyist directory:                     
Photocopies from office only – 1 point; PDF or image files on the Web – 2 
points; Searchable database on the Web – 3 points; Downloadable 
3 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Law on Lobbying, since information on campaign contributions will be publicly available, this can be 
registered within the CPI.  
429 Not determined. 
430 Lobbyist will have to pass a lobbying exam which will include filing training.  
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files/database – 4 points 
32. Location/format of spending reports:                                                                     
Photocopies from office only – 1 point; PDF or image files on the Web – 2 
points; Searchable database on the Web – 3 points; Downloadable 
files/database – 4 points 
0431 
33. Cost of copies:                                                                                                                      
25 cents or more per page – 0 points; Less than 25 cents per page – 1 point 
1 
34. Are sample registration forms/spending reports available the Web?      
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
1 
35. Does the state agency provide an overall lobbying spending total by 
year?                                                                                                                                   
No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 
0432 
36. Does the state agency provide an overall lobbying spending total by 
spending-report deadlines?                                                                                          
No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 
0433 
37. Does the state agency provide an overall lobbying spending total by 
industries lobbyists represent?                                                                                  
No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 
0434 
38. How often are lobby lists updated?                                                                           
Semi-annually or less often – 1 point; Monthly – 2 points; Weekly – 3 
points; Daily – 4 points 
1 
 ENFORCEMENT  
39. Does the state have statutory auditing authority?                                             
No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 
1 
40. Does the state agency conduct mandatory reviews or audits?                     
No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 
0 
41. Is there a statutory penalty for late filing of lobby registration form?      
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
0435 
                                                          
431 Not determined. 
432 Not determined. 
433 Not determined. 
434 Not determined. 
435 Not determined. 
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42. Is there a statutory penalty for late filing of a lobby spending report?     
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
0436 
43. When was a penalty for late filing of a lobby spending report last 
levied?                                                                                                                           
More than 5 years – 0 points; 4 to 5 years – 1 point; 2 to 3 years – 2 points; 
0 to 1 year – 3 points 
0437 
44. Is there a statutory penalty for incomplete filing of a lobby 
registration form?                                                                                                       
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
 
1 
45. Is there a statutory penalty for incomplete filing of a lobby spending 
report?                                                                                                                            
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
0438 
46. When was a penalty for incomplete filing of a lobby spending report 
last levied?                                                                                                                      
More than 5 years – 0 points; 4 to 5 years – 1 point; 2 to 3 years – 2 points; 
0 to 1 year/agency does not accept incomplete filings – 3 points 
0439 
47. Does the state publish a list of delinquent filers either on the Web or 
in a printed document?                                                                                                   
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
0 
 REVOLVING DOOR PROVISION  
48. Is there a “cooling off” period required before legislators can register 
as lobbyists?                                                                                                                  
No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 
2 
 TOTAL POINTS ex-ante 46 
 MINIMUM TOTAL POINTS if proposal get corrected adopting 
solutions suggested by the CPI that are still not determined  
63 
 
  
                                                          
436 Not determined. 
437To be answered ex-post. 
438 Not determined. 
439 To be answered ex-post. 
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Annex 2 
 
                                                          
440 Practically zero days, but since this is the closest to that than it can be granted 5 points to this 
question. 
441 To be dettermined.  
Application of the CII on the Serbian Proposal on Law on lobbying Points  
The Cost Indicator Index 
Compliance burden 
 
 C&B Label 
(CCI/CPI) 
1.  How much does an individual have to make/spend to qualify as a lobbyist or 
to prompt registration as a lobbyist, according to the definition?                         
           Qualification threshold: More than $10,000 made - 4 points          
           Qualification threshold: More than $2,500 made -  6 points            
           Qualification threshold: Regardless the amount made – 7 points 
 C3 
(4/0) 
 B2 
(6/2) 
7 B1 
(7/4) 
2. Is a lobbyist required to file a registration form?                                                                
No – 0 points  
 Yes – 5 points 
5 B2 
(5/3) 
3. How many days can lobbying take place before registration is required?                
                6 months or more – 4 points  
                Up to a month – 5 points   
                Up to 3 days  – 5 points 
 C3 
(4/0) 
 C1 
(5/1) 
5440 B2 
(5/3) 
4. Is subject matter or bill number to be addressed by a lobbyist required on 
registration forms?     
Subject matter only required –  4 points  
Bill number required –  5 points 
TBD441 C1 
(4/1)  
 B2 
(5/3) 
5. How often is registration by a lobbyist required?      
Once only –  2 points  
Every two years – 4 point  
Annually or more often – 4 points 
2 C3  
(2/0) 
 C1 
(4/1) 
 B2 
(4/2) 
6. Within how many days must a lobbyist notify the oversight agency of changes 
in registration?                                                                                                                                      
6 months or more – 4 points  
up to a month –  5 points  
up to 3 days –  5 points 
 
 
 C3 
(4/0) 
5 C1 
(5/1) 
 B2 
(5/3) 
7. Is a lobbyist required to submit a photograph with registration?                                 
No – 0 points  
TBD C1 
(5/1) 
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Yes – 5 points 
8. Is a lobbyist required to identify by name each employer on the registration 
form?            
          No – 0 points  
               Yes – 6 points 
TBD C1 
(6/1) 
9. Is a lobbyist required to include on the registration form any additional 
information about the type of lobbying work he or she does (i.e., compensated 
or non-compensated/contract or salaried)?                                                                           
        No – 0 points  
                Yes – 6 points 
TBD C1 
(6/1) 
10. Is a lobbyist required to file a spending report?                                                                   
No – 0 points  
Yes – 8 points 
8   C2 
(8/3) 
11. How often within a year is a lobbyist required to report spending?                             
Once (or once in 2 years) – 5 points  
Twice - 6 points  
Every three months or more often – 7 points 
 
5 C3 
(5/0) 
 C1 
(6/1) 
 C2 
(7/2) 
12. Is compensation/salary required to be reported by a lobbyist on spending 
reports?                                                                                                        
No – 0 points  
 Yes – 5 points 
5 C1 
(5/2) 
13. Are summaries (totals) of spending classified by category types (i.e., gifts, 
entertainment, postage, etc.)?   
No – 0 points 
Yes – 8 points 
8 C2 
(7/2) 
14. What spending must be itemized?                                                                                               
 No spending required to be itemized – 0 points,  
 All spending above $500 must be itemized – 8  
 All spending above $100 - 8 
                 All spending required to be itemized – 8  
TBD C2 
(8/2) 
 C2 
(8/3) 
 B1 
(8/4) 
15. Is the lobbyist employer/principal on whose behalf the itemized expenditure 
was made required to be identified?        
No – 0 points                                                                                                   
        Yes – 7 points 
7 C3 
(7/1) 
16. Is the recipient of the itemized expenditure required to be identified?    
No – 0 points 
                Yes – 6 points 
TBD C1 
(6/1) 
17. Is the date of the itemized expenditure required to be reported?      
No – 0 points                                                                                                          
                Yes – 8 points 
 
8 C3 
(8/1) 
18. Is a description of the itemized expenditure required to be reported?   
No – 0 points                          
                Yes – 7 points 
7 C3 
(7/1) 
19. Is subject matter or bill number to be addressed by a lobbyist required on 
spending reports?                                                                      
 C1 
(6/1) 
318
312 
 
No bill number/subject matter required – 0 points  
Subject matter only required – 6 points  
Bill number required – 5 points 
 
 
5 B2 
(5/3) 
20. Is spending on household members of public officials by a lobbyist required to 
be reported?                                                                                                                                           
No – 0 points  
Yes – 7 points 
 C3 
(7/1) 
21. Is a lobbyist required to disclose direct business associations with public 
officials, candidates or members of their households?                                                       
                No – 0 points  
                Yes – 6  points 
6 C1 
(6/1) 
 
 
22. What is the statutory provision for a lobbyist giving and reporting gifts?                 
Gifts are not reported – 0 points  
Gifts are reported – 6 points  
6 C1 
(6/1) 
23. What is the statutory provision for a lobbyist giving and reporting campaign 
contributions?                                                                                                                                
Campaign contributions not required to be disclosed on spending 
report/prohibited during  session – 0  
Campaign contributions allowed and required to be disclosed on spending 
report/allowed during session – 6 points 
6 C1 
(6/1) 
24. Is a lobbyist who has done no spending during a filing period required to 
make a report of no activity?                                                                                                          
No – 0 points  
Yes – 4 points 
4 C1 
(4/1) 
25. Is an employer or principal of a lobbyist required to file a spending report?          
No – 0 point  
Yes – 5 points 
0 B2 
(5/3) 
26. Is compensation/salary required to be reported on employer/principal 
spending reports?                                                                                                                                
No – 0 points  
        Yes – 5 points     
0 B2 
(5/2) 
The Cost Indicator Index 
Enforcement burden 
27. Does oversight agency provide lobbyists/employers with online registration?     
No – 0 points  
        Yes – 4 points 
4 C1 
(4/1) 
28. Does oversight agency provide lobbyists/employers with online spending 
reporting?                                                                                                                                                
 
        No – 0 points  
Yes – 5 points 
TBD C1 
(5/1) 
29. Does oversight agency provide training about how to file 
registrations/spending reports electronically? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 4 points 
4 C1 
(4/1) 
30. Location/format of registrations or active lobbyist directory:   
Photocopies from office only – 6 points  
PDF or image files on the Web – 3 points  
Searchable database on the Web – 4 points  
 C1 
(6/1) 
 A3 
(3/2) 
319
313 
 
        Downloadable files/database – 4 points 4 B2 
(4/3) 
 A2 
(4/4) 
31. Location/format of spending  reports: 
        Photocopies from office only – 7  point  
        PDF or image files on the Web – 3 points  
        Searchable database on the Web – 4 points 
        Downloadable files/database – 4 point 
TBD C3 
(7/1) 
 A3 
(3/2) 
 B/2 
(4/3) 
            A2 
         (4/4) 
32. Cost of copies:                                                                                                                                        
                Interested parties pay for the copies of available reports – 0 points 
Interested parties do not have to pay for the copies of available reports – 3 
points 
 CPI 
score 
missing 
33. Are sample registration forms/spending reports available the Web?                        
                No – 0 points  
                Yes – 3 points 
3 B3 
(3/1) 
34. Does oversight agency provide an overall lobbying spending total by year?           
No – 0 points  
 Yes – 6 points 
TBD B2 
(6/2) 
35. Does oversight agency provide an overall lobbying spending total by 
spending-report deadlines?                                                                                                            
No – 0 points  
Yes – 8 points 
TBD C2 
(8/2) 
36. Does oversight agency provide an overall lobbying spending total by 
industries lobbyists represent?                                                                                                     
No – 0 points  
Yes – 8 points 
TBD C2 
(8/2) 
37. How often are lobby lists updated?                                                                                              
Annually or less often – 6 points   
Monthly – 7 points  
Weekly  - 7 points 
6 C1 
(6/1) 
 C2 
(7/2) 
 C2 
(7/3) 
38. In addition to legislative lobbyists, does the definition recognize executive 
branch lobbyists?  
                No – 0 points  
                Yes – 3 points 
3 A3 
(3/3) 
39. Does the state publish a list of delinquent filers either on the Web or in a 
printed document? 
        No – 0 points  
                Yes – 4 points                                                                                                                                  
TBD C1 
(4/1) 
40. Does the state have statutory auditing authority? 
          No -0 points  
          Yes – 7 points 
7 C2 
(7/2) 
41. Does oversight agency conducts mandatory reviews or audits?                                    
No – 0 points  
Yes – 8 points 
0 C2 
(8/2) 
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42. Is there a statutory penalty for late filing of lobby registration  
        form?   
        No – 0 points  
        Yes – 8 points 
TBD C3 
(8/1) 
43. Is there a statutory penalty for late filing of a lobby spending 
        report?                                 
       No – 0 points  
       Yes – 8 points 
TBD C3 
(8/1) 
44. Is there a statutory penalty for incomplete filling of a lobby registration form?    
No – 0 points  
Yes – 8 points 
TBD C3 
(8/1) 
45. Is there a statutory penalty for incomplete filling of a lobby spending report?      
No – 0 points 
Yes - 8 points 
TBD C3 
(8/1) 
46. Structure/type of oversight agency? 
Already existing administrative unit with attributed tasks of  enforcement of 
lobbying rules – 6  points 
       Entirely new administrative agency – 8 points 
8 CPI 
score 
missing 
47. Is there a mandatory revolving door compliance  
        No – 0 points 
        Yes – 8 points 
8 C2 
(8/2) 
 
TOTAL CII SCORE ( SCALED TO 0-100 SCALE)  51  
Total burden for the compliance (%) 99 
Total burden for the enforcement (%) 47 
68% 
32% 
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Annex 3 
 
 Improved CPI score in the draft of the Serbian Proposal on Law on 
Lobbying – integration of all rules into a single regulation 
(shaded cells show where the improvements were made) 
 
 
 DEFINITION OF LOBBYIST  Points  
1. In addition to legislative lobbyists, does the definition recognize 
executive branch lobbyists?  No – 0 points; Yes – 3 points 
3 
2. How much does an individual have to make/spend to qualify as a 
lobbyist or to prompt registration as a lobbyist, according to the 
definition?                                                                                                       
Qualification threshold: More than $500 made/spent – 0 points 
Qualification threshold: More than $100 made/spent – 1 point 
Qualification threshold: More than $50 made/spent – 2 points 
Qualification threshold: $50 or less made/spent – 3 points Lobbyists 
qualify and must register no matter how much money made/spent – 4 
points 
4 
 INDIVIDUAL REGISTRATION  
3. Is a lobbyist required to file a registration form?                                               
No – 0 points; Yes – 3 points 
3 
4. How many days can lobbying take place before registration is 
required?                        
16 or more days – 0 points; 11 to 15 days – 1 point; 6 to 10 days – 2 points; 
1 to 5 days – 3 points; 0 days – 4 points 
4442 
5. Is subject matter or bill number to be addressed by a lobbyist 
required on registration forms?                                                                                 
No bill number/subject matter required – 0 points; Subject matter only 
required – 1 point; Bill number required – 3 points 
3 
6. How often is registration by a lobbyist required?                                              
Once only – 0 points; Every two years – 1 point; Annually or more often – 2 
points 
0 
7. Within how many days must a lobbyist notify the oversight agency of 
changes in registration?                                                                                                 
1 
                                                          
442 According to the Serbian proposal, lobbying cannot take place before the registration of a lobbyist.  
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16 – or more days – 0 points; 11 to 15 days – 1 point; 6 to 10 days – 2 
points; 1 to 5 days – 3 points; 0 days – 4 points 
8. Is a lobbyist required to submit a photograph with registration?              
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
0 
9. Is a lobbyist required to identify by name each employer on the 
registration form?                                                                                                       
No – 0 points; Yes – 1point 
0 
10. Is a lobbyist required to include on the registration form any 
additional information about the type of lobbying work he or she 
does (i.e., compensated or non-compensated/contract or salaried)?       
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
1 
 INDIVIDUAL SPENDING DISCLOSURE   
11. Is a lobbyist required to file a spending report?                                                 
No – 0 points; Yes – 3 points 
3 
12. How often during each two-year cycle is a lobbyist required to report 
spending?                                                                                                                          
0 – 3 filings – 0 points; 4 – 6 filings – 1 point; 7 – 9 filings – 2 points; 10 – or 
more filings – 3 points 
0 
13. Is compensation/salary required to be reported by a lobbyist on 
spending reports?                                                                                                       
No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 
 
2 
14. Are summaries (totals) of spending classified by category types (i.e., 
gifts, entertainment, postage, etc.)?                                                                          
No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 
2 
15. What spending must be itemized?                                                                             
No spending required to be itemized – 0 points; Itemization threshold: 
More than $100 – 1 point; Itemization threshold: More than $25 – 2 
points; Itemization threshold: $25 and below – 3 points; All spending 
required to be itemized – 4 points 
0 
16. Is the lobbyist employer/principal on whose behalf the itemized 
expenditure was made required to be identified?                                             
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
1 
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17. Is the recipient of the itemized expenditure required to be identified?   
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
1 
18. Is the date of the itemized expenditure required to be reported?              
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
1 
19. Is a description of the itemized expenditure required to be reported?    
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
1 
20. Is subject matter or bill number to be addressed by a lobbyist 
required on spending reports?                                                                                   
No bill number/subject matter required – 0 points; Subject matter only 
required – 1 point; Bill number required – 3 points 
3 
21. Is spending on household members of public officials by a lobbyist 
required to be reported?                                                                                                
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
1 
22. 
 
Is a lobbyist required to disclose direct business associations with 
public officials, candidates or members of their households?                      
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
1443 
23. What is the statutory provision for a lobbyist giving and reporting 
gifts?                                                                                                                              
Gifts are not reported – 0 points; Gifts are reported – 1 point; Gifts are 
limited and reported – 2 points; Gifts are prohibited – 3 points 
2 
24. What is the statutory provision for a lobbyist giving and reporting 
campaign contributions?                                                                                               
Campaign contributions allowed and not required to be disclosed on 
spending report/prohibited during session – 0 points; Campaign 
contributions allowed and not required to be disclosed on spending 
report/allowed during session – 0 points; Campaign contributions allowed 
and required to be disclosed on spending report/prohibited during 
session – 1 point; Campaign contributions allowed and required to be 
1444 
                                                          
443 The Serbian proposal makes it obligatory to disclose any gifts or services provided to the public 
officials and persons correlated with a public official (defined by the Law on Corruption fighting – 
Official Gazette 97/2008). According to this law, a correlated person should be considered to be a 
spouse or a partner of a public official, his family members upon 2nd degree, and other legal and natural 
persons which can be considered to be correlated to a public official.  
444 This is actually regulated by the Law on Financing Political Activities (Official Gazette of Republic of 
Serbia No 43/2011). Campaign contributions are allowed and limited to the amount of 20 average 
salaries (natural person) and to the amount of 200 average salaries (legal entities) annually. Political 
parties have the duty to publicly publish online all donations which exceed the amount of one average 
salary, within 8 days of receiving the donation. Even though this is not regulated by the proposal on the 
Law on Lobbying, since information on campaign contributions will be publicly available, this can be 
registered within the CPI.  
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disclosed on spending report/allowed during session – 1 point; Campaign 
contributions prohibited – 2 points 
25. Is a lobbyist who has done no spending during a filing period 
required to make a report of no activity?                                                               
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
1 
26. Is an employer or principal of a lobbyist required to file a spending 
report?                                                                                                                             
No – 0 point; Yes – 3 points 
0 
27. Is compensation/salary required to be reported on 
employer/principal spending reports?                                                                   
No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 
0 
 ELECTRONIC FILLING   
28. Does the oversight agency provide lobbyists/employers with online 
registration?                                                                                                                  
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
1 
29. Does the oversight agency provide lobbyists/employers with online 
spending reporting?                                                                                                         
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
1 
30. Does the oversight agency provide training about how to file 
registrations/spending reports electronically?                                                  
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
1445 
 PUBLIC ACCESS   
31. Location/format of registrations or active lobbyist directory:                     
Photocopies from office only – 1 point; PDF or image files on the Web – 2 
points; Searchable database on the Web – 3 points; Downloadable 
files/database – 4 points 
3 
32. Location/format of spending reports:                                                                     
Photocopies from office only – 1 point; PDF or image files on the Web – 2 
points; Searchable database on the Web – 3 points; Downloadable 
files/database – 4 points 
1 
33. Cost of copies:                                                                                                                      1 
                                                          
445 Lobbyist will have to pass a lobbying exam which will include filing training.  
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25 cents or more per page – 0 points; Less than 25 cents per page – 1 point 
34. Are sample registration forms/spending reports available the Web?      
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
1 
35. Does the state agency provide an overall lobbying spending total by 
year?                                                                                                                                   
No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 
2 
36. Does the state agency provide an overall lobbying spending total by 
spending-report deadlines?                                                                                          
No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 
2 
37. Does the state agency provide an overall lobbying spending total by 
industries lobbyists represent?                                                                                  
No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 
2 
38. How often are lobby lists updated?                                                                           
Semi-annually or less often – 1 point; Monthly – 2 points; Weekly – 3 
points; Daily – 4 points 
1 
 ENFORCEMENT  
39. Does the state have statutory auditing authority?                                             
No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 
1 
40. Does the state agency conduct mandatory reviews or audits?                     
No – 0 points Yes – 2 points 
0 
41. Is there a statutory penalty for late filing of lobby registration form?      
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
0 
42. Is there a statutory penalty for late filing of a lobby spending report?     
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
1 
43. When was a penalty for late filing of a lobby spending report last 
levied?                                                                                                                           
More than 5 years – 0 points; 4 to 5 years – 1 point; 2 to 3 years – 2 points; 
0 to 1 year – 3 points 
0446 
44. Is there a statutory penalty for incomplete filing of a lobby 
registration form?                                                                                                       
1 
                                                          
446 To be answered ex-post. 
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No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
 
45. Is there a statutory penalty for incomplete filing of a lobby spending 
report?                                                                                                                            
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
1 
46. When was a penalty for incomplete filing of a lobby spending report 
last levied?                                                                                                                      
More than 5 years – 0 points; 4 – 5 years – 1 point; 2 – 3 years – 2 points; 0 
– 1 year/agency does not accept incomplete filings – 3 points 
0447 
47. Does the state publish a list of delinquent filers either on the Web or 
in a printed document?                                                                                                   
No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 
1 
 REVOLVING DOOR PROVISION  
48. Is there a “cooling off” period required before legislators can register 
as lobbyists?                                                                                                                  
No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 
2 
 TOTAL POINTS – integrated version of the rules 62 
   
 
  
                                                          
447 To be answered ex-post. 
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Annex 4 
 
                                                          
448 Practically zero days, but since this is the closest to that than it can be granted 5 points to this 
question. 
Application of the CII on the Serbian Proposal on Law on lobbying 
(after- integration results from the step I) 
Points  
The Cost Indicator Index 
Compliance burden 
 
 C&B Label 
(CCI/CPI) 
1.  How much does an individual have to make/spend to qualify as a lobbyist or 
to prompt registration as a lobbyist, according to the definition?                         
           Qualification threshold: More than $10,000 made - 4 points          
           Qualification threshold: More than $2,500 made -  6 points            
           Qualification threshold: regardless the amount made – 7 points 
 C3 
(4/0) 
 B2 
(6/2) 
7 B1 
(7/4) 
2. Is a lobbyist required to file a registration form?                                                                
No – 0 points  
          Yes – 5 points 
5 B2 
(5/3) 
3. How many days can lobbying take place before registration is required?                
                6 months or more – 4 points  
                Up to a month – 5 points   
                Up to 3 days   – 5 points 
 C3 
(4/0) 
 C1 
(5/1) 
5448 B2 
(5/3) 
4. Is subject matter or bill number to be addressed by a lobbyist required on 
registration forms?     
Subject matter only required –  4 points  
Bill number required –  5 points 
 C1 
(4/1)  
5 B2 
(5/3) 
5. How often is registration by a lobbyist required?      
Once only –  2 points  
Every two years – 4 point  
Annually or more often – 4 points 
2 C3  
(2/0) 
 C1 
(4/1) 
 B2 
(4/2) 
6. Within how many days must a lobbyist notify the oversight agency of changes 
in registration?                                                                                                                                      
6 months or more – 4 points  
Up to a month –  5 points  
Up to 3 days –  5 points 
 
 
 C3 
(4/0) 
5 C1 
(5/1) 
 B2 
(5/3) 
7. Is a lobbyist required to submit a photograph with registration?                                 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 5 points 
0 C1 
(5/1) 
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8. Is a lobbyist required to identify by name each employer on the registration 
form?            
          No – 0 points  
                Yes – 6 points 
0 C1 
(6/1) 
9. Is a lobbyist required to include on the registration form any additional 
information about the type of lobbying work he or she does (i.e., compensated 
or non-compensated/contract or salaried)?                                                                           
        No – 0 points  
                 Yes – 6 points 
6 C1 
(6/1) 
10. Is a lobbyist required to file a spending report?                                                                   
No – 0 points  
Yes – 8 points 
8   C2 
(8/3) 
11. How often within a year is a lobbyist required to report spending?                             
Once (or once in 2 years) – 5 points  
Twice - 6 points  
Every three months or more often – 7 points 
 
5 C3 
(5/0) 
 C1 
(6/1) 
 C2 
(7/2) 
12. Is compensation/salary required to be reported by a lobbyist on spending 
reports?                                                                                                        
No – 0 points  
        Yes – 5 points 
5 C1 
(5/2) 
13. Are summaries (totals) of spending classified by category types (i.e., gifts, 
entertainment, postage, etc.)?   
No – 0 points 
Yes – 8 points 
8 C2 
(7/2) 
14. What spending must be itemized?                                                                                               
 No spending required to be itemized – 0 points  
 All spending above $500 must be itemized – 8 points 
 All spending above $100 – 8 points 
                 All spending required to be itemized – 8 points 
0 C2 
(8/2) 
 C2 
(8/3) 
 B1 
(8/4) 
15. Is the lobbyist employer/principal on whose behalf the itemized expenditure 
was made required to be identified?        
No – 0 points                                                                                                   
        Yes – 7 points 
7 C3 
(7/1) 
16. Is the recipient of the itemized expenditure required to be identified?    
No – 0 points 
                Yes – 6 points 
6 C1 
(6/1) 
17. Is the date of the itemized expenditure required to be reported?      
No – 0 points                                                                                                          
                Yes – 8 points 
 
8 C3 
(8/1) 
18. Is a description of the itemized expenditure required to be reported?   
No – 0 points                          
                Yes – 7 points 
7 C3 
(7/1) 
19. Is subject matter or bill number to be addressed by a lobbyist required on 
spending reports?                                                                      
No bill number/subject matter required – 0 points  
Subject matter only required – 6 points  
Bill number required – 5 points 
 C1 
(6/1) 
5 B2 
(5/3) 
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20. Is spending on household members of public officials by a lobbyist required to 
be reported?                                                                                                                                           
No – 0 points  
Yes – 7 points 
0 C3 
(7/1) 
21. Is a lobbyist required to disclose direct business associations with public 
officials, candidates or members of their households?                                                       
                No – 0 points  
                Yes – 6  points 
6 C1 
(6/1) 
 
 
22. What is the statutory provision for a lobbyist giving and reporting gifts?                 
Gifts are not reported – 0 points  
Gifts are reported – 6 points  
6 C1 
(6/1) 
23. What is the statutory provision for a lobbyist giving and reporting campaign 
contributions?                                                                                                                                
Campaign contributions not required to be disclosed on spending 
report/prohibited during  session – 0 points 
Campaign contributions allowed and required to be disclosed on spending 
report/allowed during session – 6 points 
6 C1 
(6/1) 
24. Is a lobbyist who has done no spending during a filing period required to 
make a report of no activity?                                                                                                          
No – 0 points  
Yes – 4 points 
4 C1 
(4/1) 
25. Is an employer or principal of a lobbyist required to file a spending report?          
No – 0 points  
Yes – 5 points 
0 B2 
(5/3) 
26. Is compensation/salary required to be reported on employer/principal 
spending reports?                                                                                                                                
No – 0 points  
Yes – 5 points     
0 B2 
(5/2) 
The Cost Indicator Index 
Enforcement burden 
27. Does oversight agency provide lobbyists/employers with online registration?     
No – 0 points  
        Yes – 4 points 
4 C1 
(4/1) 
28. Does oversight agency provide lobbyists/employers with online spending 
reporting?                                                                                                                                                
 
        No – 0 points  
Yes – 5 points 
5 C1 
(5/1) 
29. Does oversight agency provide training about how to file 
registrations/spending reports electronically? 
No – 0 points  
Yes – 4 points 
4 C1 
(4/1) 
30. Location/format of registrations or active lobbyist directory:   
Photocopies from office only – 6 points  
PDF or image files on the Web – 3 points  
Searchable database on the Web - 4 points  
        Downloadable files/database – 4 points 
 C1 
(6/1) 
 A3 
(3/2) 
4 B2 
(4/3) 
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 A2 
(4/4) 
31. Location/format of spending  reports: 
        Photocopies from office only – 7  point  
        PDF or image files on the Web – 3 points  
        Searchable database on the Web – 4 points 
        Downloadable files/database – 4 points 
7 C3 
(7/1) 
 A3 
(3/2) 
 B/2 
(4/3) 
            A2 
         (4/4) 
32. Cost of copies:                                                                                                                                        
                Interested parties pay for the copies of available reports – 0 points 
Interested parties do not have to pay for the copies of available reports – 3 
points 
 CPI 
score 
missing 
33. Are sample registration forms/spending reports available the Web?                        
                No – 0 points  
                Yes – 3 points 
3 B3 
(3/1) 
34. Does oversight agency provide an overall lobbying spending total by year?           
No – 0 points  
         Yes – 6 points 
6 B2 
(6/2) 
35. Does oversight agency provide an overall lobbying spending total by 
spending-report deadlines?                                                                                                            
No – 0 points  
Yes – 8 points 
8 C2 
(8/2) 
36. Does oversight agency provide an overall lobbying spending total by 
industries lobbyists represent?                                                                                                     
No – 0 points  
Yes – 8 points 
8 C2 
(8/2) 
37. How often are lobby lists updated?                                                                                              
Annually or less often – 6 points   
Monthly – 7 points  
Weekly  - 7 points 
6 C1 
(6/1) 
 C2 
(7/2) 
 C2 
(7/3) 
38. In addition to legislative lobbyists, does the definition recognize executive 
branch lobbyists?  
                No – 0 points  
                Yes – 3 points 
3 A3 
(3/3) 
39. Does the state publish a list of delinquent filers either on the Web or in a 
printed document? 
        No – 0 points  
                Yes – 4 points                                                                                                                                  
4 C1 
(4/1) 
40. Does the state have statutory auditing authority? 
          No -0 points  
          Yes – 7 points 
7 C2 
(7/2) 
41. Does oversight agency conducts mandatory reviews or audits?                                    
No – 0 points  
Yes – 8 points 
0 C2 
(8/2) 
42. Is there a statutory penalty for late filing of lobby registration  
        form?   
        No – 0 points  
0 C3 
(8/1) 
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        Yes – 8 points 
43. Is there a statutory penalty for late filing of a lobby spending 
        report?                                 
       No – 0 points  
       Yes – 8 points 
8 C3 
(8/1) 
44. Is there a statutory penalty for incomplete filling of a lobby registration form?    
No – 0 points  
Yes – 8 points 
8 C3 
(8/1) 
45. Is there a statutory penalty for incomplete filling of a lobby spending report?      
No – 0 points 
Yes - 8 points 
8 C3 
(8/1) 
46. Structure/type of oversight agency? 
Already existing administrative unit with attributed tasks of  enforcement of 
lobbying rules  – 6  points 
       Entirely new administrative agency – 8 points 
8 CPI 
score 
missing 
47. Is there a mandatory revolving door compliance  
        No – 0 points 
        Yes – 8 points 
8 C2 
(8/2) 
 
TOTAL CII SCORE ( SCALED TO 0-100 SCALE)  78  
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al
s 
by
 a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 
re
qu
ir
ed
 to
 b
e 
re
po
rt
ed
? 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t 
1 
 
 
2
2
. 
 
Is
 a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 d
is
cl
os
e 
di
re
ct
 b
us
in
es
s 
as
so
ci
at
io
ns
 w
it
h 
pu
bl
ic
 o
ffi
ci
al
s,
 c
an
di
da
te
s 
or
 m
em
be
rs
 o
f t
he
ir
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s?
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
 Y
es
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t 
0 
x 
 
2
3
. 
W
ha
t i
s 
th
e 
st
at
ut
or
y 
pr
ov
is
io
n 
fo
r 
a 
lo
bb
yi
st
 g
iv
in
g 
an
d 
re
po
rt
in
g 
gi
ft
s?
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
G
if
ts
 a
re
 n
ot
 r
ep
or
te
d
 –
 0
 p
oi
n
ts
; G
if
ts
 a
re
 r
ep
or
te
d
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t;
 G
if
ts
 a
re
 
li
m
it
ed
 a
n
d
 r
ep
or
te
d
 –
 2
 p
oi
n
ts
; G
if
ts
 a
re
 p
ro
h
ib
it
ed
 –
 3
 p
oi
n
ts
 
2 
 
 
2
4
. 
W
ha
t i
s 
th
e 
st
at
ut
or
y 
pr
ov
is
io
n 
fo
r 
a 
lo
bb
yi
st
 g
iv
in
g 
an
d 
re
po
rt
in
g 
ca
m
pa
ig
n 
co
nt
ri
bu
ti
on
s?
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
C
am
p
ai
gn
 c
on
tr
ib
u
ti
on
s 
al
lo
w
ed
 a
n
d
 n
ot
 r
eq
u
ir
ed
 t
o 
b
e 
d
is
cl
os
ed
 o
n
 
sp
en
d
in
g 
re
p
or
t/
p
ro
h
ib
it
ed
 d
u
ri
n
g 
se
ss
io
n
 –
 0
 p
oi
n
ts
; C
am
p
ai
gn
 
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
on
s 
al
lo
w
ed
 a
n
d
 n
ot
 r
eq
u
ir
ed
 t
o 
b
e 
d
is
cl
os
ed
 o
n
 s
p
en
d
in
g 
1 
 
 
336
33
0 
 
re
p
or
t/
al
lo
w
ed
 d
u
ri
n
g 
se
ss
io
n
 –
 0
 p
oi
n
ts
; C
am
p
ai
gn
 c
on
tr
ib
u
ti
on
s 
al
lo
w
ed
 
an
d
 r
eq
u
ir
ed
 t
o 
b
e 
d
is
cl
os
ed
 o
n
 s
p
en
d
in
g 
re
p
or
t/
p
ro
h
ib
it
ed
 d
u
ri
n
g 
se
ss
io
n
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t;
 C
am
p
ai
gn
 c
on
tr
ib
u
ti
on
s 
al
lo
w
ed
 a
n
d
 r
eq
u
ir
ed
 t
o 
b
e 
d
is
cl
os
ed
 o
n
 s
p
en
d
in
g 
re
p
or
t/
al
lo
w
ed
 d
u
ri
n
g 
se
ss
io
n
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t;
 C
am
p
ai
gn
 
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
on
s 
p
ro
h
ib
it
ed
 –
 2
 p
oi
n
ts
 
2
5
. 
Is
 a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 w
ho
 h
as
 d
on
e 
no
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
du
ri
ng
 a
 fi
lin
g 
pe
ri
od
 
re
qu
ir
ed
 to
 m
ak
e 
a 
re
po
rt
 o
f n
o 
ac
ti
vi
ty
? 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t 
1 
 
 
2
6
. 
Is
 a
n 
em
pl
oy
er
 o
r 
pr
in
ci
pa
l o
f a
 lo
bb
yi
st
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 fi
le
 a
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
re
po
rt
?  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
t;
 Y
es
 –
 3
 p
oi
n
ts
 
0 
 
 
2
7
. 
Is
 c
om
pe
ns
at
io
n/
sa
la
ry
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 b
e 
re
po
rt
ed
 o
n 
em
pl
oy
er
/p
ri
nc
ip
al
 sp
en
di
ng
 r
ep
or
ts
? 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
 Y
es
 –
 2
 p
oi
n
ts
 
0 
 
 
 
EL
EC
TR
O
N
IC
 F
IL
IN
G 
 
 
 
 
2
8
. 
D
oe
s 
th
e 
ov
er
si
gh
t a
ge
nc
y 
pr
ov
id
e 
lo
bb
yi
st
s/
em
pl
oy
er
s 
w
it
h 
on
lin
e 
re
gi
st
ra
ti
on
?  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t 
1 
 
 
2
9
. 
D
oe
s 
th
e 
ov
er
si
gh
t a
ge
nc
y 
pr
ov
id
e 
lo
bb
yi
st
s/
em
pl
oy
er
s 
w
it
h 
on
lin
e 
sp
en
di
ng
 r
ep
or
ti
ng
?  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t 
1 
 
 
3
0
. 
D
oe
s 
th
e 
ov
er
si
gh
t a
ge
nc
y 
pr
ov
id
e 
tr
ai
ni
ng
 a
bo
ut
 h
ow
 to
 fi
le
 
re
gi
st
ra
ti
on
s/
sp
en
di
ng
 r
ep
or
ts
 e
le
ct
ro
ni
ca
lly
? 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
1 
 
 
337
33
1 
 
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t 
 
PU
BL
IC
 A
CC
ES
S 
 
 
 
 
3
1
. 
Lo
ca
ti
on
/f
or
m
at
 o
f r
eg
is
tr
at
io
ns
 o
r 
ac
ti
ve
 lo
bb
yi
st
 d
ir
ec
to
ry
:  
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
P
h
ot
oc
op
ie
s 
fr
om
 o
ff
ic
e 
on
ly
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t;
 P
D
F 
or
 im
ag
e 
fi
le
s 
on
 t
h
e 
W
eb
 –
 2
 
p
oi
n
ts
; S
ea
rc
h
ab
le
 d
at
ab
as
e 
on
 t
h
e 
W
eb
 –
 3
 p
oi
n
ts
; D
ow
n
lo
ad
ab
le
 
fi
le
s/
d
at
ab
as
e 
– 
4
 p
oi
n
ts
 
4 
 
x 
3
2
. 
Lo
ca
ti
on
/f
or
m
at
 o
f s
pe
nd
in
g 
re
po
rt
s:
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
P
h
ot
oc
op
ie
s 
fr
om
 o
ff
ic
e 
on
ly
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t;
 P
D
F 
or
 im
ag
e 
fi
le
s 
on
 t
h
e 
W
eb
 –
 2
 
p
oi
n
ts
; S
ea
rc
h
ab
le
 d
at
ab
as
e 
on
 t
h
e 
W
eb
 –
 3
 p
oi
n
ts
; D
ow
n
lo
ad
ab
le
 
fi
le
s/
d
at
ab
as
e 
– 
4
 p
oi
n
ts
 
4 
 
x 
3
3
. 
Co
st
 o
f c
op
ie
s:
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
2
5
 c
en
ts
 o
r 
m
or
e 
p
er
 p
ag
e 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; L
es
s 
th
an
 2
5
 c
en
ts
 p
er
 p
ag
e 
– 
1
 p
oi
n
t 
0 
x4
49
 
 
3
4
. 
Ar
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
re
gi
st
ra
tio
n 
fo
rm
s/
sp
en
di
ng
 r
ep
or
ts
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
th
e 
W
eb
? 
   
  
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t 
1 
 
 
3
5
. 
D
oe
s 
th
e 
st
at
e 
ag
en
cy
 p
ro
vi
de
 a
n 
ov
er
al
l l
ob
by
in
g 
sp
en
di
ng
 to
ta
l b
y 
ye
ar
?  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
 –
 2
 p
oi
n
ts
 
2 
 
 
3
6
. 
D
oe
s 
th
e 
st
at
e 
ag
en
cy
 p
ro
vi
de
 a
n 
ov
er
al
l l
ob
by
in
g 
sp
en
di
ng
 to
ta
l b
y 
sp
en
di
ng
-r
ep
or
t d
ea
dl
in
es
?  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
 –
 2
 p
oi
n
ts
 
0 
x 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
4
4
9
 H
as
 t
o 
b
e 
ze
ro
 s
in
ce
 t
h
e 
p
u
b
li
c 
ac
ce
ss
 is
 in
 a
n
 o
n
li
n
e 
fo
rm
at
.  
338
33
2 
 
3
7
. 
D
oe
s 
th
e 
st
at
e 
ag
en
cy
 p
ro
vi
de
 a
n 
ov
er
al
l l
ob
by
in
g 
sp
en
di
ng
 to
ta
l b
y 
in
du
st
ri
es
 lo
bb
yi
st
s 
re
pr
es
en
t?
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
 –
 2
 p
oi
n
ts
 
0 
x 
 
3
8
. 
H
ow
 o
ft
en
 a
re
 lo
bb
y 
lis
ts
 u
pd
at
ed
? 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
Se
m
i-
an
n
u
al
ly
 o
r 
le
ss
 o
ft
en
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t;
 M
on
th
ly
 –
 2
 p
oi
n
ts
; W
ee
kl
y 
– 
3
 
p
oi
n
ts
; D
ai
ly
 –
 4
 p
oi
n
ts
 
1 
 
 
 
EN
FO
RC
EM
EN
T 
 
 
 
3
9
. 
D
oe
s 
th
e 
st
at
e 
ha
ve
 s
ta
tu
to
ry
 a
ud
it
in
g 
au
th
or
it
y?
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
 –
 2
 p
oi
n
ts
 
2 
 
 
4
0
. 
D
oe
s 
th
e 
st
at
e 
ag
en
cy
 c
on
du
ct
 m
an
da
to
ry
 r
ev
ie
w
s 
or
 a
ud
it
s?
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
 –
 2
 p
oi
n
ts
 
0 
 
 
4
1
. 
Is
 th
er
e 
a 
st
at
ut
or
y 
pe
na
lt
y 
fo
r 
la
te
 fi
lin
g 
of
 lo
bb
y 
re
gi
st
ra
ti
on
 fo
rm
? 
   
  
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t 
0 
 
 
4
2
. 
Is
 th
er
e 
a 
st
at
ut
or
y 
pe
na
lt
y 
fo
r 
la
te
 fi
lin
g 
of
 a
 lo
bb
y 
sp
en
di
ng
 r
ep
or
t?
   
  
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t 
1 
 
 
4
3
. 
W
he
n 
w
as
 a
 p
en
al
ty
 fo
r 
la
te
 fi
lin
g 
of
 a
 lo
bb
y 
sp
en
di
ng
 r
ep
or
t l
as
t 
le
vi
ed
?  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
M
or
e 
th
an
 5
 y
ea
rs
 –
 0
 p
oi
n
ts
; 4
 t
o 
5
 y
ea
rs
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t;
 2
 t
o 
3
 y
ea
rs
 –
 2
 p
oi
n
ts
; 
0
 t
o 
1
 y
ea
r 
– 
3
 p
oi
n
ts
 
0 
 
 
4
4
. 
Is
 th
er
e 
a 
st
at
ut
or
y 
pe
na
lt
y 
fo
r 
in
co
m
pl
et
e 
fil
in
g 
of
 a
 lo
bb
y 
re
gi
st
ra
ti
on
 fo
rm
? 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t 
1 
 
 
339
33
3 
 
 
4
5
. 
Is
 th
er
e 
a 
st
at
ut
or
y 
pe
na
lt
y 
fo
r 
in
co
m
pl
et
e 
fil
in
g 
of
 a
 lo
bb
y 
sp
en
di
ng
 
re
po
rt
?  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t 
1 
 
 
4
6
. 
W
he
n 
w
as
 a
 p
en
al
ty
 fo
r 
in
co
m
pl
et
e 
fil
in
g 
of
 a
 lo
bb
y 
sp
en
di
ng
 r
ep
or
t 
la
st
 le
vi
ed
? 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
M
or
e 
th
an
 5
 y
ea
rs
 –
 0
 p
oi
n
ts
; 4
 –
 5
 y
ea
rs
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t;
 2
 –
 3
 y
ea
rs
 –
 2
 p
oi
n
ts
; 0
 
– 
1
 y
ea
r/
ag
en
cy
 d
oe
s 
n
ot
 a
cc
ep
t 
in
co
m
p
le
te
 fi
lin
gs
 –
 3
 p
oi
n
ts
 
0 
 
 
4
7
. 
D
oe
s 
th
e 
st
at
e 
pu
bl
is
h 
a 
lis
t o
f d
el
in
qu
en
t f
ile
rs
 e
it
he
r 
on
 th
e 
W
eb
 o
r 
in
 a
 p
ri
nt
ed
 d
oc
um
en
t?
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
 –
 1
 p
oi
n
t 
1 
 
 
 
RE
VO
LV
IN
G 
D
O
O
R 
PR
O
VI
SI
O
N
 
 
 
 
4
8
. 
Is
 th
er
e 
a 
“c
oo
lin
g 
of
f”
 p
er
io
d 
re
qu
ir
ed
 b
ef
or
e 
le
gi
sl
at
or
s 
ca
n 
re
gi
st
er
 
as
 lo
bb
yi
st
s?
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
N
o 
– 
0
 p
oi
n
ts
; Y
es
 –
 2
 p
oi
n
ts
 
2 
 
 
 
TO
TA
L 
CP
I S
CO
RE
 –
 im
pr
ov
ed
 C
PI
 s
co
re
 6
7 
(i
ns
te
ad
 o
f 6
1)
 
N
ew
 im
pr
ov
ed
 s
co
re
: 6
7 
O
ld
 s
co
re
 b
ef
or
e 
im
pr
ov
em
en
t: 
59
 
D
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
im
pr
ov
ed
 a
nd
 th
e 
or
ig
in
al
 s
co
re
: +
 8
 
 
 
 
  
 
340
33
4 
 An
ne
x 
6 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
4
5
0
 T
h
is
 e
ff
ic
ie
n
cy
 la
b
el
 is
 n
ot
 f
u
ll
y 
p
re
ci
se
 s
in
ce
 it
 d
oe
s 
n
ot
 o
ff
er
 r
oo
m
 f
or
 t
h
e 
ev
al
u
at
io
n
 o
f t
h
e 
si
tu
at
io
n
 w
h
er
e 
lo
b
b
yi
n
g 
ca
n
n
ot
 t
ak
e 
p
la
ce
 a
t 
al
l b
ef
or
e 
th
e 
re
gi
st
ra
ti
on
, s
u
ch
 t
h
e 
Se
rb
ia
n
 p
ro
p
os
al
 o
ff
er
s.
 T
h
u
s,
 in
 t
h
e 
C
P
I 
in
d
ex
, t
h
e 
sc
or
e 
fo
r 
th
is
 q
u
es
ti
on
 is
 4
 w
h
il
e 
in
 t
h
e 
C
II
 t
h
e 
cl
os
es
t 
p
os
si
bl
e 
so
lu
ti
on
 h
as
 
b
ee
n
 s
el
ec
te
d
. T
h
is
 w
il
l n
ot
 in
 a
n
y 
ca
se
 in
fl
u
en
ce
 t
h
e 
fi
n
al
 r
es
u
lt
s,
 s
in
ce
 b
ot
h
 t
h
e 
sc
al
es
 a
re
 c
al
cu
la
te
d
 s
ep
ar
at
el
y.
 M
or
eo
v
er
, e
ve
n
 t
h
ou
gh
 t
h
e 
ef
fi
ci
en
cy
 
la
b
el
 i
s 
n
ot
 a
s 
p
re
ci
se
 i
n
 t
h
is
 s
it
u
at
io
n
, 
th
e 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e 
ru
le
s 
to
 t
h
is
 a
re
 m
u
ch
 b
el
ow
 s
o 
th
er
e 
is
 l
it
tl
e 
ro
om
 f
or
 e
rr
or
 i
n
 t
er
m
s 
of
 c
h
oo
si
n
g 
th
e 
m
os
t 
ef
fi
ci
en
t 
on
e 
(i
f t
h
is
 is
su
e 
co
m
es
 t
o 
th
e 
q
u
es
ti
on
).
  
Ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
CI
I o
n 
th
e 
Se
rb
ia
n 
Pr
op
os
al
 o
n 
La
w
 o
n 
lo
bb
yi
ng
 
(E
lim
in
at
io
n 
an
d 
al
te
rn
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
ru
le
s)
 
 
 
 
 
Th
e 
Co
st
 In
di
ca
to
r 
In
de
x 
Co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
bu
rd
en
 
 
Po
in
ts
 
C&
B 
La
be
l 
(C
CI
/C
PI
) 
El
im
in
at
io
n 
Sw
it
ch
in
g 
to
 
th
e 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e 
1.
 
 H
ow
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Summary  
 
The dynamic regulation of lobbying worldwide requires fast comparative learning, while pressures 
for the reduction of public debts require responsible and efficient policymaking. The main intention 
of this research was to improve both comparative assessment and practical policymaking by 
offering a new tool for the assessment of lobbying regulations, both structurally and comparatively.  
This research primarily represents a contribution to the lobbying regulation research arena. It 
introduces an index which for the first time attempts to measure the direct compliance costs of 
lobbying regulation. The Cost Indicator Index (CII) offers a brand new platform for qualitative and 
quantitative assessment of adopted lobbying laws and proposals of those laws, both in the 
comparative and the sui generis dimension. The CII is not just the only new tool introduced in the 
last decade, but it is the only tool available for comparative assessments of the costs of lobbying 
regulations.  
Beside the qualitative contribution, the research introduces an additional theoretical framework for 
complementary qualitative analysis of the lobbying laws. The Ninefold theory allows a more 
structured assessment and classification of lobbying regulations, both by indication of benefits and 
costs. Lastly, this research introduces the Cost-Benefit Labels (CBL). These labels might improve an 
ex-ante lobbying regulation impact assessment procedure, primarily in the sui generis perspective. 
In its final part, the research focuses on four South East European countries (Slovenia, Serbia, 
Montenegro and Macedonia), and for the first time brings them into the discussion and calculates 
their CPI and CII scores. The special focus of the application was on Serbia, whose proposal on the 
Law on Lobbying has been extensively analysed in qualitative and quantitative terms, taking into 
consideration specific political and economic circumstances of the country. 
Although the obtained results are of an indicative nature, the CII will probably find its place within 
the academic and policymaking arena, and will hopefully contribute to a better understanding of 
lobbying regulations worldwide. 
 
 
 
  
348
342 
 
Samenvatting  
 
De dynamische regelgeving op het gebied van lobbying wereldwijd vereist snelle en adaptieve 
kennis, omdat de druk op de vermindering van de overheidsschulden een verantwoordelijke en 
efficiënte beleidsvorming vereist. De belangrijkste doelstelling van dit onderzoek is om zowel een 
vergelijkende beoordeling als praktische beleidsvorming te verbeteren, door een nieuw instrument 
voor de beoordeling van regelgeving voor lobbying te bieden, zowel structureel als vergelijkend. 
Dit onderzoek levert primair een bijdrage aan het onderzoek op het terrein van regelgeving voor 
lobbying. Het introduceert een index waarmee voor de eerste keer getracht wordt de directe kosten 
voor naleving van regelgeving voor lobbying te meten. De Cost Indicator Index (CII) biedt een 
gloednieuw platform voor kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve beoordeling van bestaande wetten op het 
terrein van lobbying en voorstellen voor deze wetten, zowel in de vergelijkende als in de sui generis 
dimensie. De CII is niet het enige nieuwe instrument dat in de laatste jaren is geïntroduceerd, maar 
het is we het enige instrument dat beschikbaar is voor een vergelijkende analyse van de kosten van 
lobbying regulering. 
Naast de kwalitatieve bijdrage introduceert het onderzoek een extra theoretisch raamwerk voor 
een aanvullende kwalitatieve analyse van wetgeving op het terrein van lobbying. Door de ‘Ninefold 
theorie’ kan een meer gestructureerde assessment en classificatie van regelgeving voor lobbying 
worden geboden, door identificatie van zowel opbrengsten als kosten. Tenslotte introduceert dit 
onderzoek de Cost-Benefit Labels (CBL). Deze labels zouden een ex-ante regelgeving voor lobbying 
impact assessment procedure kunnen verbeteren, voornamelijk vanuit de sui generis invalshoek. 
In het laatste deel van het onderzoek ligt de focus op vier Zuidoost-Europese landen (Slovenië, 
Servië, Montenegro en Macedonië). Dit onderzoek brengt deze landen voor het eerst binnen de 
discussie en berekent hun CPI en CII scores. Speciale aandacht gaat naar Servië, wiens voorstel voor 
de Wet op regelgeving voor lobbying uitgebreid wordt behandeld, in zowel kwalitatieve als 
kwantitatieve zin, hierbij rekening houdend met de specifieke politieke en economische 
omstandigheden van dit land.  
Hoewel de behaalde resultaten indicatief van aard zijn, zal de CII waarschijnlijk zijn plaats in 
academisch en beleidsverband weten te vinden, en zal hopelijk bij dragen aan een beter begrip van 
lobbying regulering wereldwijd. 
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